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Throughout the transition and developing world, the choice of exchange rate 
regime is one of the most important and controversial policy decisions. What are the 
main factors that determine the choices of governments in exchange rate policy? What 
are the structures and institutions that allow governments to credibly commit to and 
sustain a fixed exchange rate regime? These are the central questions for this study. To 
answer these questions, I examine the puzzling variation in exchange rate regime 
choices in Eastern Europe (EE) and changes in these choices over time. This study is 
an attempt to explore the determinants of the “de facto” exchange rate arrangements 
chosen by policymakers in EE. I combine the choice and the sustainability of fixed 
exchange rate regimes in a political-economic approach.  
The project’s central finding is that exchange rate regime choices depend on 
several factors: first, on the different interests and strategies of incumbent domestic 
(state-owned and private) and foreign banks in determining exchange rate policies; 
and second, on the bank ownership structure and institutional variation of national 
financial systems. The variation in national financial systems between EE countries is, 
in turn, a function of the variation in privatization strategies and openness to foreign 
investments in the banking sector. This research thus demonstrates how the connection 
between financial interests and exchange rate regime choices is mediated by domestic 
financial systems. This dissertation integrates theories of financial development into 
interest groups theories in the political economy of exchange rates. 
  I evaluate this argument against two types of evidence. Statistical analysis of 
cross-national time-series data allows me to test the impact of financiers on exchange 
rate policies against a sample of twenty-five EE countries between 1990 and 2004. 
Statistical analysis is accompanied by in-depth examination of four theoretically 
important cases—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Estonia—based on a 
thorough reading of the relevant secondary literature, the perusal of central bank, 
government and archival documents, and the conducting of 105 semi-structured 
interviews. The thesis develops a novel four-fold typology of financial systems in 
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INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND EXCHANGE RATES 
Closing off all avenues for discretionary monetary policy 
not just for a time but for the foreseeable future  
is something that few societies are prepared to do. 
Barry Eichengreen1 
 
This dissertation is a study of how governments make their decisions regarding 
exchange rate policy. Exchange rate stories have always been at the center of 
international economic relations and have dominated economic headlines throughout 
history. Witness the recent intense U.S. criticism of the Chinese “hard” yuan policy in 
the face of this emerging economic giant or the panic about the U.S. dollar’s loss in 
preeminence in the global monetary system as investors switch to the euro as an 
alternative. Exchange rates have also been endowed with symbolic importance and 
prestige. In Kindleberger’s words, “A country’s exchange rate is more than a number. 
It is an emblem of its importance to the world, a sort of international status symbol” 
(1970: 198).2 
The choice of exchange rate regime is one of the most important 
macroeconomic policy decisions that are made in transition and developing countries. 
This choice can strongly influence their freedom of action, the effectiveness of their 
economic policies, the stability of their financial systems, and the growth of their 
economies. As a result, benign neglect of exchange rates is not a feasible option for 
these countries (Domac and Martinez Peria 2000). Misguided choices of exchange rate 
regimes have led to financial crises in many countries, often with severe domestic and 
international consequences. For example, the Russian financial crisis in 1998 triggered 
                                                 
1 Eichengreen (1999: 105). 
 
2 Also quoted in Kirshner (2003: 15). 
 
 2 
a panic on international financial markets. The ruble lost over eighty percent of its 
value, and the government defaulted on its foreign debt. The worsening economic 
situation has also created a political crisis in Russia: President Yeltsin dismissed Prime 
Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, who had been appointed to the post just six months earlier. 
The financial meltdown in Russia, the collapse of the peso in Mexico in 1994, the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997−1998, and the 2001−2002 Argentine crisis, to name just 
a few financial crises in emerging markets in the 1990s, put the debate over the 
appropriate exchange rate regime at center stage once again.  
What are the main factors that determine the choices that governments make 
with regard to exchange rate regimes? What are the structures and institutions that 
allow governments to commit credibly to and sustain a policy of anti-inflationary 
fixed regimes? I argue that the governments in countries with financial systems 
dominated by state-owned banks (SOBs), accompanied by weak monetary and 
regulatory institutions, are less willing and able to commit to and sustain fixed 
exchange rate arrangements than when systems of finance are characterized by greater 
participation of foreign banks in financial intermediation. If we explain an exchange 
rate policy as resulting from diverse financial institutional structures, the next question 
is: What are the sources of this diversity of financial development across nations? 
These are the two central questions for this study. To answer these questions, I attempt 
to explain the puzzling empirical variation of exchange rate regime choices in the 
transition states of Eastern Europe (EE) and the changes in these choices over time.3 In 
                                                 
3 EE countries examined in this study are divided into three groups according to the classification of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): 1) Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic States (CEB): Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania; 2) South-Eastern Europe (SEE): Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Albania, FYR-Macedonia; and 
3) the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro are excluded from my analysis because of insufficient 
data. 
 3 
spite of broad similarities in circumstances, EE countries adopted rather diverse 
exchange rate regimes during the post-communist period. I also explore the sources of 
the diversity of financial development in the post-communist EE. I argue that the 
variation in national financial systems among EE countries is a function of the 
variation in privatization strategies and openness to foreign investments in the banking 
sector. 
There can be little doubt that financial interests and institutions increasingly 
influence macroeconomic policy in both developed and developing countries. Yet, the 
existing theoretical and empirical literature says little about the role of financial 
linkages and national financial development in the choice of exchange rate regime. 
This is a serious deficiency because the consequences of international financial 
integration and the effects of banking problems on the balance-of-payment crises in 
the 1990s and in the 2008 global financial crisis demonstrated the importance of 
financial institutions in exchange rate policies and financial crises. 
As this study becomes finalized, the United States and much of the world are 
grappling with financial and economic crises. The global financial crisis of 2008 has 
provided a reminder that a financial crisis is a political phenomenon. The deeper cause 
of this crisis is the power politics of financial institutions. The U.S. “shadow banks” 
that defined deregulated American finance made the financial crisis possible by 
helping to create the biggest credit and housing bubble in history. Financiers in the 
United States and in other parts of the global financial system captured their regulators 
and took on excessive risks (Johnson 2009). In particular, in developed countries, such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom, the financial sector has accounted for an 
unsustainable share of corporate profits and profit growth.4 The U.S. government 
                                                 
4 In 1986, Wall Street’s profits made up just 19 percent of total corporate profits but 40 percent of 
American corporate profits in 2006 went to the financial sector (Summers 2008). 
 4 
reacted to the financial storm by making its most dramatic interventions in financial 
markets since the Great Depression. The turmoil has also spread across the globe. The 
dramatic collapse of Iceland’s economy, endangering savings from depositors in 
Britain and elsewhere, has highlighted risky corners of the world’s financial system. 
Five European banks failed and European governments propped up their banking 
systems with rescues and guarantees. Because of their reliance on funding from 
Western banks, EE economies have been severely affected by the financial crisis, as 
well. Rising unemployment and depreciating currencies are fueling popular discontent. 
The Hungarian and Latvian governments have already fallen as a direct result of the 
financial crisis. In January 2009, violent protests erupted in Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Bulgaria over their governments’ handling of the economic crisis. 
My research departs from the optimum currency area theories−the dominant 
approach to exchange rates−which focus on various macroeconomic fundamentals, as 
well as from the existing literature on the political economy of exchange rates by 
exploring how different groups of banks affect cooperation in both monetary and 
financial relations among EE states. I offer novel, testable hypotheses regarding banks, 
differentiated by the nature of their ownership, whose impact on exchange rate 
policies is not theorized in the existing literature. I also suggest that the comparison of 
financial systems in general and the role of banks in those systems in particular cannot 
be fully understood without due regard to the political and institutional environment in 
which these economic actors operate.  
This study combines the choice and the sustainability of fixed exchange rate 
regimes in a political-economic approach. The decision to adopt a fixed regime limits 
a government’s room to maneuver because economic policies must be consistent with 
such a regime. I examine the determinants of actual exchange rate arrangements 
chosen by policy makers in the transition economies of EE.  
 5 
Exchange Rate Regime 
I begin by conceptualizing the phenomenon of interest: exchange rate policy of 
national governments. The national exchange rate policy involves the choice regarding 
the exchange rate regime as well as the choice regarding the preferred level of national 
currency. The focus of this study is on exchange rate regime, which concerns choice 
of the degree to which the national currency is allowed to fluctuate against its anchor 
currency, e.g., the US dollar or the euro.5  
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Source: Frankel (1999), Hall (2005) 
 
Figure 1.1: The spectrum of exchange rate regimes  
 
As figure 1.1 shows, there are several alternative exchange rate regimes 
prevalent today that can be arranged along the spectrum by the degree of fixity from a 
full float to a currency union (Frankel 1999, Edwards and Savastano 1999, Bordo 
                                                 
5 The national exchange rate policy also involves the choice regarding the level of the currency value: 
governments define their preferences for “strong” (relatively appreciated) or “weak” (relatively 
depreciated) currency. Real appreciation of a domestic currency means greater purchasing power for 
domestic consumers. But appreciated currency also means increased foreign competition for domestic 
producers of tradable products because it makes their products more expensive vis-à-vis foreign goods. 
Real depreciation has the opposite effects: a weaker currency encourages exports of local tradable 
products, leads to improving competitiveness for domestic producers, and helps to reduce trade and 
payment deficits. A depreciated currency, however, raises the prices of foreign goods and services to 
domestic consumers and thus decreases national purchasing power. The choice of the level of currency 
involves the trade-off between purchasing power (achieved through a fixed nominal and/or appreciating 
real exchange rate) and competitiveness (achieved through a depreciated real exchange rate) (Broz and 
Frieden 2001, Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2003). 
 





2004).6 At the fixed-rate end of the spectrum is the option of currency union, in which 
the members share common currency, like the euro-zone. The next choice is a 
currency board (CB), in which a country has a separate currency but only when fully 
backed by inflows of foreign exchange, and there is no role for discretionary monetary 
policy or a lender of last resort.7 In a currency board arrangement, on the other hand, a 
government retains the political symbolism of its own currency and can still earn 
interest on its foreign exchange reserves (Hall 2005: 5). 
 Intermediate regimes run from adjustable pegs under which the nominal 
exchange rate is fixed but governments can periodically adjust the parity; to crawling 
pegs in which the peg is regularly reset in a series of devaluations; to basket pegs 
where the exchange rate is fixed in terms of a weighted basket of foreign currencies; to 
target zones or bands where the nominal exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate within a 
band, while the center of the band is a fixed rate. 
 Flexible regimes are divided into two groups. Free floats mean that the 
monetary authorities do not intervene, allowing the value of foreign exchange rate to 
be determined in the market. In managed floats, the central bank sporadically 
intervenes in foreign exchange markets, and adjusts money supply through raising or 
lowering interest rates.8 Free floats and irrevocably fixed regimes, that is, monetary 
unions or currency boards, represent opposite ends of the exchange rate spectrum. 
They are referred to as the “corner solutions” to the problem of exchange rate regime 
                                                 
6 For various classifications of exchange rate regimes, see chapter 4. 
 
7 Under a strict currency board, there is no actual domestic monetary policy because both the monetary 
base and the level of interest rates are endogenously determined. The currency board does not have the 
right to issue central bank money against any domestic assets. Under a modified currency board, a 
limited number of monetary policy actions are performed, such as lender-of-last resort or limited open-
market operations (Hallenberg and de Souza 2000: 9). 
 
8 In addition to active interventions in foreign exchange market resulting in changes in international 
reserves central banks use also indirect interventions through changes in interest rates or liquidity that 
do not influence reserves (Edwards and Savastano 1999). 
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choice. The research here investigates why states choose and sustain fixed instead of 
flexible regimes, so I will focus predominantly on these two categories of regimes.9 
 As figure 1.1 illustrates, government trades off exchange rate credibility 
(stability) and flexibility (monetary autonomy) across the spectrum of exchange rate 
regimes (Frankel 1995, Rodrik 1993, Edwards 1996). At one end of the spectrum, 
irrevocably fixed exchange rates bring a higher degree of credibility to policy-making 
and the relative stability of the currency over time. In a fixed regime, the central bank 
declares the value for the exchange rate that it will act to maintain. A currency’s value 
is matched to the value of another currency, to a basket of currencies, or to another 
measure of value, such as gold. On the other end of the spectrum, government gains 
monetary autonomy, that is, the ability to use interest rates to achieve domestic 
economic goals like price stability or employment. Thus, government gains flexibility 
to accommodate domestic and foreign shocks, including changes in external terms of 
trade and interest rates. 
A Puzzle of the Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition10 
I use the EE region as a testing ground because it provides a new laboratory to 
test current theories on exchange rates. Moreover, I have chosen to study exchange 
rate policies in EE because they have played a crucial role in post-communist 
economic development. Under the command economy, exchange rate served as a unit 
of account for statistical purposes, but it had a very limited impact on actual trade 
flows (Radzyner and Riesinger 1996: 20). At the beginning of the 1990s in EE, market 
institutions like central banks, financial systems, bankruptcy laws, and property rights 
                                                 
9 This study does not examine the determinants of realignments within fixed exchange rate, that is, 
devaluation or revaluation of the parity within a fixed regime or changes in the width of fluctuation 
band. It only focuses on transitions between fixed and flexible regimes. 
 
10 For a fuller discussion of the evolution of exchange rates in EE states, see chapters 4, 5, and country 
studies (chapters 6-8). 
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were virtually non-existent, and market mechanisms were weak or absent. Therefore, 
the exchange rate has served as the most important price in EE states. Radical changes 
in asset prices can disrupt the markets on which the economic welfare of the 
population depends.  
Exchange rate policies have been contested, proving to be controversial issues 
throughout the transition from a command to a market economy. These policies were 
devised to achieve price stability and to open up previously closed domestic markets 
to the global economy. In order to achieve these objectives, EE countries adopted 
rather diverse exchange rate regimes, ranging from free floats to currency boards, and 
experienced several regime shifts. These shifts were the result of proactive policy 
management as well as forced changes related to financial crises. Sharply different 
regimes continue to coexist, so exchange rate regimes in transition economies exhibit 
a puzzling degree of heterogeneity both across countries and over time.  
 Why is this diversity of exchange rate policies in EE puzzling? EE states began 
the post-communist transformation with similar legacies of communism and large 
economic imbalances.11 They faced similar reform program agendas known as the 
“Washington consensus” and had similar integrationist ambitions with the world 
economy.12 Thus, they were expected to adopt similar exchange rate policies (Sachs 
1991, Fisher, Sahay and Végh 1996, Schleifer and Vishny 1998, World Bank 1996).  
Not only did EE states adopt different regimes at the beginning of transition, 
but also no uniform trend or particular direction characterizes the evolution of 
                                                 
11 Transition countries share two principal communist legacies: First, EE states started the post-
communist transition with the political legacy of authoritarianism: despite some cross-country variation 
in the degree of openness of each communist regime, the political and institutional structures were the 
same in all EE countries (Bunce 1999). Second, they also shared the common legacy of central 
planning. Command (centrally planned) economies were characterized by the absence of property 
rights, central planning and administrative control, a semi-monetized financial system, soft budget 
constraints, and chronic shortages (Kornai 1992). 
 
12 Three neoliberal stabilization-cum-liberalization reform measures were particularly important: price 
and trade liberalization; macroeconomic stabilization; and privatization. 
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exchange rate regimes during the transition period. Transition economies have also 
used different anchor currencies in different time periods. Some used the U.S. dollar 
(Albania and many CIS republics), while others pegged their currencies to the 
Deutsche mark/euro (ex-Yugoslav republics and CEB states). Latvia is an interesting 
case: its central bank pegged the national currency to the Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR) before it switched to the euro only in 2004. Neither is progress in political and 
economic reforms in EE countries correlated with their choices of particular regimes. 
On the one hand, the frontrunners in transition have opted for different regimes. In 
2004, the Czech Republic exhibited a managed float, while Estonia pursued a currency 
board. On the other hand, transition leaders and laggards adopted similar regimes: 
compare again the Czech Republic, the leader in transition, with Albania or Moldova, 
transition laggards; the latter three exhibited flexible regimes. Equally puzzling is why 
many EE countries practiced exchange rate regimes that were, in fact, different from 
those they officially proclaimed. Thus, the variation in exchange rate policies over 
nearly two decades and from country to country in the transition region cannot be 
easily attributed to systemic factors, common legacies, similar reform tasks, or 
integrationist ambitions. 
In spite of this striking variety of exchange rate regime choices in post-
communist EE, existing empirical studies examining the determinants of these choices 
are few, and they focus mostly on selected EE countries (Corker et al. 2000, Backé 
1999, Nehrlich 2002, Bénassy-Quéré and Coueré 2002, Bénassy-Quéré and Lahréche 
Révil 2000, Hallerberg and de Souza 2000, Domac et al. 2001, Kluyev 2002, Von 
Hagen and Zhou 2005). These studies only rarely account for the role of political 
factors (Bodea 2005, Markiewitz 2006).  
So a crucial question is: What explains exchange rate regime choices in EE and 
changes in these choices over time? Why do some countries fix while others float their 
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exchange rate regimes? This is an important puzzle of the post-cold war world 
economy. Cooperation and coordination in international monetary affairs depend on 
national exchange rate policies. 
Financiers as the Explanation: A Finance-based Theory 
The power of banks is particularly evident in transition in the post-communist 
region. A “triple coalition” of the “net winners” of the early post-communist reforms, 
consisting of commercial bankers and investment funds together with state enterprise 
managers, developed into a strong political force that significantly influenced EE 
economic policies and systems, often seeking to impede further liberal reforms in 
order to retain their benefits (Hellman 1998, Johnson 2000). Across EE, banking very 
early on became one of the few growing sectors, expanding even during the initial 
recessionary period. 13 This approach explores the influence of banks on the macro-
economic policies of the government that acts on their behalf. 
Building on the financial development and growth literature and the literature 
on the effects of financial institutions on balance-of-payment crises, I suggest a new, 
distinctively finance-based approach to the political economy of international finance, 
in which exchange rate regime choice and sustainability depend on two dimensions: 
first, the political strength of state-owned, private domestic, and foreign banks with 
varying interests and strategies in exchange rate, monetary, and regulatory policies; 
and second, the bank ownership structure and institutional variation of national 
financial systems. The different financial liberalization and privatization strategies 
have yielded two principal types of financial systems in the EE region: clientelistic 
and open. Financial institutional structures represent a critical intervening variable 
mediating the connection between financial interests and exchange rate policy. 
                                                 
13 For example, in Russia, the GDP created in banking, finance, and insurance grew by 57 percent 
during 1991–1994, while the total GDP decreased by 35 percent (Popov 1999: 15). 
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 The political story of exchange rate policy in this study highlights the interplay 
of interest groups and institutional structures in policy-making. While my argument 
shares with interest-based (sectoral) approaches an emphasis on interest groups as a 
powerful force in shaping government choices regarding exchange rate regimes, I 
differ in how we assess their significance and implications. Interest-based approaches 
can answer the question of who benefits and who loses from particular policies. 
Nonetheless, a serious impediment of existing interest group and lobbying approaches 
to exchange rates is a missing link between derived preferences of societal groups and 
policy outcomes. In my framework, bank ownership structure empowers different 
types of financiers, affects their interests, and influences the responsiveness of 
governments to their demands. Ownership structure subsequently influences building 
(monetary and regulatory) institutions of financial governance. 
 Institutional explanations can identify the political obstacles that governments 
face. Conversely, the problem with institutionalist explanations is that they neglect the 
role of societal actors and their influence on policymaking. I argue that if and how 
governments respond to the lobbying of financiers depends not only on their 
organization and strength, but primarily on the ownership structure and institutional 
quality of domestic systems of finance that determine the power, strategies, and the 
ability of financiers and other societal actors to overturn exchange rate policy or exit. 
One important conclusion emerges from this analysis: this study does not 
present a lobbying argument but rather a structural argument focusing on the impact of 
institutional structures in finance on economic policies. However, structure and 
process interact and my interviews and documentary data have given me the 
information for process tracing of exchange rate policy making in carefully selected 
case studies, which do involve (interest group) politics in a crucial way.14  
                                                 
14 I am grateful to Peter Katzenstein for this remark. 
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Chapter 5 and the case studies show how various historical legacies, memories, 
the national and political purpose of governments, the design of political institutions, 
and the dynamics of political competition and other factors have, to various extents, 
impacted the capability of EE governments and reformers to free themselves from old 
communist party hierarchies and cut their ties to incumbent interest groups, which was 
consequential for their decisions to stabilize their economies, privatize SOBs, and 
choose privatization methods, including the choice of letting foreign banks in. 
Therefore, politics at time t-1 determined the power, preferences, and decisions of 
political and societal actors for financial reform policies, but what I am really 
interested in this study is chronicling the downstream consequences of these decisions 
in exploring the effects of institutional structures of finance on exchange rate regime 
choice and sustainability at time t+1. This analysis allows a better understanding of the 
institutional context of finance that frames political decisions and that will ultimately 
define the political credibility and sustainability of a fixed exchange rate regime 
policy. It also shows that many banking and financial crises in EE that led to a 
collapse of currency pegs shared a political component—the tremendous political 
power of incumbent financiers. 
Competing Theoretical Explanations 
This study relates and adds new evidence to the research on exchange rate 
regimes. Economists and political scientists offer a myriad answers to the question of 
what determines the choices of exchange rate regimes. The optimal exchange rate 
regime has been a subject of lively debate in international finance, but little consensus 
has been achieved. A “one size fits all” optimal exchange rate regime does not seem to 
exist. Rather, the appropriate regime seems to depend on the specific circumstances of 
the countries and the time period involved (Frankel 1999). 
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I consider four approaches that focus on (1) optimum area considerations and 
other approaches of open-economy macroeconomics; (2) the political strength of 
different interest groups with varying exchange rate preferences; (3) credibility, 
transparency, and institutions; and (4) various systemic factors. What is clear from 
recent scholarship is that both economic and political factors influence decisions of 
policymakers in the exchange rate area.15 There is, however, no agreement on the 
relative weight of these factors and the nature of their interactions. These explanations 
bring fundamental insights on exchange rate policy making. Still, none of these 
theories is sufficient to explain the exchange rate policies in transition economies. In 
subsequent sections, I assess the value of competing theories and offer a broad 
theoretical framework for understanding the role of financial interests and institutions 
in exchange rate regime choices. Here, I offer only a truncated version of alternative 
approaches but I will discuss difficulties with applying existing theories of exchange 
rates in chapter 5 to the post-communist region.  
Optimum Currency Area Theories 
 A large body of literature exists on the economics of exchange rates. The 
principal set of economic explanations is associated with the theory of Optimum 
Currency Areas (OCA), according to which the choice of the exchange rate regime 
depends on the structural characteristics of an economy.16 The OCA is a geographical 
area in which member countries should use fixed exchange rates among themselves or, 
equivalently, have a common currency.17 The “traditional” OCA theory stipulated the 
                                                 
15 See Levy-Yeati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2007) for a recent survey of the literature on exchange 
rates in economics, and the Autumn 2002 issue of International Organization and Kirshner (2003) in 
political science. 
 
16 For a survey of OCA literature, see Tavlas (1993).  
 
17 I should note that OCA theory applies predominantly to adopting a common (perhaps) new currency. 
The essence of this theory is that the benefits of monetary unification (transparent prices, lower 
transaction costs, greater certainty for investors, enhanced competition) are balanced against the costs of 
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criteria to assess fixed rate regimes against flexible ones that include the symmetry of 
external shocks, the degree of labor mobility, the degree of openness, and the extent of 
economic diversification (Mundel 1961, McKinnon 1963, Kennen 1969). From the 
perspective of OCA, by reducing exchange rate risk and transaction costs, a fixed 
regime is likely to encourage trade and investments, and so spur growth.18 Thus, small, 
open economies with a high proportion of economic agents sensitive to exchange rate 
risk will gain in trade and welfare derived from pegging their currencies to the 
currency of their large trading partner (Eichengreen and Leblang 2003). Under the 
high levels of labor mobility in open economies, the exchange rate is less effective as 
a policy tool.19 Countries with highly diversified production structures are more likely 
to adopt fixed regimes than those with more concentrated production (Kenen 1969). 
 More recently, research considered the development of a country’s financial 
sector in exchange rate regime choice. One should expect countries with 
underdeveloped financial systems to choose currency pegs because they lack the 
market instruments to conduct domestic open market operations, and they want to 
protect their banks against exchange rate instability (McKinnon 1991).  
                                                                                                                                            
sacrificing monetary and fiscal autonomy. The OCA theory is the principal theoretical framework for 
analyzing European monetary integration that examines the question of whether the European Union 
(EU) constitutes an optimal currency area (Eichengreen and Bayoumi 1996). Nevertheless, for most 
analysis of OCA, the distinction between a fixed exchange rate and a common currency is not important 
(except for minor issues of transaction costs and seignorage) (Canzoneri and Rogers 1990). This 
distinction does become important when we consider the credibility of a commitment not to increase the 
money supply or not to devalue it (Frankel 1995: 42). 
 
18 Although there is no direct implication from standard OCA theory that the choice of exchange rate 
regime would have a significant impact on trade and investment, there is a widespread belief that 
exchange rate stability would promote trade, particularly in open economies. Rose (2000) finds that 
irrevocably fixed exchange rates triple foreign trade.  
 
19 If there is a lack of wage or price flexibility in a country with a currency peg, the government may be 




OCA theory, therefore, specifies conditions under which it is optimal for a 
country to surrender its exchange rate autonomy. The costs of abandoning monetary 
autonomy are linked to the asymmetry of economic shocks with potential anchor 
countries and to the strength of the remaining instruments to deal with these shocks 
after giving up monetary discretion, e.g., fiscal redistribution. When the shocks 
affecting a country and its neighbors are highly correlated, there is less need for 
monetary independence (Frankel 1995).20 
Nonetheless, OCA structural explanations are insufficient because they cannot 
fully explain why important differences in exchange rate policy have been observed 
among economies with similar economic structures. OCA explanations do not appear 
to be sufficient predictors of exchange rate choices in EE. For example, OCA theory 
does not explain why CEB states that fulfill most criteria for fixed currency regimes 
show such divergence in exchange rate policies. These economies are small (with the 
exception of Poland and Romania and then only in terms of population) and open, 
similarly endowed with natural resources, located in the same geographic region, with 
trade heavily concentrated on the Deutsch mark/Euro zone. Furthermore, in spite of 
relatively constant structural factors, EE countries have changed currency 
arrangements over time. 
 More generally, OCA theory identified several economic variables as 
determinants of exchange rate regimes and a few economic objectives that 
governments could focus on in conducting their exchange rate policies. These 
variables include price stability and economic growth. Nevertheless, different 
economic fundamentals may lead to conflicting pressures for an exchange rate regime. 
                                                 
20 A recent criticism of OCA theory focuses on the extent to which hard fixes, particularly currency 
unions, may be endogenously optimal. In other words, the currency union itself brings about area 
optimality. See Frankel and Rose (1998). 
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As a result, a regime chosen to achieve one economic objective may undermine the 
other (Hall 2005: 171).  
Empirical research on exchange rates has produced limited support for models 
based solely on economic fundamentals (Freeman, Hays, and Stix 2000). The results 
are inconclusive and sometimes contradictory.21 In general, OCA does not seem to 
have predictive power (Cohen 1998). 
 Finally, the arguments based on OCA theory are built purely on efficiency 
grounds. 22 The costs and benefits of exchange rate regimes are seen from the 
perspective of a benevolent social planner seeking to maximize social welfare. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to trade policy, where there are strong economic arguments 
for the welfare superiority of free trade, there is no clear economic-efficiency 
argument for an optimal exchange rate regime. OCA explanations are apolitical: they 
ignore that what is optimal for a domestic economy as a whole may not be optimal for 
particular societal groups. The decisions of political actors about monetary regimes 
need not be compatible with the general public good.  
Societal Groups 
 In a direct challenge to OCA, societal approaches consider exchange rate 
policy outcomes as a function of a political competition among “policy 
demanders”−interest groups, economic sectors, and voters−with different preferences 
and unequal political and economic power. 23 This literature operates with the 
                                                 
21 As Richard Cooper (1999: 107) observed, exchange rate studies suffer from the same problems 
plaguing all empirical work in economics: The results tend to vary with country coverage, time period, 
and the specifications of the econometric models because “there is no entirely satisfactory way to 
‘control’ for all relevant cross-country differences or for the relevant changes in the domestic and 
international economic environment over time.”  
 
22 OCA theorists consider distributional effects of currency regimes to be unclear, small, or both 
(Giovannini 1995).  
 
23 In addition to these “demand side” approaches, scholars also study “policy suppliers,” that is, political 
institutions including political parties, veto players, electoral systems, legislatures, bureaucracies, 
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assumption that the choices of exchange rate regimes have distributional 
consequences. 
 Frieden (1991) provides the most widely cited “sectoral” (interest group) 
model of exchange rate regime choice, in which preferences of domestic economic 
actors are determined by their sectoral interests. His model predicts support for fixed 
exchange rates from the groups heavily involved in international trade and 
investments, including international investors, exporters of specialized tradable 
manufactures, and borrowers because currency volatility may negatively influence 
their cross-border business activities. These groups will be quite insensitive to the loss 
of monetary autonomy. In contrast, non-tradable sectors and import-competing 
producers of standardized products should prefer flexible regimes.24 Non-tradable 
producers, whose activities are domestically oriented, are sensitive to the ability of 
national governments to use currency to improve the competitiveness of their 
products. Import competing industries can benefit from currency volatility, which may 
reduce competition from imports by increasing the risks and costs of importing. 25  
 Nonetheless, the preferences of tradables, especially exporters, seem to be 
unclear in Frieden’s sectoral accounts. On the one hand, exporters seem to favor fixed 
                                                                                                                                            
elections, and so on. See Hallerberg (2002), Clark and Hallerberg (2000), Bernhard and Leblang (2002), 
Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), Leblang (1999), Clark (2003), Schamis and Way (2003). They build 
on a principal-agent model, in which the individual citizens (median-voters) function as principals who 
delegate the formulation of economic policy to agents, usually ideological political parties. 
 
24 Frieden specifies distributive interests in exchange rate “regime” and “level.” While exchange rate 
levels and regimes are analytically separable, in practice, they are often combined. Maintaining a fixed 
exchange rate frequently means keeping a strong, appreciated currency. I am grateful to Barry 
Eichengreen for this remark. Hefeker (1997: 27) further noticed that producers focus on the choice of 
regime rather than on exchange rate level because the former is more enduring and more manipulable 
by governments. 
 
25 Frieden employs the Ricardo-Viner model (endogenous tariff theory in international trade), which 
predicts that factors of production specific to import-competing (exporting) industries will be 
protectionist (free trade). The model also assumes that factors of production remain immobile in 
different industries in the short term. Capital and labor interests within a given sector are expected to be 
identical because these factors are specific to the sector. 
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rates because currency volatility is associated with higher risk and transaction costs 
(Frieden 1991: 444−45). But on the other hand, in his work with Stein (2001), Frieden 
argues that economies with large tradable sectors are more likely to employ a float (or 
backward looking crawling pegs) that allows competitive real exchange rates to be 
maintained because a fixed regime is associated with real exchange rate appreciation, 
which hurts the competitiveness of a domestic economy.26 In this account, exporters 
seem to value a competitive depreciated currency associated with a flexible regime. 
 Frieden (1996 and 2002) tests the sectoral argument for a country sample 
including the Member States of the European Union (EU) and concludes that the 
single best prediction of their exchange rate policies in the post-1972 period was the 
degree of trade, financial, and investment integration with the EU. In other words, he 
finds that a high level of trade with the Deutsche mark bloc and an intra-EU trade and 
capital flows resulted in a higher degree of fixity of nominal exchange rates of 
European currencies against the Deutsche mark.27 Yet we have not observed such a 
convergence toward fixed exchange rate regimes in EE countries with an equally high 
degree of trade and financial integration with Germany and with the euro-zone. 
 At first sight, focusing on the role of interest groups/economic sectors seems 
particularly appropriate for examining exchange rate policies in EE because 
institutional arrangements in the post-communist region, insulated from popular 
pressures during the most of the transition period, have rewarded narrow societal 
interests. Frieden’s baseline model, however, cannot explain the variation of exchange 
                                                 
26 Hazard models by Blomberg, Frieden and Stein (2005) indicate that countries with large 
manufacturing sectors are also more likely to abandon a fixed exchange rate. The authors find that a one 
percentage point increase in the size of the manufacturing sector is associated with a reduction of six 
months in the longevity of a country’s currency peg. 
 
27 While Frieden (1996 and 2002) develops predictions for the choice of exchange rate regime, in his 
statistical model, he operationalizes his dependent variable as the annual rate of nominal depreciation 
and the annual coefficient of variation of monthly exchange rates (see chapter 3, Appendix 3). These 
are, however, not the measures of exchange rate regime choice but rather the measures of exchange rate 
movements or exchange rate level. 
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rate regimes in EE across countries and over time. While it identifies some important 
determinants of exchange rate regimes at the macro level, it operates with the 
assumption of the Anglo-American capital market-based financial systems. So, this 
model has a limited predictive ability for the transition or developing countries with 
strong, concentrated banking structures dominated by a few large banks, which play a 
significant political role. Therefore, sectoral analysis needs to be conditioned by the 
particularities of national institutional and historical development and capabilities.  
More generally, interest group models do not specify a mechanism for 
selecting between powerful interest groups claiming governmental resources: they 
explain preferences for regime choice, rather than actual regime outcomes. Defining 
the preferences of manufacturing enterprises does not explain how these groups get 
their preferred economic policies. Frieden conceptualizes policy simply as the 
aggregate of private sector demands: sectoral characteristics determine the interests, 
the cleavages, and the balance of power among competing sectors. The state plays the 
role of a mere arbiter among competing interest groups. Nonetheless, policymakers are 
often able to dominate large industrial interests and extract rents from them. In fact, a 
sector’s concentration in itself can be a product of the level and protection provided by 
the government. Thus, sectoral approaches to exchange rates advanced by Frieden, 
like the factoral models advanced by Rogowski (1989: 20) can predict general patterns 
of “cleavages,” rather than the outcomes, for “victory or defeat depends both on the 
relative size of the various groups and on those institutional and cultural factors that 
[Rogowski and Frieden’s] perspective[s] so resolutely ignores.” Selection problem is 
thus a serious impediment in these models. 
 Furthermore, some argue that research on interest groups should pay more 
attention to the problem of insufficient collective action in monetary politics (Oatley 
1997, Giovannini 1995, McNamara 1998). Exchange rates have broad distributional 
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consequences and are less excludable than trade policy (Gowa 1988).28 In contrast, 
there are higher costs of collective action on the part of consumers and a large non-
tradable sector and more free riding in monetary policy. The relative institutional 
insulation of the central bank from direct societal pressures also keeps interest group 
lobbying on exchange rates to a minimum. Moreover, most linkages between interest 
group pressures and exchange rate outcomes are not observable, and sectors “voice” 
their demands only when they expect to be effective or they pose credible threats. 
 Frieden’s model succeeds in identifying preferences of producers and foreign 
direct investors, but it remains limited in its ability to account exchange-rate 
preferences of financiers, key actors in my theoretical framework.29 Other scholars 
working in the tradition of interest group approaches explore the role of financial 
interests and systems in exchange rate policy. Although there is a recognition that 
banks can make profit under both fixed and flexible regimes, scholars tend to agree 
that banks prefer stable currencies, long time horizons, and monetary convergence 
under capital mobility, although for different reasons. 
 Hefeker (1997) and Cohen (1993) argue that large banks favor currency 
stability because monetary convergence leads to increase in total banking transactions. 
Henning (1994) goes further arguing that there is no constant relationship between 
preferences of banks and exchange rate regimes. Instead, bank preferences are often 
“ambivalent, weakly subscribed, and situationally dependent” (Henning 1994: 34). For 
him, the character of national financial systems and bank-industry ties further 
condition preferences of financiers: In the German and Japanese credit-based systems, 
                                                 
28 All industries in the export sector benefit from stable currency. A small sector of tradable producers 
has also the advantage of prior organization and experience with lobbying for a particular trade policy. 
 
29 Although some scholars identify Frieden’s “international investors” as banking/financial services, 
Frieden (1996) operationalizes this interest group in terms of foreign direct investors. For a full 
discussion of preferences of foreign direct investors in exchange rate policies, see chapter 2. 
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characterized by close institutional ties between banks and industries, pressures for 
competitiveness-conscious and stability-oriented exchange rate policies tend to be 
stronger than in the capital market-based U.S. financial system, in which the interest in 
maintaining domestic industry competiveness is dispersed among non-organized 
stakeholders and investors, and coordination on exchange rate policy is harder to 
achieve.30 
 What distinguishes Frieden’s and Henning’s approaches making the case for 
the strength of different sectors as determinants of exchange rate policy is the relative 
weight attached to sectoral preferences versus how institutional structures shape the 
varying policy influences of different interest groups and strategic choices of policy-
makers. While Frieden’s argument is more “society-oriented,” Henning combines 
private-sector preferences and government institutions in explaining international 
monetary policies. The latter approach has much in common with institutionalist 
approaches that operate with the assumption that state institutions embody rules 
governing the relations and opportunities for building political coalitions between and 
among private interest groups and the state’s economic policymaking bodies 
(Gourevich 1977).31 In an effort to re-evaluate the interplay of institutional structures 
and bank interests in policymaking, this study nicely fits into Henning’s agenda. 
 While these reviewed works focus on industrialized countries, Hall (2005) 
argues that in a middle-income developing country, when private banks provide most 
of the financing of enterprises and the country is open to international capital, banks 
often acquire dollar-denominated debt and tend to oppose abandoning a fixed regime. 
Based on Stallings’ (1992) arguments about the influence of international capital on 
                                                 
30 For Henning, the notion of “competitiveness” of exchange rates is consistent with stable or 
depreciating currency.  
 
31 For the institutionalist literature examining the organization of the private sector, bank-industry 
relationships, and the state, see Shonfield 1969, Katzenstein1978, Zysman 1983, and Gourevich 1986. 
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economic policy in developing countries, Shambaugh (2004) claims that countries 
with a greater dependence on foreign bank loans are more likely to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate, as devalued currencies increase the cost of loan repayment and flexible 
regimes increase the risks of non-repayment. 
In defense of interest group approaches, the empirical reality in EE suggests 
that the politicization process may have moved from trade to exchange rate policy in 
the world of trade integration and capital mobility. In the domestic distributional 
game, trade and exchange rate policies are policy substitutes in terms of compensation 
benefits. International free trade agreements restrict the ability of governments to use 
trade policy, e.g., trade barriers or export subsidies, as a compensatory instrument for 
domestic interest groups, which may increase the saliency and the level politicization 
of exchange rate policy. As Henning (1994) argues, societal groups prefer external 
monetary remedies instead of trade protection because exchange rate increases 
advantages of competitiveness not only in the home market but also in the markets of 
foreign producers, and currency depreciation carries a smaller risk of foreign 
retaliation than trade protectionist measures. 
Credibility and Institutions 
The third main set of arguments emphasizes credibility-related considerations 
and the role of institutions. What unites the credibility and the OCA approaches is the 
principal trade-off between exchange rate stability and domestic monetary autonomy. 
The credibility argument is based on the idea that a country with a history of high 
inflation or previous failed attempts at decreasing inflation will have an incentive to 
adopt a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor to import the credibility of low-
inflation policies from a foreign central bank (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988, Fratiani and 
von Hagen 1992, Alessina and Barro 2002). This view is based on rational expectation 
theories examining the time-inconsistency problem (rules versus discretion) in 
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monetary policy building from the premise that governments have the ability to use 
surprise inflation to generate short-term gains in output (Kydland and Prescott 1977, 
Barro and Gordon 1983).32 The key to solving the time-inconsistency problem is 
credibility. The exchange rate provides a highly visible, easy verifiable target. It serves 
to increase the credibility of non-inflationary announcements and to reinforce a 
government’s commitment to macroeconomic stabilization. 
 An independent central bank has been identified as an alternative source of 
credibility. In this view, fixed exchange rates and independent central banks are 
considered to be alternative ways to increase the credibility of anti-inflationary 
announcements and to reduce the inflationary bias in monetary policy (Bernhard, 
Broz, and Clark 2003). An independent central bank, with price stability as its primary 
goal, should thus reduce the government’s need to resort to fixed exchange rates. By 
establishing an independent central bank that enables a government to credibly 
commit to low inflation and currency float at the same time, the government can 
escape the traditional problem of delegation-credibility versus flexibility. 
Notwithstanding, Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) show that over the longer historical 
horizon, the opposite relationship seems to hold: countries with independent central 
banks are more likely to peg. There is also a discord about which institution is a more 
efficient anti-inflationary device.33 
                                                 
32 The logic of the time-inconsistency approach is as follows: policymakers renege on their promise of 
low inflation policies to achieve short-term improvements in real economic outcomes, such as growth 
and employment. Because private actors anticipate this behavior, the attempts of policymakers to create 
inflationary surprise will be neutralized and the economic outcome will be higher inflation without 
additional output. Therefore, rational expectations of private actors introduce an inflationary bias into 
wage bargaining and price setting. For a review of this literature, see Persson and Tabellini (1994). 
 
33 For example, Keefer and Stasavage (2002) argue that a currency peg is a more efficient anti-
inflationary device than an independent central bank when it is hard for the public to ascertain the 
sources of inflationary pressures. 
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 Broz (2002) extends the logic of time-inconsistency by arguing that credible 
commitment to low inflation requires transparency to detect and punish government 
opportunism. In his framework, governments in authoritarian systems with opaque 
decision making will favor transparent commitment technologies, and thus a fixed 
regime to assist in engendering expectations of low inflation. In contrast, in 
democracies, where political decision making is transparent, legal central bank 
independence can produce low inflation. In a similar vein, others argue that 
authoritarian governments may also be better able to sustain a peg because they are 
more insulated from domestic politics and thus bear lower political costs for pegging 
(Leblang 1999, Haggard 1990). In addition, pegs are often established by the 
executive branch of government alone without legislative approval (Keefer and 
Stasavage 2002: 757). It has been shown that, historically, democratization and the 
associated expansion of suffrage create pressures for redistributive policies, thereby 
reducing policy makers’ ability to defend the value of currencies. The “compensation” 
thesis suggests that democracies that face greater societal pressures to trade exchange 
rate stability for other goals, such as the reduction of unemployment, are more likely 
to choose flexible rates (Eichengreen 1992, Simmons 1994).34 Thus, non-democracies 
are alleged to be more likely to adopt fixed rate regimes, although the causal 
mechanism behind this correlation is still debated. 
 Despite the widespread currency of credibility-based reasoning, the difficulty 
with this approach is that it assumes that the fight against inflation is the only goal of 
exchange rate policy. Governments can also use exchange rate to promote domestic 
export industries or distribute rents to their cronies. In addition, its underlying premise 
                                                 
34 The sensitivity of government to these pressures is likely to be stronger in more democratic countries 
because democratization increases the availability of information and the transparency of the political 
process, while it decreases the transaction costs of political organizations of interest groups vulnerable 
to international capital and trade flows (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, Bernhard and Leblang 1995). 
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is that all governments and their constituencies have the same level of tolerance for 
inflation. As I will show in subsequent chapters, transition countries demonstrated 
different interests and capability to fight inflation. Although the belief in the efficacy 
of exchange rate as a nominal anchor for disinflation purposes dominated the thinking 
of policymakers and external advisors at the beginning of the transition, only a few EE 
governments adopted exchange rate stabilization programs despite experiencing high 
inflation. And many of them have used both institutions—independent central bank 
and currency peg—to stabilize their economies. Finally, merely fixing the exchange 
rate does not solve the credibility problem because a weak government is likely to take 
its commitments back rather than carry sustainable policies. 
Systemic Explanations 
So far, the theories we have considered are domestic. But one further set of 
arguments underlines the influence of international factors.35 Mundell (1961) and 
Flemming (1962) extend the OCA theory to allow for capital mobility. Capital 
mobility, i.e., the ability of investors to move their capital across national borders, is 
considered to be a structural feature of the international system, constraining 
governments by determining the costs and benefits of their economic policies 
(Andrews 1994, Webb 1995). According to the open-economy macroeconomic 
Mundell–Flemming framework (also referred to as the “holy trinity”) in a world of 
high capital mobility, nominal exchange rate pegs cannot be sustained without giving 
up independent monetary policy.36 Therefore, a country can attain only two of these 
                                                 
35 The argument is that international factors influence economic policies of governments by restricting 
the set of feasible policies, by putting constraints on domestic institutions, or by changing the preferred 
policies and behavior of domestic actors. For the literature on internationalization of finance, see Cohen 
(1996), Keohane and Milner (1996). 
 
36 In the context of the EU, Padoa-Schioppa (1994) warned against efforts to pursue an “inconsistent 
quartet” of policy objectives: free trade, full capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, and independent 
national monetary policies. For him, the only solution to this inconsistency was to complement the 
internal market with a monetary union.  
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three goals: domestic monetary policy autonomy, fixed exchange rate, and capital 
mobility.37 Therefore, when the exchange rate is fixed, increased capital mobility 
reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy but enhances the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy.38 
 More recently, it has been argued that as financial globalization deepened, 
monetary policy became increasingly incompatible with fixed exchange rate regimes. 
After the currency crises in emerging markets in the 1990s, which involved 
combinations of some form of fixed regime with high capital mobility, a bipolar view 
or “hollowing-out” hypothesis has emerged according to which, in the current 
international environment of mobile capital, countries are left with two corner 
solutions: hard currency peg (currency board, dollarization, currency union) or free 
floats (Eichengreen 1994, Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995, Fisher 2001). As Eichengreen 
(1994) explains, countries can use three policy instruments to contain market 
pressures: capital controls, interest rates, and international borrowing. Because 
investors can increasingly circumvent capital controls, high interest rates can lead to 
higher unemployment, and foreign borrowing may come with intolerable conditions. 
As capital mobility increases the costs of containing market pressures, the 
government’s promise to defend the peg becomes less credible and more prone to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
37 Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) conclude that historically, while capital mobility prevailed in the gold 
standard system when monetary policy was subordinated to exchange rate stability, as soon as countries 
attempted to use monetary policy to revive their economies in the interwar period, they had to impose 
controls to curtail capital movements. 
 
38 The Mundell-Flemming model holds that the choice of the optimal exchange rate should depend on 
the type of shock hitting the economy: if shocks are predominantly real, a flexible regime is optimal, 
whereas if shocks are monetary, a fixed regime is desirable. The model assumes imperfections in goods 
markets, i.e., sticky prices, but undistorted capital markets, i.e., perfect capital mobility. Lahiri, Singh, 
and Vegh (2006), however, note that in developing countries, financial markets are underdeveloped, 
and thus financial market frictions are equally, if not more important, than goods market frictions. The 
authors suggest turning the Mundell-Flemming dictum on its head: flexible rates are optimal in the 
presence of monetary shocks, whereas fixed rates are optimal in response to real shocks. 
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speculative attacks. Thus, pegs and intermediate regimes may increase the risk of 
currency crises under high capital mobility.39 
The hollowing out hypothesis explains the consequences of the decision to 
adopt a fixed regime, but does not determine why countries choose to maintain or 
abandon it (Hall 2005: 18–23). Ultimately, then, the Mundell-Flemming model does 
not determine what choices of exchange rate regimes governments make. It only 
identifies economic costs associated with different exchange rate regimes (Hall 2005: 
16). Moreover, empirical studies have shown that many emerging market and 
developing countries have pursued hybrid or intermediate regimes between rigid pegs 
and full floats (Poirson 2001).40 Similarly, as I will show in chapter 4, intermediate 
regimes have played an important role in exchange rate policies in the transition 
economies. In sum, while international capital mobility certainly imposes certain 
constraints on policy goals of national governments, e.g., inflation, governments do 
not simply react to international conditions. Governments seem to retain a room of 
maneuver in terms of the policy instruments, e.g., as interest rates, when properly 
coordinated (Bearce 2007).41 
 Other scholars recognized the importance of the international political 
dimension of exchange rate regime policies.42 One type of explanation of international 
                                                 
39 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) argue that pegs have limited credibility under capital mobility because 
there are limits to the amount of monetary policy autonomy countries are willing to forgo to maintain 
pegs. Fisher (2001) warns that limited effectiveness of capital controls and sterilized interventions make 
pegs unsustainable under capital mobility. 
 
40 The empirical work testing the Mundell-Flemming theory yields inconclusive results. See 
Shambaugh (2004), Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2004), Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
 
41 This argument is in line with the writings on globalization stressing that states retaining some 
autonomy over economic policy explain the diversity of economic policies across countries despite 
globalization. See Garret and Lange (1995), Garrett (1998), Mosley (2000).  
 
42 I would like to stress that this study focuses on the national exchange rate policies, i.e., the choice of 
exchange rate regime rather than on the international monetary regime, i.e., the degree to which 
currencies are fixed against one another. Although national policy choices depend on the character of 
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influence stresses the importance of the anchor country, a dominant state willing to 
use its monetary leadership to make a fixed regime sustainable. According to the so-
called hegemonic stability theory, the (economic and political) strength and 
engagement of the anchor country—the hegemonic power—performs the function of 
lender of last resort for the financial system or in balance of payment crises plays a 
crucial role in sustaining policies of hard pegs (Kindleberger 1986).43 Although the 
theory provides an important insight in explaining monetary cooperation in the Bretton 
Woods system, it is difficult to extend it to a regional context. The theory is 
ambiguous over the nature and the exercise of power and it lacks micro-foundations 
for understanding the benefits and costs of monetary cooperation to a hegemonic 
power (McNamara 1998).44 For example, it has been argued that in spite of high trade 
integration, the CIS ruble zone collapsed in part because Russia was no longer a viable 
economic anchor: Moscow was no longer providing the public goods needed to 
stabilize the common monetary area (Odling-Smee and Pastor 2001).45 In fact, Russia 
itself dissolved the ruble zone in the summer of 1993. The decision to fix also involves 
a broader issue of policy dependence with respect to the policies of the anchor country 
and can impact a country’s conception of its national sovereignty.46  
                                                                                                                                            
the international monetary system, these are two different dependent variables analytically. See Broz 
and Frieden (2001). 
 
43 Hegemonic stability theory was made famous by Kindleberger (1986), who interpreted the collapse 
of the international system during the 1930s as a breakdown in international leadership. 
 
44 In regard to the European Monetary System (EMS), Fratiani and von Hagen (1992: 68) point to the 
lack of clarity on explaining German membership in the system. 
 
45 For alternative interpretations of the ruble zone collapse, see Abdelal (2001) and Pomfret (2001). 
 
46 For example, the members of the CFA zone experienced deflationary effects of pegging to the French 
franc when France pursued the policy of the franc fort to fulfill the EMU convergence criteria (Fouda 
and Stasavage 2000). 
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The level of broader political ties with the anchor country and level of shared 
political engagement and mutual interdependence among the countries with fixed 
regimes can substitute for the lack of hegemonic strength or domestic political 
weakness (Cohen 1994).47 An argument often employed to explain the commitment of 
European countries to fixed regimes identifies “European integration” as the major 
driving force: fixed exchange rates are a purely European phenomenon, driven by 
politics rather than economics (Garrett 2000). Alternatively, Gruber (2000) argues that 
monetary integration in Europe has as much to do with power, cooptation, and 
domination as with bargaining or strategic interaction. For him, the European 
Monetary System was imposed by a Franco-German coalition (the “agenda setters”), 
while other countries, which would have preferred flexible regimes, like Italy, joined 
the system of fixed rates because the price of being left out, e.g., negative signals to 
financial markets, was greater that the price of entry.48 There is a near consensus in the 
post-communist studies that the EU is the most influential external actor in the 
accession/new members countries from EE. Yet, despite the homogeneous EU 
pressures in various economic policy areas, the EE countries, proclaiming the EU and 
European Monetary Union (EMU) accession of the primary foreign policy goal, have 
pursued different exchange rate regimes. 
One further argument rests on the role of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in promoting currency boards in order to fill the “credibility deficit” that 
confronts economic policy making in emerging market countries and to assure foreign 
                                                 
47 Henning (1998) argued that European countries most effectively coordinate their exchange-rate and 
monetary policies when the United States acts in a manner that creates instability and negative 
externalities. 
 
48 Numerous studies that have examined Germany’s role in European monetary integration falls into 
two categories: those that focus on the geopolitical drives of German policy and those that focus on 
domestic economic interests. See Kaltenhaler (2002), Kaelberer (2001).  
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investors that governments will not reverse neoliberal economic reforms (Grabel 
2003).49 Of course, international interactions will shape government policies toward 
exchange rate regimes, but the challenge is to specify the relative weight of these 
international effects with domestic influences when faced with divergent policies of 
trading partners or neighboring countries. 
Normative Arguments for Fix and Float 
I would like to specify what this study is not about. First, it is a positive 
description of the choices made rather than a normative model of what the optimal 
exchange rate regime should be.50 Second, this study does not examine the effects of 
exchange rate regimes on economic growth. I do take the impact of regime choices 
into account but indirectly, by linking the current regime choices to the economic and 
political performance under previous regimes.  
Therefore, this research has not been directed at the normative debate 
surrounding the choice of exchange rate regime, the questions of whether or not states 
should be pegging or floating. The normative question revolves around weighing the 
costs of one exchange rate regime choice relative to the costs of the others. There is 
little consensus in the literature on the welfare criteria for the exchange rate regime 
choice. Here, I quickly review strengths and weaknesses of fixed and flexible regimes. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the traditional arguments on exchange rate regime choice.  
 A fixed exchange rate is an effective nominal anchor for monetary policy. 
Countries frequently adopt fixed regimes for domestic monetary (price) stabilization. 
The commitment to fixed exchange rate facilitates disinflation. Restrictions imposed 
by the objective of maintaining fixed regimes disciplines policy makers and 
                                                 
49 There are those who focus on learning and the network effects of fixed regimes (Simmons and 
Heinmueller 2004). 
 
50 This study does not attempt to estimate the equilibrium exchange rate, which requires different 
estimation techniques. 
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discourages their propensity towards erratic policies, e.g., monetary financing of a 
fiscal deficit. Fixing, therefore, reduces the probability of banking and financial crises 
(Eichengreen and Rose 1998). Fixed regimes also allow countries with weak monetary 
institutions to import monetary credibility by anchoring a national currency with a 
reputable central bank of the anchor country. 
 Furthermore, fixed regimes are associated with currency stability. Fixing limits 
exchange risks for cross-border exchanges and foreign investments facing exporters 
and importers, international borrowers and lenders, so it reduces the costs of 
international trade. Trade openness is the key parameter determining the importance of 
the advantages of fixed regimes (Frankel 1995). Last, fixed regimes have also been 
used for ambitious political integration goals, such as European monetary unification. 
 In a fixed regime, however, there is no scope for monetary policy to have 
independent effects. Governments are not able, without abandoning the parity, to use 
the exchange rate as a policy instrument to deal with domestic macroeconomic 
problems and to affect the competitiveness of domestic industries.51 Governments 
cannot devalue in the face balance of payment deficits or decrease short-term interest 
rates in a recession. Fixed regimes also reduce the ability of government politicians to 
respond to distributional pressures of interest groups, e.g. exporters, their constituents, 
for supportive policies (Broz and Frieden 2001, Bernhard, Broz and Clark 2002). 
 
 
                                                 
51 A country’s competitiveness can be sustained through wage and price adjustment (in the case of a 
fixed regime) or exchange rate adjustment (in the case of a flexible regime). 
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Table 1.1: Arguments in Favor of Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rate Regime 
 
 FIXED REGIME FLEXIBLE REGIME 
ADVANTAGES Limits the exchange risk for 
international transactions and 
foreign investments→more trade 
and capital flows. 
Decreases cost of access to 
international financial 
markets→lowers risk premium. 
Decreases domestic interest 
rates→reduces spread with the 
world market interest rate. 
Decreases inflation. 
Impedes monetary financing of the 
fiscal deficit. 
Credibility import from the anchor 
country. 
Neutralizes the effect of inflation 
on export competitiveness. 
Allows exchange rate adjustments 
to stimulate domestic demand 
and competitiveness. 
Neutralizes the impact of external 
shocks. 
DISADVANTAGES Dependence on the monetary policy 
of the peg country (sovereignty 
issues if hard pegs). 
Real exchange rate appreciation and 
current account deficit→negative 
effect on national 
competitiveness. 
Less maneuvering room for dealing 
with the balance of payments 
deficits. 
Less ability to affect domestic price 
competitiveness. 
Source of imported inflation. 
Negative effect of strong volatility 
on trade and financial 
transactions. 
A source of regional instability if 
competitive devaluations. 
Postponement of required 
structural adjustments. 
Source: Poirson (2001: 26), Edwards and Savastano (1999), Bernhard, Broz and Clark (2002). 
 
 A flexible regime allows the use of exchange rate as a policy instrument 
against economic problems, such as unemployment or economic recession. However, 
currency floats lead to exchange rate volatility, and therefore less trade and fewer 
capital flows. The use of competitive devaluations to promote domestic industries can 
even lead to risking international retaliations. 
Methodology and Organization 
The chapter has reviewed the principal predictions from existing theories that 
provide the most likely explanations of why some countries are willing and able to 
commit to sustainable policies of fixed exchange rates, while others are not. I argue 
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for a change in the way we think about exchange rate politics, placing greater 
emphasis on different types of banks, differentiated by the nature of their ownership 
and their interests. The main exercise in this study is empirically testing this new 
approach. I conclude this chapter by briefly discussing the research design and 
methodologies I use to evaluate the theory, and laying out the plan for empirical 
analyses in the remainder of the dissertation. These empirical tests all contribute to the 
central aim of the thesis: understanding and documenting exchange rate policy making 
from interest groups, through institutional structures, to outcomes. 
In Chapter 2, I outline the first dimension of the finance-based perspective 
more fully, while first exploring the sources of political influence of different types of 
financiers and identifying their interests and strategies in exchange rate, monetary, and 
regulatory policies.  
In Chapter 3, I examine the second dimension of my theory by examining how 
the chosen method of bank privatization (and industry privatization) and financial 
liberalization shaped the institutional variation of national systems of finance in EE. 
This chapter presents a novel typology of financial systems that emerged in the post-
communist region after the collapse of communism.  
Next, I evaluate the proposed theoretical argument by pursuing two approaches 
in empirical analysis: statistical analysis and comparative cases. This dualistic 
methodological approach has several advantages in explaining such a complex 
phenomenon as exchange rate policy. The quantitative analysis shows the importance 
of the relative influences of several variables, which is harder to do convincingly using 
a small number of cases. Nonetheless, there are some problems in performing 
quantitative analysis of economic policies in EE, including data restrictions for some 
countries and some years and short time series of data. Given the scale of the changes 
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in EE after the collapse of communism, there might also be a lot of “noise” in the 
regressions (Hallerberg and de Souza 2002).  
To perform a quantitative analysis, I will deduce policy preferences of groups 
for particular policies on the basis of economic theories and empirical literature. One 
important shortcoming of the deductive approach of determining preferences is that it 
sometimes relies on the economic theories that are themselves controversial (Frieden 
1999). As Giovannini (1995) maintains, there is little agreement among economists on 
a “benchmark” model for examining the distributional effects of different currency 
regimes. Moreover, economic models have not yet produced consistent hypotheses 
regarding the economic interests in favor of fixed versus flexible regimes, so the 
economic effects of an exchange rate regime depend on the particular institutional 
setting and economic conditions in a particular period of time. In order to address this 
deficiency of deductive reasoning, I will complement my statistical analysis with an 
observational or inductive approach to ascertain currency preferences of societal 
groups by observation and field interviews in the four countries under close 
examination in this study. 
In Chapter 4, I develop a quantitative model testing the effect of different 
financial institutional structures on the choices and sustainability of their exchange 
rate regimes on cross-section, time-series data on 25 transition economies in EE 
between 1990 and 2004. The empirical goal of statistical analysis is to confirm the 
independent and the contributory effects of financial interests and institutions, while 
controlling for other potential determinants of exchange rate regimes.  
Chapter 5 traces the evolution of exchange rate regimes in EE countries during 
the post-communist period. I offer a broad assessment of exchange rate policy-making 
patterns in all 25 countries of EE during two phases of economic development—
stabilization and post-stabilization—while also exploring initial conditions at the 
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outset of the transition. This chapter goes beyond chapter 4 by examining the reasons 
behind the discrepancies between the official and actual choices of governments in 
regard to exchange rate regimes. 
The mechanisms and concrete political processes, through which interest 
groups influence exchange rate policies via intermediation of financial institutional 
structures, are traceable in in-depth studies. To examine the causal mechanism that I 
suggest in detail, I employ a comparative case method by tracing the processes of 
exchange rate policy making in four countries−Bulgaria and Estonia (chapter 6), the 
Czech Republic (chapter 7), and Poland (chapter 8) −with a special emphasis on 
variation in the financial ownership structures, institutions, and processes by which 
these policies were conducted. A limited number of cases allows for a detailed 
analysis of the causal flow of events and for a systematic examination of similarities 
and differences. Detailed country studies allow assessing causal complexities and the 
importance of sequencing and timing. I develop a sequential narrative in support of the 
theoretical argument.  
Through the process tracing, these chapters seek to evaluate the mechanisms 
through which the theory expects exchange rate policy to be determined (King et al., 
1994, Brady and Collier 2004). By developing a more complete picture of financial 
development and exchange rate policy making over time, I attempt to reduce the risks 
of selection bias. These chapters are based on evidence about the content of societal 
debates drawn from newspapers, archival sources, and field research. Such field 
research entails detailed journalistic accounts and 105 interviews with policy makers 
at these countries’ central banks, Ministries of Finance, Economy, and Privatization 
and other government officials, commercial bankers, company analysts in investment 
funds, investment funds, and academics. 
I selected these cases because they represent a variation on both dependent and 
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independent variables. These countries also represent the paradigmatic types of 
financial systems in EE—capture, collusion, competition, and consensus—that have 
produced a different set of exchange rate policy outcomes. While Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic represent the possible variations on a clientelistic financial system, 
Poland and Estonia exemplify open systems. Because each typifies one of the patterns 
of post-communist institutional structures of finance, together they cover the full range 
of the behavior I try to explain in this dissertation. Their politics shared one similarity: 
each of these four states was aspiring to become a member of the European 
Community. Yet, the governments of these countries pursued divergent policies in the 
areas of money and finance. 
Bulgaria and Estonia are extreme cases of financial systems. Before 1997, 
Bulgaria had privatized none of its banks, so it preserved a crony institutional 
environment in which incumbent banks and enterprises were able to capture the 
government as well as the central bank. The government let the exchange rate float 
because it lacked the political ability to enforce unpopular policies required to defend 
a peg. Only after devastating crises in 1996–1997, a currency board was installed to tie 
the hands of the Bulgarian government. In contrast, Estonia has arm’s-length 
connections between banks and industries and an independent central bank. The 
government was able to constrain the influence of incumbent networks by liquidating 
and selling nearly all of the country’s SOBs to foreigners. A competitive financial 
system allowed the government to sustain the hardest form of exchange rate regime (a 
currency board) throughout the transition. 
The Czech Republic and Poland are intermediate cases of financial systems. 
The financial system in the Czech Republic, the outcome of voucher privatization, was 
one of collusion between large incumbent banks, industries, and the state linked by 
extensive cross-ownership. Still, the Czech central bank was able to build a reputation 
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as a credible and independent institution able to sustain a fixed exchange rate for an 
extended period of time. An inconsistent policy mix between the anti-inflationary 
monetary policy of the central bank and the expansive fiscal policy of the government 
promoting the interests of incumbents led to a collapse of the currency peg in 1997. 
The eclectic Polish method of bank privatization through public offers and sales to 
foreigners resulted in a depoliticized bank-industry relationship. The central bank, 
however, was much less independent from the government, and the policy pattern was 
a consensual exchange rate policy making with the objective of sustaining the 
competitiveness of domestic industries through the use of various soft pegs. 
The last chapter summarizes the theoretical and empirical analysis and outlines a 
general framework about the political economy of exchange rates. Having established 
the role of different types of banks in exchange rate regime determination, this chapter 
also introduces some speculations and future avenues of research regarding foreign 
ownership in finance. A graphic contemporary example of the controversial role of 
foreign investments is the emergence of the sovereign wealth funds used by 
governments of authoritarian countries to acquire strategic stakes in developed 
countries, often in a non-transparent way.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE FINANCE−BASED THEORY OF EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
The introductory chapter laid out the broad outline of this study whose general 
theme is the role of financial institutions in exchange rate policy. I identified the 
perplexing empirical phenomenon of exchange rate policy variation in transition 
economies, which raises a question about the economic and political determinants of 
the choice and sustainability of exchange rate regimes. The focus of this dissertation is 
on whether it is possible to identify the structures and institutions that make the choice 
of a fixed exchange rate arrangement and its sustainability more likely. The key 
insight of the argument is that financiers shape government decisions regarding 
exchange rate policies through financial institutional structures in several specific 
ways. 
The review of the existing literature revealed that empirical and theoretical 
gaps exist in our understanding of exchange rate regime choices. None of the 
competing schools of thought has offered a plausible explanation of exchange rate 
diversity in transition economies that accounts for the role of financial linkages. This 
study concentrates on the implications of the roles state-owned, private, and foreign 
financiers play in exchange rate regime choice and sustainability. I demonstrate that 
bank ownership does matter in macro-economic policies.52  
To date, the conventional wisdom has posited financiers as a homogenous 
societal group that is uniformly conservative, inflation-averse, and supportive of 
monetary stability. In contrast, I argue for a more nuanced view of financiers that 
                                                 
52 This argument diverges from recent institutional literature that emphasizes the primacy of institutions 
in macroeconomic policies (Acemoglu et al. 2003). I do not dispute the importance of institutions, but I 
treat them as endogenous to exchange rate regime choices rather than as exogenous. Therefore, in my 
framework, ownership precedes institutions. 
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emphasizes their diverging interests in monetary, exchange rate, and regulatory realms 
influenced by the nature of their ownership. I develop my finance-based theory of 
exchange rate choice and sustainability in two chapters. In this chapter, I develop one 
dimension of my theory by examining the interests and behavior of state-owned, 
private domestic and foreign banks’ exchange rate, and monetary and regulatory 
policies. Before turning to this analysis, I begin by presenting a full finance-based 
model of exchange rate regime choice and sustainability. Next, I explore the role and 
power of financiers in the economy and how the economy is influenced by the nature 
of their ownership. Subsequently, chapter 3 places the main argument in the context of 
recent research on finance and growth and traces the origins and development of 
financial systems in EE by exploring the role of bank privatization and various modes 
of state divestiture in financial development. I also present a novel typology of 
financial systems in EE. 
The Logic of the Finance-Based Perspective 
Figure 1 illustrates the logic of my finance-based argument. First, I begin with 
the premise that banks are powerful economic interests, with political power to exert 
pressure on government to adopt policies and legislation that suit their interests as a 
result of their market power, their organizational advantages, and their important role 
in the economy. Second, the interests and policy consequences of bank behavior in 
exchange rate policies vary depending on the nature of ownership. Bank ownership 
can take three forms: state-owned, private domestic, and foreign. Banks can influence 
exchange rate policy directly or indirectly through their impact on monetary and 
regulatory institutions and policies. Third, the structure of ownership in a country’s 
financial system empowers different types of banks, shapes the responsiveness of 
government politicians to bank demands, and mediates the demands and behavior of 
financial interests. Finally, the structure of ownership in a financial system influences 
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the subsequent building of monetary and regulatory institutions that determine the 
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Figure 2.1: Causal pathways 
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I argue that financial institutional structures dominated by state-owned banks 
(SOBs)—which I dub clientelistic—are conducive to inflationary connected lending, 
lax banking supervision, and weak prudential regulation. State ownership, “financial 
repression,” and closure of the financial system to foreign entry place the decision-
making authority in the exchange rate policy area in the hands of the incumbent 
political elite who lack incentives to build strong institutions that would change the 
“oligarchic” structures of power.53 SOBs preserve close links with the political elite 
that become political channels through which to obtain their preferred economic 
policies, which may not be compatible with the general public good. These banks 
benefit from weak institutions rather than demanding institutions that would limit the 
discretionary power of the political elite. State ownership also undermines the entry of 
new private domestic banks powerful enough to challenge incumbent networks or to 
reinforce the institutions.  
Weak regulatory institutions allow the entry of new private banks, which are 
also linked to the political elite and state-owned enterprises through ownership and 
politicized relationships. Thus, the interests and behavior of such newly created 
private banks tend to converge with those of SOBs. In such weak institutional settings, 
governments lack the political incentives, ability, and political support to commit 
credibly to low inflation and low public debt to make their pegs sustainable and 
resistant to speculative attacks. Incumbent influence is likely to result in expansive 
credit and fiscal policies, a monetary policy of high inflation, and costly bailouts that 
reduce the general welfare of the population. SOBs favor the monetary autonomy 
associated with a flexible regime that allows governments to define interest rates and 
expand the money supply. Therefore, governments have the incentive to let the 
                                                 
53 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: 329) define an “oligarchic structure” as one in which “a group of 
agents monopolize political power and is difficult to displace the entrenchment afforded to them by the 
political institutions.” 
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exchange rate float, or they are forced to devalue currency and abandon pegs in the 
face of such large economic shocks as banking and financial crises that have rendered 
previous regime choices unviable.  
For institutional structures in finance characterized by a strong foreign bank 
presence—which I call open—governments are more likely to promote policies that 
are consistent with international banks. The entry of foreign banks fosters competition 
and weakens the political influence of SOBs and their enterprise clients. It also creates 
a new set of domestic private banks with the potential to demand that institutions limit 
the discretionary influence of incumbent rent-seeking networks among banks, 
industries, and the state. Foreign banks have a vested interest in demanding strong 
institutions that will protect their property rights and stabilize their  profits. The 
incumbent political elite may have incentives to build stronger institutions that cater to 
the interests of foreign investors and private domestic banks, enabling the elite to 
regulate and extract profits from the banks. International banks favor financial 
liberalization and the monetary integration of fixed rates in order to profit from cross-
border operations. They may also discipline the host country’s monetary and fiscal 
policies and thus enable governments to commit to and sustain anti-inflationary and 
stability-oriented exchange rate policies aimed at economic stabilization and growth.  
The principal hypothesis that is tested in this study is that in countries with 
financial systems dominated by SOBs and that are accompanied by weak monetary 
and regulatory institutions, their governments will lack the political support, 
willingness, and credibility to commit to and sustain a fixed exchange rate regime. The 
likelihood of this regime should be correlated with an increase in the presence of 
foreign banks in national financial ownership and institutional structures. Financial 
and institutional structures, in which financial interests compete for influence over 
economic policy-making, represent a critical intervening variable that link these 
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interests to exchange rate policy. Financial systems in EE are, in turn, the outcomes of 
financial openness to foreign entry in the banking sector through privatization. This 
causal link is examined in chapter 3 of this study. 
The argument made here builds on political economy theories that highlight 
the role of finance in exchange rate regime choice.54 To develop my argument, I draw 
together insights from two additional analytic traditions, the first of which is finance-
growth literature examining government participation in finance and the role of 
foreign banks. It has been consistently shown that while widespread state ownership of 
banks is associated with underdeveloped financial systems and slower economic 
growth (La Porta et al. 2002, Barth, Caprio and Levine 2000, Caprio et al. 2004), the 
entry of foreign banks has mostly positive effects on financial development in 
developing and emerging countries (Detragiache et al. 2006, Goldberg 2004). Second, 
I draw on the literature that focuses on the effects of the moral hazard of governmental 
guarantees and balance-sheet bank problems inherent in the financial crises in 
emerging markets (the “third generation” models of currency crises) (Krugman 1998, 
Chang and Velasco 1998, Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999).55 The literature on 
financial crises developed in response to a different question yet is closely related to 
the exchange rate regime choice literature: If a change in one of the explanatory 
variables increases the probability of a currency collapse, it also influences the 
probability of a change in the exchange rate regime.  
                                                 
54 Recent empirical studies examining the role of financial development in regime choice include 
Aghion et al. (2006), Von Hagen and Zhou (2005), Levy-Yeyati et al. (2007), Calvo and Reinhart 2002, 
and Domac and Martinez Peria (2000). 
 
55 The first generation of currency crisis models underlines the role of weak economic fundamentals, 
such as excessive expansionary fiscal and monetary policy (Krugman 1979). The “second generation” 
models seek to explain the crisis of the European Monetary System in the early 1990s. The focus is on 
the effects of countercyclical policies in developed economies and on self-fulfilling crises, with market 
rumors unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals (Obstfeld 1994). In contrast, Kindleberger’s 1989 
historical overview of financial crises focuses on the instability of expectations, speculation, credit 
expansion, and financial need that lead to crisis, panic and collapse. 
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One of the main objectives of this chapter is to delineate how and why the 
interests and behavior of banks vary by the nature of their ownership and the sources 
of their power to influence government politicians. Subsequent sections, in turn, 
explain the building blocks of the theory.  
 
The Power of Banks 
Why would governments respond to the demands of financial interests in 
economic policymaking? Because of their market power, organizational advantages, 
and important role in the economy, banks are powerful economic interests with the 
political power to exert pressure on politicians to adopt policies and legislation to suit 
banking interests. As holders of liquid assets, financiers have structural power over the 
state to influence major political and economic decisions, and that has been 
established historically.56  
The principal source of the power for banks stems from their critical role in the 
economy. As early as 1912, Schumpeter suggested that through funding selection for 
entrepreneurs, banks can promote innovative activity and enhance economic 
development. Well-functioning banks that provide credits to the best projects, rather 
than to those with political or family connections, contribute to a more equal 
distribution of income and economic growth (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
2004).57 
                                                 
56 The European monarchs had given financiers a greater voice in policy-making as compensation for 
acquiescing to taxation. More recently, the House of Morgan, “much like the old Rothschilds and 
Barings, seemed insinuated into the power structure of many countries … the old Morgan partners were 
financial ambassadors whose daily business was often closely intertwined with affairs of the state” 
(Chernow quoted in Johnson 2000: 14). 
 
57 The advantage of banks over individual investors stems from their ability to solve the problem of 
asymmetric information between enterprises and their potential sources of finance. Asymmetric 
information creates two types of problems that impede the allocation of capital to its most productive 
use. Before a transaction is completed, adverse selection occurs and increases the probability of bad 
credit risks. As a consequence, lenders may decide not to make any loans at all, even though there are 
good credit risks in the market. After a transaction, asymmetric information leads to a moral hazard 
problem, which is the risk (hazard) that the other party will engage in activities that decrease the 
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Banks thus have important leverage over enterprises. This leverage is 
particularly strong in countries with underdeveloped capital markets, where the quality 
of information is opaque and it is harder for enterprises to issue equity or bonds as 
sources of financing (Mishkin 2006: 31).58 Banks allow these enterprises, which are 
often unable to operate on international capital markets, to access funds at prices and 
conditions not available to them outside bank finance (Hall 2005: 33). 
Second, financiers have a strong leverage over the governments. Banks serve 
as channels, through which monetary policy affects the real economy. Banks buy 
government bonds issued to finance fiscal deficits. Government bonds represent a 
profitable risk adjusted investment alternative for banks (Maxfield 1991).59 
Banks also have important private information on the health of the financial 
system and on the exact consequences of exchange rate policy (Hall 2005: 170). 
Banking crises and bank closures are associated with high fiscal costs and severe 
economic disruptions,60 so governments and central banks are sensitive to the situation 
and needs of banks, providing them with opportunities to influence economic policy-
making. In most countries, commercial banks have close institutional ties to ministries 
of finance and central banks, that is, institutions in charge of monetary and exchange 
                                                                                                                                            
probability that the loan will be paid back. Banks can efficiently diminish asymmetric information 
problems through screening, monitoring, and collateral. This discussion of the principal-agent problem 
in finance is based on Mishkin (2006) and Fohlin (2007). 
 
58 The flow of poor information exposed financial systems of EE economies to problems of moral 
hazard and insider dealing on a huge scale (Berglof and Bolton 2002: 1). 
 
59 In EE states, government debt has mostly been intermediated by banks: government securities 
represent the main portion of bank securities portfolios. Bank consolidation programs also allowed 
swaps of bad loans, accumulated by banks, for government bonds. In Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania and 
Slovakia almost half of the banks, and in Poland more than 80 percent of the banks invest more than 10 
percent of their assets in government securities (Von Hagen and Dinger 2005: 20). 
 
60 In the last twenty years, more than forty countries experienced banking crises, triggering losses that 
sometimes exceeded 50 percent of national income (Keefer 2006). 
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rate policies (Henning 1994, Maxfield 1991).61 Furthermore, policy-makers are 
sensitive to banks for purely political reasons: banks can make large political 
campaign contributions and in bad times, bank failures can effectively be used in 
electoral campaigns (Ronsenbluth and Schaap 2003: 307).62 
Finally, banks have a collective action advantage in organizing and 
overcoming free-rider problems in lobbying for preferred policies due to their market 
power and the concentrated nature of the banking system: a few large banks can 
organize more effectively to defend their interests than many diverse capital market 
investors or poorly organized depositors (Olson 1971).63 Also, a small, concentrated 
group of bankers in the Olsonian sense has an easier time in bargaining over how to 
divide the costs of lobbying and to monitor a member’s participation in lobbying 
(Olson 1966: 45−47).64 In the next section, I will argue that the political influence of 
banks and the nature of bank-state interactions are significantly influenced by the bank 
ownership structure. 
 
                                                 
61 Maxfield (1991) identified three conditions when economic policies will likely reflect the preferences 
of financiers: first, if the central bank is independent; second, if the finance ministry allies with the 
central bank and dominates economic policy-making; and finally, if the state has little ability to control 
investment financing.  
 
62 Johnson (2000: 1-26) identified four separate political roles of banks in democracies. Banks can act 
as interest groups, agents of government, patrons and clients of politicians, and (de)stabilizers of 
democratic polity. 
 
63 In most countries, the association of banks is the institutional and organizational basis for collective 
interests of the banking sector. 
 
64 The essence of the Olson’s (1971) group paradox is that because of the free-rider problem, the larger 
the group to which they belong, the more individuals will tend to contribute lower levels of action 
(money, effort, time, etc.). There are two reasons for this: the larger the group, the smaller the perceived 
effect of an individual defection and the smaller the individual prize. Therefore, the free-rider problem 
makes smaller groups more effective in pursuing their common interests than larger groups.  
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The Ownership of Banks 
According to the “political” theories of governmental participation in finance, 
the motivation of state bank ownership is to finance politically desirable projects 
without regard to economic viability in return for votes, political contributions, and 
bribes, resulting in a detrimental effect on economic growth (Shleifer and Vishny 
1998, La Porta et al. 2002, Dinc 2005, Sapienza 2002, Andrews 2005, Caprio et al. 
2004).65  
State-owned banks (SOBs) are often explicitly or implicitly required to finance 
loss-making state-owned enterprises, to provide financing on noncommercial terms to 
regions or sectors, or to direct credit based on political connections rather than on risk 
assessment (Andrews 2005: 3). Directed lending is usually part of bargaining between 
the government and SOBs. For these incumbent banks, the key to lending ability is 
their relationship with those with influence over them, including managers, other 
lenders, suppliers, and political leaders (Rajan and Zingales 2003). SOBs benefit from 
governmental support and protections in the form of bailout guarantees, below market 
discount loans, and regulatory exemptions (Kroszner 1998).66 In addition to the 
lobbying power enjoyed by banks in general, SOBs enjoy special privileges. As a 
result of the nature of their ownership, SOBs have better access to governmental 
officials and thus greater political influence on legislation and policies. Government 
banks suffer from the serious moral hazard problem of acting as both owner and 
                                                 
65 In contrast, in the classic “development” view, originated by Gerschenkron (1962), governmental 
ownership of banks can stimulate growth where economic institutions are not sufficiently developed for 
private banks to play a development role. In its more recent, “social” version, SOBs are created to 
maximize broader social objectives by allocating funds to projects with high social returns and to less 
privileged groups and sectors, such as small enterprises, agriculture, and education (Stiglitz 1993). 
 
66 Interest rate subsidies provided to banks in EE ranged from 2.9 percent in Poland to 21 percent in 
Uzbekistan (de Melo et al. 1996). 
 
 48 
regulator (Mian 2003).Their political power is particularly strong in concentrated 
banking systems, in which SOBs enjoy a monopolistic position in the market.67 
In the absence of the profit motive, SOBs have little incentive to allocate their 
capital productively. Political interference and moral hazards stemming from soft-
budget constraints68 result in bad lending decisions, and high volumes of 
nonperforming loans that make a banking system financially fragile.69 Evidence from 
EE confirms the view that governmental ownership of banks negatively influences 
financial and economic development. Many governments responded to powerful state-
owned industrial lobbies and forced the “new” SOBs to act as quasi-fiscal agents of 
the state through interest rate controls or credit programs (Denizer, Desai and 
Gueorguiev 2006: 566–567). SOBs have thus taken on the role of the “old planning 
ministries” (Desai and Pistor 1997). On the other hand, being large and geographically 
concentrated, with monopolistic positions in deposit and lending activities, SOBs 
enjoyed considerable political influence in EE. 
The privatization of SOBs to private owners enhances competition and 
changes the distribution of economic (and political) power on the financial market. 
Private domestic banks have higher cash-flow incentives and a greater distance 
                                                 
67 The political influence of SOBs is greater compared with that of other state enterprises for several 
reasons. First, it is easier to disguise political motivation behind lending given the asymmetric 
information between banks and outsiders about loan quality. Second, the costs of political loans are 
revealed only at loan maturity. Third, banks are particularly desirable instruments for the distribution of 
political rents because the lending activities of banks influence all economic sectors. Finally, politicians 
can preserve their power by controlling financial resources more easily than through direct-entry 
barriers in other economic sectors (Dinc 2005, Andrews 2005, Rajan and Zingales 2003). 
 
68 Kornai (1980) examines the concept of soft budget constraint in centrally planned economies. Kornai, 
Maskin, and Roland (2003) further elaborate on this phenomenon in transition economies. 
 
69 A growing body of empirical literature shows that the widespread state ownership of banks is 
associated with underdeveloped financial systems, interventionist governments, low profits, high 
volumes of bad loans, poor protection of property rights, and slower economic growth (La Porta et al. 
2002, Barth et al. 2000). State ownership tends also to be associated with a higher probability of 
financial instability and banking crises. 
 
 49 
between regulator and ownership (Mian 2003). However, private banks in emerging 
markets, in particular, owner-managed banks, may be also prone to connected lending 
on noncommercial terms to family, close associates, or enterprises with which they 
have multidimensional ties (Mian 2003).70 
In those EE countries where governmental ownership remained prevalent in 
banking, weak regulatory structures allowed the proliferation of new private banks 
that exhibited the same behavioral patterns as their state-owned counterparts. New 
private banks continued to operate as “agent” or “pocket” banks, created by ministries 
and other state bodies as well as by state-owned enterprises and industrial groups 
seeking access to cheap credit. In Russia, some banks came to be owned or controlled 
by oil producers, who used these “oil banks” to provide cheap credit to their 
shareholders and owners (Gnezditskaia 2005).  
Domestic private banks in EE have been deeply involved in governmental 
activities: they channeled state credits to industries, participated in the financing of 
state programs, and mobilized savings to finance the state’s internal debt (Sheriff et al. 
2003). They benefited from the same sources of political power and privileges as 
SOBs, including access to cheap credit, protection from competition, and state 
guarantees. New private banks, which were not linked to enterprises by ownership, 
were often very small in size and could not influence financial policies in any 
meaningful way (Skosples 2006). Nor had they any political influence to pressure 
governments to improve the quality of regulatory and supervisory institutions that 
would prevent rent-seeking. Incumbent banks in EE—SOBs and private domestic—
relied on lobbying based on particularistic contacts rather than on formal, 
                                                 
70 In East Asia, family-owned and company-owned banks were found to be among the most risky, with 
excessive credit growth (Tschoegl 2003: 26). 
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institutionalized channels of representation through bank associations, particularly in 
the initial years of the transition (Frye 2002a).  
The third type of banks is foreign banks.71 Foreign banks foster competition in 
a host country’s financial market where domestic banks are forced to operate more 
efficiently in order to survive.72 Foreign banks are strangers to local interest networks 
and tend to be less politically connected domestically. Thus, they are less likely to be 
able to capture the government and more likely to resist governmental pressures for 
directed lending (Kroszner 1998, La Porta et al. 2002). 
Foreign banks do not need to create coalitions, organize, or mobilize politically 
to lobby for their preferred policies. Because they are holders of mobile assets, their 
power resides in the highly credible threat to “exit” or their unwillingness to lend or 
invest in a host country (Hirschman 1970, Maxfield and Haggard 1996). Under the 
conditions of increased financial integration, the bargaining power of mobile capital 
increases as it can move without substantial costs to more profitable markets. 
Although foreign direct investment cannot be quickly liquidated, it can be abandoned 
(Maxfield 1997). Because foreign lending is necessary in capital-scarce countries to 
finance domestic investment, a government may be willing to cater to the interests of 
international banks. International financial integration and balance-of-payment crises 
can further reinforce the political influence of these banks as the generators of foreign 
exchange over a national government’s intentions (Maxfield and Haggard 1996, 
Maxfield 1997, Stallings 1992). Domestic groups that rely on foreign capital are also 
                                                 
71 Foreign banks are banks in which the majority of shares are owned by foreign firms or in which a 
foreign firm is the first shareholder and the rest of the shares are dispersed among several shareholders. 
 
72 Scholars find that foreign banks tend to have lower interest margins and higher profitability than 
domestic banks in developing countries, while the opposite is true for developed countries. For a review 
of the empirical literature on foreign banks, see Detragiache et al. (2006), Goldberg (2004). 
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likely to modify their preferences and create coalitions to promote policies favorable 
to foreign investors (Evans 1979).73 
 
Interests and Behavior of Banks 
Financiers—domestic and foreign—have the potential to influence the choice 
and sustainability of exchange rate regime directly through the pursuit of their 
interests and their behavior in the exchange rate area, but also indirectly through other 
areas that involve their central concern. In addition to exchange rate policy, the 
principal areas of concern for financiers include monetary policy and financial 
regulation, and particularly restrictions on foreign bank entry. 
A specific empirical problem related to research into interest groups is how to 
identify their preferences and strategies. We can generate a picture of the economic 
interests of financial interests on the basis of deductive logic from existing economic 
theories. We can also visualize context-specific strategies on the basis of existing 
empirical research and field interviews. In this study, economic interests are assumed 
to be exogenous and are not expected to change, as long as the actors behave 
rationally and seek to maximize profits. What we can observe are the policy 
preferences that different types of banks have, or the varying strategies by which they 
seek to achieve their goals. Financier interests do not automatically translate into 
political action or influence. As argued above, the ownership structure and 
institutional characteristics of the financial system intervene.74 
 
                                                 
73 Nonetheless, if host governments grant foreign banks special privileges that allow them to establish a 
monopolistic position on host markets, their entry will not bring positive results (Mishkin 2006: 47). 
 
74 The discussion on the differences between economic interests, i.e., preferences over outcomes and 




According to the traditional argument, to protect the real value of their 
portfolios, the most universal preferences of banks are low inflation and stable 
monetary policy (Henning 1994, Maxfield 1997, Havrilesky 1990, Kirshner 2007, 
Posen 1993, Goodman 1992).75 Banks as creditors favor price stability because 
inflation decreases the real value of their liabilities. They are particularly sensitive to 
change in the spread of interest rates, which is usually associated with high inflation.  
I argue that in certain institutional contexts and situations, banks might not 
favor low inflation rates or policies aimed at low inflation. Banks may fear hawkish 
disinflationary policies of the central bank such as a radical increase in real interest 
rates to sustain a fixed exchange rate in the face of inflationary pressures. Interest rate 
hikes not only reduce bank profits but may also make the recovery of disbursed loans 
more difficult, thereby increasing the probability of bank insolvency (Cukierman 
1991). Financiers may act as “rent-seekers” and support monetary policies aimed at 
“sub-optimal” levels of inflation (Kirshner 1998: 75). An increase in nominal interest 
rates as a result of higher inflation may only mask larger interest rate spreads applied 
by banks. Banks may consider anti-inflationary policies undesirable, particularly if 
they have benefited from conditions of high inflation (Tompson 1997, Treisman 
1998). As a result of restrictive monetary policy, central bank credits become more 
expensive, higher reserve requirements squeeze banks’ liquidity, and access to 
budgetary funds is curtailed.  
The empirical evidence from EE supports the claim that not all types of finance 
are inherently inflation-averse. In some post-communist societies, SOBs, nominally 
privatized banks, and private domestic banks with government ties often acted as a 
                                                 
75 Kirshner (2007) extends this argument into the realm of national security. For him, the preference of 
banks for low inflation also determines their preferences for cautious national security strategies 
because war almost always results in inflation and erosion of monetary discipline.  
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“pro-inflation lobby” because they were the main beneficiaries of inflation by paying 
negative interest rates on deposits and earning a float (a form of inflation tax; 
Treisman 1998, Johnson 2000).76 Inflation also eased the burden of nonperforming 
assets on bank portfolios. Incumbent banks in EE opposed fixed exchange rate 
regimes used to bring inflationary expectations down, mostly in the framework of 
exchange rate–based stabilization programs.77 
The expansive credit policies of incumbent banks also make it difficult to 
achieve price stability. Lacking concern about the inflationary consequences of their 
policy strategies, incumbent banks with governmental ties grant risky “soft” loans to 
connected enterprises. Negative real interest rates due to high inflation result in low 
levels of financial intermediation, capital flights, low savings, and often a cyclical 
pattern of macroeconomic fluctuation. Such lax industrial lending practices of 
incumbent banks often lead to inflationary pressures and banking problems. 
To stabilize inflationary expectations, a government can grant independence to 
a central bank, with the legal stipulation of providing price stability. Independent 
central banks are less prone to political business cycles associated with expansionary 
policies to lower unemployment and interest rates before elections.78 Central banks 
with a higher degree of independence from government will be also less prone to 
providing below-market discount loans to connected enterprises. Posen (1993) and 
                                                 
76 According to the estimations of Easterly and Vieira da Cunha (quoted in Treisman 1998: 9), the 
Russian banking sector received 8 percent of the country’s GDP in 1992 through the inflation tax. 
 
77 Flexible regimes also may be used to fight inflation, but in conjunction with other anti-inflationary 
strategies, including monetary or inflation targets. Monetary targeting focuses on controlling the growth 
rate of domestic money-supply aggregates. Inflation targeting is based on a pre-announced inflation 
target and on policy responses to deviations between inflation forecasts and the target. 
 
78 Empirical studies show, however, that legal independence of the central bank is correlated with low 
inflation (and high growth) in developed, but not in developing countries (Maxfield 1997). For 
transition economies, this relationship holds only at high and sustained levels of liberalization 
(Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti 2002). For a review of the literature on central bank independence, see 
Eijffinger and De Haan (1996). 
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Goodman (1992) argue that a financial sector’s strength can predict not only inflation 
but also the legal independence of the central bank. For them, the financial sector, 
which is usually highly inflation-averse, should constitute the core constituency 
supporting central bank independence.79 
In light of the previous discussion, it is plausible to assume that not all groups 
of financiers have incentives to support central bank independence. Banks that do not 
favor price stability also do not favor central bank independence. Similarly, we can 
expect incumbent industrialists to be hostile to an independent central bank, fearing 
that they might lose privileged access to finance. In addition, central banks themselves 
can support the banking sector and thus generate significant inflationary pressures. 
Foreign banks in transition and developing countries may be better able to 
resist the moral suasion of host governments to lend to politically favored constituents 
or loss-making sectors of the economy, or to purchase government-issued bonds 
(Kroszner 1998: 25). Foreign financiers hold standard preferences for monetary 
stability and low inflation. To this end, international banks have more conservative 
lending policies. The greater presence of foreign banks may thus be a stabilizing force 
in host financial markets because the banks tend to pay greater attention to loan 
quality and to diversification of exposure (Crystal et al. 2001). In countries with weak 
central banks that make it difficult to commit to low inflation, or for governments with 
low credibility in international financial markets, foreign bank ownership can serve as 
a signal of commitment and as a transparency device (Gros 2003). Foreign bank entry 
promises the beneficial side effect of disciplining a host government’s monetary (and 
                                                 
79 Adolph (2004) argues that central bank behavior depends also on the agents who run it. Thus, central 
banks whose members are in the financial sector, i.e., “conservative,” are more inflation averse than 
those banks whose members are career bureaucrats.  
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fiscal) policies, making a fixed regime more sustainable and resistant to speculative 
attacks (Obstfeld 1998, Goldberg 2004: 9).  
Because foreign banks value price stability, they should be the primary 
constituency of independent central banks. In fact, developing country governments 
often grant independence to their central banks in order to signal commitment to low 
inflation to international investors and creditors (Maxfield 1997). 
 
Financial Regulation 
Bank regulatory and supervisory institutions can reduce imprudent borrowing 
and lending by banks, limit currency mismatches, restrict connected lending, ensure 
that banks have enough capital, and reduce moral hazards associated with 
governmental guarantees to provide bailouts to banks.80 In general, commercial banks, 
similar to any other private businesses, prefer fewer restrictions on their activities. 
Nevertheless, domestic incumbent banks tend to benefit the most from protective 
national regulation, in which the government explicitly guarantees loans these banks 
make or provides a guarantee to borrowers or to banks themselves when they 
encounter financial difficulties. The government provides the “safety net” to banks 
through the lender-of-last-resort facility, deposit insurance, and the “too-big-to-fail” 
policy (Mishkin 2006).  
Governments adopt these protective policies usually because they want to 
protect the banking system and depositors against a systemic banking crisis, but 
sometimes they do so under pressure from the powerful bankers they supervise (Stern 
and Feldman 2004). This governmental safety net can create moral hazards by 
                                                 
80 Regulatory and supervisory policies that influence “sound” banking include restrictions on bank 
activities and on the mixing of banking and commerce, regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry, 
on capital adequacy, a deposit insurance system, loan-classification stringency, and troubled-bank 
resolution actions. For a comprehensive analysis and a database of bank regulation and supervision, see 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2002a, 2002b). 
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providing insolvent banks incentives to “gamble on resurrection.”81 Banks grant 
excessively risky loans while expecting that their future losses will be borne by 
taxpayers (Williamson and Mahar 1998: 3). The protection of large SOBs also 
encourages the depositors to put their money in these banks, thereby making it easier 
for the government to direct resources to favored industries and enterprises (Stern and 
Feldman 2004). The governments can induce additional moral-hazard behavior by 
pressuring the central banks to use foreign exchange reserves to bail out domestic 
banks with liquidity problems resulting from imprudent lending policies. The 
combination of protective regulation and moral hazard behavior of SOBs results in a 
situation in which these banks burden governments with large contingent liabilities 
arising from guarantees that some of these banks (and large state-owned industries, 
their clients) are “too-big (or too-political)-to fail” (Caprio et al. 2004: 2). 
Financial deregulation may lead to opposition from incumbent banks. 
Financial liberalization eliminates interest rates and other price controls, together with 
less administrative direction of credit by governments, and thus leads to a reduction of 
the implicit taxation of banks. But it also exposes the bad loan portfolios of banks, the 
outcome of the previous bad credit allocation to borrowing enterprises no longer able 
to service debts because government subsidies or guarantees on loans were 
discontinued. Moreover, liberalization increases the short-term volatility in nominal 
interest rates and asset prices that changes the distribution of credit and reduces rents 
of the state-owned sector and favored borrowers (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1997).  
                                                 
81 Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999: 6) characterize the “moral hazard” problem as a situation with the 
following characteristics: 1) banks are leveraged and have limited liability, 2) markets have asymmetric 




Incumbent domestic banks may particularly benefit from restrictions on bank 
entry because they fear increased exposure to competition, mainly from international 
banks. Incumbent banks are expected to favor regulation preventing foreign entry of 
banks into the financial sector, as newcomers will compete away their rents. They 
would also oppose any prudential regulation and supervision of their activities that 
would limit the expansion of their balance sheets beyond their capital, prevent short-
term borrowing, and curb their profit-making opportunities. 
Although the interests of domestic banks with regard to regulatory restrictions 
on capital flows are not clear-cut, capital openness facilitates access of banks to funds 
for lending (Horowitz 2005: 116, Kaminsky and Schmukler 2003: 22).82 They can 
gain from intermediation of foreign purchases of domestic securities and from 
arbitrage opportunities in international financial markets (Haggard and Maxfield 1996: 
39). Capital account liberalization, combined with the moral hazards associated with 
governmental guarantees to provide bailouts, may, however, encourage banks to 
discount the risk of default and to engage in speculative short-term financial 
transactions (Montinola 2003). With limited liability and governmental guarantees if 
their capital erodes, banks would bear little risk of liberalization of capital and would 
favor it.83 It is plausible that domestic banks, searching for new profit-making 
opportunities and speculator transactions on international markets, influenced the 
deregulation of capital flows in EE to varying degrees.84 
                                                 
82 Alternatively, domestic banks may oppose the removal of capital controls because capital can flow 
away to more attractive destinations, limiting sources of bank funds; and capital inflows may erode 
their monopoly as suppliers of funds to industries (Horowitz 2005). 
 
83 The variation in financial liberalization outcomes has been attributed to partisanship (Quinn and 
Inclán 1997), central bank independence (Epstein and Schorr 1992), and crises (Haggard and Maxfield 
1996). More recent studies suggest the role of diffusion in financial liberalization (Simmons and Elkins 
2004, Brune and Guisinger 2006). 
 
84 For example, Russia, Ukraine, and Armenia as well as the Czech Republic have rapidly and fully 
liberalized their capital accounts despite severe macroeconomic instabilities. 
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The appointment of a conservative and independent regulator/supervisor, 
which will be less likely to pursue bank bailouts, can help reduce moral hazards 
created by the governmental safety net (Stern and Feldman 2004). In most countries, 
the regulatory authority is vested in the central bank, although bank regulation can be 
also assigned to a separate agency.85 Independent central banks are less likely to act as 
lenders of last resort to the banking system during a banking crisis or to accommodate 
fiscal expansion to bail out banks (Rosas 2006: 179). Therefore, we can expect that 
incumbent banks would want to capture a central bank (or other bank regulator), 
ensuring them rents from lax banking supervision and weak prudential regulation. 
Foreign investors should favor the financial liberalization of both entry into the 
banking sector and capital flows because it allows them to expand into new markets, 
increases their investment opportunities and profits, and gives them a stronger political 
voice.86 Foreign banks as equity investors are sensitive to regulation of the capital 
account because it can also affect their repatriation and liquidation options (Maxfield 
1997: 40). Foreign investors are not passive bystanders in the financial regulatory 
reforms in the countries they invest in; rather, they examine dangers and problems 
related to their investment and push for a regulatory framework that protects their 
interests, including regulation that lowers the risk of banking and financial crises 
(Hewko 2002/2003). Large foreign banks tend to favor strict regulation when 
investing in less developed economies because they risk their international reputation 
and face larger default costs (Mian 2003). In addition, the likelihood of bailing out the 
                                                 
85 In EE, Hungary and Bosnia and Hercegovina have separate agencies for the prudential supervision of 
banks. 
 
86 Cohen (1989) noticed that while large banks benefit from cross-border operations and financial 
integration, small banks tend to prefer national regulation. Similarly, Gruner and Hefeker (1996) argued 
that large European banks pushed for a full financial integration of banking regulation within the 
European single market because it promised greater cross-border bank cooperation. 
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uninsured depositors and creditors of foreign banks by host governments is lower than 
that for domestic banks. It is politically more difficult to sell to the public the need to 
save a foreign bank from domestic resources (Gross 2003).  
Although foreign banks have more funds to cover potential loan losses, a low 
probability of being bailed out discourages foreign banks from risk-taking behavior 
(Mishkin 2006: 151). In addition, large international banks have access to international 
sources of capital and can build investor confidence. In the face of financial turmoil, 
these banks can be a stabilizing factor and provide a safety net for panicking 
depositors (Stallings with Studart 2006).87  
 
Exchange Rates 
Domestic incumbent banks are likely to favor the monetary autonomy 
associated with a flexible regime that gives the government flexibility to define 
interest rates and expand the money supply. Under a flexible regime, exchange rate 
adjustments to support domestic enterprises are less visible to the public and, 
consequently, are less politically costly than devaluation under a fixed regime (Collins 
1996).  
Furthermore, fixed exchange rates, in combination with liberalized capital 
flows, can lead to frequent changes in foreign demand for domestic currency and thus 
to high volatility in interest rates. In order to generate profits, banks usually pass these 
changes in interest rates on to their customers through credit channels, thus making it 
more difficult for banks to establish long-term relationships with their borrowers. 
Therefore, domestic banks, which have close multiple ties with borrowing enterprises, 
may favor more flexible exchange rates (Hall 2005). 
                                                 
87 Still, the presence of foreign banks can increase the risk of contagion through common lender effects. 
The risk of contagion can be reduced if foreign banks have a subsidiary presence at host markets and 
not portfolio capital alone (Goldberg 2004: 18). 
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Under some circumstances, incumbent banks may have vested interests in 
fixed regimes but behave in ways that render these regimes unsustainable. In countries 
that have adopted fixed regimes, a double moral hazard situation emerges: domestic 
banks take un-hedged dollar-denominated loans from abroad and then issue domestic 
currency loans to certain enterprises. Banks have little incentive to hedge their foreign 
exposures because the government offers insurance against the risk of exchange rates 
of both domestic borrowers and foreign investors (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). 
In the presence of governmental guarantees, it is profitable for banks to increase their 
foreign exposure, for it will bring them additional returns in the absence of currency 
devaluation. Banks that accumulate dollar-denominated debt end up with varying 
degrees of currency (or maturity) mismatches on their balance sheets.88 Faced with 
currency mismatches, banks will favor exchange rate stability and thus the 
maintenance of a fixed regime, for the sharp nominal devaluation of domestic 
currency may have a negative impact on their solvency. 
However, when a government tries to defend the currency peg by selling its 
foreign exchange reserves and by increasing interest rates, banks faced with the 
increased costs of funding are forced to call their loans, thus imposing severe strains 
on enterprises. This defense can precipitate defaults on short-term domestic debts and 
lead to banking crises (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). Balance-sheet banking 
problems can lead to balance-of-payment crises. In accordance with the “third 
generation” models of currency crises, the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime 
then occurs as the result of imperfect information and moral hazards due to 
governmental guarantees to banks without an adequate system of banking regulation 
                                                 
88 A “currency mismatch” occurs when projects that generate domestic currency are financed with 
foreign currency. A “maturity mismatch” occurs when long-term projects are financed with short-term 
loans (Eichengreen and Haussmann 1999: 3). 
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and supervision (Krugman 1998, Chang and Velasco 1998, Corsetti, Pesenti, and 
Roubini 1998). These models are also called “twin crises” models because currency 
and banking crises often occur together.89 The severe banking crises that forced central 
banks to print money to bail out failing banks, contributed to currency-debt crises and 
collapses of exchange rate regimes. These banking crises present a dilemma for 
governments that bail out failing banks and save the banking system on one hand, and 
restrict monetary policy of high interest rates to defend exchange rate regime, on the 
other.90  
Foreign banks focus on cross-border transactions and are thus more sensitive 
than domestic banks to changes in aggregate foreign currency deposits because 
volatile exchange rates create uncertainty about international transactions (Mian 2003: 
5). Banks engaged in international business have a greater capacity to protect 
themselves and to profit from short-term exchange rate fluctuations (McNamara 1998: 
37–38, Oatley 1997: 17). But hedging is costly and more difficult beyond one-year 
periods because of limited forward markets (Hefeker 1997: 61).91 Hedging is 
particularly difficult in underdeveloped financial systems and for small countries’ 
currencies (Cooper 1999: 111). Even the most sophisticated hedges are no substitute 
for stable exchange rates (Dumas 1994), so international banks, as foreign direct 
investors, prefer to invest in countries with fixed regimes. They would rather bear the 
                                                 
89 While most often a banking crisis predates a currency crisis, the causal link is not unidirectional 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). 
 
90 Copelovich and Singer (2007) advance the argument that central banks responsible for both monetary 
policy and bank regulation, and confronted by two potentially conflicting goals—fighting inflation and 
maintaining financial stability—are more sensitive to bank stability. Therefore, they will less likely to 
engage in aggressive interest rate adjustments in the face of inflationary pressures than when bank 
regulation is assigned to a separate agency. For the examination of the determinants of government 
responses to banking crises, see Keefer (2006) and Rosas (2006). 
 
91 The innovative credit markets have not yet invented hedges for credit risk, considered to be the 
greatest banking risk. Natural hedges, achieved by negative correlations within the bank portfolio, are 
hard to find as credit exposures more often exhibit some degree of correlation with one another. 
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risk of sharp devaluations than the risk arising from a non-credible monetary policy 
and high exchange rate volatility (Papaioannou 2005).92 They tend to suffer less from 
the devaluation of host-country currency because they lend primarily to exporters and 
large foreign corporations, who usually benefit from a lower currency value (Tschoegl 
2003).  
Foreign banks, as portfolio investors, are also interested in price and financial 
stability and in risk reduction (Maxfield 1997: 42–45). Foreign banks lending to 
developing and transition countries should be particularly favorable to fixed regimes 
in order to decrease the risk of non-repayment and increase the risk-adjusted rate of 
return (Shambaugh 2004: 284).93 Governments in less developed countries 
experiencing a shortage of capital may have incentives to adopt a fixed regime, in part 
to attract foreign investors. 
In sum, large international banks earn an important portion of their profits from 
cross-border operations; therefore, the banks desire a high level of financial 
integration to increase the volume of banking transactions. Because of economies of 
scale, financial integration enables these banks to provide cross-border financial 
services more cheaply and to gain a larger market share (Hefeker 1997: 6). Because of 
their orientation toward international finance, international banks tend to favor stable 
exchange rates to promote overseas investment and to reduce currency risks. A 
credible fixed regime, combined with sufficiently high levels of foreign exchange 
reserves to discourage currency speculators, decreases risk and increases profit 
                                                 
92 The exchange rate preferences of foreign investors in the real sector vary depending on their 
investment motivations. If foreign investors seek export platforms in host countries, then their exchange 
rate preferences will converge with those of the export-oriented sectors, and they will prefer flexible 
regimes. On the other hand, investors seeking export platforms for specialized manufactured goods with 
limited “pass through” who are not affected by exchange rate volatility will prefer fixed regimes. See 
Shambaugh (2004).  
 
93 Shambaugh (2004: 286) argues that host governments relying on foreign portfolio investors may 
prefer a flexible regime to reduce the risk of sudden capital flight. 
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opportunities for banks. International banks are thus supporters of the monetary 
integration of fixed exchange rates.94 International financiers are also likely to favor an 
independent central bank to the extent that it can prevent excessive exchange rate 
volatility. Table 1 summarizes the expected interests and behavior of state-owned and 
foreign banks in exchange rate, and in monetary and regulatory policies. 
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This chapter has outlined the theory that politicians’ decisions to adopt and 
sustain a fixed exchange rate regime should be an increasing function of the financial 
institutional structures dominated by outsider financiers and stable monetary and 
regulatory institutions. My argument is the second cousin to arguments linking 
macroeconomic policies to the relative capability of the financial sector to influence 
government actors. Still, I go beyond that and show how and why government 
responsiveness varies with bank ownership structure. This study tells a story about 
forces shaping exchange rate policy making, linking financial ownership and 
institutional structures to the relative capacity of different financial actors to influence 
government actions. The argument is also broadly consistent with other arguments 
stressing the structural power of foreign capital in influencing government actions.  
The impact of the conditions set by international financial institutions to explain their 
exchange rate policy choices is secondary to domestic conditions in transition 
economies in which their external monetary policy choices reflect primarily the 
finance logic of domestic distribution and institution building. While arguments 
stressing economic institutions (i.e., property rights, and monetary and regulatory 
institutions) and regime type are consistent with the argument presented in this study, 
arguments stressing how various political institutions, such as political parties alone, 




THE VARIETY OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE 
“…free financial markets are the elixir that fuels the process of creative destruction, 
continuously rejuvenating the capitalist system. As such, they are also the primary 
target of the powerful interests that fear change.” 
Rajan and Zingales95 
In the preceding chapter, I developed just one dimension of my finance-based 
theory of exchange rate regime choice by exploring the sources of the political 
influence of banks on government politicians. I also identified the interests and 
strategies of SOBs, private domestic banks, and foreign banks regarding exchange rate 
and monetary and regulatory policies. The second dimension of the theory suggests 
that government responsiveness to the demands of various types of banks is a function 
of the national financial system in place at the time. In this chapter I go one step back 
and examine what determines the development of a national financial system in EE. 
The principal explanatory factor presented is financial openness to foreign entry in the 
banking sector through privatization. 
The financial system—“the brain of the economy”—coordinates the 
channeling of funds from households and enterprises that have surplus funds to those 
that have a shortage of funds and allocates savings to the best investment opportunities 
(Mishkin 2006: 25).96 A growing body of literature demonstrates a strong positive link 
between the functioning of the financial system and long-run economic growth 
(Levine 2004).97 The experience of the post-communist countries of EE represents a 
                                                 
95 Rajan and Zingales (2003b: 25). 
 
96 Financial systems provide five broad functions: 1) evaluating projects and allocating capital, 2) 
exerting corporate control, 3) facilitating risk management, 4) mobilizing and pooling savings, and 5) 
facilitating exchange (Levine 2004). 
 
97 Some scholars, however, disagree and insist that instead of causing growth, financial institutions only 
respond to demands from the enterprise sector. A notable example of this view is Joan Robinson’s 
(1952: 86) claim that “where enterprise leads finance follows.” 
 66 
unique opportunity to shed new light on issues of financial development. 
The development of the financial system in post-communist EE provides a 
natural experiment in that most EE countries began the transition with a monobank 
system, in which both money supply and credit allocation functions were located 
within a single institution. The transition from a command economy, where almost all 
property was state-owned, to a market economy with individual property rights was a 
quasi-experiment in which a completely new set of institutions were created over a 
short period of time. Facing similar financial liberalization pressures (and 
Europeanization for a subset of countries), EE countries pursued a remarkable 
diversity of financial development policies intended to create market-oriented 
financial systems. These different financial reform strategies led to a variety of 
financial systems that were consequential for their monetary and exchange rate 
policies. If we define the exchange rate policies of EE states as the result of diverse 
financial institutional structures, we explain one puzzle but reveal a new one: What are 
the sources of this diversity of financial development in the EE region?98  
I argue that the variation in the timing and the mode of divestiture of state 
assets in banks (and industries) and the opening to foreign bank entry have had major 
consequences for the variation in financial systems in EE. Varying financial reform 
strategies in the region have yielded two principal types of financial systems: 
clientelistic and open. These systems can be distinguished according to the nature of 
the structure of bank ownership, which can take one of three possible forms: state, 
private domestic, or foreign. Institutional governance; that is, monetary and regulatory 
institutions and the accompanying features of the financial architecture, then depends 
crucially on the ownership structure. 
                                                 
98 In this respect, the approach of sequenced explanations adopted by Katzenstein (1985) is similar to 
that employed in this dissertation. 
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Financial reforms are difficult to implement because of opposition from 
entrenched parties. The most important source of such opposition is usually SOBs, as 
well as their clients, state-owned enterprises. If a government defers the hard choice to 
privatize government banks (and industries) or uses insider privatization schemes that 
restrict foreign bank entry, a clientelistic financial system develops. The oligopolistic 
bank ownership structure remains dominated by incumbent, mainly government, 
banks, so the financial system remains repressed, which allows the government to 
impose discretionary policies. The regulatory and monetary institutions manage bank 
licensing, imprudent bank borrowing and lending, and the moral hazard associated 
with governmental guarantees to provide bailouts to domestic banks also remain weak. 
Weak corporate governance allows rent-seeking networks of incumbent financiers and 
industrialists whoa re connected through lending and ownership to preserve political 
channels to control the governments. Because of their privileged access to government 
politicians, incumbents have the power to obtain their preferred economic policies. 
Incumbent influence is more likely to result in excessive moral hazard behavior by 
banks, high volumes of nonperforming loans, poor protection of property rights, costly 
bank bailouts, and forced changes in exchange rate regimes after systemic banking and 
financial crises.  
In contrast, if a country allows foreigners to assume the role of strategic 
investors in domestic SOBs through transparent privatization, an open financial 
system develops. The entry of foreign banks weakens discretionary forms of state 
intervention and the political influence that was established during communism of 
clientelistic networks among banks, industries, and the state. Openness to international 
banks—agents of globalization—simultaneously fosters competition, under which 
governments have incentives to build strong regulatory institutions and credible 
central banks. This openness also creates a new set of domestic private banks with the 
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potential to demand these institutions.99 Foreign financiers have vested interests in 
ensuring strong institutions that will protect their property rights and stable profits. 
The government is also motivated to improve the quality of institutions that enable it 
to regulate foreign financiers and extract revenues from them. This institutional setting 
allows governments to harden budget constraints and pursue sustainable financial and 
exchange rate policies aimed at economic stabilization and growth. 
Within each financial system, I further identify two subtypes depending on the 
status of the central bank.100 The central bank can have independent or subordinate 
status in both types of financial systems in the economy.101 I thus identify four ideal 
types of financial institutional arrangements that I call capture, collusion, consensus, 
and competition.102 When a small network of incumbent banks and enterprise 
managers is able to dominate the government and the central bank through personal 
and ownership ties, the likely outcome is capture, which leads to discretionary 
monetary policies and unsustainable exchange-rate regimes. Collusion is the state of 
affairs in which incumbent banking ties to industry are close, either through 
management or ownership, and in which there is also a fusion of interests among 
banks, industries, and the government, but the central bank is autonomous. The likely 
outcome is an incoherent and unsustainable monetary-fiscal policy mix. Consensus is 
the type of system in which ties between (domestic and foreign) banks and industries 
are market-based but the policy interests of the ministry of finance (and other 
                                                 
99 In EE, it was not until foreign banks were allowed to acquire strategic stakes in the domestic banking 
sectors that private ownership took a firm hold (Berglof and Bolton 2002: 85). 
 
100 The four-fold typology presented below is based on the empirical data from EE. 
 
101 In this chapter, I do not systematically explore the reasons for this variation in central-bank 
independence. However, I carefully trace the relationship among central banks, commercial banks 
(domestic and foreign), and industries in my case studies. 
 
102 I am indebted to Anna Grzymala-Busse for her excellent insights on business-government 
relationships in various EE countries that significantly influenced my typology. 
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economic ministries involved in exchange rate policy-making) overlap with those of 
the central bank. The economic policy pattern is likely to be a stable currency, but 
exchange rate policies are adjusted to the needs of economic sectors. Finally, 
competition is the state of affairs in which ties between (mostly foreign) banks, 
industries, and the government are weak, and the central bank is autonomous. The 
resulting economic policy in this case is likely to favor exchange rate fixity. Figure 3.1 
displays the key dimensions and characteristics of the different financial systems.  
Departing from the standard view on central bank independence, I argue that 
granting legal independence to a central bank does not necessarily lead to good 
economic outcomes (as the Czech case illustrated in chapter 7 demonstrates). The 
importance of an independent central bank is contingent on the bank ownership 
structure. In other words, the distinction between incumbent versus foreign-dominated 
banking structures conditions the importance of central bank independence and how it 
functions.103  
In section 1 of the next part of this chapter, I briefly consider the strengths and 
weaknesses of existing explanations of financial system variation. In section 2, I 
explore various privatization strategies and present the logic of my argument on 
financial system development. In section 3, I empirically examine the differences in 






                                                 





• Weak regulation and supervision 
• Rent-seeking bank-industry ties¹ 
• Inflationary connected lending 
• Financial instability and banking crises 
• Bank bailouts (“too big to fail”) 





















• Strong regulation and supervision 
• Market-based bank-industry ties¹ 
• Depoliticized lending 
• Financial stability 
• No bailouts of banks 
• Sustainable exchange rate policies 
¹Through ownership/management 
 
Figure 3.1: Key dimensions and characteristics of financial systems 
 
Related Literature 
My study touches on many of the themes of the financial development and 
growth literature. Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) provided the most ambitious 
explanation of a national diversity of financial systems, emphasizing access to capital. 
Two types of financial systems were identified based on these criteria: bank-based and 
market-based financial systems. In market-based systems, financial markets directly 























































financial intermediaries, such as banks, provide loans to enterprises for financing their 
investments (indirect finance). Gerschenkron linked the timing of industrialization to 
the organization of the financial system while focusing on the relative degrees of 
market, bank, and state intermediation in providing long-term capital: whereas the 
British industrialization was market-financed, French and German industrialization 
was financed by banks.104 In extremely backward countries, such as Russia, it was the 
government that generally fulfilled the function of the bank and encouraged economic 
growth (Gerschenkron 1962: 22). 
Zysman (1983) applied Gerschenkron’s insight to the study of industrial policy 
in the postwar period and identified France (instead of Russia) as the model of a state-
led banking system. Rather than emphasizing the extent of a country’s economic 
backwardness, Verdier (2001, 2004) stressed the degree of state centralization in 
explaining why some countries (Britain and France) but not others (Germany) 
developed corporate securities markets.105 Hall (2005) showed that in developing 
countries, the dominant type of finance systems is the private-savings system, in 
which domestic investment is financed mostly by the private savings of investors.  
These explanations and typologies of financial systems focus predominantly on 
developed countries and do not seem very helpful for examining EE. It has been 
argued that EE societies share many features of late industrializers; their private 
                                                 
104 Industrialization in France was financed by investment banks, whereas in Germany it was financed 
by universal banks. 
 
105 Economists and policymakers have long debated the relative benefits of bank-based versus market-
based financial systems, mostly comparing four countries—Germany and Japan versus the United 
States and the United Kingdom. The results of Levine’s (2002) broad cross-country examination show 
that although overall financial development is strongly correlated with economic growth, there is no 
support for the superiority of either the bank-based or the market-based view. Although banks may 
perform better than “atomistic” markets at identifying innovative projects and enterprises, effectively 
monitoring managers and financial industrial expansion; banks may also acquire powerful influence 
over and extract rents from enterprises. Bank managers may collude with enterprises with which they 
have long-term, multidimensional ties against other creditors and be reluctant to bankrupt such 
enterprises (Levine 2004: 26-33). 
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enterprises exhibit a high reliance on lending from commercial banks for shortages of 
capital and credit (Roderick 2002).106 Most empirical analyses of financial 
development in EE thus concluded that the financial system best suited to 
developmental needs, and the one that has actually emerged in all EE countries, is 
closer to the German system than the American one (Gross and Steinherr 2004, Bolton 
and Berglof 2002).107 This difference exists despite the rhetoric of EE governments to 
follow IMF prescriptions and to model their economies on Anglo-American 
capitalism.  
Post-communist financial systems are strongly dominated by banks, and 
ownership structures in individual firms and banks are highly concentrated. Capital 
markets are relatively underdeveloped, volatile, and illiquid, with trade concentrated in 
a small number of enterprises. Some EE countries, including Albania, Belarus, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have never established 
stock markets (Berglof and Bolton 2002). Only Russia has occasionally been depicted 
as an exception in EE as it moves in the direction of a market-based system because of 
several factors: the “securities friendly” nature of its enterprise privatization through 
the distribution of vouchers, decentralization of its banking system, and, finally, the 
periods of high inflation that undermined bank intermediation (Popov 1999). 
Nevertheless, the banking systems in EE countries seem to be hybrids of 
different systems rather than pure versions of the German model of cross-shareholding 
                                                 
106 Historically, late industrializing societies used commercial banks or state banks to achieve strategic 
national objectives (Gershenkron 1962).  
 
107 In the 1990s, bank-related scandals in Germany raised doubts about the benefits of the bank-based 
system, with the primary criticism revolving around anti-competitive practices, biases towards heavy 
industry, and banking system instability. Critics denounced relationship-based banking because it gave 
banks disproportionate power over enterprises and allowed them to exploit their positions by imposing 
collusive agreements and mergers. The outcome was a concentration of financial services accompanied 
by the increased market power of a few large banks and high finance costs. German and French 
financial systems have recently undergone deep transformation through liberalization and large-scale 
privatization, which lead to a gradual rapprochement to a market-based model of finance (Fohlin 2007). 
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or the securities-based system. For example, the Czech banking system in the 1990s 
was characterized as a hybrid of the French “price-administered” and the German 
“oligopolistic” credit systems (Desai 1995). Rostowski (1995) argued that it is 
unlikely that transition economies will develop German-style universal banks because 
their SOBs, ill-equipped to allocate and manage long-term credit, are likely to fail to 
exercise strict financial control over borrowers. 
Given that financial systems in most EE economies are underdeveloped, the 
approaches that would be more helpful in studying these systems would be those that 
point to the complementarities between markets and banks and that focus on the 
sources of cross-national variance in financial development across nations.108 One 
strand of this literature stresses the importance of differences in national legal systems, 
showing that English common law systems have stronger investor-protection 
enforcement and thus more developed financial systems than civil law systems (La 
Porta et al. 1997 and 1998).109 Yet, despite inheriting the same set of civil law 
systems, EE countries have not performed equally well in developing their financial 
systems.110 The more recent political economy strand recognizes the relationship 
between various political factors and financial systems development (Haggard et al. 
1993, Kroszner 1998, Haber et al. 2003, Pagano and Volpin 2005, Rajan and Zingales 
2003a, 2003b, Fries 2005, Keefer 2006, Stallings with Studart 2006).111 
                                                 
108 A developed financial system exhibits the following characteristics: 1) protection of property rights, 
2) an accounting and disclosure system that promotes transparency, 3) a legal system that enforces 
market contracts, and 4) a regulatory infrastructure that protects consumers, promotes competition, and 
controls excessive risk-taking (Rajan and Zingales 2003a: 18).  
 
109 Researchers working within this tradition have related financial development to property rights, 
enforcement of financial contracts, and investor protection. 
 
110 Only Russia has had a brief, but unsuccessful, experiment in a common-law approach to corporate 
law (Berglof and Bolton 2002: 90). 
111 See King and Levine (1993), Levine (1997), and Levine and Zervos (1998) for the recent landmark 
studies on financial development and growth, and Levine (2004) for a recent review of this literature. 
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My explanation of the variation in EE financial systems is most closely related 
to the interest group theory of financial development developed by Rajan and Zingales 
(2003a, 2003b). Its foundations are worth some elaboration. According to this theory, 
when financial markets are underdeveloped, incumbent interest groups—financiers 
and industrialists—reap all the benefits of new business opportunities. These groups 
are the only ones with access to capital, through internal cash flows or relationship-
based finance, and they will use their political power to oppose financial development 
because it introduces competition and erodes their positional rents and relationships.112 
However, the greater the openness of a country to trade and capital flows, the weaker 
the ability of incumbents to impede financial development. When a country is open to 
foreign trade, incumbent industries cannot charge monopoly prices. Similarly, when a 
country is open to global financial flows, enterprises are not limited to financing 
supplied by incumbents. Thus, the variation in the extent of financial development 
among countries and over time is a function of the variation in both trade barriers and 
capital openness. Along the same lines, Fries (2005) argued that banking reforms in 
EE advanced when vested interests from the previous regime in the industrial sector 
weakened in the face of trade and financial openness enhancing competition.113  
The current study can be viewed as an extension of this approach by showing 
that when a country is open to foreign competition in its financial sector and allows 
privatization by foreign investors, the political influence of incumbent financiers and 
industrialists is reduced. I thus argue that variation in financial structures is a function 
                                                 
112 The literature examining the sources of interest-group influence on governments includes 
information asymmetries (Helpman and Grossman 1996), institutions (Persson and Tabellini 2000), and 
collective-action problems (Olson 1965). 
 
113 Studies also have identified determinants of financial development that are exogenous to 
contemporary political processes, such as the nature of European colonization (Acemoglu and Johnson 
2003), religion, and social capital (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2004).  
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of variation in the barriers to foreign investments in the banking sector.  
 
Explanation of the Variety of Financial Systems in EE  
Overall Background 
Before the collapse of communism, EE countries had financial systems based 
on a “monobank” that performed all banking functions: issuing money, acting as the 
state treasury, and existing as the only source of credit for the economy (Lavigne 
1999: 186–189). Under a command economy, governments used SOBs to direct credit 
to state enterprises for production and investments for attaining output targets that 
conformed to economic plans. Socialist financial systems consisted of government 
banks specialized by economic sector or foreign trade (like investment, agricultural, 
trade-finance banks), a national bank, and savings banks. 
Financial markets in socialist countries were “financially repressed.” In such a 
system, it was the government that determined who gives or receives credit, and at 
what price (Williamson and Mahar 1998: 2, McKinnon 1991).114 Financial repression 
permitted EE governments to impose policies, regulations, and informal controls that 
included selective and sectoral credit schemes, high reserve requirements, interest rate 
ceilings, and controls on foreign exchange that inhibited the standard operation of 
banks (Denizer et al. 2006). The costs of financial repression were usually borne by 
depositors who received low or negative interest on their funds and by small 
enterprises that had limited access to credit (Stallings with Studart 2006: 22–23). 
Socialist financial systems were thus simply “accounting control and cash 
disbursement vehicles” for the state, which also provided deposit and payment 
                                                 
114 Financial repression has a long history. As early as the Middle Ages in Europe, forward foreign-
exchange contracts (bills of exchange) were invented to bypass interest rate controls (Caprio et al. 2001: 
4, fn. 1).  
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services to enterprises and individual savers (Montes-Negret and Muller 1996). 
Financial systems have developed through several stages since the collapse of 
communism. The first task of the new post-communist governments was to create a 
two-tier banking system with a central bank and independent commercial banks.115 As 
table 3.1 shows, some countries had already created a two-tier banking system before 
the collapse of communism. Initially, both the newly created commercial banks and 
the “specialty” banks with monopolies in their core activities were state owned, 
including savings banks that were the only banks with extensive branch networks to 
collect primary deposits (Bonin et al. 2004). 
 
Table 3.1: Introduction of Two-tier Banking System 
 
Country Monobank Year 
Yugoslavia National Bank of Yugoslavia 
Narodna Banka Jugoslavije 
1954 
Soviet Union The State Bank of the USSR 
Gosbank 
1987 
Hungary National Bank of Hungary 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
1988 
 
Poland National Bank of Poland 
Narodowy Bank Polski 
1989 
Czechoslovakia The State Bank of 
Czechoslovakia 
Státní Banka Československá 
1990 
Bulgaria Bulgarian National Bank 
Blgarska Narodna Banka 
1991 
Financial liberalization has been one way to reduce government ownership of 
banks, to eliminate government-imposed restrictions on financial transactions, and to 
increase competition in the banking industry. Privatization of government banks and 
liberalization of restrictions on the entry of private and foreign banks into domestic 
                                                 
115 For a good discussion of the initial bank reforms in transition economies, see Journal of 
Comparative Economics 1997, volume 25, no. 1 and OECD. Proceedings: The New Banking 
Landscape in Central and Eastern Europe: Country Experience and Policies for the Future. Paris: 
CCET: 1997. 
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financial markets are the key components of financial liberalization (Mishkin 2006, 
Mahar and Williamson 1998).116 Bank privatization has been the cornerstone of the 
financial reforms in EE. Privatization has worked alongside interest rate liberalization, 
the free entry of new banks, and fundamental changes in regulatory and supervisory 
institutions to transform socialist banking systems into market-oriented banking 
systems.117 The objective of privatization and other bank reforms was to create private 
property, replacing discretionary forms of state intervention and the rent-seeking of 
SOBs by increasing competition in financial markets.118 Thus, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998: 10–11) articulate the rationale for privatization in transition countries: 
 
Privatization then offers an enormous political benefit for the creation of 
institutions supporting private property because it creates the very private 
owners who then begin lobbying the government … to create market-
supporting institutions … [Such] institutions would follow private property 
rather than the other way around. 
 
                                                 
116 Mishkin (2006: 51) identified two components of financial liberalization: internal and external. 
While internal financial liberalization involves lifting regulations that restrict domestic financial 
institutions from lending their funds at market rates or that set quantitative limits on the allocation of 
credit, external liberalization focuses on capital account liberalization and openness to foreign banks 
(Mishkin 2006: 51). In the comprehensive Survey of Financial Liberalization, Mahar and Williamson 
(1998) identified six dimensions of financial liberalization: 1) the elimination of credit controls, 2) the 
deregulation of interest rates, 3) free entry into the banking sector, 4) bank autonomy, i.e., freeing banks 
from ad hoc interference in bank management, 5) private ownership of banks, and 6) liberalization of 
international capital flows. 
 
117 For an excellent discussion of financial sector reforms in transition economies, see Berglof and 
Bolton (2002), and the EBRD Transition Report 1998: Financial Sector in Transition. 
 
118 Privatization was part of the so-called Type II reforms focused on the establishment of a viable 
commercial banking system and of the appropriate regulatory infrastructures (Hanoušek, Kočenda and 
Švejnar 2005).  
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Privatization and the Logic of Financial Development 
The privatization of SOBs has proved to have had a crucial role in the 
development of financial systems.119 Bank privatizations were sporadic in the 1960s 
and 1970s in Europe, but the main wave of privatizations occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s in over one hundred countries. Privatization in banking has been much slower, 
however, than in other sectors, despite its promise of significant gains (Megginson and 
Netter 2001).120 In spite of numerous privatizations over the past few decades, 
extensive governmental ownership of banks persists throughout the world. State 
ownership of banks also varies widely by region. As table 3.2 shows, in 1995, South 
Asian countries had the highest share of banking sector assets held by government-
controlled banks, followed by the Middle-Eastern and EE countries. Megginson’s 
(2005) comprehensive survey of empirical evidence on bank privatization concluded 
that an increasingly common outcome of large-scale privatization programs in many 
countries is foreign ownership of banks, which has a positive economic effect but 







                                                 
119 Numerous studies have demonstrated the positive effects of privatization on the size and liquidity of 
stock markets, the enhancement of securities diversification, investor confidence-building, and so on. 
See Boutchkova and Megginson (2000) for a survey of the literature on privatization and financial 
development.  
 
120 The share of state-owned enterprises of “global GDP” has declined from more than 10 percent in 
1979 to less than 6 percent (Megginson and Netter 2001: 380). 
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Table 3.2: Ownership Structure of Banking Systems around the World, 1970–
1995 
 
       1970          1985          1995 
Region   State Private State Private State Private 
Developed  37.0 63.0  31.6 68.4  21.8 78.2 
Developing  65.6 34.4  2.6 37.4  48.4 51.2 
East Asia Pacific 49.1 50.9  5.7 54.3  41.1 58.9 
Eastern Europe 90.2 9.8  6.0 4.0  49.9 50.1 
Latin America  65.8 34.2  4.8 45.2  40.1 59.9 
Middle East  55.4 44.6  5.1 44.9  54.2 45.8 
South Asia  94.7 5.3  97.9 2.1  87.5 12.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 40.8 59.2  48.5 51.5  33.6 66.4 
Source: Stallings with Studart (2006: 63).  
 
Bank privatization in EE differs significantly from bank sales in other parts of 
the world: first, they involved a transformation from a socialist system, in which banks 
played a central coordinating and credit-rationing function, to a market economy in 
which banks have completely different functions; and second, many banks were sold 
through voucher privatization (Megginson 2005).121 Bank privatization is also 
significantly different from the privatization of industrial enterprises in EE. EE 
governments privatized SOBs in smaller numbers and later, they privatized state-
owned enterprises.122 
This study advances the argument that timing and the chosen privatization 
method significantly determines the overall impact of the privatization process on how 
the financial system functions. SOBs were the largest banks in the financial markets of 
EE countries, and their privatization to outsiders was important in limiting their 
                                                 
121 A special issue of the Journal of Comparative Economics (1997, 25) is dedicated to banking 
privatization in EE.  
 
122 In contrast to the banking sector, the number of privatized companies in transition economies was 
very large. Djankov and Murrell (2002) reported over 150 thousand large firms in transition economies 
that faced transformation changes. See Megginson and Netter (2001), Djankov and Murrell (2002), and 
Hanoušek, Kočenda and Švejnar (2005) for surveys of a large body of literature on enterprise 
privatization in EE. 
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power. Governments privatizing SOBs face a common set of problems that include the 
method of privatization and the policy for the entry of private/foreign capital. 
The different privatization methods used include 1) direct sales to a foreign 
strategic investor, 2) initial public offering on domestic markets, 3) voucher 
privatization (sometimes known as “mass privatization”), and 4) management-led 
buyouts, where bank management, employees, and customers are the first to be 
offered shares for purchase (Megginson and Netter 2001).123 In contrast to the first 
two methods, in which the government expects to raise revenues, in voucher 
privatization, vouchers exchangeable for shares in state banks and enterprises are 
distributed at deep discounts to the population. This method, the most controversial 
method of divesting state assets, has been used exclusively in transition economies.124 
Voucher privatization, with significant concessions to insiders, or management-
employee buyouts, is considered here as an “insider” privatization method. 
Related to the adopted privatization method is a determination of the maximum 
stake that any single investor—domestic or foreign—can have, so a government’s 
strategy for bank privatization in EE involved choosing both a policy on foreign 
ownership and a method of privatization consistent with this policy (Bonin et al. 1998: 
21). The entry of foreign banks into the EE banking sector was directly connected to 
privatization through a direct sales method; that is, auctions or tenders. These involved 
only a very few foreign greenfield banks, particularly in the initial years of transition. 
Following Bonin (1998), in this study, governmental policy that encourages (or 
                                                 
123 Brada (1996) presented a full taxonomy of privatization methods. In addition to the privatization 
methods examined in this study, he also identified the privatization through restitution method, 
appropriate when property that was expropriated in the past can be returned to either the original 
owners or to their heirs. This method was only used in EE but not in bank privatization. 
 
124 The mass-privatization program has been seen as the biggest “switching point” in post-communist 
development (King and Hamm 2005: 54). 
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discourages) the entry of either new private banks or foreign banks as greenfield 
investments corresponds to privatizing the banking sector.  
EE governments have chosen different strategies for bank privatization. While 
some countries have chosen to liberalize and privatize their banking systems, mostly 
to reputable foreign banks, and to strengthen the institutional capacity of their 
domestic financial systems, others, for example, a number of post-Soviet republics, 
along with Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania, chose not to genuinely break up the 
socialist banking system and instead to retain effective control of banks. SOBs in the 
latter three countries remained major stakeholders in industrial enterprises, either 
through the outstanding debts of these enterprises or through personal relations 
inherited from the communist regime. Governments have also used regulations to 
restrict new competition, particularly from foreign banks. For example, in Azerbaijan, 
a 1994 decree required state-owned enterprises to bank only with SOBs. Similarly, 
since 1992, Russia has imposed an official limit on the entry of foreign banks.125  
Delayed privatizations and restrictions on foreign bank entry protect SOBs 
from competition. Financial systems remain financially repressed and dominated by 
large SOBs, which are able to preserve their relationships with those who have 
influence over enterprises, such as managers, other lenders, and the political elite, as 
well as their monopoly rents as the sole providers of funding to various enterprises. 
Financial repression is used to maintain soft budget constraints to state-owned and 
privatized enterprises through banks that absorbed the losses of those enterprises in the 
short run (Denizer et al. 2006: 566). Directed credits to certain industries at low 
interest rates on the basis of political connections encourage rent-seeking behavior and 
the misallocation of funds (Caprio et al. 2001: 6). Privatization has a strong potential 
                                                 
125 The limit on foreign bank ownership was 12 percent until 2001 but was later increased to 25 percent.  
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to improve the functioning of a financial system in part by limiting harmful 
governmental interventions in allocating credit. Private ownership of banks also 
provides better incentives to discipline the risk-taking behavior of bank managers.  
However, Insider privatization schemes—vouchers and management-led 
buyouts—do not improve financial institutional outcomes. The outcome of these 
schemes is an extensive cross-ownership between banks and industries that remains an 
indirect form of state ownership (Kornai 1995: 43–45). Hence, existing management 
remains firmly entrenched, and banks are not independent of state control. Insider 
privatization, therefore, does not credibly challenge incumbent banks and enterprises.  
In EE, voucher privatization allowed citizens to use vouchers that were 
distributed free or at nominal cost to acquire shares in state-owned enterprises.126 The 
attraction of the program was the speed in which state property was transformed and 
the egalitarian distribution of shares to the population. Mass privatization was also 
intended to destroy the strongest potential anti-reform coalitions, which consisted of 
managers and workers of state-owned enterprises (King and Hamm 2005).So, the 
decision to pursue mass privatization, and its specific program design, was primarily 
dictated by politics (Boycko et al. 1996).  
Nonetheless, contrary to intentions, voucher privatization has brought new 
opportunities for incumbent banks to become involved in the ownership of industrial 
enterprises, mainly through their role in managing voucher privatization (investment) 
funds. Voucher distribution initially resulted in a widely held ownership structure, 
which impeded (foreign) strategic investors from taking an interest in a bank. Over 
time, domestic incumbent banks, through investment funds, acquired significant share 
                                                 
126 The design of voucher privatization varied across countries. While the Czech voucher privatization 
program relied heavily on vouchers and prohibited the post-sale trading of stock, the Russian program 
privatized only small stakes (29 percent on average) in enterprises and allowed the unrestricted trading 
of vouchers (Katz and Owen 1997). 
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holdings in other banks and industrial enterprises (King and Hamm 2005). Voucher 
privatization in the Czech Republic resulted in cross-ownership between incumbent 
banks and enterprises (or even with the government). Banks acted simultaneously as 
owners and creditors of these enterprises and were thus motivated as owners to bail 
them out when they were in difficulty. We can expect that incumbent interests would 
support vouchers and private-placement methods of state divestiture because these do 
not erode their established monopolies (Ben-David 2003). 
Voucher privatization was also sometimes used as a means to preserve 
domestic ownership and to impede foreigners from buying domestic industries. For 
example, one of the principal motives behind the voucher privatization program 
implemented by the Klaus government in the first half of the 1990s was to prevent 
foreign investors from the buying the then weak Czechoslovakian economy. Later on, 
the Czech government also prohibited or tacitly discouraged foreign ownership in the 
privatizing of banks. 
Management-led privatization and other specific government programs 
allowed incumbent banks to acquire strategic shares in “crown jewel” enterprises and 
in other banks without investing a lot of money (Martin 2002, Eyal et al. 1998, Stark 
and Bruszt 1998). In 1995, the Russian government implemented a program called 
“loans for shares” that transferred control of twelve natural resource enterprises to a 
small group of powerful Russian banks at a fraction of their value.127 This “wild 
privatization” in Russia allowed the largest banks in Moscow to become the dominant 
players in the Russian economy (Rutland 2005: 4). In Ukraine, the government 
                                                 
127 The objective of the program was to finance the increased budget deficit. To this end, the Russian 
government contracted loans for about 1 billion dollars against the collateral of shares owned by the 
state in the most profitable natural resource industries. Because the government did not buy back the 
shares after the agreed-upon three-year maturity period, banks took ownership of valuable state assets 
(Gros and Steinherr 2004). For example, the Menatep bank obtained 78 percent of Yukos shares, and 
Oneximbank gained 38 percent of Norilsk Nickel shares (Popov 1999: 23). 
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introduced so-called surface privatization, allowing bank clients—former state-owned 
enterprises—to acquire large stakes in government banks and to distribute bank shares 
to the employees of these client enterprises and of the banks themselves (Barisitz 
2005: 65). The extent of cross-ownership led to the rise of financial conglomerates and 
“financial oligarchs,” especially in Russia and Ukraine (Rutland 2001 and 2005). 
When privatization allows a buyer to put only a little of his own capital into the bank, 
there is a danger that such a privatized bank will engage in risky activities (Mishkin 
2006: 150). 
The privatization of SOBs in EE was also directly linked to the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises.128 As Stark et al. (2000) pointed out, in the East European 
“privatization race,” the lack of private investors often resulted in “privatization” of 
state-owned enterprises to other state-owned enterprises. Thus, relations among 
enterprises were based not only on economic but also on political and social 
considerations and the state retained an important connection with state enterprises 
throughout the privatization process.129 Insider privatization methods also allowed 
state-owned enterprises to become bank shareholders. Generally, when large 
enterprises are allowed to buy banks, they are likely to engage in connected lending 
(Mishkin 2006: 150). 
In sum, contrary to the standard theoretical expectations that vouchers (and 
share-issues) will foster development of financial markets and improve corporate 
governance in finance, these strategies in EE allowed weakly regulated domestic 
incumbent banks to capture the state, preserving their political influence, positional 
                                                 
128 Clarke, Cull and Shirley (2004) provided a good summary of a large body of literature on enterprise 
privatization. 
 
129 Some commentators labeled the outcome of these privatization strategies “managerial capitalism” 
(Eyal et al. 1998, Martin 2002). 
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rents, and the institutions that served their interests. Excluding foreign owners from 
privatization enabled politicians to sell off bank assets to domestic supporters and to 
powerful rivals at below-market value. Soft budget constraints and the pervasiveness 
of connected lending meant that banks were not motivated to pursue their debtors 
because they could rely on the government for support in dealing with debtor 
problems. This was the case for banks in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and for 
state banks in Georgia, in Macedonia, and in other countries that adopted voucher 
privatization (Tang et al. 2000). Citizens have actually become owners of the worst-
performing privatized assets, while the best companies have come under insider 
control, and asset-stripping has become widespread (Megginson and Netter 2001: 
346). 
The third privatization method, widely subscribed initial public offerings 
(IPOs), is politically attractive as a means of preserving domestic ownership. IPOs 
avoid the pitfalls of lending to parties connected to majority owners of the bank. 
However, in countries with underdeveloped capital markets structures (inexperienced 
investment banks and limited trading mechanisms), this method can lead to 
undesirable outcomes ranging from the inefficient share distribution to market 
manipulation (Andrews 2005: 23).  
Because most transition economies have small, emerging capital markets, the 
privatization method that will increase the likelihood that the governance of the bank 
will be independent from the government as well as from the incumbent bank 
management is selling banks through tender or auction to a prominent foreign 
shareholder (Bonin et al. 1998: 5). Privatization to reputable international banks can 
quickly introduce independent governance into the financial system, helping to erode 
the rent-seeking of incumbents. Outside financiers have proved to be in the best 
position to mitigate problems that were present when incumbents dominated financial 
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markets. Foreign banks are strangers to local interest networks and prefer to gain 
market shares and profits through competition (Bossone et al. 2003: 24-25). Therefore, 
foreign bank entry introduces competition among financiers, giving the most viable 
domestic enterprises access to alternative funding sources. Foreign bank entry also 
drives rents of incumbent banks down from quasi-monopolistic levels in addition to 
imposing hard budget constraints on borrowing enterprises. It has been also 
empirically demonstrated that governments able to commit to property rights 
protection are more likely to privatize via asset sales (Megginson et al. 2000).130 
Foreign banking ties with enterprises are usually weak in terms of both debtor 
relations and equity investment, and are based on arm’s-length rather than political 
connections. Foreign ownership thus reduces the potential for politicization of bank 
lending and increases the integration of financial markets (Bonin and Wachtel 1999).  
In sum, financial systems that have a greater weight of foreign banks in 
financial intermediation tend to be more competitive and stable. On the other hand, 
privatization through vouchers, particularly when the government retains a significant 
share and thus continues to intervene in lending decisions, reduces the benefits of 
privatization and results in inconsistent economic policies. 
Data Comparing Financial Systems in EE 
The task ahead is to apply these distinctions empirically, first linking the mode 
of privatization to the ownership structure and institutional characteristics of the two 
types of financial systems: clientelistic, with a bank ownership structure dominated by 
incumbents (mostly SOBs); and open, with a higher share of foreign banks in financial 
intermediation. In this section, I explore how different privatization experiences led to 
                                                 
130 A disadvantage of tender offers from a strategic foreign investor is the need to set a price 
administratively for the transaction. If the price is too low, the government is accused of having “sold” 
domestic interests to foreigners. If the price appears to be too high, or if a government restricts the offer 
of bank control, strategic investors may lose interest (Bonin and Wachtel 1999). 
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different types of financial systems in EE. Admittedly, few cross-sectional 
observations in my regional sample of countries are entirely independent because 
governments learn from one another. This is particularly true in international finance. 
However, this learning was neither linear nor systematic across the countries under 
examination. 
Presenting my results relies mostly on graphic data presentation, bivariate 
relationships, partial regression plots, and a few regression models. My argument is 
based not only on these single statistics but on the entire body of evidence, including 
elite interviews and archival sources. I do not dispute that the openness of a national 
banking sector to foreign buyouts explains all financial structures. The empirical 
regularities I identify may serve to suggest the plausibility of this argument, however. 
I expect that a greater openness of domestic banking sectors to foreign buyouts 
via tender offers would erode the power of SOBs and lead to more open, competitive 
financial systems.131 The impact of foreign capital on the preferences and actions of 
domestic groups within countries is likely to grow with the entry of foreign banks. To 
investigate the relationship between the mode of privatizing banks and enterprises and 
the financial system ownership structure, I created the privatization method data set. I 
operationalize the privatization method used by the country by creating a dummy 
variable, assigning a value of 1 if privatization was done through direct sales or 0 if 
the country privatized through insider privatization—either voucher privatization with 
significant concessions to insiders, or management-employee buyouts—or if no 
privatization took place. I coded qualitative data on privatization using the various 
years of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition 
                                                 
131 Rajan and Zingales (2003) showed a negative correlation between direct barriers to entry into the 




Reports. I choose this time-series index over a pure cross-sectional index because I 
want to capture important changes in the privatization method over time. For example, 
switching from insider privatization to direct outsider sales could have resulted in 
transforming the banking system, leading perhaps to a change in the exchange rate 
regime, which a purely cross-sectional variable would not explain. I report only 
“primary” and “secondary” privatization methods.132 I use a cumulative measure of 
privatization because I expect its effect on financial development to show with some 
time lags. 
The privatization variable also serves as a proxy for restrictions on foreign 
investments in the domestic banking sector. These restrictions often reflect the 
nationalist attitudes of governments, which tend to be reluctant to lose domestic 
control of large institutions that evoke pride and nationalistic feelings. The 
privatization variable has some additional limitations. First, governments can transfer 
their share of ownership in SOBs through mergers and acquisitions. Second, 
governments faced with soaring budget deficits and banks with large portfolios of 
nonperforming loans are more likely to liquidate SOBs than to privatize them. Indeed, 
many post-Soviet republics liquidated government banks after the banking crises of 
the 1990s. 
I perform an exploratory data analysis by examining the bivariate relationship 
between the direct-sales method of privatization and foreign bank assets (figures 3.2 
and 3.3). Foreign bank assets are the shares of total bank assets held by these banks 
exceeding fifty percent a year, as reported in the EBRD Transition Reports. As the 
                                                 
132 Other scholars operationalized privatization methods in EE differently. For example, Garibaldi et al. 
(2001) constructed three indicator variables: privatization through direct sales, privatization through 
auctions involving vouchers, and management-employee buyouts. They assigned a value of 1 to the 
series if the method constituted the “primary” privatization method during the year, a value of 0.5 if it 
constituted the “secondary” privatization method, and a value of 0.25 if it constituted the “tertiary” 
method. If no privatization took place, these scholars assigned a value of 0 to all three indices. The 
disadvantage of this classification method is that it is somewhat subjective and arbitrary. 
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graphs show, there is a clear positive correlation between the two: countries that 
privatize their banks through tenders or auctions tend to have financial systems with a 
higher share of foreign banks in financial intermediation. The correlation is 
significantly positive, and regression estimates (not reported) show that it persists after 
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Figure 3.2: Direct sales method (used as a primary method of privatization) and 
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Figure 3.3: Direct sales (used as a primary and secondary method of 
privatization) and asset share of foreign banks of total banking assets, 1990–2004 
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In spite of privatization, the banking sector in EE remains one of the most 
state-controlled sectors for many EE economies. Financial systems in countries that 
delayed privatization or that privatized SOBs through various insider privatization 
schemes are yet dominated by state bank assets. State bank asset shares are the shares 
of majority assets of SOBs in total banking sector assets, as reported by the EBRD 
Transition Reports.133 In the extreme cases of clientelistic finance systems that delayed 
or introduced insider privatization schemes, such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the government has controlled over 50 percent of bank 
assets throughout the transition (figures 3.4 and 3.5).134 In Turkmenistan, the share of 
SOBs has dramatically increased of late, and the government had nearly full control 
over the banking sector in 2004: seven banks control 95 percent of all bank loans in 
the local currency and 100 percent of all hard currency–denominated loans.135 This 
control facilitated the preservation of patron-client ties between clientelistic interest 
groups and their bureaucrat patrons. In the banking sectors of the aforementioned 
countries, foreign capital has a very limited role. The asset share of foreign banks is 
less than 10 percent, with the exception of Belarus, which has recently increased 
foreign bank presence in its market. In addition, the foreign bank presence on the 
market of many post-Soviet republics is usually Russian rather than Western.  
 
                                                 
133 The state includes the federal, regional, and municipal levels as well as the state property fund and 
pension fund. 
 
134 Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan all delayed reforms or 
introduced mass privatization, but they allowed the exchange of privatization certificates outside the 
stock exchange (Golodniuk 2005: 10).  
 
135 Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are resource-rich countries, and such countries have usually high 

































































Figure 3.4: Clientelistic systems in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and 

















































Figure 3.5: Clientelistic systems in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan: Asset share of foreign banks of total banking assets 
 
Nevertheless, the continued state ownership of banks has often been harmful to EE 
societies. Governments in some EE countries with clientelistic financial structures 
accelerated SOB privatization to reputable international banks in order to bring 
independence from incumbent groups to the banking sector, and to build more 
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competitive finance systems. This strategy was prompted by SOB failures, the high 
cost to the state of keeping banks, financial instability, systemic banking and financial 
crises, and severe economic collapse late in the transition. Because fiscal costs and 
losses in output associated with crises are significant and visible, banking and 
financial crises present reformers with unique opportunities to change policies, 
including privatization policies in banks (and industries) (Bossone et al. 2003: 24).136  
As argued above, in the Czech Republic, the Klaus center-right government 
was resistant to foreign bank ownership. Only several bank failures and the currency 
turmoil in 1997 paved the way to re-evaluate the role of banks. The new social-
democratic government led by former central bank governor Josef Tošovský opened 
up the ownership of Czech banks to foreign institutions. The second successor country 
of the former Czechoslovakia, Slovakia, also started with voucher privatization, but it 
was able to implement stricter regulations on investment funds limiting the extent of 
cross-ownership between banks and industries. 137 However, the government of the 
populist and authoritarian Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar adopted a law banning 
privatization of the three largest SOBs in order to continue using those banks to direct 
credits to large exporters.138 A consequence of this politicized lending and the short-
term speculations of banks was a destructive credit increase on the market, leading to a 
                                                 
136 The fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs of the banking crises (including bank restructuring and deposit 
compensation) ranged from 7 to 42 percent of the output for the Central European countries, from 0.1 to 
18 percent of output for the CIS countries, and from 2 to 3 percent of the output for the Baltic countries 
(Tang et al. 2000). In most CIS countries, enterprises, banks, and depositors were left exposed rather 
than bailed out through recapitalization (Sherif et al. 2003: 71).  
 
137 However, similarly to the Czech Republic, one of the outcomes of the voucher method in Slovakia 
was the emergence of “secretive” private financial groups with political ties like the Penta Group, J&T 
Group, and Istrokapital, which became significant economic players. Author’s interview with Juraj 
Renčko, former Advisor to the Minister of Finance, and the Head of the Coordination Unit for Bank and 
Enterprise Restructuring and Privatization (1999–2002), December 6, 2005, Bratislava. 
 
138 The Slovak Parliament approved delaying privatization of VÚB, Slovenská Sporiteľňa, Investičná a 
Rozvojová banka, and the Slovenská Poisťovňa insurance company until 2003. 
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run on banks. A new pro-Western government led by Mikuláš Dzurinda, which came 
into power in October of 1998, accelerated privatization to foreigners, which 
pulverized incumbent coalitions of banks and industries linked to the previous 
government.  
In Bulgaria, delayed privatization led to an unsustainable vicious circle when 
the government continued to subsidize ailing state-owned enterprises through SOBs. 
Because most of these credits turned out to be uncollectible, banks accumulated 
losses, which were in turn refinanced by the central bank. The banking and currency 
crisis became the logical consequence, which culminated at the beginning of 1997 
with hyperinflation, a massive depreciation of currency, and the collapse of several 
banks. The economic crisis was accompanied by a deep political crisis and mass 
demonstrations. The socialist government of Zhan Videnov was forced to resign; a 
new anti-communist government led by Ivan Kostov privatized the country’s first state 
bank in 1997.139  
In Croatia, which in 1995 had virtually no foreign investments in the banking 
sector, the ten largest banks in the country were mostly foreign-owned by 2002. A 
particularity of Croatia’s trajectory was that since 1957, domestic commercial banks 
were not owned by the state but were socially owned and controlled by worker self-
management enterprises. After the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, where 
monetary policy was a major source of income redistribution, the Croatian 
government continued the inflationary financing of its expenditures via an inflation tax 
(Kraft 1995: 479). This experience proved disastrous to the Croatian banks that were 
facing large amounts of bad loans and currency mismatches on their balance sheets. 
The Croatian government decided to select four major banks (Slavonska, Splitska, 
                                                 
139 Author’s interview with Nikolay Nenovsky, Member of the Governing Council of the BNB, June 26, 
2007, Sofia. 
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Riječka and Privedna) for rehabilitation, which resulted in their nationalization so that 
four large SOBs were created in Croatia in 1995 before being privatized to foreigners. 
Albania has also slowly started to privatize banks after the damage that was done by 























































1990 1995 2000 2005
year
 
Figure 3.6: From clientelistic to open finance in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 



























































Figure 3.7: From clientelistic to open finance in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Croatia, and Slovakia: Asset share of foreign banks of total banking assets 
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Although Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and several other post-Soviet republics 
suffered severe banking financial crises in 1998, these did not bring major changes in 
their approaches to bank privatization or and liberalization of foreign entry into their 
banking sectors. At the end of 2001, in Russia more than 460 banks were still state-
owned, with as many as 679 having shares or stakes from all public institutions 
(including the central bank that owns the largest bank: Sberbank).140 The state held 
controlling stakes in 62 banks and blocking shares in 80 banks (Sherif et al. 2003: 
46).141 Even banks not formally owned by the state remain under influence of state 
bureaucrats (often via a “golden share”) especially at regional and municipal levels.142 
Ukraine has a smaller share of SOBs, but they have a strategic importance and are 
used for political patronage (Sherif et al. 2003: 47) (table 3.3).143 
In sum, over time, EE countries decreased state ownership in the banking 
sector (see table 3.3). While Central Europe saw a decline in state ownership of banks 
as the result of privatization, in the Baltics, this decline also resulted from the 
consolidation of SOBs through liquidation or mergers and a large entry of foreign 
banks. In many CIS countries and in Romania, governments closed and liquidated 
failing banks (Tang et al. 2004). State bank assets in Central Europe and the Balkans 
were more prominent than those in CIS countries because hyperinflation wiped out 
                                                 
140 The data on state ownership in the Russian banking sector are very limited, though. 
 
141 The opposite trend can be observed in Russia. The Putin government created a new Bank of 
Development in May 2007 led by new group of oligarchs, the so-called silovarchs, with close links to 
the government (Volkov 2008). 
 
142 The 1998 financial crisis weakened Russian banks. Some banks were renationalized, e.g., the taking 
over of the viable Promstroybank  by Vneshtorgbank in 2005, or they were owned or controlled by oil 
producers such as Gazprom, LUKoil, or Yukos. Oil companies use these banks to provide cheap credit 
to their shareholders and owners (Vernikov 2007: 12, Gnezditskaia 2005).  
 
143 The smaller shares of SOBs in Ukraine also reflect the fact that its large agricultural bank, Ukrayina, 
underwent liquidation in 2001. 
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asset values in the latter. Among the CIS countries, Armenia and Georgia have fully 
eliminated state ownership in the banking sector. 
 
Table 3.3: Asset Share of SOBs of Total Banking Assets 
  
CEB &SEE  1996 2004 CIS 1996 2004 
Albania 93.75 51.93¹ Armenia 3.19 0.00 
Czech 
Republic 
69.93 2.88 Azerbaijan 77.58 56.09 
Estonia 6.56 0.00 Belarus 54.10 70.20 
Hungary 15.31 6.65 Georgia 0.00 0.00 
Latvia 6.86 4.04 Kazakhstan 28.44 3.72 
Lithuania 54.02 0.00 Kyrgyz Republic 4.99 4.07 
Poland 69.82 21.72 Moldova na 17.64 
Slovakia 54.18 1.31 Russian 
Federation 
36.98² na 
Bulgaria 82.18 2.27 Tajikistan 5.26 12.23 
Croatia 36.20 3.26 Turkmenistan 64.11 96.11¹ 
FYR 
Macedonia 
0.00 1.88 Ukraine 13.48² 8.00 
Romania 80.90 7.54 Uzbekistan 75.55 67.58 
Slovenia 40.74 12.57    
 
¹Asset share of SOBs in 2003 
² Asset share of SOBs in 1997 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports, various issues.144 
Kazakhstan has also been able to reduce the assets of SOBs substantially since 
1998, but this decline was mainly due to the liquidation of SOBs. An important feature 
of the bank ownership structures in Russia, Ukraine, and other CIS countries was the 
large number of small “private” startup or spin-off banks of the Gosbank branches. 
This type of ownership transformation was a “proxy” for bank privatization, but the 
resulting banks continued to operate as pocket banks, or captives of the state 
enterprises they financed (Sherif et al. 2003: 37–38).145  
                                                 
144 I am grateful to Anita Taci, an EBRD economist, for sharing the bank ownership data with me. 
 
145 Similarly as under socialism, enterprises in many CIS countries engage in barter and tolerate 
payment arrears, i.e., uncollectible debts between enterprises, rather than rely on formal financial 
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On the other hand, those societies that began to privatize their SOBs to foreign 
strategic investors were able to reduce the negative effects of the rent-seeking 
networks of incumbent financiers and industrialists and to avoid severe economic 
crises. Hungary was the first to use a case-by-case method of privatization to foreign 
banks. The Hungarian government allowed three foreign banks to operate as early as 
1985. By mid-1997, eight of the top ten Hungarian banks were mostly foreign-owned 
(Bonin 2004). Poland initially adopted a positive stance toward foreign ownership of 
banks, and then backtracked, before again opening its banking sector to foreigners and 
encouraging greenfield investments. The privatization process in Poland was eclectic 
and changed over time, with the emphasis shifting from a mix of IPOs and minority 
stakes to strategic investors, to IPOs exclusively and then back to direct sales to 
foreign strategic investors.146 Laar’s government in Estonia moved aggressively to 
liquidate weak SOBs from the outset of the transition in the early 1990s, to consolidate 
them and to attract foreign investment, mostly from Scandinavia. This move has 
managed to destroy the political influence of the pre-independence coalition of state 
and party bureaucrats and managers of state banks and enterprises.147 In 2004, foreign 
banks held the largest share of the total banking assets from all EE countries (98 
percent). As Table 3.4 shows, the extent of the banking system internationalization 
still varies considerably within the EE region.148 
                                                                                                                                            
institutions. For example, in Ukraine, net enterprise arrears were estimated to be 98 percent of GDP in 
1998 (Sherif et al. 2003).  
 
146 Author’s interview with Stefan Kawalec, former General Director in the Ministry of Finance and the 
Chief Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz (1989–1991), Deputy Minister of Finance (1991–
1994), July 16, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
147 Author’s interview with Mart Laar, former Prime Minister of Estonia (1992–1994 and 1999–2002), 
July 19, 2007, Tallinn. 
 
148 In Central Europe, the share of foreign banks is as much as 80 percent, controlled by less than a 
dozen international banks, mostly European, including Unicredito (Italy), Erste Bank (Austria), KBC 
(Belgium), and Societé Génerale (France). It is interesting to note that the share of foreign banks is very 
 98 
 
Table 3.4: Asset Share of Foreign Banks of Total Banking Assets 
 












































































¹Asset share of foreign banks in 2003. 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports, various issues. 
 
As argued previously, I expect that those societies that transferred bank ownership 
from the government through auctions and tenders to foreign strategic investors are 
more likely to develop an open financial system with a strong regulatory and 
supervisory framework. To investigate this relationship, I use the Fries (2005) measure 
of financial development, based on the annually published EBRD Transition Report, 
which has three dimensions and is the simple average of three variables: 1) the reform 
of banking institutions and regulations,149 2) the share of private banks in total bank 
assets, and 3) the share of foreign banks in total bank assets. In figures 3.8 and 3.9, I 
                                                                                                                                            
low in Western Europe, where only 15 percent of banks are foreign-owned (The Economist, April 28–
May 4, 2007:13). 
 
149 A more detailed description of this index, which is the primary indicator of financial development in 
my econometric models, is provided in chapter 4. 
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graph this measure of banking development against the cumulative measure for the 
method of divestiture of state ownership. There is a clear positive correlation between 
the two: countries that privatize through direct sales tend to exhibit a more open, 
competitive, and better regulated financial system. In 2001, a clear divide is apparent 
between the former countries and those that were caught in a vicious cycle of financial 
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Figure 3.9: Cumulative privatization through direct sales against financial 
development in 2001 
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Table 3.5 shows the results of my test of the above hypothesis. As the estimates show, 
privatization through direct sales has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
financial system development. This is true even if I control for the influence of 
incumbent interests on financial development (proxied by openness to trade, measured 
as exports plus imports of goods as a share of GDP over the period 1990–2004), 
following Rajan and Zingales (2003) example and using a fixed effects model.150 
Openness, however, becomes statistically insignificant in fixed effects panel 
regressions.  
 
Table 3.5: Financial Development and Privatization 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 



































The standard errors are in parentheses. (*) indicates significance at the 10% level, (**) 
at the 5% level, (***) at the 1% level. 
(i) Pooled regression with robust standard errors, if direct sales used as a primary 
privatization method. 
(ii) Pooled regression with robust standard errors, if direct sales used as primary and 
secondary privatization method. 
(iii) Fixed effects panel regression, if direct sales used a primary privatization method. 
(iv) Fixed effects panel regression, if direct sales used as primary and secondary 
privatization method.  
 
 
                                                 
150 The Breusch-Pagan test indicates that there are significant country level effects, implying that pooled 
OLS would be inappropriate. The results of the Hausman test indicate that the random effects model is 
not appropriate, either. 
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In some clientelistic systems (but not in others), SOBs were also able to capture 
central banks, which then became the main vehicle of unsustainable monetary policies 
and excessive lending of last resort to banks. As illustrated in chapter 6, in Bulgaria, 
the managers of state enterprises and banks were closely connected to the members of 
the banking supervision department at the Bulgarian central bank, which provided 
discretionary refinancing to these groups. The annual laws also required that the 
central bank print money to partially finance the government deficit, which was in 
direct violation of the central bank law.151 The governor of the Central Bank of Russia, 
Victor Geraschenko (who previously chaired the Gosbank), was notorious for 
increasing the money supply by bailing out problematic enterprises and their lenders 
(Berglof and Bolton 2002: 79). 
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show the bivariate relationship between government 
ownership of banks and central bank independence. As expected, countries with a 
larger presence of SOBs in the financial system have less independent monetary 
authorities, although the correlation is not very strong. In contrast, when foreign banks 
dominate financial intermediation, central banks tend to have more autonomy in 
conducting monetary and exchange rate policies. 
 
 
                                                 
151 Author’s interview with Lubomir Christov, former Chief Economist and Member of the Managing 
















































Figure 3.11: Asset share of foreign banks of total banking assets against central 
bank independence152 
 
The distorted economic policies resulting from the patronage or preferential treatment 
of incumbents were symptoms of the underlying institutionally weak financial systems 
dominated by SOBs. The brief discussion that follows on the consequences of bank 
ownership structures dominated by incumbent domestic banks is summarized 
                                                 
152 The indices of central bank independence are from Popova (2000) and Bodea and Popova (2005). 
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schematically in table 3.6, which presents statistical data on prudential regulatory 
frameworks (columns 1–2), bank intermediation (column 3), and banking fragility 
(column 4).  
 
Table 3.6: Selected Indicators of Banking Development 
 













Albania 6 91.3 7.2 1992– 
Armenia 35 7.9 34.2 1994–1996 
Azerbaijan 180 19.9 20.0 1995– 
Belarus 42 12.5 29.9 1995– 
Bulgaria 41 13.0 48.8 1996–1997 
Croatia 54 8.2 16.9 1996 
Czech Republic 35 19.9 5.8 1989–1991, 1996 
Estonia 19 2.1 7.6 1992–1995 
Georgia 101 6.6 27.3 1991– 
Hungary 43 6.6 5.1 1991–1995 
Kazakhstan 130 6.0 24.1 No data 
Kyrgyz Republic 18 7.6 28.3 1990s 
Latvia 42 10.0 14.1 1995– 
Lithuania 15 28.3 7.6 1995–1996 
FYR Macedonia 6 21.1 8.0 1993–1994 
Moldova 25 26.0 11.3 No data 
Poland 81 11.5 6.1 1992–1995 
Romania 24 56.5 14.7 1990– 
Russian Federation 2297 9.1 91.7 1995, 1998–1999 
Slovakia 33 33.4 4.6 1991, 1996–1997 
Slovenia 39 10.0 7.5 1992–1994 
Tajikistan 18 3.0 13.0 1996 
Turkmenistan 67 13.9 70.0 No data 
Ukraine 230  46.3 1997–1998 
Uzbekistan 31 0.4 22.0 No data 
 
Source: Di Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); EBRD Transition Reports, various issues. 
                                                 
153 In many post-Soviet republics, which experienced hyperinflation at the beginning of the transition, 
the problem of bad loans was initially solved by wiping out the real value of the loans from the 
communist regime (Murinde et al. 2001: 450). 
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An examination of this table suggests the following: First, a liberal policy of issuing 
banking licenses and inadequate financial regulation and banking supervision led to a 
proliferation of private banks whose new owners were state enterprises or party-
affiliated institutions. Whereas in Central Europe private banks were created mostly 
through the privatization of SOBs (spin-offs of the central bank), in the post-Soviet 
republics, many de novo domestic private banks were born under lax entry 
requirements (Coricelli 2001). During the creation of many new banks from the 
branches of Zhilsotsbank in Russia, branch managers were allowed to choose the 
assets for the new private banks, e.g., Mosbusinessbank, so they were essentially 
acquiring state assets at a zero price (Andrews 2005: 23). In the first wave of financial 
liberalization in Russia, two new types of banks, linked to the state bodies, were 
established: zero banks (created by party affiliated institutions) and industry banks 
(established by state enterprises) (Johnson 2000: 36–37). As a result of lax licensing 
requirements, the Russian banking system consisted of 2,500 banks in 1994 (Johnson 
2000). 
Second, a weak regulatory framework has not deterred SOBs and politically 
connected domestic private banks from taking on excessive risk. These banks have 
engaged in short-term speculations in international markets that in combination with 
liberalized capital flows have been a source of currency mismatches on bank balance 
sheets, banking sector fragility, and balance-of-payment crises (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1999, Demirguc-Kunt and Dertragiache 2000).154 
Third, the predominant role of SOBs also led to pervasive connected lending to 
loss-making state enterprises and to the accumulation of huge proportions of bad 
                                                 
154 Johnson et al. (2000) showed that among emerging markets liberalizing capital flows, those with 




loans. Concentrated industrial structures and large state-owned enterprises of the 
central planning period enhanced the capacity of various enterprises to organize as 
special-interest lobbying groups. As a legacy of financial repression, SOBs in most EE 
countries inherited nonperforming bank loans from the previous periods of directed 
lending, though not from the same levels.155  Nonetheless, bad loans were also the 
outcomes of deficient credit-assessment procedures and the politicized lending of 
banks to state-owned industries during the post-communist period. The lending 
portfolios of SOBs became heavily concentrated among a few enterprises and 
industrial sectors. Lack of competition in the banking sector and an inflationary 
environment allowed SOBs to benefit from large net spreads between loan and deposit 
rates. Therefore, not only were incentives or mechanisms to effectively enforce debt 
service missing, but also foreclosing on large borrowers—state-owned enterprises—
threatened bank solvency. Banks were expecting their losses to be covered by the 
government (Dyker 2001).156  
 
Conclusion 
The argument I have outlined in this chapter is that the timing and mode of the 
privatization and internationalization of a nation’s financial sector result in two 
principal types of financial systems: open and clientelistic. After the collapse of 
communism, democratizing EE societies faced strong distributive pressures from 
incumbent interests demanding protection. If policy makers delayed the privatization 
of SOBs (and industries), or used insider privatization schemes restricting foreign 
                                                 
155 The collapse of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and restrictive economic 
policies during the transition led to rapid increases in inter-firm debt and bad loans, reaching 23–35 
percent of total outstanding loans (McDermott 2004a: 9). 
 
156 These were off-budget subsidies that allowed governments to support loss-making enterprises 




bank entry, the status quo—that is, the financially repressed system—benefiting rent-
seeking SOBs and enterprises prevails. On the other hand, liberalization of foreign 
entry is a way to increase the share of foreign banks, to change the distribution of 
power in domestic financial markets, and to limit harmful government interventions in 
allocating credit. 
Clientelistic systems remain dominated by SOBs. Weak monetary and 
regulatory institutions, and economic policies including a monetary policy of high 
inflation, expansive credit and fiscal policies, excessive bailouts of failing banks and 
loss-making enterprises that reduce the general welfare of the population are then 
likely to be symptoms of the political influence of incumbents. On the other hand, in 
open systems, an increased participation of foreign banks in financial intermediation 
has a positive effect on the quality of regulatory and monetary institutions, and a 
disciplining effect on government monetary and fiscal policies. Applying this 
argument explains a great deal of the variation in financial systems development 
across EE countries.  
I have also shown that a country’s financial system is not static but exhibits 
some variation over time. Incumbent financiers and industrialists become entrenched 
in “good” times, but banking and financial crises tend to undermine the credibility of 
those interests that had favored status-quo policies, which are usually responsible for 
those crises. The incumbent interests and institutions may fragment and weaken 
(politically and financially), their interests may diverge, and new constituencies 
favorable to financial liberalization can be created. The incumbents are politically and 
financially weak to form effective anti-reform coalitions (Maxfield and Haggard 
1996). After the systemic banking and financial crises in the second half of the 1990s, 
some EE countries privatized and opened their financial sectors to foreign investors, 
which had some observable convergence impacts on their financial systems. Perhaps, 
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as Benjamin Cohen (1996: 288) noted, “the globalization of finance has obviously 
increased pressures for general policy convergence toward an agenda set by 
investors.” 
In the subsequent statistical chapter, I will develop a quantitative model testing 
the effect of different financial systems on the choices and sustainability of their 
exchange rate regimes for cross-section, time-series data on 25 transition economies in 
EE over the period 1990–2004. I will also employ a comparative case method in the 
qualitative chapters by tracing the processes of exchange rate policy making in four 
countries—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Estonia—with a special 
emphasis on variation in the financial ownership structures, institutions, and processes 




In chapter 2, I developed a theory that links financial interests and structures to 
exchange rate regime choices; also,; also, I specified hypotheses and implications that 
derived from that theory. For this chapter, I conducted various statistical tests that 
estimate the importance of a financial hypothesis, while controlling for the other 
economic and political explanations of actual exchange rate regime choices, discussed 
in chapter 1. Another set of tests estimates the influence of the same variables on the 
officially proclaimed exchange rate regimes. The principal hypothesis that will be 
tested in this chapter is that financial systems dominated by foreign and private 
domestic banks, accompanied by strong monetary and regulatory institutions increase 
the probability that a country would pursue a fixed exchange rate regime. 
 The first section describes the data used in the tests. The second section 
discusses the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable—
exchange rate regime—followed by a brief review of the evolution of exchange rate 
regimes in EE. The fourth section outlines the main relationships of the model from 
the literature review in chapter 1 and the theory in chapter 2 and discusses how the 
indicators of the key variables are developed. The primary analysis uses binary and 
multinomial logistic models on panel data. Also addressed in the analysis is the 
question of endogeneity and causality that arise in this context by using an 
instrumental variables approach via the generalized method of moments estimations. 
The analysis proposes the method of banking and industrial privatization as a new 
instrument for financial development. The instrument is derived from my theory of 
financial development in EE presented in chapter 3; where I established that 
privatization through direct sales to foreign investors creates a greater incentive for 
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financial institutional building. The econometric analysis underlines the positive 
influence of the level of financial development, defined here by the degree of financial 
openness and quality of banking supervision and regulation, on the probability of 
adopting and sustaining a fixed exchange rate regime. While financial system 
development was the variable of interest in chapter 3, it becomes the primary 
independent variable in this chapter. A further discussion of the results, in the light of 
the broad qualitative assessment of the exchange rate data in transition economies and 
the evidence of the case studies, is left to chapters 5−8.  
 
The Sample 
The test of the above hypotheses makes it possible to assess both the impact of 
the financial sector on exchange rate policy determination and the variation in that 
impact across countries and over time. As a principal empirical test, a panel data (a 
cross-section and time-series data set of twenty-five countries of EE from 1990–2004) 
is used to estimate a series of logit models with a binary exchange rate regime index as 
the dependent variable.157 Data limitations preclude expanding this sample either 
temporally or cross-sectionally. The year 1990 is taken as the start of the economic 
transformation in the post-communist region.158 Before 1990, developments occurred 
mostly in the political realm, related to the process of democratization. In the 
                                                 
157 Some authors (Bénassy-Quéré and Couré 2002) recommend cross-section rather than panel data 
estimations, arguing that the choice of an exchange rate regime should depend on structural variables 
that are more country-dependent than time-dependent. Nonetheless, estimating by using panel data has 
several advantages over purely cross-sectional estimating. First, it allows taking into account how 
financial development over time within a country has influenced the country’s exchange rate policies. 
Using a panel, I gain degrees of freedom by adding the variability of the time-series dimension. Second, 
in a cross-sectional regression, any unobserved country-specific effect would be part of the error term, 
potentially leading to biased coefficient estimates, while panel context enables controlling for 
unobserved country-specific effects. 
 
158 I use annual data, rather than quarterly data because my model also includes institutional variables 
that tend to be sticky. Quarterly data would introduce unnecessary correlations and little additional 
information. (Author’s conversation with David Freedman, Spring 2006, Berkeley.) 
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economic realm, the foreign exchange regimes were unreformed, and currencies were 
not convertible. The sample period includes the years during which EE countries 
experienced an economic slowdown and financial turmoil, for example, the Russian 
financial crisis of 1998, as well as the years of economic growth. For the new 
countries building independent statehood after the collapse of communism, the series 
starts with independence.159 
 
The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is treated as a binary exchange rate regime 
index: countries either float or fix. I examine the probability that a country will pursue 
or maintain a fixed exchange rate regime at time t.160 Measuring the degree of 
exchange rate regime flexibility is the main challenge of the empirical analysis of 
exchange rate regime choice. The most widely used measure is based on the official 
IMF classification from the International Financial Statistics database and explained in 
more detail in the Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions. 
The official regime is the regime that national authorities annually declare to the IMF. 
Recent empirical studies have provided evidence that the evaluation of adjustments in 
central parities and foreign exchange market interventions can generate exchange rates 
quite different from the official arrangements. Therefore, the policies that countries 
claim to be following differ from the actual outcomes of these policies. On the one 
hand, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) show that many countries officially claim to run 
floats but intervene frequently in their foreign exchange markets to reduce exchange 
                                                 
159 For the Czech Republic and Slovakia before 1993, I used the data reported for Czechoslovakia. 
 
160 This dichotomy is not optimal in accounting for the great diversity of exchange rate arrangements in 
EE or for tracing the evolution of exchange rate regimes within individual countries. It also sacrifices 
valuable information about intermediate regimes. However, it is appropriate to test the current 
hypotheses. Fix versus float dichotomy is a metaphor for less or more flexible regimes. Adding 
additional hypotheses for other types of regimes would unnecessarily make my central argument fuzzy 
and less amenable to systematic testing. I thank Barry Eichengreen for this remark. 
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rate volatility, although the monetary authorities have no official commitment to 
maintaining the parity. This behavior is often referred to as the “fear of floating” 
phenomenon. On the other hand, Gosh et al. (1997) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(LYS) (2000, 2005) argue that countries that frequently adjust the central parity can 
make an officially fixed regime resemble one that floats. In this case, these countries 
manifest a “fear of pegging” behavior. 
Discrepancies between announced and actual exchange rates may reflect 
concerns about the political costs of devaluations under an official peg, may result 
from low credibility of the monetary authority, a trade-off between the cost of 
intervention of foreign exchange markets and the real output losses caused by 
exchange rate volatility, a response to the inappropriateness of the official regime to 
the underlying economic fundamentals, or may reflect the quality of institutions 
associated with the capability of countries to maintain pegs (Alesina and Wagner 
2003, Calvo and Reinhart 2002, Von Hagen and Zhou 2002). Developing countries 
may not want to let their currencies float freely because their financial markets are less 
developed, and their central banks fear that a significant devaluation of exchange rate 
may negatively affect the country’s foreign debt and its ability to have access to 
domestic-currency loans from abroad, which is deemed to be the “original sin” 
(Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999).161 A symptom often found in small emerging 
market economies, where the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade and inflation 
is considerable, is fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart 2002).162 
                                                 
161 Developing countries usually have unhedged foreign currency denominated debt and high exchange 
rate risk exposure and thus have an incentive to peg to the foreign currency that they have borrowed, 
even if they officially float (Hausmann, Paniza, and Stein 2000).  
 
162 Some developing and transition countries engage in dollarization, or euroization in Europe, 
unofficial or official. An unofficial dollarization is the case when a foreign currency is used as a 
substitute for a domestic currency or prices and wages are set in a foreign currency. The extreme case of 
official dollarization is when a foreign currency is the only legal tender. 
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Although the official regime declaration is a signal to currency speculators of 
the formal commitment of the government and central bank to exchange rate stability, 
it does not capture the policies inconsistent with this commitment. De facto 
classification has the advantage of being based on observed behavior. 163 My 
investigation concerns actual exchange rate policy, so I use the “Natural Exchange 
Rate Classification” as compiled by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) (R&R) and extended 
by Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006) as my primary measure of de facto exchange 
rate regimes.164 R&R measure the uses of “parallel” market exchange rates as well as 
extensive country chronologies of the history of exchange rate arrangements and 
related factors (such as exchange controls and currency reforms) to determine the 
actual operation of an exchange rate regime. The R&R classification provides the 
current state of the art for the measurement of actual exchange rate policies. The R&R 
measure is more appropriate for my purposes than those of LYS (2005) or Ghosh et al. 
(1997) because this measure is the most widely available and focuses explicitly on the 
identification of longer-term “regimes” rather than shorter-term “spells” within a 
regime (Rogoff et al. 2003: 10).165  
                                                 
163 Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996) suggest using the variability of real and nominal exchange rate. In 
contrast with the Behavioral Real Exchange Rate literature (Clark and MacDonald 1998, Eichengreen 
and Choudry 2005), the goal of this study is not to explain real exchange movements but rather to 
explain policy choices; thus, it seems less suitable to use measures of the variability of a (nominal or 
real) exchange rate. 
 
164 An alternative approach, pioneered by Holden, Holden and Suss (1979), characterizes the de facto 
exchange rate regime on the basis of the degree of intervention in the foreign exchange market, as 
measured by variation in international reserves. The problem this approach presents is how to measure 
the degree of intervention. Using changes in reserves is not satisfactory because the authorities do not 
necessarily intervene through direct purchases and sales of reserves. It is also difficult to disentangle 
regime changes associated with intervention from those resulting from exogenous shocks. As a result, 
only relatively few studies have followed this approach (Poirson 2001: 7).  
 
165 Ghosh et al. (1997) refine the IMF data on exchange rate regimes from 1973–1996. LYS does not 
measure exchange rate policies but the ex-post behavior of the exchange rate. LYS developed a de facto 
classification for 183 countries from 1973–2004 based on the behavior of three variables: changes in 
nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these changes, and the volatility of foreign reserves. The idea 
behind LYS is that fixed (flexible) regimes should exhibit low (high) volatility in exchange rate 
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 The R&R classification is based on a 15-point scale. I follow Simmons and 
Hainmueller (2006) and dichotomize it with a 10-point cutoff.166 A noticeable feature 
of the R&R classification is that it distinguishes episodes of high inflation and 
uncontrolled depreciation as “freely falling” regimes. Contrary to Simmons and 
Hainmueller, who discard observations classified as “freely falling” (associated with 
extreme macroeconomic imbalances and inflation higher than 40 percent) and those 
for which parallel market data are missing, I retain freely falling regimes because they 
are highly represented in my sample. In the 1990s, freely falling regimes accounted for 
41 percent of the observations for the transition economies.  
Until recently, the discrepancies between de facto and de jure regimes have 
largely been ignored in the literature.167 Most of the existing empirical studies 
examining the determinants of exchange rate regimes in EE countries use officially 
announced exchange rate regimes (Kluyev 2002, Von Hagen and Zhou 2002, 2005). 
Table A.1 in the Appendix presents de facto and the IMF classifications of exchange 
rate regimes used in this study. 
                                                                                                                                            
movements but high (low) volatility in international reserves. LYS data report only 106 observations 
from 20 transition economies.  
 
166 The following regimes were coded as fixed: no separate legal tender, pre-announced peg or currency 
board arrangement, a pre-announced horizontal band with a bandwidth not exceeding +/-2 %, a de facto 
peg, a pre-announced crawling peg, a pre-announced crawling band with a bandwidth not exceeding +/-
2 %, a de facto crawling peg, a de facto crawling band with a bandwidth not exceeding +/- 2%, and a 
pre-announced crawling band with a bandwidth exceeding +/- 2 %. A de facto crawling band with a 
bandwidth not exceeding +/- 5%, a moving band with a bandwidth not exceeding +/- 2%, managed 
floating, freely floating, freely falling, and hyperfloating were coded as flexible. 
 
167 Recognizing the substantial divergence between actual and declaratory monetary policy, in 1997, the 
IMF itself changed its reporting criteria to take into account the actual functioning of a country’s regime 
(Cf. IMF 1999, Section IV and IMF 2003). Another IMF classification of the de facto regimes was 
recently undertaken by Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002). 
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Brief Overview of Exchange Rate Regimes in EE168 
Table 4.1 represents a more systematic presentation of the evolution of 
exchange rate regimes in EE. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 report the percentages of country 
observations that fall into two categories of exchange rate regimes—fixed and float—
during three sample periods, i.e., 1990–1995, 1995–1999, and 2000–2004, based on 
the number of country-year observations in each period considered, and comparing de 
jure with de facto classifications. In figure 4.1, we can observe that the shares of 
official floats increased from 47.37 percent to 65.85 percent, while the shares of 
official fixed regimes decreased from 52.63 percent to 34.15 percent over the period 
1990–2004. However, the de facto classification reported in figure 4.2 shows that 
among all EE states, 76 percent actually adopted a floating rate in the early 1990s. 
This share of actual floats decreased and reached 50 percent at the end of the decade, 
and subsequently decreased further to 38.66 percent by 2004. In contrast, the share of 
de facto pegged regimes increased from 23.28 percent in the early 1990s to 61.34 
percent in the most recent period.169 The difference between announced and actual 
exchange rate policies suggests that EE countries have been more prone to fear of 







                                                 
168 For a detailed history of the evolution of exchange rate regimes in EE, see chapter 5. 
 
169 R&R make an interesting observation about exchange rate history, claiming that even in the period 
after Bretton-Woods from 1970−2001, peg and crawling peg were the most popular regimes. 
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Table 4.1: De jure Exchange Rate Regimes in EE: Intermediate Option (a) 
 




1990−1995  44.74 7.89 47.37 
1996−1999  23.00 19.00 58.00 
2000−2004  24.39 9.76 65.85 
 
Source: Author’s estimates using IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Regimes and  
Restrictions, various issues. 
¹Includes no separate legal tender, currency board, and other conventional fixed pegs. 
²Includes horizontal bands, crawling pegs, crawling bands. 




















Source: Author’s estimates using IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Regimes and 
Restrictions, various issues. 
 























Source: Author’s estimates using Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), extended by Razo-Garcia and 
Eichengreen (2006). 
 
Figure 4.2: De facto exchange rate regimes in EE, 1990−2004  
 116 
The comparison between de jure and de facto regimes also reveals that 
intermediate regimes have played in practice a much larger role than according to the 
official regime classification (tables 4.1 and 4.2). This share has increased over time: 
from 22.55 percent in the initial years of transition to 46.22 percent during the most 
recent reported period, so the share of de facto intermediate regimes during the period 
2000−2004 was five times as often in place than officially stated. Thus, the bipolar 
view, reviewed in chapter 1, maintaining that intermediate regimes are not a viable 
option in a world of high capital mobility cannot be confirmed for the transition 
economies. Countries with currency boards like Estonia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and 
Bosnia and Hercegovina as well as countries that have recently adopted inflation 
targeting combined with de jure free floats like the Czech Republic and Poland pursue 
corner solutions. Still, the central banks in the later group of countries continue to 
intervene in the exchange rate markets. 
  
Table 4.2: De facto Exchange Rate Regimes in EE, 1990−2004: Intermediate 
Option (b) 
 








1990−1995 6.03 21.55 8.62 63.79 
1996−1999 16.67 44.79 11.46 27.08 
2000−2004  21.01 46.22 27.73 5.04 
 
Source: Author’s estimates using Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), extended by Razo-Garcia  
and Eichengreen (2006).  
 
°Includes arrangements with no separate legal tender, pre-announced peg or currency boards,  
and pre-announced horizontal bands with a bandwidth not exceeding +/-2 %. 
¹Includes de facto pegs, pre-announced crawling pegs, pre-announced crawling bands with  
a bandwidth not ²exceeding +/-2 %, de facto crawling pegs, de facto crawling bands with a  
bandwidth not exceeding +/- 2%, pre-announced crawling bands with a bandwidth exceeding +/- 2 %, 
de facto crawling bands with a bandwidth not exceeding +/– 5%, and moving bands with a  
bandwidth not exceeding +/– 2%. 




Determinants of Exchange Rate Regime  
 
Primary Variable of Interest: Financial Development 
As Frieden (2002) noted, the distributional effects of exchange rate policies are 
difficult to examine because special interest politics are generally unobservable. It is 
also difficult to find good proxies for interest group pressures and lobbying. Direct 
measures of the political power of interest groups and their capability to influence 
policies are “controversial at best” (Rajan and Zingales 2003: 23). Table A.3 in the 
Appendix summarizes the proxies for societal interests in recent empirical studies on 
the political economy of exchange rates. 
 I argued previously that the influence of banks is mediated by the bank 
ownership structure, which can be dominated by state-owned, private domestic, or 
foreign banks. The bank ownership structure, in turn, affects the demand and supply of 
institutions that supervise and regulate the banking sector and carry out monetary 
policy. To measure the effect of ownership structure and the institutional quality of the 
financial system on exchange rate regime choice, I use the three-dimensional index of 
financial development evolution developed by Fries (2005) based on the annually 
published EBRD Transition Reports. 
The first dimension of this index measures the liberalization and institutional 
reform of the banking system.170 The EBRD transition indicator for banking reform 
evaluates several dimensions of the post-communist reform of the banking sector, 
including the separation of commercial banking activities from the central bank, 
liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation, the use of directed credit, progress 
in the establishment of institutions of prudential regulation and supervision, and the 
degree of banking competition. The second dimension of the index represents the 
                                                 
170 The 1998 Transition Report was dedicated to an in-depth examination of banking and financial 
services in EE. 
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share of private banks in total bank assets, which indicates the transformation of 
ownership in banking through the entry of new private banks and the privatization of 
state banks. The final dimension of the index reports the share of majority foreign-
owned banks in total bank assets, which measures the degree of openness to 
competition from the entry of foreign banks through either the establishment of new 
banks or the acquisition of existing banks.171 
 A higher value on this index means a higher share of foreign and private banks 
in financial intermediation, accompanied by stronger monetary and regulatory 
institutions, and thus a more developed financial system. With an increase in the level 
of financial development, I expect a higher probability of adopting and sustaining 
fixed exchange rate regimes; thus, I expect the sign to be positive. 
In figure 4.3, I graph the measure of financial development against the R&R 
fine classification that includes 15 categories of exchange rate regimes. The graph 
shows the negative relationship between these two measures: countries at higher levels 
of financial development have less flexible exchange rates.172 Figure 4.4 shows four 
examples of the primary financial development measure for countries. It demonstrates 
that competitive financial systems, represented by Estonia clearly exhibit a steep 
upward trend in liberalization of financial institutional-building. As discussed in 
chapter 3, in contrast with the radical approach to finance reform in Estonia 
accompanied by a currency board, the Polish approach was more incremental and 
                                                 
171 I use the index instead of a simple share of foreign bank assets of total banking assets, for it better 
captures my primary hypothesis. In open financial systems, the presence of foreign banks in financial 
intermediation is likely to be accompanied by a greater degree of private ownership of banks and 
banking competition and more developed regulatory and supervisory institutions. The three-
dimensional index of financial development variable combining ownership structure with institutional 
features of the financial system is a better predictor of exchange rate regime policies than its individual 
dimensions. 
 
172 In the R&R fine classification, exchange rate regimes run from 1−15, with 1 representing the most 
rigid regimes and 15 the most flexible regime. For R&R fine classification of de facto exchange rate 
regimes, see appendix 1. 
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shows less dynamic institutional reforms, particularly after 2000 that coincide with the 
efforts to limit the independence of the central bank and multiple delays in bank 
privatization. The Czech Republic began the transition with dynamic financial 
reforms, followed by stagnation until the financial turmoil in 1997, which was the 
turning point in financial and exchange rate policies. Finally, as the graph shows, 
Bulgaria as well up to the 1996−1997 financial crisis, did not implement any financial 
liberalization policies, but it experienced a progressive trend afterwards, accompanied 














































Source: Author’s estimates using IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Regimes and 
Restrictions, various issues. 
 








































































Source: Author’s estimates using Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), extended by Razo-Garcia and 
Eichengreen (2006). 
 
Figure 4.4: Value of financial development for Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech 
Republic, and Poland, 1990−2004  
 
 
Additional Financial Variables 
The recent literature has stressed that currency mismatches in financially 
dollarized economies may be critical to the choice of exchange rate regimes. One 
important manifestation of the moral hazard behavior of domestic incumbent banks is 
that they borrow excessively abroad at low interest rates and lend excessively at home 
in domestic currency at high rates, while a close bank-government nexus sets up the 
expectation that no bank would be allowed to fail (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Paniza 
2003).173 There are two views on the links between exchange rate regime and currency 
mismatches. On one hand, fixed regimes can encourage currency mismatches because 
banks and firms do not hedge their foreign liabilities, for they believe that the 
governmental commitment to defend the peg protects them from exchange rate risk 
                                                 
173 Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003: 15) identify additional causes of currency mismatches, 
including insufficient accumulation of reserves as insurance against exchange rate shocks, and the 
“original sin.”  
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(Mishkin 2006, Obstfeld 1998). Alternatively, greater flexibility increases the cost of 
hedging and so may not result in lower currency mismatches (Eichengreen and 
Hausmann 1999).  
The literature does not clearly establish the direction of causality. In one view, 
banks with currency mismatches on their balance sheets may have an interest in 
maintaining a fixed regime. Therefore, countries with high mismatches may choose to 
peg (Arteta 2002, Hall 2005, Woodruff  2005). In the second view, when there is a 
currency mismatch, the government is often unable to maintain the currency value. 
The central bank has the option of raising interest rates but this can destroy weakened 
domestic banks that are facing increased funding costs. The outcome is often a 
banking crisis combined with a currency crisis. Therefore, greater mismatches may 
force countries to float. I operationalize currency mismatches as the ratio of foreign 
assets to foreign liabilities in the banking sector. The second view corresponds better 
to the empirical reality in EE, and thus with higher currency mismatches, I expect a 
lower probability of sustaining a fixed exchange rate regime. 
In developing countries that often exhibit high levels of financial dollarization, 
it is difficult to disentangle empirically currency mismatches from the impossible 
trinity considerations. Capital controls should enhance the sustainability of a fixed 
exchange rate regime, since they make the regime less vulnerable to discrepancies 
between macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, often leading to capital outflows. 
To test the influence of capital mobility on exchange rate arrangement, I create a 
dummy variable, taking the value of 1 for the years when the country accepted the 
obligations under the Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. I expect that 
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liberalization of capital movements will decrease the sustainability of fixed exchange 
rates.174 
The literature examining the role of central bank independence in exchange 
rate regime choices, discussed in chapter 1, does not clearly establish in which 
direction central banks should affect an exchange rate regime. Agreeing with 
Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), I expect that the same factors that led politicians to 
make their central banks independent would also be positively associated with the 
decision to limit the monetary autonomy via a fixed exchange rate regime. Thus, I 
expect that central banks with a higher degree of independence from governments will 
be less prone to pursue bailouts for banks or to extend massive loans to governments 
and so generate inflationary pressures that are not compatible with a fixed regime. I 
use the measure based Cukierman, Miller and Nyeapti (CMN) (2002) indices of 
central bank independence. CMN developed indices of legal independence for central 
banks in 26 transition economies in EE for the period 1989–1998. 175 Popova (2000) 
and Bodea and Popova (2005) followed a similar coding procedure and extended the 
CMN’s database until 2004. Indeed, many EE countries enacted new central bank 
laws after 1998. For example, Bulgaria enacted a new law on the central bank on July 
1, 1997, granting it greater legal independence from the government, but CMN’s 
aggregate index for Bulgaria remains at the same level (0.55) throughout the reported 
period. The correlation between these two measures of legal central bank 
independence (CBI) is 0.82. 
                                                 
174 Many empirical studies use Chinn and Ito’s (2004) measure of de jure capital account openness. This 
measure is based on four binary dummy variables reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Rates and Exchange Restrictions with a higher number indicating a lower overall level of restrictions. 
However, data on EE countries are available only for recent years. It reports only the last 5-7 years for a 
small number of EE countries. 
 
175 Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002) showed that EE reformers created central banks with levels of 
legal independence that are higher, on average, than those of developed economies during the 1980s. 
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Economic Variables 
The other two sets of covariates include economic and political variables 
largely as controls. In order to test the relevance of the traditional OCA hypothesis, I 
consider two commonly used structural factors that affect regime choice: openness and 
economic size. Openness shows the exposure of the country to nominal shocks from 
the world economy. Greater openness leads to the need for nominal protection, 
increasing the probability of choosing a fixed regime. Openness also enhances trade 
gains derived from stable bilateral exchange rates. Countries that depend heavily on 
international trade with a high proportion of economic agents sensitive to exchange 
rate risk are expected to favor fixed regimes. Small size affects exchange rate regime 
choice through its effect on openness, given the higher propensity of small economies 
to trade internationally. Smaller economies should benefit more from the potential 
stability provided by a fixed exchange rate. I use real GDP, expressed in logs, to 
measure the size of a country’s economy. I measure a country’s dependence on trade 
with an openness variable composed of imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. 
A large strand of literature has studied the use of fixed exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor for macroeconomic stabilization in inflationary economies, but the 
literature does not provide an unambiguous answer. While countries with moderate 
inflation might have incentives to use the exchange rate as an anchor, high inflation 
(large but transitory inflation shocks) in a given year makes a fixed exchange rate less 
sustainable and calls for exchange rate adjustments to align relative prices. High 
inflation (and hyperinflation) creates pressures on the exchange rate market that may 
force monetary authorities to devalue and float either voluntarily or as a consequence 
of a currency crisis (Levy-Yeayti, Sturzenegger and Reggio 2002, Edwards 1996). 
This phenomenon is in light of a “sustainability hypothesis” that links weak 
governments with either the collapse of existing pegs or the inability to commit to a 
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credible peg as a deflationary device. Following Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and 
Reggio (2002), I include a dummy for high inflation (and hyperinflation), defined as 
an annual inflation rate exceeding 150 percent. I expect high inflation to increase the 
pressures to float, as the peg becomes unsustainable. 
 
Political Variables 
To test Frieden’s sectoral hypothesis, I control for the interests of nonfinancial 
sectors, namely the interests of manufacturing industries and agriculture. Following 
Frieden, Gheci and Stein (2001), I look at both the agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors, with the lobbying power of each group assumed to be proportional to that 
sector’s share in the country’s GDP. In contrast to these authors and Frieden (2002), 
who omit non-tradables in their empirical analyses, I follow the standard practice and 
use the ratio of tradables (industry and agriculture) to nontradables (services), 
indicating the relative size (as a measure of the economic power) of industrial and 
agricultural interests. I test whether the manufacturing and agricultural sector might 
favor greater flexibility (although this might be contingent on the level of protection) 
and thus focus on the competitiveness of the exchange rate. The higher the value of 
manufacturing and agriculture in domestic production relative to services and the 
stronger their “voice,” the stronger I expect pressures to be for a more flexible 
exchange rate regime.176 
 Nondemocracies are alleged to be more likely to adopt fixed rate regimes, 
although the causal mechanism behind this correlation is debated, as chapter 1 
illustrates. I expect that as democracy consolidates, the likelihood of pursuing fixed 
                                                 
176 I am aware that these proxies do not cover all private interests, especially foreign investors in the 
real sector. Because the impact of FDIs in industrial sectors is not central to my theory, I do not control 
for it in my empirical model. 
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exchange rate regimes decreases. I use the Freedom House scores as a proxy for the 
level of democratic consolidation.177  
 
Empirical Model: Probability of Fixing  
In this section, I present the econometric model applied to test the hypotheses 
presented in the previous section in a unified framework. I use binary logit on panel 
data as my baseline econometric model of exchange rate regime choice.178 Logit 
analysis allows time-varying determinants, so it is a useful tool for estimating the 
annual probability of an exchange rate peg (Klein and Marion 1997).179  
I describe the choices of exchange rate regimes using a discrete variable, tiy , . 
This variable can take one of two values: 
 tiy , = 0 if the country i chooses a flexible regime in year t,  
tiy , = 1 if the country i chooses a fixed exchange rate regime in year t 
with the probabilities p i , where i = 0, 1 and ∑ =1ip .  
                                                 
177 The Polity 2 variable drawn from the POLITY IV database is the most popular measure of the level 
of democratization in a state. However, Polity 2 during years that were affected by interruptions, 
interregnum, and transitions seem to produce distorted and misleading information about the true level 
of democracy (Pluemper and Neumayer 2007) and does not correspond to the empirical reality in EE 
states. For no clear reason, Polity 2 measures reports for Estonia, the leader of transition, the unchanged 
score 6 from the beginning of transition, while the scores of laggards in democratization such as 
Moldova or Romania are assigned scores of 8 and 9, for 2004. It is equally unclear why the project 
reports the highest democracy score of 10 for Hungary from the outset of the transition.  
 
178 Besides rare analyses based on OLS (Holden, Holden, and Suss 1979), most studies on exchange 
rate regime choice have used discrete choice models (binary or ordered logit and probit). See, for 
example: Collins (1996) Poirson (2001), Klein and Marion (1997), Hallerberg (2002), Broz (2002), 
Schamis and Way (2003), Shambaugh (2004), von Hagen and Zhou (2005), and others. For studies 
examining the collapse of fixed exchange rate regimes, see Frankel and Rose (1996), Sachs, Tornell, 
and Velasco (1996), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998). 
 
179 Although there are similarities between binary choice and survival models, logistic regressions with 
a binary dependent variable are more appropriate for my analysis because some of the cases switched 
from pegs to floats and back to pegs. Hazard models are designed to model the transition from one state 
to another state instead (Author’s conversation with Christoper Zorn and David Freedman, August 
2006). For an excellent treatment of logistic regressions, see Long (1997). 
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I estimate the following panel data random effects logit for fixed regimes:180 
)exp(1/)exp(),|1Pr( iitiitiitit cxcxcxy +++==  . 
This choice is based on the continuous latent variable tiy ,* (attractiveness of the fixed 
exchange rate regime), which is a linear function of all the variables: 
ititititit yyxy *{1,* =+= υβ >0} 
where yit = 1 if country i chooses a fixed exchange rate regime in year t, and the 
composite error itiit uc +=υ is such that both the unobserved effect ci and the 
idiosyncratic error uit are orthogonal to xit. Vector xit is a vector of explanatory 
variables and includes three sets of covariates: financial, economic, and political. 
The likelihood of belonging to these categories is defined in terms of 
probabilities of the values of an underlying latent variable, tiy ,* . I can assume here 
that the error terms follow the logistic or normal distribution. Because probit 
estimations provide similar results, my arbitrary choice of logistic distribution has no 
negative consequences for the quality of this study. Therefore, I estimate binary logit 
random effects models on all country-year observations.181 All data are annual, and the 
independent variables are lagged one year. 
 The econometric literature on panel data models suggests employing the 
specific fixed effects model if the empirical model focuses on a particular set of 
                                                 
180 Random effects models use the information from both cross-country and within-country variation. 
These models fully utilize the panel information: they use country-pair fixed-effects, while allowing for 
time invariant regressors. Random effect estimates are usually more efficient because they use 
information both “between” and “within” panels. Panel data random effects models however, impose 
more stringent assumptions on the structure of the errors than a fixed effects formulation: 
TtuxuE iiit ,...,1,0)|( , ==  and ),...,,(,0)()|( 21 iTiiiiii xxxxuEuxE === . 
 
181 I should test for the poolability of our data in order to compare the panel data model to the cross-
sectional model. The standard procedure in this case is the likelihood ratio test for two models: the large 
one with estimated country-specific effects and the nested one without these effects. However, because 
the ML is an inconsistent estimator of the first one, the likelihood ratio test fails ex ante. For a good 




countries. However, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is inconsistent in the 
case of a country-specific fixed effects model (Chamberlain 1980). As N tends to 
infinity, for a fixed T, the number of fixed effects fori,μ I = 1, …, N, increases with 
the sample size N, and we have an incidental-parameters problem (Wooldridge 2002). 
This means that fixed effects cannot be consistently estimated for a fixed T. Although 
MLE is consistent when T tends to infinity, T is usually small for panel data (T=12–15 
in my case).182 For the linear panel data regression model, when T is fixed, only 
parameters of explanatory variables β can be estimated consistently, by removing the 
fixed effects from the estimated model. This is possible for the linear case because the 
MLE of β and μi are asymptomatically independent, but this is no longer the case for a 
qualitative limited dependent variable model with fixed T. With country-specific 
effects, MLE does not provide consistent estimates for the coefficients.  
Another potential problem is omitted variable bias; that is, variables that would 
explain the choice of exchange rate regimes but whose effects, because they are not 
included as explanations, are incorrectly attributed to the included variables. The 
introduction of country-specific fixed effects into the regression can control for 
(country-specific) omitted variables that may be correlated with the right-hand-side 
variables, but this method has some drawbacks. By restricting information to within-
country variability, the usefulness of the data is drastically reduced, and important 
information is thrown out. As long as we are interested in the long-run determinants of 
regime choices, it is advisable to preserve the cross-country comparison of time-
invariant pegs and floats, i.e., between-country variability. A key drawback of fixed 
effect estimators is that if time-invariant regressors are included in the model, the 
standard fixed effects estimator will not produce estimates for the effects of these 
                                                 
182 Because the classifications of exchange rate regimes used in this study cover different periods, T 
varies from 12–15 depending on the classification used. 
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variables. Fixed effects do not eliminate time-variant omitted variables that may still 
result in biased estimates. As Levy-Yeyati et al. (2002: 13–14) argue, “With fixed 
effects, this cross-country result is lost, as the logit estimation uses the fixed effect to 
match the probability of the observed outcome for that country regardless of the 
coefficients on the other variables, thus dumping all variables without within-country 
volatility and all data for countries for which the chosen regime does not change.” 
When there is no compelling choice between the two models, the random-effects 
model is often preferred if there are covariates that are constant within panels. Fixed-
effects models are not able to estimate the coefficients of these theoretically 
interesting time-invariant covariates because the covariate is collinear with the fixed 
effect (Hardin and Hilbe 2000: 34, Wooldridge 2002). I choose to use random effects 
also because I include some (institutional) time-invariant covariates in xi..183  
 Another econometric issue associated with this analysis concerns inconsistency 
between the de jure and de facto natures of exchange rate regimes. As shown above, 
widespread and serious discrepancies between official and actual regimes have been 
observed in EE. Relying only on official announcements could be misleading. 
Therefore, I use the R&R (2004) de facto measure, extended by Razo-Garcia (2006), 
as my primary measure of exchange rate regimes. For robustness checks, I also 
employ the IMF de jure classification of exchange rates. 
 Finally, temporal dependencies in the choices of exchange rate arrangements 
are likely to play an important role, for past experiences with a certain regime can 
influence its desirability and the probability of its continuity. Controlling for the 
“stickiness” of a regime in regressions is usually done by including a lagged value of 
                                                 
183 Acemoglu et al. (2002: 27 and 2003) justify not accounting for unit effects in the following way: 
“Recall that our interest in the historically-determined component of institutions (that is more clearly 
exogenous), hence not in the variations in institutions from year-to-year. As a result, this regression 
does not (cannot) control for a full set of country dummies.” 
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the dependent variable as a regressor—what Beck et al. (2002) call the “restricted 
transition model”—or allowing for serial correlation in the error term. In my case, the 
only justification for including a lagged y in logistic regressions would be to assume 
that a fix (float) at t–1 itself causes the fix (float) in the current period. This is different 
from the standard time-series assumption that the underlying latent y*, i.e., latent 
propensity to peg, shows persistence over time. However, the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable precludes the use of standard fixed or random effects estimators. 
Fixed and random effects rely on a strong exogeneity assumption that is automatically 
violated in dynamic panels (Keane and Runkle 1992).184 Thus, I do not estimate a 
dynamic panel of regime choice. 
 In conjunction with using the random effects binary logit models on panel data, 
I pursue two additional econometric modeling strategies. I estimate a multinomial 
logit model with an unordered dependent variable using four categories of exchange 
rate regimes in R&R classification. Second, I also estimate a random effects model 
using R&R fine grid classification with 15 categories of exchange rates to measure the 
exchange rate regime’s rigidity.  
Discussion of Empirical Results  
Table 4.3 reports descriptive statistics for the principal variables used in the 
empirical model of exchange rate determination. Data availability constraints on some 
covariates reduce the sample size. The use of lagged variables further restricts the 
sample. Table 4.3 presents a correlation matrix that demonstrates that there are very 
few correlations of note among the principal explanatory variables. This is of 
particular importance because it would be reasonable to worry about the collinearity.  
                                                 
184 See, also: Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). 
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Table 4.4 reports my estimates from a baseline specification of the model 
including the principal financial variables, as well as economic and political controls. 
A positive sign associated with a variable means that a larger value raises the 
probability for a choice and sustainability of a fixed exchange rate regime. All 
regressions include lagged values of all explanatory variables. The main and most 
consistent result of the baseline static models is that financial variables play a 
significant role in choosing and sustaining a de facto exchange rate regime in EE 
countries. Column (1) presents a basic version of the model that tests the impact of my 
principal variable financial development on exchange rate. Column (2) includes other 
financial variables and economic control variables. Column (3) evaluates and controls 
for political effects. Column (4) is a benchmark model that includes financial, 
economic and political covariates. 
 
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the principal variables used in the paper. For each 
variable, the number of observations, the mean, standard deviation, minimum value, 
maximum values are reported.  
 
Variable Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Exchange Rate 
Regime 
331 0.447     0.498 0 1 
Financial 
Development 
308 3.975 2.633        0.33        9.59 
Currency 
Mismatch 
285    1.756 6.240        0 72.060 
Central Bank 
Independence 
243 0.556 0.180     0.178      0.875 
Non-Financial 
Sectors 
362 1.325     0.867    0.2902871  5.290 
Democratic 
Consolidation 
354 7.059     3.484        2 14 
High Inflation 356 0.205     0.404        0 1 
Openness 353 94.785     33.131    26.257    182.673 
Size 375 3.82e+10  8.24e+10  7.09e+08   5.82e+11 
Capital 
Liberalization 
375 0.477     0.500        0 1 
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The coefficient estimates of all financial variables—financial development, 
central bank independence, and currency mismatches—are statistically significant and 
have the expected sign in all regressions. Countries with financially developed 
systems dominated by foreign and private banks and characterized by strong monetary 
and regulatory institutions tend to adopt and sustain more rigid exchange rate regimes. 
This interpretation is supported by the positive coefficient for the first two financial 
variables. Conversely, a higher level of mismatches on bank balance sheets makes it 
more difficult to sustain a currency peg.  
The macroeconomic fundamentals considered by OCA theory also provide 
some guidance in the choice of exchange rate regimes. The negative sign on the high 
inflation dummy coefficient indicates that at very high and unmanageable levels of 
inflation (higher than 150 percent in this model), inflation is considered to be the most 
important problem in an economy. High inflation as a result of expansionary monetary 
policy leads to the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime. The sign of the GDP 
coefficient estimate suggests that larger countries are less likely to peg, although its 
effect becomes insignificant when political variables are included in the model.  
Contrary to conventional expectations, degree of openness has a negative sign, 
for an increase in the openness of an economy decreases the probability of choosing a 
fixed regime.185 This is quite intuitive because open economies are more vulnerable to 
external shocks. The mean value of openness of all EE countries is 94.8 percent. To 
moderate the negative impact of foreign shocks, EE governments pursue flexible 
exchange rates.186 In line with the “impossible trinity hypothesis,” the coefficient of 
                                                 
185 Internationally oriented economic agents might prefer a flexible arrangement to allow depreciation, 
thus maintaining the competitiveness of major trading partners, which suggests that small and open 
economies might be averse to fixed rates. 
 
186 Poirson (2001) and Kato and Uctum (2003) also find that developing countries prefer to keep 
flexible or intermediate regimes.  
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the liberalization of capital movements shows that as countries liberalize capital 
accounts, they tend to move toward more flexible regimes, but this influence does not 
attain statistical significance.  
Turning to political variables, regime choice is influenced by both degree of 
democratic consolidation and nonfinancial sectors. The positive sign on the democracy 
coefficient indicates that governments in those EE countries that attained a higher 
degree of democratic consolidation faced more intense distributional pressures from 
interest groups and were thus less likely to sustain a currency peg.187 A higher 
proportion of domestic producers in manufacturing and agriculture relative to services 
also makes it more difficult to choose a fixed regime. 
Interpreting the estimated coefficients is difficult because the effect of a 
change in an explanatory variable on the likelihood of choosing a particular regime 
depends on the value of the coefficient and on the realization of the explanatory 
variable itself. To facilitate interpretation, column (5) in table 4.5 reports the marginal 
effects of a change in each explanatory variable on the probability of choosing an 
exchange rate peg. Marginal effects are measured by the first-order partial derivatives 
of the probabilities with respect to the variable in question and evaluated at the sample 
mean of each variable. The marginal effects of the dummy variables are measured as 
changes in the relevant probability when the dummy switches from 0 to 1. 
                                                 
187 Freedom House Democracy scores on political rights and civil liberties run from 1–14, with 1 
representing the highest level of democracy and 14 the lowest. Therefore, we have to reverse the 




Table 4.4: Correlation Table 
 











































–0.2721   –0.4174   –0.0502   –0.3004   1.0000      





–0.3774   –0.4756    0.0387   –0.3320   0.4387    0.2772    1.0000    
Openness 0.2767    0.3043    0.0143    0.1971   –0.1483   –0.2185    0.0013    1.0000   
 




0.3726    0.6946   –0.0438   0.3901   –0.3964   –0.2842   –0.5411   0.1964      0.0601  1.0000 
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The set of regressions presented in table 4.5 offers solid evidence that the level 
of financial development (private and foreign ownership and the quality of supervisory 
and regulatory institutions) plays an important role in exchange rate regime choices. It 
is also reassuring that other financial variables in the regressions have the expected 
effects: central bank independence has a positive and significant impact on the 
probability of fixing while the effect of currency mismatches is negative and 
statistically significant.  
Robustness Checks 
 In the next subsection, I discuss further evidence on the robustness of my main 
empirical findings. I examine whether the results are robust to alternative exchange 
rate classifications, additional control variables, and alternative estimation methods. 
The main results corresponding to this discussion are presented in tables 4.6–4.11. 
 
Alternative Model Specifications 
Financial variables appear to be persistent. To control for persistence effects, I 
ran several variations on the above model to check the robustness of my results and to 
consider some extensions of my argument, and the main results remain stable.188 I use 
the following: 
• Financial crises 
A typical scenario of a financial crisis is a period of fixed regime, followed by a 
large devaluation and collapse of peg. Many countries in EE were affected by the 1998 
Russian financial crises. I control for the contagion effect of the Russian crisis by 
introducing a crisis dummy in table 4.6, column (1). I show that this does not 
significantly affect my results.  
                                                 
188 In addition to robustness checks reported here, I also used added the measure of the IMF influence 
proxied by a country’s participation in IMF programs and a control for foreign exchange reserves. In 
general, these sensitivity tests did not significantly change the main results. 
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Table 4.5: Determinants of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Dependent Variable: Probability of Pursuing a Fixed Regime with the Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) De Facto Exchange Rate Regime Classification, extended by Eichengreen and Razo-
Garcia (2006). 


























Financial Development 0.562*** 
(0.138) 
0.512** 





0.127       
Central Bank 
Independence 
  6.872** 
(2.627)   
  8.355**   
 (2.549)      
  4.947*    
(1.984)      
1.222       
Currency Mismatch (log)  –0.719* 
(0.286)    
–0.557*    
(0.249)     
–0.817**   
 (0.277)    
–0.202       
High Inflation  –2.358** 
(0.891)     
 –2.261**   
 (0.860)     
–0.485       
Openness   –0.031 * 
 (0.012)      
 –0.004    
(0.010)     
–0.001       
Capital Liberalization  –0.159 
(0.733)       
 –0.525    
(0.746)     
–0.128       
Size (log)  –0.641***   
(0.191)     
 –0.983***   
(0.267)     
–0.243       
Non–Financial Sectors 
(log) 
  –3.007***   
(0.817)     
–3.005**   
 (1.059)     
–0.742       
Democracy   
 
 0.825***   
(0.152) 
 0.407***    
(0.120)      





–11.387***   
(2.262)    
16.024*    
(6.548)      
 
Log Likelihood –139.468 –88.285 –85.496 –81.077  
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Observations 300 229 229 229  
 
Note: Statistics with *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
• European Union (EU) 
I control for EU influence by using a dummy variable for the preparation for EU 
accession.189 The EU dummy could be also treated as a regional dummy or as a 
control for the level of economic development because the countries involved in the 
                                                 
189 I re-estimate the model (but do not report), employing the distance from Brussels as an alternative 
measure of the EU influence.  
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EU integration process are also the leaders in economic reforms. I report in table 4.6, 
column (2) that the EU does not appear to have a significant impact on exchange rate 
regime choice, but the main result of regressions remains stable and significant.190 
• Government Partisanship 
Scholars also examined political parties that mediate interest group preferences for 
exchange rates (Bearce 2003). Some have argued that right wing parties are likely to 
support fixed regimes because their business constituencies benefit from low inflation 
and stable currency made possible by fixing (Simmons 1994). Left wing parties, 
reflecting the working class interests, are less concerned with controlling inflation 
(Garrett 1995, Simmons 1994, Leblang 2003). Still, tests on the partisan arguments on 
the choice of exchange rate regimes have produced only mixed results. I tested for the 
effect of party polarization on exchange rate regime, and as table 4.6, column (3) 
shows, it does not significantly affect exchange rate regime choice. Nor does the 
inclusion of a political-party variable change the coefficient estimates on the principal 
explanatory variables. This result is in line with the predominant view in the literature 
on political parties in EE, according to which the ideological dimensions of party 
systems in EE are less important than their socio-cultural dimensions and their 
attitudes toward the communist regime. The party labels of EE governmental 
incumbents do not always reveal their true economic policy stance (Kitschelt et al. 
1999). In addition, transposing the sector-group perspective into partisan politics is not 
easy because many economic sectors cut across traditional party lines (Frieden 1991). 
In sum, for the domain of transition economies as a whole, arguments stressing party 
politics alone have little relevance for explaining currency politics. 
                                                 
190 This result might be explained by the fact that there is a high correlation between democracy levels 
and EU integration. EE countries that are associated/member countries of the EU are also more 
democratic, since democratic consolidation is a precondition of EU membership (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.73). I am thankful to Grigor Stoevsky, Economic Research and Projections Directorate, 
Bulgarian National Bank for this comment. 
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Table 4.6: Determinants of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Robustness: Alternative Model Specifications. 
Probability of Pursuing a Fixed Regime with the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) De Facto 
Exchange Rate Regime Classification, extended by Eichengreen and Razo–Garcia 
(2006). 











Financial Development  0.507*   
(0.199)      
0.488*   
(0.198)      




 5.065*   
(1.993) 
5.109*   
(2.058) 
4.678*    
(1.991) 
Currency Mismatch (log) –0.812**   
(0.273)     
–0.759**   
(0.288) 
–0.857**   
(0.281) 
High Inflation –2.299**   
(0.853) 
–2.115*   
(0.883) 
–2.240**   
(0.866) 
Openness –0.004   
(0.010)     
–0.007   
(0.011) 
–0.006   
(0.010)     
Capital Liberalization –0.474   
(0.751)     
–0.370   
(0.749) 
–0.530    
(0.757) 




–0.959***   
(0.269) 
Nonfinancial Sectors (log) –2.924**   
(1.054) 
–2.653*   
(1.069) 
–2.972**   
(1.062) 
Democracy  0.408*** 
(0.120) 
0.487***   
(0.138) 
0.435***   
(0.126) 
Financial Crisis  –0.762   
(0.817) 
  
European Union  1.028   
(0.860) 
 




15.321*   
(6.540) 
15.290*   
(6.603) 
Log Likelihood –80.637 –80.350 –80.707 
 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Observations 229 229 229 
 
 
Note: Statistics with *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Alternative Measures  
In addition to my primary measure of financial development, I also use change 
in the ratio of credit to private sector to GDP that is frequently used in empirical 
studies. This measure accounts for one of the most important functions of the financial 
sector: channeling savings to the productive sectors of the economy (King and Levine 
2000). Nonetheless, it does not capture the main hypotheses advanced in this study. In 
EE, the easier access of enterprises to finance was not necessarily reflected in 
increased bank lending to the private sector, for two reasons: first, the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises led to a significant increase in private credit to GDP, even in 
the absence of privatization and development in the financial sector; and second, 
reform of the socialist system of finance was aimed at both reducing the scale of bad 
credit and creating new institutions and sound credit policies. Therefore, the outcome 
was better loan quality rather than simply a credit increase. The interest rate spreads, 
that is, spreads between bank lending and deposit interest rates, measuring the 
financial terms on which borrowing enterprises can access funds that my index of 
financial development evaluates, better reflect an improvement in access to finance by 
enterprises (Fries 2005). 
In addition to the ratio of credit issued to private firms to GDP, I also use the 
measure of the importance of commercial banks relative to the central bank in 
allocating domestic credit (the ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit 
money bank domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets) as alternate measures 
of financial development, following King and Levine (2000). This measure accounts 
for the degree to which commercial banks or the central bank allocate society’s 
savings. The expectation is that private commercial banks are better able to identify 
profitable investments and monitor managers and facilitate resource mobilization than 
central banks (Beck, Levine and Loyaza 2000: 268). (In addition to these three 
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indicators of financial ownership and institutional development, I also consider 
directed credit as additional measure in the sensitivity section.)191 
 
Table 4.7, columns (1) and (2), present results when alternate measures of 
financial development are used. When the importance of banks relative to the central 
bank in allocating domestic credit is used to measure financial development (column 
1), I obtain results substantively and statistically similar to those in the baseline model. 
Column (2) shows that when private credit to GDP to measure financial development 
as a robustness check is used, this alternative measure of financial development does 
not enter with a coefficient that differs significantly from zero at conventional 
confidence levels. Nevertheless, my main results remain stable and significant. Only 
the coefficient for trade openness became positive and statistically significant: open 
economies are more likely to fix. A potential explanation is that not only does this 
measure not capture the principal hypothesis examined in this study, but it also 
excludes credits issued by the central bank and development banks, as well as credit to 
the public sector and claims of one group of financial intermediaries on another (Beck 
et al. 2000). This is a serious deficiency for this measure because many EE central 






                                                 
191 Liquid liabilities of the financial system divided by GDP is also used as a measure of financial sector 
development. However, this is a measure of financial depth; that is, the overall size of the financial 
sector, so it does not gauge the influence of different types of financial interests and institutions, which 
are the primary focus of this analysis.  
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Table 4.7: Determinants of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Robustness: Alternative Measures of Selected Explanatory Variables. 
Probability of Pursuing a Fixed Regime with the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) De Facto 
Exchange Rate Regime Classification, extended by Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia 
(2006). 
























–0.584   
(0.788) 
0.373*   
(0.181) 
Central Bank Independence 7.258** 
(2.797) 
10.091*   
(4.481) 
4.839 *   
(2.008) 
Currency Mismatch (log) –1.336*** 
(0.351) 
–0.939*   
(0.444) 
–0.820 **  
(0.264) 
High Inflation –3.355** 
(1.107) 
–4.879*   
(2.301) 




0.062*   
(0.029) 
–0.003   
0.010 
Capital Liberalization 0.686 
(0.633) 
–1.870   
(1.419) 
–0.167    
(0.725) 
Size (log) –1.838*** 
(0.433) 





Non–Financial Sectors (log) –5.591*** 
(1.443) 
–5.132**   
(1.673) 






1.065**   
(0.349) 




–4.241   
(12.555) 
22.119***   
(6.319) 
Log Likelihood –78.724 –51.908 –84.117 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.009 0.000 
Observations 225 175 229 
 





Finally, following Acemoglu et al. (2003), I also use constraints placed on 
executives and dictators as an alternative measure of democracy. This measure refers 
to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives, whether individuals or collectivities, so the focus is on the checks and 
balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. Higher scores are 
related to more veto points in the institutional structure. Table 4.7, column (3), shows 
that the results remain the same: democracies are more likely to float their currencies 
than autocracies.192 
Alternative Exchange Rate Regime Classifications 
I re-estimated my model using the IMF de jure regime classification to test 
whether the difference in exchange rate strategies among EE countries can be 
explained by the inappropriateness of the different classifications.193 There are indeed 
observable differences between the results of the models based on the de facto and the 
de jure regime specifications. These differences are not surprising given that the 
observed discrepancies between the two classifications are well documented. The 
correlation between these two regime classifications is low (the correlation coefficient 
is 0.29). As I illustrate in chapter 5 and the case study chapters, governments in many 
EE states officially proclaimed fixed regimes but due to the institutional weaknesses 
of their national financial systems, they were incapable, in practice, of sustaining pegs, 
and they reneged on their declared regimes and devalued currencies. On the other 
                                                 
192 Following Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Regio (2007), I also use the ratio of foreign liabilities in 
the domestic financial sector relative to money stocks to measure liability dollarization as an alternative 
proxy for the presence of currency mismatches. I also use the Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002) 
index of central bank independence. While coefficients on both CBI and currency mismatches become 
insignificant, the coefficient on the primary financial variable remains stable and statistically 
significant. The results are available from the author on request. 
 
193 Using the IMF classification, the following regimes were coded as fixed: dollarization, euroization, 
currency boards, conventional fixed pegs, horizontal bands, crawling pegs, and crawling bands. 
Managed floats with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate and independent float were coded as 
floats. 
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hand, actual exchange rate arrangements in countries with institutionally advanced 
financial systems dominated by foreign financiers resemble fixed regimes although the 
monetary authorities officially declared flexible regimes. Hence, I argue that de facto 
categories are preferable descriptions of exchange rate policies in EE.  
As can be seen in table 4.8 (columns 1 and 2), the financial development 
coefficient estimate remains statistically significant, but it does not have the expected 
sign. The coefficient on central bank independence shifted in the opposite direction 
and became insignificant. With regard to financial determinants, only the coefficient 
on currency mismatches enters with the same sign and significance. Democracy 
remains statistically significant, but now autocracies prefer more flexibility in their 
exchange policies. The coefficient on nonfinancial sectors remains stable and 
significant in the expected direction. Turning to economic determinants, none has 
attained statistical significance. These results suggest that official regime choices seem 
to be less guided by macroeconomic fundamentals than de facto regimes.194  
 A country that chooses a fixed regime must have sufficient international 
reserves to assure its credibility and sustainability. The collapse of a fixed regime is 
often associated with the steady erosion of international reserves. The availability of 
foreign exchange reserves to defend a currency peg is important to reduce the risk of 
speculative attacks, so I introduce international reserves in months of imports to 
control for this effect (table 4.8, column 3). I use the IMF classification of exchange 
rate regime to test this effect because it is the official regime declarations that signal to 
the financial markets and to speculators the commitment and ability of central banks to 
sustaining a currency peg. Nonetheless, the level of foreign exchange reserves does 
not play a significant role in regime choices if de jure classification is used. 
                                                 
194 Zhou and Von Hagen (2004) use a simultaneous equation model to explain the joint determination of 
the two regimes because the distributions of de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes are not 
independent of each other. 
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Table 4.8: Determinants of De Jure Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Robustness: Alternative Exchange Rate Regime Classifications. 
Probability of Pursuing a Fixed Regime with the IMF De Jure Exchange Rate Regime 
Classification. 
Estimation: Random Effects Logit Model. 
 











–0.363 *  
(0.166) 
–0.481*   




Central Bank Independence –0.899   
(1.351)     





Currency Mismatch (log) –0.532 *  
(0.255)     





High Inflation –0.812   
(0.722) 





Openness  0.029 **  
(0.010) 





Capital Liberalization  0.289   
(0.726) 





Size (log)  0.755**   
(0.239) 



























Log Likelihood –97.074 –96.149 –85.412  
Prob > chi2    0.02 0.020 0.01  
Observations 228 228 214  
 
Note: Statistics with *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 




Alternative Estimation Methods 
Exchange rate regimes adopted by EE countries cover a wide range of 
alternatives, some of which do not fall neatly into the conventional fixed-flexible 
dichotomy, so it is useful to examine the results with unordered choice between 
different categories of exchange rate regimes. I adopt a multivariate model with an 
unordered polychotomous dependent variable using cross-country pooled data. 
Following Eichengreen and Razo Garcia (2006), this model allows four choices of de 
facto regimes: hard peg, intermediate, float, and freely falling regimes. As table 4.9 
shows, I choose different regime outcomes as the base categories: hard pegs (columns 
1−3), and freely falling (columns 4−5). Consistent with my predictions, countries with 
more developed financial systems tend to choose fixed regimes (hard pegs and 
intermediate) over freely falling regimes. The probability of choosing hard pegs also 
increases as central bank independence increases.  
Nevertheless, the results change when I choose freely falling regimes as the 
base category: a higher degree of central bank independence increases the probability 
of choosing freely falling regimes over intermediate regimes and floats. This is quite 
intuitive: freely falling regimes are usually associated with very high levels of 
inflation, followed by a currency crisis. High inflation puts pressure on a fixed regime. 
A central bank tries to defend the currency by selling its foreign reserves. A steady 
erosion of international reserves leads to the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Finally, as expected, countries with currency mismatches tend to prefer more flexible 
regimes. Figure 4.5 shows that predicted probabilities for the extreme categories as 
well as for floats tend to be less than 0.25, with most predictions for intermediate 





Table 4.9: Determinants of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Robustness: Alternative Estimation Methods—Multinomial Logit Model. 
Probability of Pursuing a Fixed Regime with the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) De Facto 




































































 0.249  
(0.913) 


































































 4.678  
(6.617) 
Log Likelihood:198.398 
Pseudo R2: 0.336 
Observations: 229 
 
Note: Statistics with *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure 4.5: Predicted probabilities from a multinomial logit model 
 
 As an alternative method of estimation, I use generalized estimating equations 
(GEE) to account for within-group correlations in logistic regression. GEE models 
allow for specifying the within-group correlations structure for the panels and 
adjusting the intra-cluster correlation (table 4.10, column 1).195 While most results 
remain unchanged, caution is in order, for the coefficient on CBI changed the sign and 
became statistically insignificant. I also estimate random effect GLS using the fine 
R&R measure with 15 categories of exchange rates as the dependent variable to test 
the sensitivity that cut-off points do not lead to biased results (table 4.10, column 2). I 
obtain similar results to the baseline model.196  
 
                                                 
195 These models correspond to population-average (or marginal) models in the panel data literature. 
 
196 Because in the R&R fine classification, where exchange rate regimes run from 1−15, with 1 
representing the most rigid regimes and 15 the most flexible regime, we have to reverse the 




Empirical research on exchange rate regimes faces endogeneity problems 
(simultaneity). While most of my exchange rate regime choice determinants are not 
subject to endogeneity, some may reflect a possible reverse causality; that is, the 
determinants may be the consequences of exchange rate regime performance. They 
are, therefore, potentially endogenous to the exchange rate regime choices (Levy-
Yeyati et al. 2002). These include foreign ownership of banks.197  
My primary hypothesis is that the higher the degree of private and foreign 
ownership, the greater the likelihood that governments will adopt and sustain fixed 
regimes. Nonetheless, some argue that foreign banks may be unwilling to invest 
capital in countries where the government owns and controls the domestic banking 
system. Therefore, strategic choices of foreign banks may themselves lead to the 
politicized finance pathologies associated with government ownership of banks and 
more flexible regimes. In addition, governments may implement regulatory barriers to 
foreign entry to limit the degree of foreign bank participation.  
Reverse causality, if present, will produce overestimated coefficients. The 
literature on the endogeneity of exchange rate regimes has been largely inconclusive. 
The problem of endogeneity can be resolved in different ways: by using instrumental 
variables or by estimating a system of simultaneous equations. Given that there are 
many potential economic as well as political variables that can be used, it might be 
difficult to estimate so many equations.  
 
                                                 
197 Other examples include inflation or openness. The use of a currency peg leads to lower inflation 
rates, but, in turn, inflation is also an important determinant of exchange rate regime choice. Similarly, 
the exchange rate stability provided by a currency peg reduces exchange rate volatility and thus may 
foster trade. In turn, trade openness is one of the principal economic determinants of fixed exchange 




Table 4.10: Determinants of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
 




























































Note: Statistics with *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
In order to minimize the potential endogeneity problem, I first instrumentalize 
all right-hand-side variables in my model by using their own one-year lagged values as 
instruments in all regressions estimated above. This method assumes that the exchange 
                                                 
198 Please note that in contrast to the random effects model, in which coefficients represent expected 
differences (odds ratios, etc.) within an individual, given a change in their X from one value to another, 
coefficients in a GEE model represent expected differences within a population, given a change in 
everyone’s X from one value to another.  
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rate regime choice is ex-ante optimal, meaning that policy makers choose an exchange 
rate regime for the current period on the basis of the previous period’s performance. 
 Second, to examine whether endogeneity is a serious issue in this context, I 
also re-estimated my baseline regression by using the instrumental variable (IV) 
approach instrumenting for my primary variable—financial development. The 
excluded instruments have to be strongly correlated with the endogenous independent 
variables but have no direct impact on the dependent variable. Therefore, instrumental 
variables can only affect the dependent variable through the explanatory variables. 
 Based on the argument advanced in chapter 3, I instrument the principal 
financial development variable with the method of privatization variable. Method of 
privatization does satisfy the exclusion restriction—that is, it has almost certainly an 
independent impact on the probability of exchange rate pegging. Exogeneity is not a 
sufficient condition for economically meaningful instrumental variables (Levine, 
Loyaza and Beck 2000), so I have provided the reasons that the method of 
privatization is closely connected to factors that directly affect the behavior of 
financiers and financial institutional development in chapter 3. I am not aware of the 
arguments in the existing literature that link a country’s privatization method to an 
exchange rate regime determination. Following Levine (2002), I use an additional 
instrument to deal with endogeneity of foreign banks entry—the absolute value of the 
latitude of the country—to capture regulatory restrictions on foreign entry. 
Geography-based instruments are commonly used in the finance and growth literature. 
The rational behind the choice of this instrument is the argument provided by 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) that geographical endowments influence 
institutions, including national views toward openness and competition.199 Hall and 
                                                 
199 A common instrumental variable used to control for the endogenous determination of financial 
development is legal origin—English common law, French, German, Scandinavian civil law—
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Jones (1999) also show that geography, latitude in particular, is strongly correlated 
with high quality institutions. I have not identified any literature in which latitude 
independently affects exchange rate regime choices and hence violate the exclusion 
criterion. 
I use the IV strategy in the context of the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation (and report Newey-West standard errors) to address the potential 
problem of heteroscedasticity and serially correlated errors.200 GMM is usually used 
when facing heteroscedasticity of unknown form because standard IV estimators 
(though consistent) are inefficient in the presence of heteroscedasticity, preventing 
valid inference (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2003).201 My dependent variable in the 
baseline model is dichomous—fix or float—and thus logit or probit models would be 
the standard estimation method. Nonetheless, I am not aware of an IV estimator for a 
dichotomous dependent variable with heteroscedasticity and serially correlated errors, 
or of statistical tests for instrument strength and exogeneity.202 Following Eichengreen 
and Leblang (2006), I will estimate linear probability models. As a consequence, 
parameter estimates cannot be interpreted in terms of probabilities and predicted 
values may fall outside the zero-one interval.  
Testing the validity of the moment conditions (instruments) is crucial to 
ascertaining the consistency of GMM estimates. I test the relevance (strength) and 
                                                                                                                                            
developed by La Porta et al. (1998). Nonetheless, this instrument is not appropriate for my sample, for 
all EE countries are classified as a “socialist” legal system in the above database.  
 
200 The GMM was introduced by Lars Hansen (1982). 
 
201 The GMM estimator is more efficient than the simple IV estimator in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, and if the errors are neither heteroscedastic nor serially correlated, it is not worse 
asymptotically than the IV estimator (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2003). 
 
202 Heteroscedasticity tests (Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg test) using levels of IVs as well as 
fitted value and its square that I conducted, signal problems of heteroskedasticity in the estimated 
equation’s disturbance process. 
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exogeneity of instrumental variables (i.e., that they satisfy the exclusion restrictions) 
performing two tests: First, I calculate an F-test for the exclusion of the instrument(s) 
based on the first stage regressions and consider my instrument(s) strong if the F-
statistics is greater than ten (Staiger and Stock 1997). I also use the Cragg-Donald test 
of the null hypothesis of under-identification,203 Proceeding if the instruments satisfy 
both tests. Finally, the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions in a GMM context 
(called the J statistic) tests the null hypothesis that the model is not overidentified.204 
In the context of the exchange rate regressions, moment conditions mean that 
privatization method may affect the exchange rate regime choice only through the 
financial development indicators and the variables in the conditioning information set 
(that is, the other exchange rate regime determinants). 
Table 4.11 reports results of GMM estimation. The F-statistics from the first 
stage regressions for the joint significance of the instruments is relatively high with 
low p-values, providing support for the instruments used in the exchange rate 
equations. The instruments are significant in the first stage equations and they satisfy 
the Cragg-Donald test of under-identification. Similarly, the Hansen J-test of over-
identification of all instruments does not cast doubt on the instruments’ validity. The 
coefficient on financial development has retained both its statistical and economic 
significance in all three estimations and after using alternative measures of CBI and 
currency mismatches. The novel instrument of financial development proposed by this 
study yields the expected result: the direct sales method of privatization leads to higher 
levels of financial institutional development. Although the coefficients for central 
                                                 
203 The rank condition requires that there be enough correlation between the instruments and the 
endogenous variables to guarantee that unique parameter estimates can be computed. If the rank 
condition fails, the equation is considered to be underidentified (Baum 2006: 191). 
 
204 The null hypothesis of Hansen’s test is that the overidentifying restrictions are valid; that is, the 
instrumental variables are not correlated with the error term. 
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bank independence retained their statistical significance, they shifted in the opposite 
direction.  
This result is yet another proof that the direction in which an independent 
central bank influences exchange rate regime choice is not clear. Column (1) estimates 
the equation instrumenting financial development using privatization, while column 
(2) adds latitude. Column (3) replicates column (2) but uses alternative measures of 
currency mismatches and CBI. I use Levy Yeyati’s (2004) deposit dollarization ratios 
as an alternative measure of currency mismatches and CMN indices of central bank 
independence.205 Column (4) eliminates all controls and finds that the relationship 
between financial development and the probability of exchange rate peg remains 
positive and statistically significant.206  
Beyond econometric tests, we can use the broad historical and empirical 
evidence to form a judgment on the endogeneity of our explanatory variables to 
exchange rate regime choices. To this end, I have carefully traced the process of 







                                                 
205 Other potential measures of currency mismatches are Eichengreen et al. (2002) “ability to pay” 
measures and the ratio of foreign liabilities in the domestic financial sector relative to money stocks 
(Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Reggio 2007).  
 
206 Following Levy, Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Reggio (2007), I have further estimated (but not reported 
here) the GMM models using two instruments for de jure central bank independence and currency 
mismatches—the rule of law and voice and accountability—taken from the World Bank’s Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007). Although these instruments perform well in terms 
of identification and exogeneity, they have not passed the Hansen test of overidentification. 
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Table 4.11: Determinants of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Estimation: Instrumental variables regression estimated via Generalized Method of Moments 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




































































































































Note: White’s heteroscedasticity consistent and auto-correlation robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Instruments refer to the set of exogenous instruments used in the first stage 
regressions. The F-test refers to the F-test for the second stage model. The first stage F is the 
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust F-test for testing the exclusion of the 
instruments from the first stage. Cragg-Donald under-identification tests the null hypothesis 
that the first stage is under-identified. The null hypothesis of the Hansen J test of over-
identifying restrictions is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.  
Statistics with *, **, *** are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter accomplished two tasks. One, in the first part I present a new 
empirical measure of the key explanatory variable—financial development—to 
capture the influence of financial interests and institutions in choice and sustainability 
of exchange rate regime. Two, with this empirical measure of national financial 
development and other financial variables, I developed a finance-based political 
economy model, while controlling for economic and political variables identified in 
the literature on exchange rates. I tested my theoretical prediction in the context of 25 
transition economies of EE between 1990 and 2004.  
I show that existing theories on exchange rates are incomplete because they do 
not consider the effect of bank ownership and institutional structures on governmental 
choices of exchange rate regimes. Panel logit models of exchange rate regime 
determination in EE are largely consistent with the central prediction that countries 
with financial systems characterized by greater participation of foreign and private 
banks in the bank intermediation, accompanied by strong monetary and regulatory 
institutions, are more willing and able to commit to and sustain fixed exchange rate 
regimes than countries with financial systems dominated by incumbent SOBs. I also 
show that the de facto exchange rate regimes in EE diverge considerably from what is 
announced. These effects largely persisted against a variety of robustness checks, 
including different measures of financial development, different model specifications, 
and estimation methods. Finally, in contrast to many existing studies, I address the 
problem of endogeneity using an IV approach via GMM estimation with a novel 
instrument for financial development—the method of privatization of banks and 
industries—derived from my theory of financial institutional development in EE that I 
closely examine in chapter 3. 
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 This research suggests new directions for research on the choice of exchange 
rate regime that accounts for the role of financial institutional structures in exchange 
rate policy. Results from these large-n quantitative analyses demonstrate that the 
hypotheses derived from the theory in Chapters 2 and 3 contribute to explaining 
choices that governments make with regard to exchange rate regimes. The subsequent 
chapters will build on the theoretical frames and statistical results, and examine the 
specific processes and the mechanisms that link the changes in financial institutional 
structures to exchange rate regime choices, first comparatively in all EE states (chapter 
5) and then in four case studies. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will present comparative 




EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES IN TRANSITION 
Foreign exchange allocation is a useful channel 
for political favoritism and/or personal enrichment, 
by political leaders and by administering officials alike. 
 
Richard N. Cooper207 
 
This chapter surveys the remarkable diversity of exchange rate regimes in the 
post-communist states of EE. It also explores the extent to which this heterogeneity 
corroborates the argument that policymakers are more likely to choose and sustain 
fixed exchange regimes when they pursue stabilization and privatization policies that 
constrain political influence of incumbent financial and industrial interests. The ability 
of central banks to detach themselves from these established inflation lobbies is also 
an important element of stable currency policy. Independent central banks are among 
the main forces behind the imposition of “hard budget” constraints on banks and 
enterprises. In contrast, governments were not able to commit to sustainable fixed 
regimes when monetary policy continued to be a source of redistribution by 
preferential allocation through SOBs of credit to enterprises and agricultural 
producers, often in an environment of high inflation and negative interest rates.  
In chapter 3, I examined the role of privatization and financial liberalization in 
financial system development in EE. In this chapter I explore indirectly the role of 
incumbent and foreign banks in exchange policies by examining national financial 
development strategies that empowered different types of banks and shaped the 
responsiveness of politicians to their demands. While the statistical chapter 4 has 
established empirical links between various independent and contributory effects of 
financial factors on the probability of fixing the exchange rate, this chapter illustrates 
                                                 
207 Cooper (1997: 465). 
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these effects comparatively by exploring exchange rate histories in all EE states over 
time. Furthermore, I explore the reasons behind the discrepancies between the official 
and actual choices of governments with regard to exchange rate regimes in individual 
EE states that I have shown in chapter 4 on the aggregate data. I also identify the 
outliers, that is, the cases that do not seem to be comprehensive in terms of my 
theoretical framework. Finally, this chapter provides comparisons for how well the 
finance-based theory performs against rival hypotheses. While they provide important 
insights into some aspects of policy-making in EE, I will show that there are no 
existing theoretical approaches that account for the wide variety of exchange rate 
strategies in the transition region. The discussion in this chapter is far from conclusive 
in terms of empirical evidence. Rather, it suggests the plausibility of the argument and 
supplements the statistical chapter and in-depth case studies by offering a broad 
assessment of exchange rate policies in the EE region. 
After the collapse of the Soviet-type socialist system, the choice of exchange 
rate regime was seen as a major policy decision in EE countries (Pomfret 2003: 600). 
Exchange rate strategies throughout the transition impacted progress in decreasing 
inflation, the management of capital flows, and external competitiveness of the EE 
economies . Nonetheless, exchange rate policy in EE cannot be considered in 
isolation. This chapter situates it in the context of the overall transformation process, 
which is the interaction of initial conditions after the collapse of communism and 
institutional characteristics, as well as economic and political transition strategies. So, 
I first briefly examine initial conditions after the collapse of communism and then 
trace empirically the evolution of exchange rate regimes choices (voluntary and 
forced) in EE states in different periods of the post-communist transition. 
Before we turn to the post-communist region of EE, let me briefly explore 
exchange rate evolution in a comparative perspective. Following the collapse of the 
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Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1973, the practice of fixing 
exchanges was generally abandoned by the major countries in Europe and Japan, and 
there has been a gradual shift from fixed to more flexible exchange rates. The 
movement toward hard pegs in Europe reflects mostly the monetary unification 
project.208 Many developing countries still pegged their currencies in the 1970s either 
to a single currency (the U.S. dollar or French franc) or to a basket of currencies.209 In 
the 1990s, they officially shifted away from currency pegs and intermediate regimes 
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Source: Obstfeld (2007: 37). 
 
Figure 5.1: Changes in exchange-rate flexibility in developing countries, 1991–
2004 
 
Nonetheless, many developing countries—including transition economies, as 
this study shows—manage their exchange rates to a greater extent than announced. In 
fact, soft pegs have shown remarkable durability (Rogoff et al. 2003). De facto 
intermediate regimes still account for one-third to one half of regimes in developing 
                                                 
208 The members of the European Community created the European Monetary System in 1979, which in 
1999 evolved into the European Monetary Union (EMU) with a common currency.  
 
209 All the IMF member countries not classified as industrial countries are considered as “developing” 
countries here. Emerging market and transition economies are included in this sample. 
 
210 For a historical perspective on exchange rate regimes, see Bordo (2004), Eichengreen (1996). 
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contexts (Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia 2006). The choice of the exchange rate regime 
for developing and transition countries is thus different from that of developed ones. 
The monetary authorities of developing countries lack credibility and have limited 
access to international markets. Compared to industrialized countries, these countries 
suffer from more pronounced adverse effects of exchange rate volatility on trade, high 
liability dollarization, and higher pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation. In 
developing contexts, exchange rate devaluation is always connected with the loss of 
output and recession, yet in developing countries, devaluation spurs growth.211 
 
Initial Conditions 
As argued in chapter 1, EE states started the post-communist transition with a 
political legacy of authoritarianism and common legacies of central planning.212 In 
particular, they started with a common set of economic distortions inherited from the 
communist era (table 5.1). These included repressed inflation, extreme shortages in 
consumer and producer markets, large fiscal deficits and debts, uncompetitive 
production, and weak trade and financial links with Western markets (de Melo et al. 
2001). Their industrial structures shared similar features: high shares of industry and 
manufacturing and repressed service sectors.213 Most countries, particularly Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Hungary, and Poland, inherited large external debts.214 As a consequence of 
                                                 
211 Maurice Obstfeld. International Economics course, lecture on March 20, 2007, Department of 
Economics, University of California, Berkeley. 
 
212 Hanson (1995) further breaks down the communist legacies into ideological, political, 
socioeconomic, and cultural components. On the legacies of communism, see also Jowitt (1992), 
Hanson and Ekiert (2003). 
 
213 Only in Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia did services represent fifty percent of GDP. Ideological 
considerations that held nonmaterial output to be “unproductive” were one of the main reasons behind 
the suppression of services during communism (de Melo, et al. 2001: 4, fn. 8).  
 
214 Russia assumed all the Soviet era foreign debt and thus freed other post-Soviet republics from past 
international obligations (Fisher and Sahay 2000: 10). 
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communist policies, intended to create an interdependent communist trade bloc, 
external trade flows were concentrated within the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA).215 The breakdown of the CMEA and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union severely disrupted international trade and payments in most EE countries. In the 
monetary realm, EE countries had non-convertible currencies and a large black market 
premium on the exchange rate.216 
In sum, all EE countries started the transition with a deep economic crisis and 
dislocation with the exception of the former Czechoslovakia, which had a stable 
economy and low foreign debt (Sachs 1996: 147). While I stress these similar starting 
points in terms of domestic economic and political structures in EE, I recognize some 
variation in background conditions that might have affected post-communist 
trajectories. Nonetheless, as this study shows, most of these differences in initial 
conditions, identified in the existing literature, fail to explain the different exchange 
rate regime outcomes in EE states.
                                                 
215 The inter-republic exchanges accounted for around 85 percent of trade in 1991 for the post-Soviet 
states, except for Russia and Ukraine. 
 
216 A high black market exchange rate premium, that is, a differential between the official and the free 
exchange rate is an indicator of depreciation expectations. It represents a distortionary tax on exports 
and a subsidy on imports. Black market premiums were the highest in the ex-Soviet states, Bulgaria, 



































Years under  
central planning
Albania 13 1,400 37 Poor 4.3 6.6 434 47 
Armenia 10 5,530 55 Poor 25.7 25.6 1,828 71 
Azerbaijan 10 4,620 44 Rich 25.7 29.8 1,828 70 
Belarus 8 7,010 49 Poor 25.7 41.0 1,828 72 
Bulgaria 7 5,000 59 Poor 18 16.1 921 43 
Croatia 7 6,171 35 Poor 12 6.0 27 42 
Czech Republic 4 8,600 58 Poor –7.1 6.0 185 42 
Estonia 5 8,900 44 Poor 25.7 30.2 1,828 51 
Georgia 11 5,590 43 Moderate 25.7 24.8 1,828 70 
Hungary 4 6,810 36 Poor –7.7 13.7 47 42 
Kazakhstan 9 5,130 34 Rich 25.7 20.8 1,828 71 
Kyrgyz Republic 9 3,180 40 Poor 25.7 27.7 1,828 71 
Latvia 5 8,590 45 Poor 25.7 36.7 1,828 51 
Lithuania 5 6,430 45 Poor 25.7 40.9 1,828 51 
Macedonia, FYR 7 3,394 43 Poor 12 6.0 27 47 
Moldova 9 4,670 37 Poor 25.7 28.9 1,828 51 
Poland 4 5,150 52 Moderate 13.6 8.4 277 41 
Romania 11 3,470 59 Moderate 16.8 3.7 728 42 
Russia 6 7,720 48 Rich 25.7 11.1 1,828 74 
Slovak Republic 4 7,600 59 Poor -7.1 6.0 185 42 
Slovenia 5 9,200 44 Poor 12 4.0 27 46 
Tajikistan 6 3,010 34 Poor 25.7 31.0 1,828 71 
Turkmenistan 11 4,230 34 Rich 25.7 33.0 1,828 71 
Ukraine 6 5,680 44 Moderate 25.7 23.8 1,828 74 
Uzbekistan 11 2,740 33 Moderate 25.7 25.5 1,828 71 
¹Freedom House Democracy Index (political rights and civil liberties) in 1990 or in the first year for which the score is available.  
²Repressed inflation is defined as the percentage change in real wages less the percentage change in real GDP. 
³Trade dependence is defined as the ratio of CMEA exports and imports to GDP. 
Source: Adapted from De Melo, Denizer, Gelb and Tenev (2001), Freedom House: Nations in Transit, various issues
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EE states implemented political and economic reforms simultaneously in the 
early 1990s.217 The economic agenda of post-communist reformers was based on a 
similar menu: macroeconomic stabilization to overcome the damages of high inflation; 
privatization of state enterprises and banks; liberalization of markets to allow open 
entry and competition; and institutionalization of rule of law and the protection of 
property rights (Havrylyshyn and Olding-Smee 2000: 8).218 In the initial reform phase, 
fighting against high inflation and establishing credibility on international markets 
were the top priorities of policymakers in most EE states. Because of earlier 
liberalization steps, open inflation was chronic in Poland and the former Yugoslav 
republics in 1989. But repressed inflation, in the form of a monetary overhang, was 
high across the EE region (de Melo et al 2001: 7).219 So, price liberalization at the 
beginning of the transition resulted in high inflation (and a wage-price inflationary 
spiral in some countries) and a dramatic fall of output in most EE states.220 As table 
5.2 shows, the 12-month pre-stabilization inflation rates ranged from hyperinflation of 
57 thousand percent per annum in Georgia to 26 percent in Hungary.221 
 
                                                 
217 Nation and state building have also been central to post-communist development. Virtually all EE 
transitions were national liberations either from the Soviet bloc or from domination by a federal state. 
On post-communist multiple transitions, see Bunce (1999).  
 
218 It has been argued in post-communist studies that democratization and economic reforms are highly 
correlated in EE: more democratic countries feature capitalist economies. See Hellman (1998), Fish 
(1998), Bunce (1998), Kopstein and Reilly (2000), Kurz and Barnes (2002). A slightly different picture 
might emerge if we disaggregate economic reforms. Failed financial sector reforms with deleterious 
consequences for economic development in the Czech Republic, one of the most successful 
democracies in EE, might put this general phenomenon in question. 
 
219 Some countries initiated partial liberalization before the collapse of communism: Yugoslavia 
abandoned formal planning in the 1950s; Poland initiated reforms in 1968 and Hungary did so in 1981. 
 
220 High inflation accompanied by a drastic fall in output and negative growth is called stumpflation. 
 
221 The worst hyperinflation in the EE region (in Georgia in 1992−1994 and in the former Yugoslavia in 
1992−1993) was driven by war finance. Military assistance from Russia reduced the need for 
inflationary war finance in civil war torn Tajikistan (Pomfret 2003: 604).  
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Exchange Rate Strategies  
An important element of the initial stabilization strategy aimed at combating 
high inflation was the choice of exchange rate regime (Fisher and Sahay 2000). A 
currency peg has been regarded as the most effective strategy to combat inflation, to 
stabilize the economy, and to facilitate the introduction of current account 
convertibility.222 For countries with a history of high inflation, weak and unstable 
governments, and non-credible monetary institutions, a fixed regime can signal the 
commitment towards exchange rate stability. An exchange rate commitment is 
particularly desirable in societies where central banks are not independent or lack 
public and political support for market-based discipline (Wyplosz 1999: 17).  
Even for countries that started the transition with lower inflation rates, the 
“Washington consensus,” actively promoted by the IMF through conditionality loans, 
held that a fixed exchange rate was the appropriate nominal anchor for stabilization, 
provided that fiscal policy was sustainable (Von Hagen and Zhou 2002: 7).223 Credible 
and sustainable exchange rate-based stabilization programs, however, required a 
political will to depoliticize the allocation of credit and to create an independent 
banking sector by privatizing SOBs. Directed credit that dominated the lending 
operations of many SOBs has been a major source of inflation in the post-communist 
region.  
                                                 
222 Liberalization of the current account was accompanied by substantial initial devaluation of domestic 
currencies, which were strongly overvalued under central planning, to restore a balance between supply 
and demand for currencies as well as to stimulate exports and to curb imports. 
 
223 International financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, and EBRD) made financial aid and technical 
support to transition economies conditional on adopting structural adjustment policies used by these 
institutions to address structural crises in developing countries, especially in Latin America. The 
Washington Consensus list of policies, codified in Williamson (1994) included fiscal discipline, 
reorientation of public expenditures, tax reform, financial liberalization, unified and competitive 
exchange rates, trade liberalization, openness to foreign investments, privatization, deregulation, and 
property rights. The Washington consensus has been under attack since the mid-90s. Stiglitz (2000) 
criticized IMF bailout conditions during the financial crisis in East Asia, imposing stringent 
stabilization measures that caused severe recessions in the region. For a recent criticism of the 
Washington consensus, see Rodrik (2006). 
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adopted (sole legal 
tender) 
Exchange regime in 
2004 
(De Facto) 
Albania Aug 92 Fixed 293 237 (‘92) 1993 NA Flexible  
Armenia Dec 94 Flexible  1885 10896 (‘93) 1995 Nov 93 (Nov 93) Fixed  
Azerbaijan Jan 95 Flexible  1651 1787 (‘94) 1996 Aug 92 (Jan 94) Fixed  
Belarus Nov 94 Flexible  2180 1997 (‘93) 1996 May 92 (May 94) Flexible 
Bulgaria Feb 91 Flexible  245 579 (‘97) 1998 NA Fixed  
Croatia Oct 93 Fixed  1903 2585 (‘89) 1994 Dec 91 Fixed  
Czech Republic Jan 91 Fixed  46 52 (‘91) 1992 Feb 93 Fixed  
Estonia Jun 92 Fixed  1086 947 (‘92) 1993 Jun 92 (Jun 94) Fixed  
Georgia Sep 94 Flexible 56476 7486 (‘93) 1996 Apr 93 (Aug 93) Flexible  
Hungary Mar 90 Fixed  26 35 (‘90) NA NA Fixed  
Kazakhstan Jan 94 Flexible  2315 2961 (‘92) 1996 Nov 93 (Nov 93) Fixed  
Kyrgyz Republic May 93 Flexible  934 958 (‘92) 1993 My 93 (May 93) Flexible  
Latvia Jun 92 Flexible  818 1162 (‘92) 1993 May 92 (Jul 92) Fixed  
Lithuania Jun 92 Flexible  709 1162 (‘92) 1994 May 92 (Oct 92) Fixed 
FYR Macedonia Jan 94 Flexible  248 1780 (‘92) 1995 Apr 92 Fixed  
Moldova Sep 93 Flexible 1090 2198 (‘92) 1995 Jul 93 (Jul 93) Flexible 
Poland Jan 90 Fixed 1096 640 (‘89) 1992 NA Flexible  
Romania Oct 93 Flexible  314 295 (‘93) 1995 NA Flexible 
Russia Apr 95 Flexible  218 2510 (‘92) 1996 Jul 93 (Jul 93) Fixed  
Slovak Republic Jan 91 Fixed  46 58 (‘91) 1990 Feb 93 Flexible  
Slovenia Feb 92 Flexible  288 247 (‘91) 1993 Oct 91 Fixed 
Tajikistan Feb 95 Flexible  73 7344 (‘93) 1994 May 95 (May 95) Flexible 
Turkmenistan NA Flexible 20 9743 (‘93) 1997 Nov 93 (Nov 93) Flexible  
Ukraine Nov 94 Flexible 645 10155 (‘93) 1990 Sep 96 (Sep 96) Fixed 
Uzbekistan Nov 94 Flexible 1555 1281 (‘94) 1996 Nov 93 (Jan 94) Flexible² 
 
Source: Fisher and Sahay (2000), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006), IMF Annual Reports on Exchange Rare Regimes and 
Restrictions, Abdelal (2001), Johnson (2000). 
¹Pre-program inflation is inflation in the 12 months prior to the month of the stabilization program. Inflation is calculated from December to December. 
²De Jure exchange rate regime since Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) do not report the de facto regime. 
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In the demobilized post-communist context at the outset of the transition in 
1989, macroeconomic stabilization and institutional reforms were carried out through 
the concentrated power of the technocratic elite who had considerable discretion over 
economic policies. These technocrats were “the necessary, if not sufficient 
prerequisites” of drastic economic reforms, including costly anti-inflationary programs 
(Williamson 1994). The extrication of government from societal pressures at the 
beginning of the transition was facilitated by the fact that interest groups, old and new, 
had not yet defined their interests and a system of lobbying or interest group 
organization, through which to consolidate opposition to radical reforms was lacking 
(Ost 1993). Nonetheless, as I argued in the preceding chapters, the success of 
stabilization and its accompanying financial sector reforms along with the specific 
factors in the design of these reforms reflected the initial constellations of political 
coalitions between the state and economic interests (financial and industrial) at the 
outset of transition (initial conditions) and the choices made by the new governments 
concerning financial liberalization and transfer of state assets to private hands.224 The  
diverse patterns of state asset transfer and financial system development that resulted 
explain a great deal about the variation of exchange rate regimes among EE states. 
Table A.4 in the Appendix displays strategies that the EE central banks adopted in 
exchange rate management from 1990–2004. 
 
The Early Peggers: Stabilization and Financial Openness 
Societies existed in which serious reformers facing relatively favorable initial 
economic conditions were able to secure political support for market reforms and cut 
ties with the incumbent interests from the socialist era and newly created rent-seeking 
                                                 
224 I am not addressing the issue of the appropriate speed of property transfer or the speed and sequence 
of reform measures, which were hotly debated in the initial years of transition. 
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interests through financial liberalization and privatization of SOBs and enterprises to 
outsiders during the early stages of transition.225 These governments were able to limit 
the deleterious effects of insider privatization of banks and industries, discussed in 
chapter 3. Financial openness smoothed the path for competition and easy entry by 
new private banks, enterprises, and foreign investors. It undermined the monopolistic 
position of the old communist coalitions of party hierarchy and prevented managers of 
SOBs and state monopolies from draining state resources and from asset stripping. 
These conditions, in turn, allowed the governments to implement sufficient monetary 
and fiscal controls to support a dismantling of their interventionist and protectionist 
policies, to commit to consistent stabilization and reform programs (table 5.2). 
Governments in these societies were more likely to adopt fixed exchange rate 
regimes, sometimes as a part of the IMF exchange-rate based stabilization programs, 
to pursue price and financial stabilization and hard budget constraints.226 International 
banks and new private banks and enterprises without political baggage are better able 
to survive without state protection. They are more receptive to structural adjustments 
and less likely to pressure governments for exchange rate adjustments. The entry of 
foreign investors interested in macroeconomic stability and fixed regime was an 
important step in this direction (Korhonen 1999: 17). 
Early peggers−Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic 
States−outperformed the floaters in terms of inflation reduction (table 5.2). Poland was 
                                                 
225 The argument here is broadly consistent with the literature explaining long-term patterns in 
economic policy making by focusing on the critical junctures in the political decision-making process. 
See Przeworski (1991), Frye (2002b), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001). As Bunce (2000: 717) argues, 
the advantage of a sharp break with an authoritarian regime was the victory of the opposition forces in 
the first elections, quick construction of democratic institutions and successful economic reforms. See, 
also Fish (1998), Bunce (1999), Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006). 
 
226 EE countries adopted exchange rate-based stabilization programs when stabilization was anchored 
to nominal variables (such as exchange rate or wages); or a money-based stabilization program when 
anchors of stabilization were real variables (real money supply and/or real interest rates). For a 
discussion on the advantages and drawbacks of different anchors, see Domac et al. (2001). See Bruno 
(1992) and Gomulka (1995) for comparisons of IMF-agreed stabilization programs in EE. 
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the first to launch a “shock therapy” program in January 1990.227 The reform strategy 
that became widely known as the “Balcerowicz plan,” after the Solidarity Minister of 
Finance, Leszek Balcerowicz, was based on the fixed exchange rate of the Polish zloty 
to the U.S. dollar. Its objective was to fight against hyperinflation and to restore a 
stable and convertible currency. The comprehensive stabilization and liberalization 
program adopted by the opposition Solidarity government was the expression of its 
willingness to cut ties radically with the communist regime. Stabilization was 
accompanied by massive cuts in fiscal subsidies, strict bad loan regulation in the 
banking sector, and bank privatization that included placement with foreign investors. 
Hungary initially opted for a gradualist money-based approach to stabilization 
focused on improving the trade balance but it was combined with a fixed exchange 
rate regime. Nonetheless, after a “reform pause” around the mid-1990s, the monetary 
policy became more expansionary and the country suffered from persisting fiscal and 
current account deficits. The Socialist government of Lajos Bokros adopted an 
austerity package in 1995, supported by the governor of the National Bank of Hungary 
(NBH) Gyorgy Surányi. The centerpiece of the package was a greater weight assigned 
to the fixed exchange rate in a disinflation strategy (Burdekin, Nelson, and Willett 
1999: 114). Exchange-rate-based stabilization was accompanied by banking sector 
reform. In fact, Hungarian banks withdrew from enterprise sectors in terms of both 
lending and ownership from the very early days of transition. Banks restructured their 
                                                 
227 In the first years of transition, a hotly debated issue was the speed of the transition, stemming from 
the difference between two paths of transformation in EE: Poland launched a “shock therapy” model 
(also called “Big Bang” or “cold turkey”), while Hungary adopted a gradualist approach. The 
proponents of the first approach (Sachs 1993, Lipton and Sachs 1990, Fisher and Gelb 1991) expressed 
intellectual and political commitment to a monetarist vision of economic management stressing the 
importance of simultaneous macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. They called for rapid 
privatization to avoid asset stripping and to prevent newly formed vested interest groups from blocking 
privatization later. The proponents of gradualism (Dewatripont and Roland 1992, Aghion and 
Blanchard 1994, Murell 1993) underlined the high adjustment costs of rapid changes resulting in terms 
of unemployment and political costs of reforms. The latter group put greater emphasis on building 
institutions and market infrastructure as a crucial pre-condition for successful liberalization. Beyond 
these differences, both radical and gradual reform approaches shared many common elements. 
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loan portfolios before they were privatized through case-by-case, cash-based 
privatization to foreign investors. The government was able to assist in the financial 
reform by injecting new capital into the big banks but at the same time imposing strict 
financial regulation (Barnes 2003).228 
There are good reasons to conclude that the accounts focusing on the pace of 
transition or pure pressures of interest groups and economic sectors will be unable to 
explain the regime choices of the early peggers. Although the speed of reforms in 
Poland and Hungary differed, both adopted stabilization programs based on fixed 
regimes. Similarly, both countries, having experimented with political and economic 
liberalization already in the 1970s and 1980s, began the transition with relatively well-
organized societal groups and competing political actors. Although a negotiated mode 
of exit from communism in both Poland and Hungary provided an additional 
opportunity for these incumbent interests to entrench themselves, they were not able to 
capture the state.229  
In contrast, orthodox communist policies left the former Czechoslovakia (and 
its successor republics) with poorly organized social and political groups. A strong 
strategic control of the economy and polity gave the first post-communist government 
leeway to pursue economic reforms. Similar to Poland, the former Czechoslovakia had 
initially opted in 1990 for the shock therapy model and a fixed exchange rate regime 
as part of the IMF stabilization program. The program was adopted less of necessity, 
                                                 
228 An important piece of legislation discouraging banks from supporting failing enterprises was the 
1992 stringent bankruptcy law, according to which bankruptcy proceedings were launched against any 
enterprise with more than ninety days of loan arrears (Barnes 2003: 549). See, also Bartlet (1996). 
 
229 EE countries exited communism in different ways: The post-communist regime in Hungary was the 
outcome of pacted transition, in Czechoslovakia the outcome of mass-mobilized transition, and in 
Poland and Slovenia the outcome of mass mobilization combined with elite-negotiated transition 
(Bunce 1999). There are several competing explanations for the variation in the communist exit, 
focusing on structural factors like geography (Kopstein and Reilly 2000), the legacies of pre-communist 
development (Kitschelt et al. 1999), the strength of the anticommunist opposition (Bruszt and Stark 
1992), and pre-communist schooling (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006). 
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for the macroeconomic indicators were relatively good, than as an expression of the 
political victory of finance minister Václav Klaus, a radical reformer. He had tried to 
liberate the government from various social and political groups but was unwilling to 
cut ties with banks. After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, both successor 
republics—the Czech Republic and Slovakia—continued a fixed regime policy. 
The initial reforms in Czechoslovakia provided credibility and strong 
foundations for the continuation of a fixed regime in Slovakia, allowing the newly 
established National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) to peg the new national currency, the 
Slovak koruna. This exchange rate strategy was chosen in spite of a complete lack of 
foreign reserves and limited access to international capital markets due to the political 
uncertainty following the division of the federation.230 Therefore, the Slovak 
populist−cum−authoritarian government of Vladimír Mečiar (1992−1994) retained a 
currency peg and restrictive monetary policies from the original transformation 
blueprint inherited from Czechoslovakia. Still, the government broke down in the 
areas of privatization and industrial policy, delaying the second wave of voucher 
privatization and establishing a regime that rewarded political allies—the communist-
era enterprise managers—with lucrative privatization deals. 
In the Baltic countries, an important component in the economic reforms was 
currency reform. Russia and the other fourteen post-Soviet republics inherited a ruble 
zone, a currency union based on the Soviet ruble. The Baltic States exited the ruble 
zone early and ultimately, pegging their new currencies. Estonia was the first to exit 
the ruble zone. The launching of an independent currency, the kroon, in 1992 
coincided with the implementation of a radical reform program based on a currency 
board to fight high inflation inherited from the ruble area. The currency board imposed 
                                                 
230 Author’s interview with Karol Mrva, Member of the NBS Board, Executive Director Financial 
Market Operations, December 9, 2005, Bratislava. 
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a rigorous institutional and monetary policy framework that left little space for 
discretionary policy. The Bank of Estonia (BOE) was prohibited from lending to the 
government and short-term financing of commercial banks in order to avoid political 
pressures. The liberal foreign investment and trade regimes as well as the privatization 
of banks and enterprises on a cash-basis to foreign investors enabled the government 
to break decisively with the communist legacy and build a competitive financial 
system based on market-based bank-industry ties.231 The rigid peg has enjoyed a broad 
political consensus, shared by the BOE and has had considerable public support from 
the beginning, bringing transparency and credibility to economic policies (Grigonyté 
2003:116–119). 
Lithuania pegged its new national currency, the litas, to the U.S. dollar in 
1993, which was subsequently changed to a currency board in April 1994. Although 
the Lithuanian parliament had already passed a law in December 1991 on the national 
currency, political disagreements delayed exit from the ruble zone (Korhonen 1999: 
17). The intention to introduce a currency board, announced by the Prime Minister at a 
press conference in October 1993, was followed by a clash of diverse economic, 
political, and ideological interests (Camard 1996). The idea of currency board was 
supported by the government (and the IMF) but it was opposed by the Bank of 
Lithuania (BOL), commercial banks, and many industrial enterprises. Banks were 
against the proposal because a currency board would have meant large profit losses by 
trading in foreign currency. The Federation of Industrialists wanted the exchange rate 
at a lower level to preserve the competitiveness of domestic exports (Aima 1998, 
Nenovsky, Hristov, and Mihaylov 2002: 11). A currency board was established in part 
                                                 
231 Foreign ownership transferred the responsibility for lender of last resort operations to the bank 
shareholders (Wyplosz 1999: 18). 
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to prevent the kind of political interference with the BOL that led in 1993 to the 
dismissal of the bank governor and the board (Maxfield 1997: 59).232  
The Latvian government chose to peg its new currency, the litas, to Special 
Drawing Rights of the IMF (SDR) in February 1994. Slower financial sector reforms 
and abuse by insiders led to the banking crisis in 1995. The largest Latvian bank, 
Banka Baltija, which held 30 percent of deposits, and fifteen other banks collapsed.233 
Insider lending was a prominent feature in most insolvent banks: bank managers, bank 
owners, and the state used bank resources to finance their own credits; however, there 
were other reasons for the Latvian banking crisis that differed from the other two 
Baltic states (Berensmann 2002: 220). Latvian banks profited from financing transit 
trade between the East and West from 1993 to 1994 because world prices for metal 
and other commodities were substantially higher than Russian prices. But when 
Russian prices increased to the level of world prices, the credit portfolios of banks 
deteriorated. Latvian banks were also used for Russian flight capital and money 
laundering (Berensmann 2002: 225). In fact, the role of interest groups has been much 
greater in Latvia than in Estonia, partly related, perhaps, to different economic 
structures, particularly the existence of larger industrial units with more political clout 
and the greater involvement of the ethnic Russian population in business activities in 
Latvia (Feldmann 2000: 18–19). After the banking crisis, the government accelerated 
liberalization and privatization of the financial and enterprise sectors. A crucial factor 
                                                 
232 In contrast to Estonia, the institutional design of the Lithuanian currency board allowed the BOL to 
exercise the lender of last resort function when the banking sector threatened financial stability in 1995. 
During the Lithuanian banking crisis in 1995, the central bank provided liquidity support for a small 
bank (Aura Bank) that had been experiencing problems. When the largest private bank (Innovation 
Bank) and two other banks ran into difficulties, the Lithuanian parliament passed a law requiring the 
government to extend guarantees for interbank borrowing by struggling banks (Korhonen 1999: 27).  
 
233 Before closing Bank Baltija, the Latvian authorities tried to negotiate with bank management to 
prepare a restructuring plan. When these negotiations proceeded, bank managers were reportedly able to 
strip the bank of 260 million U.S. dollars of assets and transfer them to a Russian financial institution 
(Barisitz 2002: 94). 
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in Latvia’s successful reforms was also the high independence of the Bank of Latvia, 
which had pursued a de facto peg since 1994 (Pomfret 2003: 601). 
In spite of slightly different approaches to the initial choice of regimes and 
commitment to financial openness, all three Baltic countries were able to sustain fixed 
regimes throughout the transition, often in the face of large negative shocks, including 
banking crises, currency appreciation, voter backlash against reforms in Estonia, and 
so on. By instituting currency board rules, policymakers lost possibilities (and 
incentives) to exercise discretionary monetary policy to distribute rents to incumbent 
interests. Rigid pegs signaled a clear commitment to inflation stabilization and created 
confidence in commitment to financial openness and reform.234 
While early peggers shared their commitment to disinflationary policies based 
on fixed regimes, they differed in their commitment to establish independent monetary 
authorities. Legislators in Estonia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic granted their 
central banks complete autonomy in monetary and exchange rate policies to “deflect 
political pressures,” as the prime minister of Estonia put it (Laar 1994: 3). But Polish 
and Hungarian central banks had a legally stipulated role in supporting government 
economic objectives, and the governments have been assigned an important role in the 
exchange rate policy (Radzyner and Riesinger 1997). Therefore, exchange rate policy-
making in these countries is based on a “consensus” between the central bank and 
government. So, when currencies of these countries started to appreciate in real terms 
under fixed regimes in conditions of residual inflation and increasing capital inflows, 
they switched to crawling pegs and crawling bands that served the dual objectives of 
maintaining competitiveness and moderating inflation (Frommel and Schobert 2006: 
                                                 
234 The other difference between the Estonian and Lithuanian currency boards is that while Estonian law 
allows only the parliament to devalue currency, Lithuanian law gave this right first to the government 
and later to the BOL (Hansson 1997: 270). 
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468). The appreciation eroded competitiveness of tradable producers who became 
vocal critics of the monetary policy, leading to a deterioration of trade and current 
account balances and to the accumulation of foreign debt.235 Crawling pegs have been 
considered to be an effective nominal exchange rate anchor in an inflation reduction 
program (Dornbusch and Werner 1994). In addition, the governments of both 
countries severely limited their ability to borrow from their central banks. These legal 
restraints on discretionary borrowing and open financial systems allowed Poland and 
Hungary to pursue sustainable exchange rate policies without financial turbulences. 
After it left the Yugoslav monetary union, Macedonia also tried to regain 
stability by adopting an exchange rate peg but less decisively in the beginning than 
other early peggers. The disintegration of the Yugoslav monetary union that 
accompanied the break-up of the Yugoslav federation led to extremely high inflation 
in all its successor states, which was additionally fuelled by military conflicts, 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, and failed stabilizations.236  
The Klusev’s “government of experts”237 in Macedonia, introduced its new 
currency, the denar, and the first stabilization package in April 1992 accompanied by 
the establishment of an independent central bank, National Bank of the Republic of 
Macedonia (NBRM), modeled upon the German Bundesbank (Bišev 2002: 272). 
Initially, inflation and repeated devaluations of the currency persisted because of the 
                                                 
235 For example, the President of the large Hungarian firm Videoton repeatedly criticized the monetary 
policy of the NBH for a large currency overvaluation (Bohle and Greskovits 2004: 21). 
 
236 Monetary policy was highly politicized and a major source of redistribution of income in the former 
Yugoslavia. The National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) allocated the credit to agriculture, exporters to 
the CMEA, and the Yugoslav National Army. It also assumed foreign exchange rate losses of SOBs 
(infamously known as a “black holes”): banks were liquid in foreign exchange but dependent on NBY 
for daily dinar liquidity needs, and NBY had to monetize foreign exchange flows. After yearly inflation 
breached a thousand percent, a stabilization program anchored to the Deutsche markwas announced in 
December 1989. But the stabilization was unsuccessful. Inflation accelerated in mid−1991, as NBY 
began printing money to finance war (Kraft 1995, Prašnikar, Jazbec, et al. 2002).  
 
237 There were only two politically affiliated ministers in the government.  
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pressure of agricultural producers for monetary expansion and easy credit (Kraft 1995: 
485, Daviddi and Uvalic 2003). In autumn 1992 and December 1993, the government 
adopted two subsequent stabilization packages, sponsored by the IMF, which were 
successful at regaining monetary stability. Earlier, in June 1993, the Sobranie (the 
legislative body) enacted legislation to privatize banks together with enterprises under 
the general enterprise privatization scheme (but avoiding mass privatization) and 
strengthened the banking supervisory standards (Perry 1997: 263). By the end of 1995, 
more than 60 percent of the share capital of the four old banks was privately owned 
(Bisev 2002: 266), allowing the government in October 1995 to replace the flexible 
regime with a fixed regime to maintain price stability. Although the entry of foreign 
investors into the financial sector had been liberalized and macroeconomic policies 
were prudent, the ownership structure did not have substantial foreign participation 
until the end of 1999, mainly because of high political risk.238 NBRM has retained its 
de facto peg to the Deutsche mark (the euro) since the early 1990s, and was able to 
withstand the 2001 ethnic and security crisis and other external shocks (Barisitz 2004 
and 2007).239  
In sum, not only did the fixed regime help to decrease inflation but the output 
loss of disinflation was lower in countries that have used it as the external anchor at 
the outset of the transition. An important advantage of a fixed regime was that it 
provided a highly visible and easily verifiable target and represented a rapid 
institutional fix for credibility problems of post-communist governments and central 
                                                 
238 Between 1992−1996, Macedonia experienced a reversal in its democratization. After elections in 
1994, opposition parties were excluded from the Parliament and society was controlled by the party in 
power with roots in the former nomenklatura (Drezov 2001: 417). 
 
239 The main external shocks that influenced the post-communist development in Macedonia include the 
unilateral Greek embargo on movement of trade of the two countries from April 1994 to November 
1995, the Kosovo crisis in 1999, and the EU sanctions against the authoritarian regime of Slobodan 
Miloševic in Yugoslavia in 1999 (Bišev 2002). 
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banks. The fixed regime as a nominal anchor also helped to stabilize the budgetary 
cost of debt servicing in states with high external debt (such as Hungary and Poland) 
and worked as a disciplining device for domestic industries.  
 
The Floaters: Clientelism and Fear of Pegging 
Some societies whose fiscal and monetary authorities continued to pump funds 
to state-owned enterprises through SOBs were reluctant to adopt radical stabilization 
programs, including those based on a fixed exchange regime, and policies compatible 
with these regimes (table 5.2). The banking sector was the incipient and subject to 
intense political pressure for directed credit from enterprise lobbies and government 
ministries in control of ailing enterprises and economic sectors. Subordinate central 
banks were required to lend directly to government to finance fiscal deficits. 
Continued subsidies, directed credits, and bailouts to incumbent financial and 
industrial interests generated substantial pressure for inflationary monetary expansion, 
and challenged stabilization and institutional reforms.  
The persisting linkages within the financial system (between state-owned and 
new crony private banks) and between banks and enterprises, as well as the linkages of 
these interest groups with the government allowed these groups to extract inefficiently 
large resources from the state. SOBs and enterprises in need of more intensive 
protection against foreign competition together with government politicians, 
benefiting from the links with these state monopolies, developed into a strong political 
force, capable of altering even the most committed anti-inflationary reform programs 
to retain their gains (Hellmann 1998).  
Stabilization and financial reforms were delayed, allowing these states to 
preserve clientelistic financial systems characterized by rent-seeking and corruption.240 
                                                 
240 On delayed reforms, see Alesina and Drazen (1991), Rodrik (1996). 
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Even when some of these countries during some periods officially announced fixing, 
they tended to float more than what they announced and frequently reneged on their 
commitment to a fixed regime. Their exchange rate strategies can be characterized as 
fear of pegging. This discrepancy between their official and actual exchange rate 
policies is best explained by Alesina and Wagner (2003), who show that when 
countries announce pegs and then break their commitments to pegs reflect weak 
institutions (corruption, weak protection of property rights, and so on) related to poor 
macroeconomic management to maintain monetary and fiscal stability. Flexible 
regimes led to postponement of privatization and banking reforms in EE. 
Bulgaria and Romania initially adopted flexible exchange rate regimes despite 
being plagued by high inflation. After a few months of attempted stabilization in 
1991−1992, their central banks repeatedly provided bailouts to SOBs and enterprises 
and monetized rapidly increased credit that led to further inflationary pressures 
(Berglof and Bolton 2002: 80). Bulgaria started with float and money-based 
stabilization but its de facto monetary policy was rather loose and accommodating, 
and this notably compromised the country’s stabilization efforts (Dobrinsky 2000: 
586). 
The monetary policies of the National Bank of Romania (NBR) were often 
under intense political pressure to accelerate the nominal devaluation of the national 
currency in order to alleviate price competitiveness problems in industry, to finance 
deficit spending needs of the government, and to bail out failing SOBs repeatedly 
(Barisitz 2004: 108–110). To this end, the Parliament adopted a law obliging SOBs to 
provide loans to “strategic” sectors, such as agriculture and energy imports, and 
requiring the central bank to cover these loans. There has been strong political 
pressure placed on SOBs to sustain large state-owned companies. SOBs, in turn, 
expected government protection because bankruptcies were a politically unacceptable 
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solution. The government further rewarded SOBs by providing them with profit-
making opportunities by issuing high yielding treasury bills (Doltu 2002: 288). In this 
highly inflationary environment, exporters started to hoard hard currency, which put 
additional pressure on the foreign exchange market and complicated stabilization 
policy (Daianu 1995: 218). 
Although Albania initially attempted to officially peg its currency to the U.S. 
dollar in 1991, its stabilization program ended in failure and collapse of pegs because 
monetary policies continued to be a source of income redistribution. In July 1992, the 
Berisha regime adopted a managed float as a part of an IMF−supported stabilization 
program. The program required, among other things, free movement of the exchange 
rate and phasing out subsidies to failing enterprises (Pano 1997: 335). 
As shown in the previous section, in the post-Soviet region, the Baltic states 
that were able to cut ties with incumbent interests and were interested in fast paced 
reforms, pegged to Western currencies to achieve and demonstrate a commitment to 
price stability from the early years of transition. Most CIS republics were not able to 
commit to the requirements associated with maintaining fixed regimes and floated 
their currencies after the disintegration of the ruble zone in 1993. Banking systems in 
most CIS states remained dominated by SOBs and discriminatory restrictions were 
imposed on foreign banks. It should be noted, though, that some CIS republics 
suffered from longer legacies of communism and more unfavorable initial conditions 
than countries in CEB (table 5.1). Belarus, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan during the 
1993−1995 period, and Ukraine and Russia during the 1995−1997 period officially 
announced pegs, but were not able to sustain them. Instead, they pursued de facto 
intermediate or flexible regimes, clearly demonstrating fear of pegging.  
Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine’s first president, did not make a decisive break with 
the past; instead he continued in the Soviet-style economic micromanagement, while 
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Leonid Kuchma, the country’s second president, delayed stabilization and financial 
reforms (Stone 2002: 169). In November 1992, Ukraine introduced a transitional 
currency, the karbovanets, to pursue a more inflationary monetary policy than was 
consistent with membership in the ruble zone, which allowed the government to 
subsidize domestic industries and agricultural producers (Petryk 2006). By May 1992, 
the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) had already doubled the level of credit to state 
enterprises (Stone 2002: 173). As a result, in 1993−1994, Ukraine had the worst 
inflationary experience in the ex-Soviet Union: inflation peaked at more than 10 
thousand percent and led to the biggest economic downturn in the history of the 
country with 23 percent decrease in real GDP (Petryk 2006).  
Victor Yushchenko, who was appointed the governor of the NBU in 1993, 
tightened monetary policy. Stabilization started for the first time at the end of 1993 
with setting a narrow corridor for the exchange rate of the coupon-karbovanets against 
the U.S. dollar. The NBU replaced the two-tiered exchange rate system, used to 
subsidize imports by state enterprises with a unified exchange rate, as well as the 
corrupted foreign currency rationing system with a system of open currency 
auction.241 Importantly, the NBU imposed credit ceilings on individual banks and 
abolished the practice of refinancing banks at preferential interest rates (Stone 2002: 
177–178). During the monetary reform of 1996, the temporary currency was 
exchanged for a more permanent currency, the hryvnia, at the rate of 100,000:1. But 
the NBU continued to extend directed credits to agriculture and energy lobbies. In 
order to stabilize the new currency, the exchange rate began as a nominal anchor for 
the fight against inflation, which was the condition of the IMF Standby Program 
                                                 
241 Previously, there were at least four exchange rates in Ukraine: the central bank official exchange 
rate, the auction rate, the commercial rate of cash purchase-sale, and the black market exchange rate. 
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(Stone 2002: 183). Nonetheless, financial reforms were hindered by insider 
privatization of banks, discussed in chapter 3. 
In Tajikistan, the civil war of 1992−1993 and in 1996−1997 dominated 
political developments. The war delayed until May 1995 the country’s exit from the 
ruble zone and implementation of consistent economic reforms. 242 The availability of 
exportable energy resources in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan may have allowed the 
governments to delay radical reforms because of high levels of rent-seeking in these 
oil producing countries (De Melo et al 2001, Hefeker 1997) (table 5.1). Delayed 
privatization and banking system reforms in these countries allowed incumbent banks 
and industries to extract large resources inefficiently from their governments. 
Uzbekistan is one of the least reformed transition economies; it had never committed 
to an anti-inflationary program based on a fixed exchange rate, and it only succeeded 
lowering the inflation rate below 50 percent in 1998 (Pomfret 2006). Domestic banks 
continue rolling over loans to enterprises on non-commercial principles because they 
operate under government guarantees (Spechler 2004). Uzbekistan maintained a 
system of multiple exchange rates, including a black-market price and foreign-
exchange controls.  
Similarly, Belarus under the authoritarianism of President Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka—that Taras Kuzio (2003) called a “neo-Soviet with a little goulash 
communism”—pursued de facto flexible regimes. Most stabilization and banking 
reforms are still before its government. The central bank is completely dependent on 
the President who issued a Decree in March 1998, transferring the responsibility for 
monetary policy to the government. Most of the country’s productive capacity 
remained in state hands, making it the most unsuccessful case of privatization in EE 
                                                 
242 Although Tajikistan had a de facto separate currency after November 1993, the ruble was used and 
its central bank did not control monetary policy (Pomfret 2006: 6). See, also Abdelal (2001). 
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(Kaltenhaler, Ceccoli, and Michta 2006). In 1996, the private sector accounted for 
only 15 percent. The government artificially maintained the overvalued Belarusian 
ruble against the U.S. dollar and imposed restrictions on the foreign-exchange market. 
The IMF and foreign investors, worried about the halt of the privatization process in 
the second half of 1996, have largely withdrawn from the country (Gurushina, Wyzan, 
and Slay 1997). 
Georgia’s delayed reforms, civil unrest, and warfare in 1992−1993 resulted in 
hyperinflation, extreme currency substitution, and repeated devaluations.243 After the 
introduction of the surrogate currency in April 1993, monetary and credit policies 
were excessively accommodative and repeatedly subject to direct intervention of the 
government and parliament. The Law on the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) did not 
provide for the bank’s independence from the government. NBG remained closely 
involved in operating the Savings Bank and other former specialized banks and was 
required to provide credit to the government. In fact, in 1992−1993, the government 
deficit was almost entirely financed by the central bank (Gurgenidze 1995: 199).  
The Georgian banking system remained dominated by five large SOBs 
continuously bailed out by the government.244 Weak banking regulation, lenient 
licensing procedures, and low minimum capital requirements led to a rapid 
proliferation of “quasi-private” banks founded by state enterprises, primarily to obtain 
cheap financing for their shareholders. Despite negative lending rates in real terms, 
banks became one of the most profitable industries in Georgia through maintaining 
high spreads on their retail banking activities (Gurgenidze 1995: 203–209). Thus, a 
                                                 
243 The conflict in Abkhazia and with the supporters of ex-President Gamsakhudia resulted in a drastic 
fall in output, but inflation did not reach the hyperinflationary level until after the introduction of the 
coupon in 1993 (Wang 1999: 4). 
 
244 As early as 1991, two SOBs, Agroprombank and Industriyabank, had serious bad loan problems and 
were bailed out by the government at a cost about 1.8 billion U.S. dollars (Gurgenidze 1995: 208). 
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flexible regime was adopted almost by default because the government was unwilling 
to commit to policies compatible with a sustainable peg. In 1995, the government 
finally adopted the IMF-supported stabilization program to stop hyperinflation. 
However, the government continued to use a flexible regime, arguing that regime 
flexibility is needed to allow financing of its operations by NBG and to generate 
seignorage-related revenues (Wang 1999: 9).245 The stabilization program helped to 
halt hyperinflation and allowed the government to introduce a new national currency, 
the lari. Nonetheless, while the NBG stopped providing credit to the banks and 
economic sectors, it continued to finance the government. 
 
The Cost of Clientelism: Banking Crises and Failed Regimes 
The choice of exchange rate regime plays a crucial role in macroeconomic 
stabilization in the short term. In the medium-term, policymakers need to devise and 
implement a policy mix, which is consistent with the chosen regime. Fixed regimes 
and currency boards have increased the credibility of central banks and economic 
policies by limiting the discretionary powers of monetary authorities. Pegging required 
a certain degree of commitment from the monetary authority and the government to 
pursue policies compatible with this regime. Tightening monetary policy itself did not 
prevent banks from supporting state enterprises. It was crucial that peggers observed 
the rules of the game inherent in this exchange rate strategy including constraining an 
activist monetary policy and implementing financial institutional reforms. Fixed 
regimes required sound financial systems. 
                                                 
245 In the context of the stabilization program, there was a discussion on the choice of exchange rate 
regime. Some advocated a currency board to provide an anchor to the financial system and credibility of 
the program. But the float proponents prevailed (Wang 1999: 9). 
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In societies where central banks remained subordinate, they were compelled to 
monetize loses incurred by enterprises, government, and banks.246 When the banking 
sector remained dominated by incumbent banks, weakly capitalized or insufficiently 
supervised capital flows led to systemic banking crises and currency collapses. The 
governments that were not able to commit to prudent fiscal policy and to conduct 
financial reforms, including privatization of SOBs to outsiders, were forced to 
abandon the chosen exchange rate regime, often after costly financial crises. Thus, 
exchange rate regime changes in EE were the results of a deliberate strategy, but were 
also associated with banking and currency crises that brought about forced regime 
changes. 
A fixed exchange rate regime persisted for more than six years in the Czech 
Republic. It was considered a symbol of Czech success (Horváth 1999: 277). 
However, the economy has encountered extensive problems due to the lagging 
reforms in the financial sector relative to progress in privatization in trade and foreign 
exchange. Voucher privatization led to opaque governance structures in both the 
enterprise and banking sectors, and created new opportunities for corruption by the 
four largest SOBs through managing voucher privatization funds. The Klaus 
government’s protective bank policy and a loosening of fiscal constraints were at odds 
with the fixed regime requirement and clashed with the anti-inflationary policy of the 
independent Czech National Bank (CNB). The policy slippages of the Czech 
government in the mid-1990s were instrumental in forcing CNB to abandon the peg in 
1997 under extreme market pressures, which involved the rising shares of bad loans, a 
banking crisis, and an attack on the currency. The collapse of the peg resulted from 
economic policies that were inconsistent with a fixed regime (Backé 1999). 
                                                 
246 Banks in EE did not support independent central banks, for central banks took an active role in 
financial system reforms that placed constraints on commercial bank behavior (Johnson 2006). 
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In Slovakia, as a result of insider privatization that virtually excluded 
foreigners and expansive fiscal policy under the third Mečiar administration 
(1995−1998), the NBS was forced to abandon a fixed regime in October 1998.247 The 
government’s expansive policy had generated unsustainably high current account 
deficits financed by external borrowing.248 In its privatization policy, the government 
adopted a law on barring the sale of strategic enterprises, including the three largest 
SOBs and measures that privileged domestic applicants over foreign applicants in the 
privatization process with the aim of establishing a “domestic entrepreneur class” 
capable of sustaining Slovak independence.249 The privatization of banks and access to 
financing became a means to reward political loyalists who were large corporate 
patrons, which contributed to an increase in inter-enterprise debt and bad loans.250  
NBS followed a strict anti-inflationary program to counter the government’s 
fiscal laxity and to communicate its position to the government.251 NBS resisted 
pressure from the government and the financial and industrial sectors for financial 
laxity. It tried to prevent attacks on the currency by suspending the refinancing of the 
                                                 
247 The objectives of the 1995 Program Declaration of the Government deviated from the original 
transformation program in three areas: first, intention to shift from restrictive to expansive financial 
policy; second, active sectoral industrial policy; and third, major changes in the area of privatization. 
 
248 Author’s interview with Juraj Renčko, former Advisor to the Minister of Finance and the Head of the 
Coordination Unit for Bank and Enterprise Restructuring and Privatization (1999−2002), December 6, 
2005, Bratislava.  
 
249 For example, in 1995, out of 367 privatization decisions, only 5 favored foreign applicants. In 1996, 
foreign investors won only 2 out of 400 decisions (Mikloš 1997). 
 
250 VSŽ (Východoslovenské železiarne), the largest Slovak steel producer and exporter first acquired a 
large share of its creditor bank—the Investment and Development Bank—to finance its expansion plans 
in enterprises in spite of the disapproval of NBS and the criticism of the IMF. Later, it replaced all but 
one of the bank’s Board of Directors, resulting in a near bank failure. Author’s interview with Ladislav 
Vaškovič, CEO of EXIMBANKA, former Chairman of the Board of VUB, December 12, 2005, 
Bratislava. Also, Mikloš (1997: 72). 
 




financial sector in 1997 in spite of strong bank opposition.252 The behavior of NBS 
fuelled growing tensions with the government and industrial leaders, resulting in 
government attempts to limit the independence of NBS in early 1998 by proposing a 
controversial draft amendment to the central bank law, which would have increased its 
participation in the short-term covering of the state budget deficit. Nonetheless, given 
NBS’s reputation as a pillar of macroeconomic stability, the government was forced 
by the threat of a loss of domestic and international confidence to retreat from plans to 
curtail its independence (Dvorsky 2000: 20).253  
In both the Slovak and Czech Republics, the central banks were able to detach 
themselves from established interest groups and conduct a price-stabilizing monetary 
policy based on exchange rate fixing. However, their policies conflicted with that of 
the governments, which were unwilling to impose hard budget constraints on domestic 
banks and prevented opening their banking system to foreign buyouts. Both central 
banks tried to prevent currency devaluations but were not able to defend pegs. It was 
frustrating for the leadership of the NBS to deal with this unsustainable economic 
policy mix, as the former Vice governor of the NBS explains:254  
 
The Mečiar government provided guarantees and privatized to people without 
capital. The NBS had to pursue restrictive monetary policy to compensate for 
bad economic policies. This caused interest rates to rise sharply, with rates on 
new loans peaking at over 20 percent in fall 1998. The exchange rate band was 
gradually widening. Expectations of upcoming elections were looming. In 
                                                 
252 Author’s interview with Peter Ševčovic, Member of the Bank Board of the NBS, December 2005, 
Bratislava. 
 
253 I examine the international influences in transition in Slovakia in a companion paper: Jana 
Grittersova, “Carrots, Sticks, and Nationalism: International Dimension of Democratization in Slovakia 
and Croatia,” mimeo. 
 
254 Author’s interview with Elena Kohútiková, Vicegovernor of NBS (2000−2006), December 6, 2005, 
Bratislava.  
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September [1998] the NBS tried to defend the peg by massive interventions on 
international markets. But the government generated a double deficit. Right 
after the elections the koruna was devalued. 
 
Currency crashes in EE have occurred not only under standard fixed regimes but also 
under flexible regimes as demonstrated by repeated currency crises in Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Albania. A protracted period of sluggish reforms and the reluctance of 
the governments of those countries to privatize banks threatened the stability of their 
financial systems and led to a financial and economic crisis in the late 1990s. In all 
three countries, financial crises contributed to political upheaval and changes of 
government. In extreme cases of rent-seeking interest groups, weak governments, and 
captured central banks leading to banking crises and currency collapses, currency 
boards were installed (as in Bulgaria and Bosnia) to tie the hands of government.  
In Bulgaria, seven consecutive governments of ex-communist Bulgarian 
Socialist Party (BSP) and the opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) during 
1990–1996 proved unable to commit to bank stabilization and privatization. Only 
hyperinflation and a banking and financial crisis in 1997 led to the adoption of a 
radical stabilization program (supported by the IMF) and opening the banking system 
to foreigners. The program also replaced the discredited inflationary and discretionary 
central bank by a Deutsche mark currency board in July 1997.  
Romania and Albania also witnessed devastating banking and financial crises 
primarily because of the collapse of a number of fraudulent pyramids (Ponzi schemes) 
around a small number of domestic banks (Berglof and Bolton 2002: 85). Weak 
financial regulation allowed the proliferation of quasi-banks (so-called cooperatives), 
unregulated by the NBR from 1997. These banks engaged in aggressive speculation on 
the financial markets that resulted in liquidity problems in these institutions and in a 
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systemic banking crisis in 1999 (Doltu 2002: 290). President Iliescu and the ruling 
party were defeated and a transfer of power took place. After the crisis, the new 
government abolished administrative controls over the official exchange rate but 
continued a free float policy. The float complicated the task of NBR, whose credibility 
remained weak, to bring down inflation, which remained at two-digit levels until the 
end of 2004 (Crespo-Cuaresma 2005: 847–848). Nevertheless, the government has 
recently launched the privatization of two major SOBs.255 The financial sector reforms 
have recently been accompanied by a fairly stable real effective exchange rate. 
Similarly, in Albania, speculative behavior of crony pseudo-banks, which offered 
astronomical interest rates, led to a devastating banking crisis. 
The 1998 Russian financial crisis generated in other EE economies, to a 
varying degree, capital outflows leading to exchange rate and equity market pressures 
and higher interest rates (Backé 1999: 51). The crisis also generated the CIS area-wide 
currency devaluations. Most CIS countries then moved to floats that allowed them to 
postpone financial reforms even further.256 Kazakhstan was the hardest hit by the 
Russian crisis. In fact, Kazakhstan’s economic system resembles Russian capitalism in 
its concentration of economic power and corrupted privatization policies that favor 
domestic energy and mineral producers (Pomfret 2006: 6–7).  
The Ukrainian financial crisis in 1998 had similar root causes as did the 
Russian one but was less dramatic with smaller depreciation effects because the 
Ukrainian banks had no large foreign loan exposures. The reform-oriented, if short-
lived Yushenko government came to power in December 1999. It renewed 
                                                 
255 Romanian Bank for Development and BancPost. 
 
256 Currently, the CIS zone may be characterized as the “U.S. dollar zone” because its members depend 
on exports of commodities, which are quoted in U.S. dollars. CIS countries also launched discussions to 
form a monetary union among themselves (Vinhas de Souza 2005: 422). 
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stabilization efforts, strengthened the powers of the NBU, and initiated banking 
reform, but it was voted out of office in April 2001 by a political coalition of business 
oligarchs and communists.257 However, the new government remained committed to 
the policy of its predecessor and decided to pursue the de facto exchange rate peg 
based on the U.S. dollar to stabilize inflationary expectations (Van Aarle, de Jong and 
Sosoian 2006). 
 
Fear of Floating: From Clientelism to Financial Openness  
After the painful learning experiences with failed pegs, some societies opened 
their banking systems to foreign competition, built strong institutions of financial 
governance (better protection of property rights, stricter banking regulation), and 
replaced clientelistic systems with open financial systems. Although they were forced 
officially to abandon fixed regimes, their central banks managed the exchange rate to a 
greater extent than announced. These societies have pursued fear of floating policies. 
Their strategy of pursuing stable exchange rates signals credibility to international 
markets while high exchange rate volatility and devaluation are perceived as an 
indication of weak economic management and institutions (Alesina and Wagner 
2003). 
The situation in Croatia during the second half of the 1990s is often cited as a 
classic example of the fear of floating. The Croatian Democratic Union−led 
government under President Tudjman established a new central bank, Croatian 
National Bank, solely responsible to parliament, and tried to stabilize the economy 
through a restrictive monetary policy and a peg of temporary currency to the Deutsche 
mark in December 1991. Nonetheless, inflationary pressure rose again in 1992−1993 
because the government financed its expenditure via an inflation tax. The central bank 
                                                 
257 The NBU was able to overcome political barriers and decided to liquidate the large government 
bank—Bank Ukraine—that focused on agriculture and practiced insider-lending (Barisitz 2006). 
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continued to service large loss-making enterprises and provided soft credits to 
agricultural lobbies and the shipbuilding industry (Kraft 1995).258 The average annual 
inflation rate in September 1993 over 1,500 percent forced the government to adopt a 
new stabilization program in October 1993 based on managed float and grant the 
central bank independence (Daviddi and Uvalic 2003). The program put inflation 
under control and the government successfully introduced a new currency, the kuna, in 
May 1994. After unsuccessful enterprise privatization, the government launched 
successful privatization of socially-owned banks to foreign investors. It also 
introduced a new banking law that strictly regulates the susceptibility of banks to the 
influence of well-connected interest groups.259 These policies allowed the Croatian 
central bank to pursue officially tightly managed float that actually resembles a fixed 
regime. Because the large share of Croatian’s liabilities is made up of foreign 
currency, the stability of the national currency is crucial for the stability of the banking 
sector (Barisitz 2004: 103–104).260  
 The Czech and Slovak republics officially adopted flexible regimes (in 
combination with inflation targeting) after their pegs collapsed in 1997 and 1998. 
After currency collapses, new governments in both countries launched ambitious bank 
privatization programs and opened the door to foreign investors.261 Open financial 
                                                 
258 In 1992, the Croatian government also put pressure on the governor of the central bank, demanding a 
loan with a maturity of ten years and an interest rate below the inflation rate (Dvorsky 2004: 72). 
 
259 The impact of enterprise privatization in the first half of the 1990s resulted in those associated with 
the ruling party of President Tudjman controlling socially owned assets, including rich expatriates from 
the Croatian Diaspora who helped to finance Tudjman’s 1990 victory and the managers of the socially-
owned enterprises who profited from management buyout loan schemes (Cohen 1997).  
 
260 There is a high level of euroization in Croatia: about two-thirds of loans and deposits is denominated 
in, or indexed to, a foreign currency (Barisitz 2007: 85). The high degree of euroization originates in the 
war period of the early 1990s, when foreign currency was used as a means of payment (Crespo-
Cuaresma et al 2005: 848). 
 
261 Initially, the first Dzurinda government (1998−2002) was unable to adopt decisive measures to 
stabilize the economy and privatize banks and industries. This indecisiveness brought the country to the 
brink of a financial crisis in May 1999, which was a turning point in government policies. Author’s 
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systems allowed their central banks to pursue stable exchange rates by systematically 
intervening in foreign exchange markets.262 
Since the mid−1990s, some CIS republics pursued de facto pegs to the U.S. 
dollar (either directly or via a ruble target) although they continued to float their 
exchange rates officially. Armenia introduced its own national currency, the dram, in 
November 1993 and implemented a stabilization program, backed by an IMF 
agreement. The program drastically reduced hyperinflation. Stabilization was 
accompanied in 1994 by a large scale privatization program, tightened banking 
regulation, and a liberal policy toward foreign investments aimed at attracting 
investors.263 The main policy objective of the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Armenia (CBRA) under Governor Tigran Sarkisyan was macroeconomic stability to 
create favorable conditions for the private sector.264 While CBRA officially claimed to 
pursue a float, partly to reduce the level of dollarization in the country, it manages the 
exchange rate to a greater extent than announced. CBRA has proven its independence 
when, in spite of public pressure from exporters, it refused to intervene when the 
currency started to rapidly appreciate against the U.S. dollar in 2003 due to an increase 
in private remittances (Danielyan 2005). 
                                                                                                                                            
interview with Juraj Renčko, former Advisor to the Minister of Finance and Head of the Coordination 
Unit for Bank and Enterprise Restructuring and Privatization (1999−2002), December 6, 2005, 
Bratislava. 
 
262 After adopting a float, NBS continued to intervene when the exchange rate volatility exceeded one 
percent. Author’s interview with Peter Ševčovic, Member of the Bank Board of the NBS, December 14, 
2005, Bratislava. The Monetary Program of the NBS for the year 2000 stated: “When NBS expects 
appreciation pressures, it is ready to intervene … the intent of NBS will be to stabilize the foreign 
exchange rate approximately at the current level. CNB also tried to limit exchange rate volatility after it 
officially proclaimed float, and its interventions during 1998−2000 were clearly the sign of fear of 
floating. Author’s interview with Miroslav Hrnčíř, Advisor to the Governor of CNB, June 7, 2006, 
Prague.  
 
263 By 1999, the only SOB that remained to be privatized was the Savings Bank. “Armenia: A special 
Report” prepared by Euromoney. London, Paril 1997. 
 
264 See “Armenian Central Bank head says policies will be more predictable,” BBC Monitoring Former 
Soviet Union-Economic, September 11, 1999. 
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Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev introduced a new currency, the som, to gain 
control over monetary policy and to reduce inflation, as part of sweeping stabilization 
and liberalization reforms designed by the IMF in May 1993 (Abdelal 2001: 50). 
Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian republic to succeed in decreasing inflation 
bellow 50 percent in 1995. The government also pursued privatization with the 
greatest vigor of any country in the CIS region, made substantial progress in adopting 
modern central bank legislation, and allowed widespread foreign penetration into the 
country’s banking sector (Lybek 1999, Gurushina, Wyzan and Slay 1997). Kyrgyzstan 
also refrained from giving direct credit to government and strengthened banking 
regulation, allowing its central bank to pursue de facto fixed regimes in recent years.  
 
Russia: Oligarchic Capitalism in One Country?265 
Russia is a unique case since it emerged as a political, economic and military 
hegemon in the CIS region and was the core of the ruble zone. Russia itself dissolved 
the currency union in 1993 in spite of previous attempts to hold it together (Abdelal 
2001: 46). The Russian financial system has also developed unique features and 
players: financial oligarchs. In 1992, President Yeltsin decided to adopt the same 
shock therapy program as in Poland, initially supported by fairly restrictive monetary 
policy. The stabilization program was implemented by Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar’s 
reform team.266 However, in contrast to other early stabilizers, in exchange rate policy, 
                                                 
265 I borrow the term from Dani Rodrik’s weblog http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/ 
2007/04/oligarchic_capi.html. For a more detailed analysis of the role of financiers in exchange rate 
policies in Russia see a companion paper: Jana Grittersova. “Financial Architecture in Transition: 
Russia, the Czech Republic, and Poland,” mimeo.  
 
266 The actual policies of many reformers, such as Leszek Balcerowicz, Yegor Gaidar, and Václav 
Klaus, were, however, often much less radical than their rhetoric. Most EE countries combined both 




the Russian government did not commit to a fixed regime.267 Moreover, the Central 
Bank of Russia (CBR) under Governor Victor Gerashchenko systematically 
undermined the government’s attempt to stabilize the economy by increasing the 
money supply (Berglof and Bolton 2002: 79).268  
During the first years of the post-communist stabilization in Russia, the 
positional rents of incumbent banks facilitated their co-optation as the major 
stakeholders in the government’s hyperinflationary policy through maintaining 
artificially high interest rates on treasury bills, which offered banks huge speculative 
opportunities (Shleifer and Treisman 2000). An anti-inflationary stabilization program 
based on a fixed exchange rate was therefore an undesirable option for banks Banks 
actively lobbied against the central bank’s attempts to tighten monetary policy from 
1992 through 1994 (Treisman 1998, Gross and Steinherr 2004).269 
Russian banks significantly influenced the ability of the Russian government to 
sustain a fixed regime. During the Yeltsin era, banks played a particularly important 
role, because in the absence of support from a political party and opposition from the 
Russian Duma, the president was dependent on their support (Gnezditskaia 2005: 
465). The withdrawal of the state from the banking sector was inconsistent and limited 
in scope. The state foreign trade bank (Vneshtorgbank) and the state savings bank 
(Sberbank) remained under state control, and former specialized banks that financed 
selected companies during communism were transformed into “channel banks” and 
                                                 
267 Interestingly, John Maynard Keynes helped to establish a currency board in Northern Russian in 
1918, in the middle of World War I and the Russian Revolution. It functioned well for two years until 
the Bolsheviks abolished it (Boyden 1993: 11). 
 
268 The growing opposition to the Gaidar program forced the resignation of the previous governor of 
CBR and his replacement by Gerashchenko. Jeffrey Sachs famously called Gerashchenko “the world’s 
worst central banker” (Adolph 2004: 119). 
 
269 For an examination of financial system development and exchange rate policies in Russia, see a 
companion paper: Jana Grittersova (2007). “Financial Architecture in Transition: Russia, the Czech 
Republic, and Poland,” mimeo. 
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continued to distribute credit to selected sectors (Popov 1999: 15). As chapter 3 
illustrates, loans for shares privatization was pivotal in the transition to the so-called 
“oligarchic capitalism,” which allowed “oligarchic” banks to capture industrial 
producers and create financial-industrial groups.270 
When inflation rose to about 150 percent in 1995, the government finally 
adopted a peg of the ruble to the U.S. dollar, aimed at disinflation as part of the new 
stabilization program for the period 1995−1997 (Rutland 2001). The introduction of a 
ruble corridor zone meant the loss of the most lucrative arbitrage opportunities of 
Russian banks on international financial markets.271 The government compensated 
banks by high yielding federal government securities (gosudarstvennye 
kratkosrochnye obligatsii, or GKOs) and interbank credit markets (Hellmann 1995). 
Because banks were not more able to profit from lending to the government at high 
interest rates, they changed their monetary preferences in favor of a restrictive 
monetary policy of high interest rates combined with a fixed regime (Havrylyshyn and 
Odling-Smee 2000: 9). At that time, banks became strong opponents of devaluation, 
for by mid-1998, they had unbalanced sheets with 20 billion dollar liabilities and only 
12 billion dollars foreign assets because of their speculations with GKOs (Woodruff 
2005, Gros and Steinherr 2004: 35). Russian problems with the economic 
fundamentals appeared in 1997 but the CBR intervened to support the currency 
through higher interest rates because it was not willing to sacrifice the interests of 
banks (Woodruff 2005). These interventions resulted in huge losses of CBR’s foreign 
exchange reserves.272 Banks were parasites on the Russian state, draining state assets 
                                                 
270 Author’s discussion with Peter Rutland, March 17, 2006, Berkeley, CA. 
 
271 In July 1995, the CBR under interim governor Tatyana Paramonova announced its intention to 
stabilize the ruble zone within a band of 4,300-4,900 rubles to the U.S. dollar through October 1995. 
 
272 The CBR lost over 40 percent of its international reserves (6.5 billion U.S. dollars) in May 1998 
alone. 
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and revenues that led to the unsustainable budget deficit, delayed devaluation of the 
ruble, and helped to trigger the 1998 financial crisis. The Russian crisis was a full-
blown financial crisis with currency, debt, banking and stock market crises.273 In 
September 1998, Russia finally abandoned the exchange rate band and introduced a 
float (IMF 1999). The tenacity with which Russia resisted a timely devaluation of the 
ruble and an exit from its currency peg before the financial crash in 1998 can be 
explained, in part, by the pressures of banks with large foreign currency-denominated 
debt on the government to maintain a fixed exchange rate (Woodruff 2005). Critics 
pointed out that a costly collapse of currency could have been avoided if the Russian 
central bank had been willing to sacrifice the interests of domestic banks and exit the 
peg earlier (Stone 2002). An interesting feature of crisis resolution was that the 
government abstained from substantial reform and opening of the banking sector. 
Quite the contrary, the share of SOBs in total assets even expanded after 1998. 
 
Two Possible Outliers: Slovenia and Azerbaijan 
The exchange rate strategies of Slovenia do not seem to be very 
comprehensive in terms of my finance-based hypothesis. The country started the 
transition with negligible foreign exchange reserves, almost forty percent of the 
banking sector insolvent, and a high inflation legacy. The Slovenian government 
adopted a gradual approach to stabilization based on a managed float.274 And yet, the 
Slovene case offers one of the best examples of successful reform policies. The Bank 
of Slovenia (BOS) strongly committed to fight inflation, intervened heavily in the 
foreign exchange market. For the most of the transition period, BOS was able to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
273 Among the major causes of the banking crisis were foreign exchange exposures and bad lending 
with limited risk diversification. 
 
274 Inflation was reduced to 5-6 percent month by April 1992 and reached 2 percent in July 1992.  
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maintain little nominal volatility of the Slovenian tollar until the country adopted the 
euro in January 2007.  
An announced float allowed the BOS the room to engage in activist demand 
management. In Slovenia, the socialist regime was perceived to be homegrown, and 
thus was less discredited than in many other EE states (Feldman 2006). The 
government protected domestic industries and refused the IMF-sponsored proposals 
for rapid privatization of socially-owned enterprises and banks.275 It was reluctant to 
let foreigners in to take over domestic banks and to allow direct foreign ownership, a 
sentiment also reflected in the banking industry. The government was particularly 
reluctant to privatize the two largest banks (White 2000).276 It began to liberalize the 
banking sector substantially and dismantle barriers to foreign entry only in 1999 under 
strong EU pressure (Lindstrom 2005).277  
How do we explain the successful monetary and exchange rate stability in 
Slovenia in spite of its slothful pace of privatization? One explanation stresses a 
remarkable degree of independence, with which the BOS was endowed from the 
beginning. The BOS was prohibited from extending a loan to the government for more 
than 5 percent of the budget.278 Both monetary and fiscal policies supported 
stabilization. The other potential explanation may be that the influence of the “soft 
                                                 
275 In 1992, Jeffrey Sachs proposed to the Slovenian government an IMF-endorsed plan for rapid 
privatization. The deputy prime minister Joze Mencinger submitted his resignation as a sign of his 
opposition to the plan. Prime Minister Alojz Peterle supported the dissenting “native” and rebuffed 
Sachs’ blueprint for privatization (Ganev 2005: 369). 
 
276 The two largest SOBs are Nova Lubljanska Banka and Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor. 
 
277 A similar situation existed in the enterprise sector. It was not until 1994 that privatization began and 
by June 1995, only 200 of the 1,500 socially-owned enterprises selected for privatization had been 
privatized (Ramet 1997: 210). 
 
278 Some argue that BOS was able to maintain stable currency because it applied quite a restrictive 
stance with regard to capital flows, in contrast to other CEB states that liberalized their capital accounts 




money” coalition of domestic banks and industries was limited by focusing their 
attention to the possibilities of enrichment via insider privatization, instead of 
inflationary credit policies (Kraft 1995).  
The case of Azerbaijan is even more puzzling, for it has one of the highest 
government involvements in private business (Laurila and Singh 2000: 36).279 
Although the official regime is a float, in practice the National Bank of Azerbaijan 
(NBA) has used substantial reserves to keep the manat stable since the mid-1990s 
when the government launched the IMF-designed stabilization program to reduce 
inflation. Thus, in practice, the exchange rate resembled a fixed regime. Although the 
NBA is officially directly accountable to parliament and relatively independent from 
the government, in practice it operated under the tight scrutiny of President Heydar 
Aliyev (elected in 1993 and re-elected in 1998) known for its “patriarchal approach” 
to ruling the country (Laurila and Singh 2000: 39). Bank privatization and institutional 
reforms were delayed and the government imposed several restrictions on foreign 
bank entry like putting a 30 percent ceiling on foreign capital (Laurila and Singh 2000: 
40).280 But in contrast to countries with a similar clientelistic system of finance, the 
government’s need for raising deficit financing was reduced because it raised revenues 
from oil-production sharing contracts.  
The economy of Azerbaijan has some specific features that may help explain 
the government’s exchange rate policy-making: first, its industrial structure is 
dominated by the oil industry and strong inflows of oil-related export earnings helped 
                                                 
279 The EBRD Transition Report 1999 also ranked Azerbaijan as the most corrupt country in EE. 
 
280 The government only merged three SOBs—Prominvest Bank, Agroprom Bank and Savings Bank—
into a single new bank, the United Universal Bank. The largest bank, International Bank of Azerbaijan, 
is still in state hands. 
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the NBA to rebuild reserves and defend the currency parity; 281 second, a large share of 
barter trade-transactions; and finally, a persisting lack of trust in the banking system 
that leaves large amounts of money outside of banks (Singh and Laurila 1999).  
Consequently, there is little in this study’s analytical framework that can 
explain why the Slovenian or Azeri governments were able to pursue a policy of de 
facto pegs (though officially floating) with financial sectors that remained dominated 
by SOBs and closed to foreign investors throughout most of the transition period. 
Slovenia was also one of the few countries without a banking crisis in the 1990s and 
was the first to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
 
Alternate Explanations and Conclusion 
As I demonstrated in this chapter, exchange rate strategies in EE states are 
diverse, ranging from free floats to currency boards. Choices of anchor currencies 
have also varied. Progress in disinflation has been stronger in countries operating 
under a fixed regime (table A.5). This chapter is not intended as a strong test of the 
argument laid in chapters 2 and 3. Nevertheless, data on cross-country variation in 
exchange rate regimes in post-socialist societies are consistent with the argument at its 
broadest level. This variation in regime choices is consistent with the variation in 
stabilization and bank reform approaches adopted by governments to build financial 
systems. There are still large, though declining discrepancies between official and 
actual exchange rate regimes, reflecting the ability and willingness of EE governments 
to pursue policies compatible with sustainable fixed regimes. 
As we saw in chapter 1, although existing approaches provide important 
insights into some aspects of exchange rate policies in EE, they cannot account for the 
wide variation in financial development and exchange rate strategies in the post-
                                                 
281 The manat remained the only CIS currency immune to the Russian crisis. See EBRD Transition 
Report 1999.  
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communist region. Among the alternative explanations, the credibility-related 
explanations pose the greatest difficulty for the theory I advance, because this 
argument was important in EE, particularly in the early years of transition, when price 
liberalization and the elimination of monetary overhangs inherited from the past 
resulted in high inflation. Some countries adopted fixed regimes for credibility 
purposes in the form of exchange-rate-based stabilization programs. A fixed regime 
was expected to anchor inflation expectations for price-and-wage setters and help to 
deal with the problems related to underdeveloped foreign exchange markets (Nehrlich 
2002). And yet many states opted for flexible regimes initially, despite being plagued 
by high inflation and lacking credible monetary institutions. 
An extension of this explanation is that the rise of democracy in EE societies 
was accompanied by the consolidation of interest groups. Distributional conflicts may 
have increased the government incentives to follow short-term policies to obtain 
political legitimacy, and decreased their willingness or ability to maintain credible 
exchange rate commitments. While this explanation may offer some insight into the 
exchange rate strategies of some leading countries in democratization like Poland, 
other countries scoring equally high on democracy did not move gradually toward 
more flexible regimes as democratic consolidation progressed but were forced to 
abandon pegs because of financial turbulence as was experienced in the Czech 
Republic. 
The challenging question concerns how and to what extent various interest 
groups and economic sectors shape changing the preferences of politicians with regard 
to exchange rate policies in EE states. The underlying premise of Frieden’s (1991) 
sectoral argument is that asset specificity of a sector and its industrial organization 
determine the incentives and capacity to lobby the government successfully for desired 
 198 
economic policies.282 Enterprises with very specific investments would want to protect 
themselves from foreign competition, and thus should be more likely to lobby.  
That is not what happened in EE. At the outset of transition, the industrial 
landscape in most EE countries was dominated by the powerful industrial lobbies in 
the heavily subsidized and non-competitive manufacturing sectors that survived the 
breakdown of communism. When EE governments opened their markets, these 
industries were facing competitive international pressure to adjust. Because most of 
these manufacturers had high asset and factor inflexibility, their “exit” to another 
product or industry would have been costly in the short and medium terms (Hirschman 
1986). In the light of the sectoral literature, we would thus expect them to lobby for 
state support in the form of subsidies or competitive exchange rates. Moreover, old 
state monopolies enjoyed low costs of political organization because they had large 
scale productive units and were regionally concentrated. Because they were large 
firms, they may have been successful in lobbying, independent of asset specificity (Alt 
et al. 1999). Many of these large industries were also the leading tradable sectors283 
that have enjoyed a privileged status derived directly from the state’s own interests 
that depend on the profitability of the leading sector to assure export earnings and state 
revenues, in accordance with Shafer’s (1994) argument.  
First, the fact that there was a little variation in asset specificity and 
organizational characteristics of domestic producers in EE states at the outset of 
transition and yet diverse exchange rate policies, calls into question the utility of pure 
sectoral arguments. Second, large tradable producers in EE states have had obviously 
                                                 
282 Excluded are alternative uses for the resources invested in lobbying and decisions by other 
enterprises harmed by one firm’s lobbying activities. The assumption here is that firms are pre-existing 
organizations and do not have to solve internal collective action problem. See Alt et al. (1999). 
 
283 The leading sectors in CEB states were incorporated in the transnational system of production as 
export platforms with a EU destination (Bohle and Greskovits 2004). 
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powerful incentives and power to lobby successfully for competitive exchange rates. 
The real exchange rate appreciation of most EE currencies should have spurred their 
competitiveness concerns and pressure for a relatively weak currency and monetary 
autonomy, allowing government interventions on the foreign exchange market.284 
Nonetheless, micro-level data on sectoral attitudes over the exchange rate examined 
by Frieden himself (with Broz and Weymouth) (2007) reveals that most EE 
enterprises have not usually considered the exchange rate as an obstacle to their 
business activities.285 The claim is also supported by evidence from my field 
interviews with policy-makers and representatives of industries in several EE 
countries. EE exporters remained competitive on the world markets in spite of 
currency appreciations and did not lobby for currency devaluations.286 
Frieden (2002) introduces an additional caveat to the sectoral theory: the 
distributional impact of exchange rate changes are contingent on the impact of 
exchange rate “pass-through,” that is, the extent to which an exchange rate change is 
reflected in the prices of imported goods.287 Many EE states started the transition with 
a heavy reliance on the export of raw materials, in which subsidized energy and metal 
                                                 
284 During the post-stabilization period from the mid-1990s, exchange rates of most EE currencies 
appreciated in real terms as a result of initial domestic price liberalization, exchange-rate-based 
stabilization programs, productivity changes in tradable sectors (Balassa-Samuelson), and increasing 
capital inflows. 
 
285 Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth (2007) use firm-level data from the World Bank’s World Business 
Environment Survey administered to owners and managers of over ten thousand firms in eighty 
countries in 1999. They looked at individual responses to the following question: “How problematic is 
the exchange rate for the operation and growth of your business?” They report that the responses of 
enterprises in most EE countries are below average values. 
 
286 Author’s interview with Ján Vlčko, Associate Director and Juraj Paľa, Director of the Department of 
the European Union, Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry, December 13, 2005, Bratislava. 
Also, Author’s interview with Ján Oravec, President of the National Union of Employers (representing 
enterprises with foreign capital in Slovakia), December 15, 2005, Bratislava.  
 
287 Industry’s sensitivity to exchange rate changes thus depends on the degree to which it exports 
products to foreign markets, uses foreign-made goods, or competes with foreign producers on the basis 
of price (Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein 2001). 
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sectors enjoyed a privileged status. Alternatively, they specialized in labor intensive 
industries and produced standardized products (textiles, apparel, furniture, etc.). The 
industrial and export composition in some EE economies have changed over time. In 
many CIS republics like Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, the 
energy and raw material sectors remained the leading export sectors (table 5.3). For 
example, in post-communist Russia, oil oligarchs replaced heavy industry, the 
military-industrial complex, and agricultural producers that had dominated the Soviet 
command economy (Rutland 2001). According to the sectoral argument, these 
producers of standardized commodities with a high degree of pass-through should be 
less concerned about currency fluctuations but should prefer a depreciated currency, 
and thus a flexible regime.  
In CEB, industries previously dependent on the CMEA markets declined, e.g., 
energy production based on cheap Soviet energy supplies, agriculture, and food 
products. On the other hand, more capital intensive industries and exports of 
specialized and differentiated products gained importance, e.g., telecommunications, 
automobiles, and information technology (Eichengreen and Kohl 1998, Bohle and 
Greskovits 2004, King 2002) (table 5.3). For Frieden (2002), these producers, who 
care more about market share (quality, service, and customer loyalty) than about price 
should be sensitive to exchange rate volatility but relatively insensitive to exchange 
rate level: they should prefer a fixed regime. So, for a purely sectoral argument to 
hold, both Macedonia producing mainly standardized commodities (textiles and steel) 
or Armenia exporting primary products, and thus competing on the basis of price, 
should have pursued flexible regimes (table 5.3). Here again, the observed empirical 
variation on exchange rate regimes in EE ties to a weakness in the sectoral literature.  
A misfit between structural characteristics of EE economies and their exchange 
rate strategies is also apparent. In the OCA framework, variation in exchange rate 
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regimes in CEB is considered to be a function of the size of the economy and the 
flexibility of labor markets, the reason that Poland‘s big economy exhibits a more 
flexible regime than Estonia’s  much smaller economy. This is also the reason why 
Hungary and Estonia with flexible labor markets have pursued a fixed regime, while 
the Czech Republic with a less flexible labor market abandoned a peg (Coricelli 2002: 
408). But the contrary seems to be true: on average, larger EE countries were more 
likely to fix their currencies than the smaller ones (Von Hagen and Zhou 2002). 
 
Table 5.3: Main Export Commodity Groups between 1993 and 1997 
 
Country Main export commodity groups 
Albania Clothing (28%), footwear (22%) 
Armenia Diamonds (74%), metalliferous ores (9%) 
Azerbaijan Cotton (29%), oil (21%) 
Belarus Clothing (21%), fertilizers (9%) 
Bulgaria Clothing (18%), non-ferrous metals (11%) 
Croatia Clothing (24%), footwear (9%) 
Czech Republic Vehicles (12%), electrical machinery (9%) 
Estonia Oil (23%), wood (14%) 
Georgia Oil (23%), iron & steel (18%) 
Hungary Electrical (12%), power machinery (12%) 
Kazakhstan Non-ferrous metals (39%), oil (29%) 
Kyrgyz Republic Gold (27%), cotton fibers (25%) 
Latvia Oil (41%), wood (23%) 
Lithuania Clothing (23%), oil (20%) 
FYR Macedonia Clothing (34%), iron & steel (20%) 
Moldova Clothing (25%), iron & steel (19%) 
Poland Clothing (11%), vehicles (8%) 
Romania Clothing (30%), iron & steel (10%) 
Russia Oil (32%), non-ferrous metals (20%) 
Slovak Republic Iron & steel (13%), vehicles (12%) 
Slovenia Vehicles (13%), electrical machinery (10%) 
Tajikistan Cotton (62%), textiles (17%) 
Turkmenistan Cotton (56%), textiles (18%) 
Ukraine Iron & steel (27%), metalliferous ores (15%) 
Uzbekistan Cotton (82%), non-ferrous metals (7%) 
 
Source: Adapted from the EBRD Transition Report 1999: 179.    
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A problem with the explanations based on OCA theory is that they do not 
provide sufficient variation in determinants to account for changes of currency 
regimes over time, for structural characteristics of economies do not change often. 
OCA explanations are poor predictors of Russia’s back-and-forth exchange rate policy 
between fixed and flexible regimes in spite of the relatively unchanging structural 
characteristics of its economy. OCA is also wrong about the ruble zone. The initial 
IMF recommendations to the post-Soviet republics, couched in terms of OCA theory, 
were to remain within the ruble zone. Since intra-USSR trade was disrupted and the 
tendency to use barter accelerated in 1992, preserving the common currency was 
promoted on the ground that it was a bulwark against these unfavorable economic 
developments (Pomfret 2003: 602).288  
Nonetheless, from the perspective of individual republics, membership in the 
ruble zone was associated with two important problems. First, there was a shortage of 
cash because the initial Russian reform program was based on a restrictive monetary 
policy, which led the other ruble zone members to issue parallel currencies to alleviate 
the cash shortage. Second, the institutional setting of the ruble zone encouraged 
inflationary monetary policy: all ruble zone members retained control over domestic 
credit creation, but there was no institution that could have effectively exerted 
monetary control over the ruble (Pomfret 2003: 602–603, Abdelal 2001: 68). Many 
ex-Soviet republics exited the ruble zone right before Russia itself dissolved it. Thus, 
OCA does not explain the causes of ruble zone collapse, either. 
This leads us to consider the importance of the IMF and other external actors 
in influencing exchange rate regime choices of EE governments. First, Estonia and 
other Baltic states show that it is possible to sustain fix even with liberalized capital 
                                                 
288 See also IMF World Economic Outlook, Spring 1992, Washington, D.C.:41-2. 
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flows. Second, no doubt that the “IMF-World Bank complex,” as Grabel (2003) puts 
it, tried to monitor monetary institutions and exchange rate policies in transition 
economies with the objective of “importing” credibility from abroad vis-à-vis market 
agents..But the IMF was rather reluctant to advise EE governments to adopt fixed 
regimes at the outset of the transition because it was unwilling to provide stabilization 
funds to those countries that lacked adequate foreign reserves to defend pegs, as the 
case of Estonia clearly illustrates (Sachs 1996).289  
In addition, the IMF has not been consistent in recommending exchange rate 
policies on countries taking structural loans in the last thirty years. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, the conventional wisdom of the Fund was more favorable to fixed exchange 
rate regimes and their associated stabilizing and trade-promoting benefits.290 This 
position changed after the financial crises in emerging markets in the 1990s when the 
IMF seemed to become more favorable to flexible regimes under conditions of capital 
mobility.291 The current strategy of the IMF is to recommend a currency regime based 
on the country’s economic fundamentals, to stress convertibility and transparency in 
currency arrangements, and to discourage competitive devaluations.292  
                                                 
289 In fact, many of the drastic adjustment programs in EE states proposed by the IMF have typically 
been self-imposed, to which the IMF has given “its blessing rather than having been the primary 
initiator” (Bruno 1992: 74). 
 
290 Countries were also expected to reduce government spending by precluding printing of fiat money 
and granting aid to state owned enterprises in financial difficulties. 
 
291 These financial crises took place with pegged rates, which deprived the countries concerned of 
flexibility to make appropriate adjustments. 
 
292 Author’s personal conversation with Rodrigo Rato, former Managing Director of the IMF, Berkeley, 
CA, February 2, 2006; author’s interview with Willy Kiekens, IMF Executive Director, June 6, 2006, 
Prague. Also, IMF Art. IV. 1. iii. states: “Member countries can choose any exchange arrangement that 
suits them, under the condition that it is consistent with the general objective of the IMF, which is to 
foster ‘orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability.’ Countries should avoid manipulating 
exchange rates to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage over other members.” 
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Not only is the IMF inconsistent in its policy recommendations but post-
communist countries, even the ones that are not “the Golliaths of geopolitics” as 
Ganev (2005: 368) puts it, often did not follow its recommendations. While the IMF 
has supported the establishment of the currency board in Lithuania, its stance differed 
from that promoted in Estonia. The decision to adopt a currency board in Estonia was 
a national choice in spite of the disagreement with the IMF (Nenovsky, Hristov, and 
Mihaylov 2002: 7). Similarly, the nationalist Mečiar government in Slovakia refused 
to agree to a 30 percent currency devaluation suggested by the IMF in February 
1993.293 
A different approach to examining the role of international factors focuses on 
broader foreign policy choices and strategic state concerns. In accordance with the 
premises of national purpose analysis put forward by Abdelal (2001), the paradoxical 
adoption of a currency board by Estonia after it exited the ruble zone, with the 
Deutsche mark as the anchor currency, involving the loss of the newly established 
monetary authority out of Russia to the Bundesbank, was partly motivated by the 
objective to politically link national autonomy from Russia to a new statehood in 
Europe.294 In this theoretical perspective, we would expect the EE countries that have 
tried to pursue economic reintegration away from the ex-Soviet Union towards Europe 
to fix their currencies to the deutsche mark (the euro). The support of the West can 
hardly have led to the Estonian policy of radical monetary autonomy from Russia 
because at that time, the European Community urged the Estonian government to be 
cautious in introducing its own currency (Laar 2002: 117). More important, the 
nationalist perspective has a difficult task explaining why a political consensus 
                                                 
293 Author’s interview with Peter Ševčovic, Member of the Bank Board and the Executive Director for 
the Monetary Area and Statistics of the NBS, December 14, 2005, Bratislava. 
 
294 Also, personal discussions with Rawi Abdelal. 
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concerning the exchange rate policy was initially lacking in Latvia and Lithuania, two 
countries that had also departed from the ruble zone early on with a similar objective 
of pursuing a policy of radical economic autonomy from Russia. As illustrated earlier 
in this chapter, these two Baltic states opted for a more gradual approach to monetary 
reform and they experienced a short transition period with a discretionary central 
bank, monetary policy accommodating interest groups, and flexible exchange rate 
regimes.295 Moreover, the three Baltic states differed in terms of the anchor currency, 
to which they chose to peg. These Baltic countries chose to peg their new currencies to 
non-European currencies: Latvia to SDR and Lithuania to the U.S. dollar.  
More generally, in the context of the fifteen post-Soviet successor states 
Cooper (2007) finds that the national purpose perspective itself cannot explain the 
sequence of the departure from the ruble zone: Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, neither of 
which had a coherent, unified national identity, left the ruble zone early, while states 
with well-established national identities like Georgia and Moldova were slow to exit 
the ruble zone. It is also hard to argue that all EE states with EU integrationist 
ambitions chose to peg their currencies to the European anchor. While in some states, 
exchange rate stabilization against the euro has recently gained a more prominent 
weight, this may simply reflect the increased trade and financial orientation to the EU. 
Out of this group, only a few countries have consistently pursued fixed regimes from 
the date that they signed the Europe Agreements.296 It should be also noted that while 
the EU accession process implies legally binding trade and financial liberalization, the 
European Commission leaves accession countries free to adopt any exchange rate 
                                                 
295 While Latvia and Lithuania began with flexible exchange rate regimes, during this period they 
exhibited nearly stable exchange rates brought about central bank interventions (Hansson 1997: 267, fn. 
17). 
 
296 Slovenia and Slovakia entered the EMU in January 2007 and January 2009. Estonia and Lithuania 
joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism II in 2004. 
 
 206 
regime including a currency board.297 However, it rules out unilateral euroization, that 
is, replacement of domestic currency by the euro, until full acceptance into the 
EMU.298 Still, the adoption of the acquis communautaire by EE countries includes 
coordinating macroeconomic policies that require low inflation and fixed regime is 
considered to be a direct commitment to economic stabilization and closer cooperation 
with the EU.  
In sum, while the national purpose analysis may explain the exit from the ruble 
zone in some EE states, it is inadequate in explaining the subsequent decisions about 
exchange rate policies as well as financial reforms. The indeterminacy of the national 
account with regards to financial development policies can again be demonstrated by 
comparing the experiences of the three Baltic states. Although almost 60 percent of 
the Latvian banking system is owned by banks from Sweden and other Nordic 
countries, foreign bank ownership in Latvia is much lower than in Estonia and 
Lithuania. Domestic banks and a few small banks owned by investors from CIS 
countries continue to play an important role in Latvia. These banks rely on more 
fragile forms of foreign financing, mainly short-term syndicated loans and non-
resident deposits, which face notable redemption pressure in the context of the global 
financial crisis of 2008. Most of these foreign assets were concentrated within the 
                                                 
297 In the field of trade policy, there is no room for derogation in the EU’s single market. In competition 
policy, the EU declares any public aid, which distorts competition by favoring certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods, incompatible with its competition policy. The EU has also influenced 
the development of banking sectors in EE states by pressuring for liberalization and privatization and 
for dismantling protective barriers to entry (Lindstrom 2005).  
 
298 The European Commission’s view is that “any unilateral adoption of the single currency by means of 
‘euroization’ would run counter the underlying economic reasoning of EMU in the Treaty, which 
foresees the eventual adoption of the euro as the endpoint of a structured convergence process within a 
multilateral framework. Therefore, unilateral ‘euroization’ would be a way to circumvent the stages 
foreseen by the Treaty for the adoption of the euro” (EC-DG-II, 2001: 21). Some commentators argue 
that the real reason behind this aversion of EU politicians to unilateral euroization is the fear that the 
exchange rate, at which a country unilaterally euroizes, might be excessively undervalued and 
undermine the competitiveness of EU exports. The European Central Bank may also fear that it would 
be obliged to provide lender of last resort liquidity to a unilaterally euroizing country (Jackowski and 
Rostowski 2002, Nuti 2002). 
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Parex Bank, the second largest bank and the largest domestically owned bank and a 
few smaller domestic banks. The international financial crisis has brought the 
vulnerabilities of the Latvian economy to a head, which culminated in a run on Parex 
Bank in August 2008, coalescing into a financial crisis. The Latvian government 
turned to the IMF, which approved an emergency loan program centered on 
maintaining the country’s exchange rate (IMF 2009). While the other two Baltic states 
share key macroeconomic imbalances, they have not experienced a full-blown 
financial crisis because their financial systems are more open with greater 
participation of Western banks. Latvian banks for a long period had very strong ties to 
the Russian and CIS markets and exploited the interest rate differential between those 
markets and the Latvian one. Large portions of savings and foreign currency accounts 
in Latvian banks are still owned by depositors from Russia and other CIS republics. 
This reflects stronger economic links with Russia, notably through the large Russian-
speaking minority in Latvia, which has maintained its contacts with the Russian 
commodities business (Adahl 2002).  
Finally, policy recommendations with regard to optimal exchange rates for EE 
countries were also ambiguous. Some commentators like Sachs (1996) recommended 
that EE countries adopt more flexible arrangements once high inflation was 
eliminated, while others like Coricelli (2002) warned that floats associated with high 
interest rate spreads and the vulnerability of domestic economies to external shocks 
can have negative effects.  
The central lesson of this chapter is that although external pressure, credibility, 
structural characteristics, and preferences of the industrial sectors are important, by 
themselves they are of little use in explaining the variety of exchange rate regime 
choices in the EE region. The differences in the evolution of exchange rate regimes in 
EE reflect both the depth of ownership and institutional reforms in the financial sector, 
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as well as successful macroeconomic stabilization. They reflect variation in the 
determination of EE governments to cut ties with financial and industrial incumbents 
and to pursue disinflation, to establish independent central banks and effective 
regulatory institutions, to implement budget discipline and pursue financial and trade 
openness. In societies where governments were reluctant to devise a strategy for 
breaking the power structure and to liberate banks from non-banking constraints by 
privatizing them, uncertainty and inflation remained high. High inflation favored 
short-term considerations. Uncertainty over property rights undermined the confidence 
of foreign investors. Therefore, as Wyplosz (1999: 17) argued, “There was thus a 
virtuous circle involving stabilization, limited exchange rate flexibility and low 
inflation, and a vicious circle where runaway inflation and exchange rate flexibility 
were the consequence of the absence of macroeconomic stabilization.”  
In an effort to gain a fuller empirical picture of the connection between 
financial interests and institutions on one hand, and exchange rate choice, on the other, 
the following chapters present detailed tracing of the processes of exchange rate policy 
making in four specific post-communist states. 
 209 
CHAPTER 6 
ESTONIA AND BULGARIA: COMPETITION AND CAPTURE  
 
The confidence of the Estonian kroon depends on the actual power of Bank of Estonia 
over the commercial banks. 
 
Siim Kallas and Mart SÕrg299 
… the prevailing part of the banks was included in various “bandit” coalitions with 
people from the government, parties, and the business. Their sole goal was quick and 
single enrichment on the account of the public. Notions like “connected lending, 
inside lending, informal lending… were common phenomena in Bulgaria at that time. 
 
Bertlemann, Hristov, and Nenovsky300 
 
In this chapter and subsequent chapters, I will further develop my finance-
based theory by presenting four detailed cases to illustrate the role of finance in 
exchange rate policy. These cases represent four different types of financial systems 
that offer empirical leverage on the question of exchange rate regime choice and 
sustainability. In all four cases, ownership structure and the institutional nature of the 
financial systems were crucial influences on the direction of exchange rate policy-
making. For each of the four country studies, financial development and exchange rate 
policies are evaluated as part of the historical narrative. It should be noted that the case 
chapters illustrate only the functioning of the causal mechanism in my finance-based 
theory, rather than offering an encompassing analysis of fifteen years of political and 
economic transition. 
 Chapter 4 provided statistical evidence concerning the determinants of choice 
and sustainability of exchange rate regime. These quantitative results showed that the 
financial systems dominated by foreign and private banks, accompanied by strong 
                                                 
299 Kallas and Sõrg (1994: 14). 
 
300 Bertlemann, Hristov, and Nenovsky (2002: 23). 
 210 
monetary and regulatory institutions, were associated with a higher probability of 
fixed exchange rate regimes in any given year than those dominated by incumbent 
government banks. So, decreasing participation of SOBs and increasing presence of 
foreign banks in the financial system increases the likelihood that a country would 
pursue a fixed exchange rate regime. A combination of quantitative indicators and 
qualitative evaluation is used in the country studies to trace the process of exchange 
rate policy making by focusing on the principal elements that establish the argument: 
first, how a financial system is developed through liberalization of bank entry and 
various methods of divestiture of state assets in banks and enterprises; and second, 
how a financial system is structured by examining the different aspects of the primary 
explanatory variable used in econometric models presented in chapter 4 that reflect 
several dimensions of post-communist banking sector reform including the separation 
of commercial banking activities from the central bank, the use of directed credit, the 
quality of prudential regulation and supervision, and the central bank authority. 
 Before I proceed with examining evidence from four case studies, I would like 
to advance the following argument. Initial exchange rate choices in EE were part of 
stabilization and economic reform packages, together with financial sector reform and 
privatization. Although financial reforms (two-tier banking structure, liberalization of 
entry, privatization) belong to the structural reform phase, they had to be launched 
immediately or at least made public to add credibility to the stabilization packages, for 
creating a market environment primarily meant having a well-functioning financial 
system.301 The standard instruments of monetary and fiscal stabilization required a 
two-tier banking system, which would allow the central bank to influence monetary 
creation by the commercial banks through an interest rate policy (Lavigne 1999: 115–
                                                 
301 Some argue that what communism left behind was, in institutional terms, a tabula rasa (Elster, Offe, 
and Preuss 1998). It should be noted, however, that informal institutions always persist under the veneer 
of formal institutional change. I am grateful to Peter Katzenstein for this thoughtful remark.  
 211 
117). Privatization of banks and enterprises required establishing legal grounds and 
institutions, finding buyers for state-owned assets, and monitoring how the 
privatization process progressed. Therefore, actually implementing privatization was 
slower than adopting initial exchange rate regimes. Seen in this light, this study 
underlines a government commitment to a fixed regime accompanied by a 
commitment to liberate economic policies from the influence of incumbent banks and 
enterprises through financial openness and privatization to outsiders at the outset of 
the transition. This leads to a gradual decrease in participation of incumbent banks and 
an increase in participation of foreign banks in financial intermediation. If a country 
allowed foreigners to assume the role of strategic investors in SOBs through 
privatization, it was able to build an open financial system, which was in turn was 
associated with sustainable exchange rates.302  
 This chapter looks at two contrasting cases of exchange rate policy making in 
Estonia and Bulgaria. These two countries are different from each other in their 
approach to financial institutional reform but similar in terms of the general problems 
of communism that EE experienced as a whole. Estonia exhibited a cumulative 
trajectory of its post-communist transformation experiment. The government adopted 
a currency board (CB) arrangement in April 1992 in the wake of independence. A hard 
peg was a major part of the initial macroeconomic stabilization program that was 
accompanied by the liberalization of the newly established financial system. From the 
outset of the transition, there was a strong political will to commit to a rigid fixed 
regime that simultaneously required the political will of government to discipline its 
monetary and fiscal policies, and thus to resist demands from incumbent interest 
groups for credit. This goal was achieved by the radical withdrawal of the state from 
                                                 
302 As argued in chapter 3, the key element of financial development in EE has been the divestiture of 
state assets in the banking sector through privatization to foreign strategic investors, rather than simple 
openness to foreign (greenfield) banks. 
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banking through privatization, hard budget constraints imposed on incumbent banks 
and enterprises, and the government’s commitment to open the domestic banking 
sector to foreigners. A “competitive” financial system characterized by an institutional 
environment free from the political involvement of incumbent financial and industrial 
interests in resource extraction was in turn a crucial precondition for the continuity of 
a CB. It is remarkable that the Estonian government was able to sustain a hard peg 
throughout the entire transition even with changing presidents and parliaments, several 
bank failures, and the 1998 Russian financial crisis.  
Bulgaria started its economic transition experiment with slow reforms and 
inconsistent economic policies. Its exchange rate policy can be divided into two 
periods, which are also associated with different approaches to macroeconomic 
stabilization and financial reforms. During the 1990−1996 period, Bulgarian 
governments on both left and right proved unable to cut their ties with financial and 
industrial incumbents and to commit to a credible stabilization program based on a 
fixed exchange regime. Instead, a flexible regime adopted in 1991 allowed 
stabilization and financial reforms to be delayed, and a financial system of “capture” 
to be created. The influence of powerful incumbent interests capturing the government 
and the central bank, led to repeated bailouts of financially troubled government banks 
and enterprises, monetization of the budget deficit, and repeated devaluations of the 
national currency. Only when the 1996−1997 dramatic twin crisis—banking and 
currency crisis led to the collapse of one third of banks, hyperinflation, and a run on 
the currency, Bulgaria adopted a highly restrictive CB insulating the central bank from 
political manipulation. Because the financial crisis was primarily due to systematic 
moral hazard behavior of the banks, mostly SOBs, widespread political support was 
generated to implement delayed painful yet necessary stabilization and privatization 
reforms.  
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Bulgaria and Estonia share institutional legacies from the socialist era as well 
as a number of features important for making decisions on exchange rate regimes. 
First, both countries are small and open economies that have been highly dependent on 
international markets.303 These are the countries that have faced several external 
constraints and have been influenced by international actors, the IMF in particular, 
restraining their policy autonomy more than for large countries. 
Second, in contrast to Poland, both Bulgaria and Estonia were fully developed 
communist states along the standard Soviet lines, with full nationalization of 
production and services, collectivization of agriculture, and five-year plans. Both 
countries became dependent on trade with the Soviet Union and CMEA. The Soviet 
system was centralized and its planning structures highly integrated, which had 
resulted in high economic dependence of the post-Soviet republics. In the second half 
of the 1980s, only 2−3 percent of Estonia’s exports went outside the Soviet Union and 
two thirds of these exports were to other CMEA countries (Kukk 1997: 262). The 
collapse of the Soviet empire thus caused a deep trade shock and economic recession 
in Estonia. Similarly, Bulgaria was perceived as the EE country closest to the Soviet 
Union, at least since the 1960s. Bulgaria’s industrial structure was the result of late, 
socialist industrialization, oriented towards the Soviet markets.304 While a number of 
CMEA member countries attempted to reorient their trade flows to/from other trading 
partners in the 1970s and 1980s, the degree of Bulgaria’s dependence on trade with the 
Soviet Union reached over 50 percent of overall Bulgarian trade. Thus, the shock to 
the Bulgarian economy resulting from the disintegration of the CMEA bloc resembled 
a trade shock, which led to shortages of goods and raw materials and a loss of 
                                                 
303 The CIA fact-book reports that in 1995, Bulgaria’s GDP at PPP was 46 billion U.S. dollars and 
Estonia’s GDP at PPP was 12 billion U.S. dollars.  
 
304 Author’s interview with Veselin Mintchev, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, 
June 27, 2007, Sofia. 
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Estonian export markets during the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Dobrinsky 
2000: 582–3). 
In both countries, the collapse of the Soviet system caused a collapse of output 
that coincided with hyperinflation following price liberalization which resulted in a 
deep recession.305 Their reform programs also started with a relatively similar property 
rights structure and degree of state ownership.306 In addition, these two countries 
shared two other legacies that are important in exchange rate policy-making. One was 
a very low level of international reserves in the initial years of transition, where their 
only access to foreign financing was at the door of international financial institutions. 
The level of foreign reserves influences a country’s ability to commit to a fixed 
regime. The other similarity was the widespread dollarization of their economies. 
When the degree of dollarization in an economy is high, a fixed regime is usually 
preferable to stabilize the economy, for sudden changes in transaction uses of 
domestic and foreign currency may produce large swings in the exchange rate.307 
Finally, both Estonia and Bulgaria joined the EU in May 2004 and January 2007 and 
should have had powerful external incentives to align with the policies of fixed 
regimes in the single currency area. Given these similarities, any observed variation in 
economic policies and institutions for these two countries is noteworthy. 
                                                 
305 The cumulative fall in real GDP was about 35 percent in Estonia for the years 1991−1994 (over 25 
percent during 1991−1992), and 28 percent in Bulgaria for the years 1989−1993 (Minassian 1998: 331, 
Knobl, Suitt, and Zavoico 2002: 9). In fact, many predicted that Estonia faced a gloomy post-
authoritarian future in the shadow of its powerful neighbor, Russia. Not only was Estonia closely 
connected to the Soviet economy but it had only a brief period of independent statehood from 1918 to 
1940, and its democratic experience had been short-lived (Bennich-Bjorkman 2007: 317). 
 
306 In Bulgaria, there were some early attempts at economic reforms during the period 1982−1986, 
when the Bulgarian party-state bureaucrats tried to increase efficiency by enhancing the self-
management of enterprises. The main ideological credo was “the state as owner and the workforce as 
steward.” In 1989, the government adopted Decree 56 on Business Activity, preserving the self-
management approach but transferring control rights from workers to managers (Peev 1995). 
 
307 The ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad money (a commonly used measure of dollarization) 
was over 20 percent at the time a CB was introduced in Estonia. In Bulgaria, this ratio amounted to 30 
percent in 1991 (Balino, Bennet, and Borensztein 1999). 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. Before I enter into a detailed 
analysis of the events surrounding exchange rate policy making, a word is in order on 
the broader economic context in which it was carried out. Exchange rate policy is part 
of overall macro-economic policies, so I will begin discussing the country’s overall 
transformation strategy. Later sections trace the principal elements of the finance-
based theory by focusing on how the financial system was developed; the position of 
the central bank, the strategies of banks and industrial enterprises in exchange rate, 
monetary, and regulatory policies; and how government policies were affected in 
regard to their exchange rates. 
 
Estonia 
The Monetary Reform and Currency Board 
Estonia was among the first Soviet republics to break away from the former 
Soviet Union308 and the first country of the ex-Soviet Union to establish its own 
currency.309 Monetary reform was the most important component of postcommunist 
reforms. The first real step toward monetary reform was undertaken in January 1990 
when the Estonian Supreme Council declared the Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank, BOE), 
                                                 
308 Estonia had a brief independence during the interwar period. Following the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact, 
it was invaded by Soviet troops in 1939, then occupied by the Nazis in 1941, and finally annexed by the 
Soviet Union in 1944. The country declared its independence on August 20, 1991. See Taagepera 
(1993). 
 
309 The idea of Estonia’s own currency was already emerging in August 1987, when four Estonian 
social scientists in the Tartu daily Edasi forwarded a proposal for economic autonomy in Estonia 
(known as the “Four-Man Proposal”). Among the authors of the proposal were Edgar Savisaar, the first 
Prime Minister of independent Estonia and Siim Kallas. During the late communist period, they had 
already proposed the so-called Isemajandav Eesti, a program of economic self-management to move 
Estonia away from the Soviet Union.  Interestingly, the plan was known by its initials, IME, the 
Estonian word for miracle (Kallas and Sorg 1994: 3, Knobl, Sutt, and Zavoico 2002: 4). In fact, it is 
claimed that the Estonian opposition movement, the Popular Front, formed in 1988, was largely a 
movement to fulfill the IME project (Terk 2000: 23). In 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic of 
Estonia adopted the resolution “on the current situation in banking and the realization of the program of 
the transition to the Estonian currency,” which assigned the government and the central bank the task of 
preparing for monetary reform. The principal administrator was Rein Otsason, President of the BOE. 
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the legal successor of the central bank that existed before 1940, with the task of 
preparing the introduction of a national currency.310 The commitment to currency 
reform found expression in the formation of the Monetary Reform Committee in 
March 1991 by the Supreme Council, whose members were committed to market-
based reform.311 The combination of independence granted on 20 August 1991 and the 
appointment of Siim Kallas as governor of the BOE in September 1991 gave an 
important impetus to the momentum for the reform (table 6.1). The BOE, which was 
the intellectual locomotive of market reforms, gained a governor that had been at the 
forefront of the currency reform debate for several years (Knobl, Sutt, and Zavoico 
2002: 6). It is interesting to note that the Ministry of Finance was not a significant 
policy player in monetary reform at that time (Buyske 1997: 77). However, the 
Savisaar government (1990−1992) began to lobby the BOE for currency reform based 
on the introduction of vouchers (temporary supplements to the ruble) on the grounds 
that it would leave more time to make important decisions on the exchange rate 
regime (table 6.2).312 
The deterioration of economic conditions underlined the urgency of fast and 
coherent reforms. The post-Soviet economic shocks were strong, particularly the rise 
of prices approaching hyperinflation: while in 1991, the annual inflation was above 
                                                 
310 The BOE was originally founded in February 1919 when Estonia first gained its independence, but it 
was closed in June 1941 following the country’s annexation by the Soviet Union. For a detailed history 
of the BOE, see www.ee/epbe/en/history.hmtl. 
 
311 The Monetary Reform Committee consisted of 3 members: the Prime Minister, the governor of the 
BOE, and an independent expert. The founding members were Edgar Savisaar, Rein Otsason, and Siim 
Kallas. In February 1992, the new committee included Tiit Vähi (Prime Minister), Siim Kallas 
(Governor of the BOE), and Rudolf Jakalas, the Estonian-born Swedish banker (Laar 2002: 113). 
 
312 There were alternative proposals for monetary reform. For example, Estonian Professor Vello Volt 
suggested introducing payment vouchers or a convertible ruble (koru) to restrain the spread of 
inflationary effects of the ruble zone into Estonia. Another proposal was to declare the Finnish currency 
as the official legal tender together with the Estonian currency. This proposal was inspired by the 
experience of 1918, when the Finnish currency was in circulation in Estonia (Laar 2002: 109). 
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200 percent, by 1992, it reached close to 1,100 percent (Staehr 2004: 45).313 The BOE 
and the Estonian Savings Bank issued checkbooks to alleviate the shortage of cash but 
these were not very popular among the population.314 The confidence in the 
inflationary ruble (the “occupation ruble”) was lost. The Savisaar government, blamed 
for the bad economic situation and delays in economic reforms, fell in January 1992 
and was replaced by a caretaker government led by Tiit Vähi, the former transport 
minister.  
 
Table 6.1: Governors of the Bank of Estonia, 1990−2007 
 
Governor Tenure Background 
Rein Otsason December 28, 
1989−September 
23, 1991 
Economist (Head of the State Plan 
Committee) 
Siim Kallas September 23, 
1991−April 27, 
1995 
Politician (Member of the Supreme 
Council of the USSR) 
Vahur Kraft April 27, 
1995−June 7, 2005 
Banker 
Andres Lipstok June 7, 2005 Politician (Minister of Finance, 
Minister of Economic Affairs, 
member of Riigikogu) 
 












                                                 
313 The main factors that contributed to inflation included not only Russia’s mismanagement of the 
ruble, but also price liberalization, the elimination of Soviet subsidies on imported raw materials, and 
the deliberate undervaluation of the new currency (Brown 1993: 494-495).  
 
314 To alleviate cash shortages, the Tartu City Government introduced its own currency, which was 
quickly abolished by the BOE (Laar 2002: 119). 
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Prime Minister Party affiliation of 
Prime Minister 
1990 Edgar Savisaar Popular Front 
1992 Tiit Vähi I Estonian Coalition Party 
October 21, 1992−           
November 2, 1994 
Mart Laar I  Pro Patria Union  
November 3, 1994−         
April 16, 1995 
Andres Tarand Independent 
April 17, 1995−               
March 13,1997 
Tiit Vähi II Estonian Coalition Party 
March 14, 1997−             
March 28, 1999 
Mart Siimann Estonian Coalition Party 
March 29, 1999−             
January 27,2002 
Mart Laar II Pro Patria Union 
January 28, 2002−           
April 9, 2003 
Siim Kallas Estonian Reform Party 
 
The IMF (and the European Community) disapproved of introducing an 
independent Estonian currency on the grounds that the Estonian government would 
not be able to stabilize its currency because of the lack of foreign exchange 
reserves.315 In April 1992, the IMF negotiating mission submitted to the Estonian 
authorities a Memorandum of Financial and Economic Policies, suggesting a freely 
floating exchange rate. However, Kallas, the BOE governor, was committed to urgent 
currency reform and expressed great interest in a CB arrangement. He was attracted to 
this currency regime because the regime was associated with a degree of transparency 
and credibility similar to that of the gold standard, under which Estonia experienced 
                                                 
315 The IMF was apparently concerned that monetary reform in Estonia could create problems for 
monetary reconstruction in Russia, which was the institution’s predominant focus. Author’s interview 
with Mart Laar, former Prime Minister of Estonia (1992−1994 and 1999−2002), July 19, 2007, Tallinn. 
See also, Hansson and Sachs (1992: 1–2). Stanley Fisher (1997: 17) described the doubts of the 
international financial community about the initial regime choice of Estonian authorities at a conference 
on the 5th anniversary of the Estonian kroon in 1997: “Many of those who heard about the intention to 
introduce the CB in 1992 were doubtful that it could succeed.”  
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monetary stability during the 1927−1933 period.316 Kallas worried that if a flexible 
regime was chosen, the constant disputes and political pressures would cause extra 
confusion and dual money circulation in the unstable post-communist landscape 
(Kallas 2002: 130).317 Instead, a CB promised an immediate solution to the problem of 
resisting demands for credit from the government and incumbent interest groups. 
It is unclear who was the first to seriously suggest the idea of a CB in Estonia. 
According to Prime Minister Laar, the initial idea about adopting a CB in Estonia 
came from Jeffrey Sachs,318 who arrived in Tallin in April 1992 accompanied by Ardo 
Hansson and Boris Pleskovic.319 Simultaneously, Swedish and American academics 
Lars Jonung, Steve Hanke, and Kurt Schuler also proposed a CB arrangement. 
According to their proposal, Sweden would grant Estonia the initial reserves to 
establish a new CB in the amount of six hundred million Swedish krona. The CB 
would have three Swedish and two Estonian representatives, who would enjoy the 
exclusive right to emit the Estonian currency fully backed with gold and foreign 
currency reserves (Hanke, Jonung, and Schuler 1992). This proposal, however, did not 
find full support of the Estonian authorities, for the BOE had been removed from 
                                                 
316 A CB is a fixed exchange rate regime similar to a gold standard regime. The authorities forego 
discretionary control over the money supply and replace it with an automatic mechanism that links 
money supply changes to the balance of payments. The amount of foreign exchange reserves that the 
CB stands ready to exchange for domestic money is sufficient to cover the monetary base. 
 
317 The Estonian authorities feared that with a flexible regime, the kroon (along with ruble, for to stop 
its use would have been a contentious issue) and convertible foreign currencies would have remained in 
circulation (Ennuste et al. 2004: 21). 
 
318 Author’s interview with Mart Laar, former Prime Minister of Estonia (1992−1994 and 1999−2002), 
July 19, 2007, Tallinn. 
 
319 Ardo Hansson was an Estonian-born economist from the World Bank, who has also worked as a 
member of Anders Aslund’s reform adviser team in Slovenia and elsewhere in EE. He was also advisor 
to Prime Ministers Vähi and Laar. Hansson brought Estonian policy-makers into contact with Western 
economists associated with Sachs and Aslund (Feldmann and Sally 2002: 90). Boris Pleskovic was 
economic advisor to the Prime Minister of Slovenia and had had experience with the Slovenian 
currency reform.  
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regulating the circulation of money. There were also problems getting a loan from 
Sweden; moreover, the suggested amount of reserves for the Estonian CB to operate 
with was considered insufficient (Kallas and Sorg 1994: 5).320 
In spite of IMF disapproval and discontented incumbent interest groups, Prime 
Minister Vähi successfully introduced the long-awaited Estonian currency and a CB 
arrangement in June 1992.321 At that time, the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) passed 
three laws regarding monetary and exchange rate policy: the currency law, the law on 
the backing of the Estonian kroon, and the foreign exchange law defining the CB and 
its operating procedures.322 The Decree on the Monetary Reform Committee from 17 
June 1992 “on the performance of the currency reform” provided the main features of 
the currency reform and established the Estonian kroon as the sole legal tender starting 
on June 20, 1992 (Kallas and Sorg 1994: 10–11). 
The main goals for exchange rate policy were stability and credibility (Pautola 
and Backé 1998: 78). Although Estonia did not comply with OCA criteria at the time 
of CB adoption, the Deutsche mark, endowed with a reputation for credibility from the 
Bundesbank’s commitment to low inflation, was considered an appropriate anchor 
(Sulling 2002: 472).323 The exchange rate between the kroon and the Deutsche mark 
                                                 
320 Yet another proposal was submitted by Holger Schmieding, who suggested a CB for all three Baltic 
states. He suggested pegging a common Baltic currency to the ECU and Banque de France as the 
manager of this common currency (Laar 2002: 110-111). 
 
321 The IMF eventually changed its approach and issued a statement of support the day before the 
currency was introduced (Brown 1993: 496). The Joint Statement by the Government of Estonia and the 
IMF on Currency Reform was published on June 19, 1992 in the IMF News Brief No. 92/16: 23. 
 
322 The Law on the Security of the Estonian Kroon establishes the CB principle. In order to provide 
transparency for the operation of the CB, the BOE is divided into Issue Department, which is de facto 
CB, which concentrates all high liquid assets and liabilities, and the Banking Department, which 
incorporates less liquid assets and the excess of foreign exchange reserves over the cover for monetary 
liabilities. 
 
323 In 1991, Germany accounted for only 0.2 percent of Estonia’s total trade. Finland and Sweden, its 
current major trading partners, accounted for 2.3 percent and 0.5 percent (Sulling 2002: 472, fn. 4). 
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was set at 8 kroon to 1 Deutsche mark.324 The official conversion rate for the pre-
independence currency was 10 rubles to 1 Estonian kroon. Some government advisers 
pressed for a strong currency revaluation on the grounds that only this would generate 
the dollar income needed to purchase goods at “world prices” (Laar 2002: 122). For a 
successful CB arrangement, Estonia needed 120 million U.S. dollars of foreign 
reserves (Laar 2002: 120). At the time of the currency reform, only the gold restituted 
from the United Kingdom was available (52 million U.S. dollars). To support the 
newly established currency regime, the Estonian Supreme Council also decided to 
commit to the balance of the BOE reserve some areas from the state forest (which 
could have been sold in the event of crisis) with the estimated value of 150 million 
U.S. dollars as an additional guarantee of the foreign currency reserves (Kallas and 
Sorg 1994). The CB thus started with partial backing of the BOE liabilities but full 
backing was achieved only within a month after the monetary reform following further 
gold restitution.325  
Before the monetary reform, incumbent banks (mostly government owned) 
carried out risky loan policies and speculations on exchange rates because rising 
inflation reduced the risk of crediting and increased profits from loans. Banks were 
using this unstable economic environment to make a lot of money. The BOE, not 
backed by strong legal independence initially, was weak in enforcing prudential 
                                                 
324 The Swedish kronor, Finnish markka and ECU were also considered as candidates for the peg or 
even as candidates for full dollarization. The U.S. dollar was never suggested as a serious alternative 
during the discussions on the anchor currency. The argument against ECU was that a single currency 
peg was more transparent and simpler than pegs to currency baskets (Sepp, Lättemäe, Randveer 2002: 
334-335). 
 
325 Before the occupation in 1940, Estonia had over 11 tons of gold abroad: 4.8 tons in the United 
Kingdom, 2.9 tons in Sweden and 3.3 tons in Switzerland in the Bank for International Settlements. 
Negotiations with these three countries were concluded successfully, and in mid-June 1992, the gold 
reserves of the BOE were restored (Kallas and Sorg 1994: 8-9). Forty-five million dollars was restituted 
from Sweden and the BIS in July 1992 (Knobl, Sutt, and Zavoico 2002: 14, fn. 30). 
 
 222 
regulations and sanctions.326 Being aware of this institutional weakness, banks 
expected the central bank to provide liquidity assistance and bail outs, which led to 
reckless lending and financial speculation, resulting in mismatches on their balance 
sheets (Hansson 1995: 150). Banks were unhappy with the adoption of a CB that 
required commitment from the government and the central bank to low inflation, a 
stable exchange rate, and financial reforms that would reduce bank profits. Former 
Prime Minister Laar recalls bank reactions at the moment that a CB was adopted in the 
Parliament: 
Banks were furious. They missed the moment because they did not know what 
the currency board meant. We did not say much about it in the Parliament 
before its adoption. There was only one economist from the Agricultural Party 
who understood what [the currency board] is and its consequences, and he 
voted against it.327  
The Estonian Parliament gave substantial authority to the Monetary Reform 
Committee to conduct monetary reform and to decide on financial system reforms.328 
The effectiveness of this institutional mandate was reinforced by the highly technical 
nature of the Committee’s work that limited the number of potential interest groups 
with sufficient expertise to follow or challenge its decisions (Buyske 1997: 82). It was 
not only banks but also many politicians who voted for the CB, which was adopted 
                                                 
326 Rein Otsason, then President of the BOE, pursued the idea of subordinating all SOBs directly to the 
BOE and transforming the central bank into an institution similar to the former USSR State Bank. 
However, this proposal was not put in place because of the opposition of some members of the BOE 
Board and the government (Sorg 1994: 6).  
 
327 Author’s interview with Mart Laar, former Prime Minister of Estonia (1992−1994 and 1999−2002), 
July 19, 2007, Tallinn. See also Lloyd (1994). 
 
328 Bo Kragh (quoted in Buyske 1997: 82), a proponent of the Monetary Reform Committee, described 
its extensive powers in the following way: “…it can determine the time of monetary reform, what to do 
with the Estonian financial system, taxes, debt, securities, pensions, wages, fines, foreign trade and with 
the USSR armed forces [in Estonia].” See also Transcript of the 33rd session of the Estonian parliament, 
4th seating, March 14, 1991. 
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almost unanimously, for its implications were not fully grasped. Banks and politicians 
were convinced that even after monetary reform, the central bank or government 
would continue to provide “cheap credits” to failing factories and collective farms 
(Laar 2002: 121–122).  
The Estonian CB is a semi-orthodox version of this arrangement (Khoury and 
Wihlborg 2006).329 The BOE was prohibited by law from devaluing the Kroon; only 
the Parliament has this right. The choice of the CB was clearly a political choice 
because it helped Estonia to exit from the ruble zone, making the BOE independent 
from all government agencies and prohibiting it from financing any government debt, 
engaging in selling securities, and lending to banks or state-owned enterprises. 
Therefore, the CB arrangement meant that the BOE should focus on preserving a 
stable exchange rate, instead of trying to reach compromise among exchange rate 
stability, unemployment, and output growth (Kallas and Sorg 2002: 13). Kallas, the 
BOE governor, was a key member of the Monetary Reform Committee that 
established the CB. The decision to make the BOE responsible for the CB enhanced its 
authority; increased its capacity in relationship with the banks because the BOE is 
unable to serve as lender of last resort; and facilitated its task in maintaining a stable 
currency regime because the kroon is fully secured (100 percent) by gold and 
convertible foreign currencies and the conversion rate is established by law (Buyske 
1997: 92). The currency regime proved successful in combating inflation, which was 
brought down to 89.8 percent in 1993 and to 29 percent in 1995 (Laar 2007: 5). 
                                                 
329 As of 2006, the IMF classified only six other countries exhibiting a CB: Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
Bulgaria, Brunei-Darrussalam, Djibouti, Hong Kong SAR, and Lithuania. The unsuccessful 
Argentinean CB was the primary inspiration for Ardo Hansson (Laar 2002: 153-154). The Estonian and 
collapsed Argentinean CBs deviate from the orthodoxy of a central bank. Nonetheless, in contrast to 
Argentina where the central bank continued to finance the government, the BOE is not permitted to 
finance a government deficit. Author’s interview with Ulo Kaasik, Head of the Economics Department 
of the BOE, July 18, 2008, Tallinn. For a review of the necessary conditions for the orthodox CB and 





“Just Do It” Reform Strategy and Outsider Privatization 
The CB has been a cornerstone of the economic reform program that included 
the continuation in price liberalization, a conservative fiscal policy, ultra-liberal trade 
policies, attracting foreign capital, and full scale privatization to facilitate market-
based price and wage adjustments to changing internal and external conditions, rather 
than using the exchange rate (Kallas and Sorg 1994: 12, Sulling 2002).330 Estonia’s 
economic reform was predicated on a radical withdrawal of the state from the 
economy and finance and a shock therapy strategy of economic stabilization. Thus, 
many reforms were carried out simultaneously and adjustments were made to 
coordinate and link them together (Ennuste et al. 2004: 7).331 The CB was established 
with fully liberalized current account transactions and a system of few capital controls, 
mostly abolished by the end of 1994. The government also introduced a flat tax of 26 
percent (on personal and corporate incomes) and a legal requirement to eliminate state 
subsidies (including subsidies to agriculture) to maintain balanced budgets that have 
limited government ability to engage in ambitious redistribution policies.332  
                                                 
330 Laar maintained that openness of the economy, although politically unpopular, attracts foreign 
investments and fosters competition, reconstruction, and growth. Author’s interview with Mart Laar, 
former Prime Minister of Estonia (1992−1994 and 1999−2002), July 19, 2007, Tallinn. The Estonian 
government abolished all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. The average tariff rate in Estonia in 1993 
was 1.4 percent, while Poland maintained 11 percent tariffs in industry and 18 percent in agriculture 
(Feldmann 2007). On trade liberalization in Estonia, see also Feldmann and Sally (2002), Lindstrom 
(2005). 
 
331 There was a consensus in the transition literature that price liberalization, macroeconomic 
stabilization, and privatization must be implemented immediately after the collapse of a command 
economy (Blanchard et al. 1991). 
 
332 The government refused the loan from the IMF to balance the budget because it decided to construct 
the future of Estonia on “the momentum for radical reforms, not loans.” Attracting foreign investments 
was considered to be a superior alternative to borrowing from international institutions because the 
latter preserves economic backwardness (Laar 2007: 4 and 6). 
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Managers of state-owned enterprises used price liberalization to make profits. 
Price liberalization resulted in rapidly rising output prices, but managers did not 
reevaluate the price of fixed assets or inventories. Because these enterprise assets were 
bought at cheap ruble prices, managers were suddenly able to make high profits and 
enrich themselves (Brown 1993: 498). However, the collapse of inter-republican trade 
and the currency reform had thrown incumbent enterprises into the competitive market 
economy environment, so these enterprises were putting pressure on the BOE for 
cheap credit. However, Kallas, the BOE governor, refused these requests for credit on 
the grounds that such a policy could undermine the currency reform (Knobl, Sutt, 
Zavoico 2002: 7, 11). 
The rightist coalition government that was elected in September 1992, led by 
the Pro Patria Union with Mart Laar as Prime Minister, was the most effective in 
pulverizing the pre-independence nomenklatura coalition of state and party 
bureaucrats and managers of SOBs and enterprises, and in pursuing radical economic 
reforms.333 It publicly proclaimed a “House Cleaning” campaign aimed at the vestiges 
of communist attitudes (Steen and Ruus 2002: 237). The government sent a clear 
message to all economic actors: “There is no point anymore in pinning hopes on 
former good relations with the ruling circles” (Laar 2002: 185). Estonian reformers 
were able to use the window of opportunity for dramatic change provided by the 
economic crisis at the outset of the transition, political independence, and weak rent-
seeking interest groups to adopt a “home-grown” reform strategy (Feldmann and Sally 
2002: 93). The principal lesson of the Estonian reform strategy was summed up by the 
advertising slogan: “Just do it,” which meant being decisive about implementing 
                                                 
333 The Laar’s Pro Patria party was formed in 1991 from the fusion of several small Christian-
Democratic conservative and right wing parties. 
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reforms and sticking with them in spite of the short-term costs that they cause (Laar 
2007: 3).  
Estonian authorities were determined to cut ties with incumbent interests from 
the socialist era and so they committed to rapid privatization of banks and enterprises 
early in the transition.334 Privatization had begun before independence but early 
legislation on ownership reform in the Soviet period favored insiders, and the process 
bore signs of spontaneous privatization. In addition to joint ventures with Western 
investors, early efforts to escape the fetters of state ownership also included “small 
state enterprises,” which were semi-private spin offs from state enterprises as well as 
so-called “peoples enterprises,” an experimental leasing system for insiders similar to 
the Yugoslav-style of self-management (Mygind 2000: 7).335 In addition, the growing 
independence movement pushed ownership reform toward restitution. Privatization 
was incorporated in the Estonian SSR government program, which came to power 
after the elections in March 1990, led by Savisaar. The privatization concept of 1990 
emphasized direct sales with the participation of foreign investors, as the main form of 
privatization, necessary to create active owners. Privatization for money was also seen 
as a way to provide reserves for introducing the new Estonian currency (Terk 2000: 
19–40).336  
                                                 
334 From the beginning, Estonian politicians refused to meddle in the economy. Even during the 
perestroika period, Estonia invoked the principles of private property as a way to attack the prerogatives 
of the Soviet state (Buyske 1997: 98). As former Minister of the Economy, Jaak Leimann explains: 
“Our liberal philosophy is due to the fact that we are so small and we just don’t like state-owned 
industry” (Robinson and Vipotnik 1998: 2). 
 
335 When Soviet law in 1987 allowed state enterprises to seek partnerships and Western suppliers, 
Estonia established over 150 joint enterprises. These enterprises were later taken over mostly by 
foreigners. Moreover, over 2,000 new private cooperatives were established (Brown 1993: 494, Mygind 
2000: 7). The Act on Small-Scale Privatization was adopted by the Supreme Soviet in December 1990. 
 
336 The banking law of 1989 has awarded the BOE quite extensive powers in privatization of 
enterprises. Article 9 of this law stated: “To ensure the stability of monetary circulation …a part of 
assets in the possession of the Republic of Estonia are given to the disposal of the BOE, including 
revenue from privatization, shares of state-owned joint-stock companies … The privatization of assets 
in state ownership shall be organized by a legal body at the government of the Republic of Estonia, 
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An important legal document for privatization was the Act of the 
Fundamentals of Ownership Reform adopted by the Estonian parliament in June 
1991.337 At the time the law was adopted, the Estonian Parliament favored voucher 
privatization (known as the political, or re-distributional approach), while the Savisaar 
government preferred direct sales for cash (called the economic approach). The 
nationalist policies in relation to the Russian speaking minority meant employee 
takeovers were not a favorable privatization option (OECD 1999). Although all parties 
were united in their commitment to reducing the state’s role in the economy, 
disagreements regarding the actual implementation of privatization contributed to the 
fall of the Savisaar government in January 1992.338 The Ministry of Economy took the 
lead in initiating the policy shift to asset sales at the expense of vouchers, in spite of 
the Parliament’s opposition and the public’s expectations of voucher privatization.339 
The Ministry of Economy had de facto practical responsibility for privatization 
because the State Property Agency in the Ministry of Economy established in 1990 to 
supervise privatization was part of its hierarchy. The BOE, the Ministry of Finance, 
and the Ministry of Industry also supported a direct sales method. The first seven large 
enterprises were experimentally privatized via asset sales between September 1991 
and April 1992 (so-called pilot privatization) (Terk 2000). 
                                                                                                                                            
headed by a Supervisory Board. At least half the members of the Supervisory Board will be appointed 
by the Council of the BOE” (Terk 2000: 95-102). 
 
337 The following discussion of state and societal preferences in privatization policy relies on Buyske’s 
account (1997: 95-110). 
 
338 The temporary government of Tiit Vahi, which was in power until the September 1992 elections, 
initially expressed its intention to comply with parliament’s preferences for the voucher method. 
Legislation was adopted for the privatization of housing and agriculture using vouchers. 
 
339 Several factors influenced the choice of direct sales including the appointment of a new Minister of 
the Economy, Olari Tall, known for his managerial ability and Andres Bergmann, an Estonian with 
business experience in Germany as Deputy Minister. Both admired the achievements of the German 
privatization agency, Treuhandanstalt, which used the direct sales method in the former East Germany. 
Moreover, the CB put a premium on a balanced budget, and direct sales were seen as a way to increase 
budgetary revenues (Buyske 1997: 100-102). 
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Enterprise managers did not play an active role in privatization policy for 
several reasons. Those who had the most to lose from privatization were the Russian 
managers of the military and heavy industrial enterprises with political connections 
historically focused on Moscow. They were “disenfranchised” in terms of domestic 
influence by the policymakers and legislators in the independent Estonia. Estonian 
enterprise managers were frustrated with the Soviet command economy and expected 
that a free market environment and foreign investors would solve their problems. In 
addition, the hard budget constraints imposed by the government from the start of the 
transition was a clear signal to enterprise managers that privatization was their only 
option for financial survival. 
The Laar government increased control over the privatization process. It 
merged the two existing privatization agencies into one Estonian Privatization 
Agency, put under the authority of the Ministry of Finance. A new Law on 
Privatization was adopted in July 1993. The policy of direct sales to “real” owners was 
“cemented” in September 1992, when the Estonian Privatization Agency, with the 
technical support of German consultants, adopted a privatization scheme modeled on 
the East German Treuhandanstalt scheme, which was based on auctions to outsiders.  
This privatization strategy, coupled with very liberal foreign investment, trade 
regimes, and a 1992 strict bankruptcy law, which also applied to banks, created a 
system that provided foreign investors with many opportunities to enter the Estonian 
market (Feldmann 2007: 345). Incumbent enterprises were cut off from subsidies, and 
some were liquidated with their assets privatized (Mygind 2000: 10). A legal 
framework for foreign direct investments was adopted a few months after the country 
regained its independence in 1991, which turned Estonia into the “Hong Kong of 
Europe.” Yet, the Estonian government did not provide selective incentives for 
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specific foreign investors and did not engage in activist industrial policy (Feldmann 
and Sally 2002). 
The second stage of privatization started with the announcement of the first 
international tender for the sale of 38 enterprises in November 1992 (Ennuste et al. 
2004: 16). Large enterprises were sold directly to “core” investors using open tenders 
that were followed by negotiations on restructuring and new investment. Foreign 
owners were already playing a prominent role in that process and acquired around 40 
percent of the sale value of all privatized enterprises by the end of 1994.340 Foreign 
investors were interested in macroeconomic and currency stability and the CB greatly 
contributed to this (Korhonen 1999: 17). The pace of privatization was remarkable: 
over half the enterprises were privatized within less than a year and half (1993–1995) 
(Laar 2002: 262). Large-scale enterprise privatization to strategic investors was 
successfully completed in mid-1996 (Barisitz 2002: 87).  
At the end, the voucher method that began late 1994 was used but only 
marginally to make people part of the property transformation process and to create a 
stock exchange.341 Vouchers were primarily used for privatizing housing but from the 
end of 1994 it was also possible to use vouchers to buy minority shares in some large 
enterprises but only after majority shares were already sold to a core, usually foreign, 
owner.342 Banks were not privatized through the voucher method. 
                                                 
340 For 1997 and 1998, foreign capital paid more than 50 percent of the total revenues of the Estonian 
Privatization Agency (Mygind 2000: 9). 
 
341 At the end, Estonian privatization was a synthesis of different models, uniting the advantages of East 
German and Czech models while avoiding their shortcomings. Author’s interview with Mart Laar, 
former Prime Minister of Estonia (1992−1994 and 1999-2002), July 19, 2007, Tallinn. 
 
342 In contrast with the Czech Republic, investment privatization funds did not have any formulated role 
in Estonian legislation. In June 1996, there were 6 investment funds that amassed only 1 percent of the 
total value of distributed vouchers (Mygind 2000: 10). 
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In sum, the aim of Estonian reformers was rapid property transformation with 
the goal of attracting foreign investors into the banking and enterprise sectors. Large-
scale privatization involved a high political consensus and the participation of 
opposition party representatives on the boards of institutions that carried out 
privatization, which pushed aside the former nomenklatura and its cronies (Ennuste et 
al. 2004: 18). A stable national currency was considered a crucial precondition for 
foreign investment and privatization (Brown 1993: 496).343 In the next section, I will 
discuss how privatization policies of banks and industries impacted financial system 
development and the ability of Estonian monetary authorities to sustain strong 
commitment to stable currency policies.  
 
Financial Development Phase I: The First Banking Crisis (1992−1993) 
Banking reform in the Soviet Union started in 1988, when the Soviet 
monobank system was reorganized into a two-tier banking structure, consisting of 
Gosbank (the State Bank of the USSR) and specialized SOBs: Sberbank (Savings 
Bank), Agroprombank (Agricultural Bank, later Maapank), Promstroibank (Industry 
and Construction Bank), Zhilotsbank (Residential Construction and Light Industry 
Bank, later Social Bank), and Vneshekonombank (Foreign Trade Bank, later renamed 
the North Estonian Share Bank, NESB).344 The first new private bank in Estonia (and 
in the ex-Soviet Union) was the Tartu Commercial Bank (Tartu Kommertspank, TCB) 
created in December 1988. The shareholders of the bank were mainly Estonian state-
owned enterprises (Sorg 1998: 169).345 In December 1989, the Estonian Supreme 
                                                 
343 For a comprehensive analysis of the privatization process in Estonia, see Terk (2000). 
344 Before World War II, the Republic of Estonia had a banking system with the central bank and three 
types of financial institutions: universal commercial banks, city banks, and savings and loan 
associations (Sorg 1998: 168). 
 
345 TCB permitted several shareholders to establish branches, which were de facto economically 
independent. In this way, the Tallin Commercial Bank, Virumaa Commercial Bank, West-Estonian 
Commercial Bank, and Otepää Innovation Bank were established. 
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Council adopted the banking law, which reestablished the BOE as the central bank of 
the Republic. The law, however, contained both command and market economy 
elements and because the Soviet ruble was Estonia’s currency at that time, the BOE’s 
authority was confined to monitoring banks (Hansson 1995: 148, Barisitz 2002: 85). 
In the chaotic institutional and hyperinflationary environment prior to 
monetary independence, banking became a lucrative business. Most SOBs earned 
most of their profits from foreign currency speculations and short-term foreign trade 
arbitrage transactions between the USSR and the West (Barisitz 2002: 85). During the 
cash crisis period, arbitrage of the various prices for cash and non-cash rubles 
represented considerable profit-making opportunities.346 With lax or nonexistent 
banking regulations and supervision, related mainly to confusion concerning the 
licensing policies of dual power in Estonian banking (the BOE and Gosbank) from 
autumn 1988 to June 1992, few restrictions were placed on such speculations 
(Hansson 1995:147). The Estonian branch of Gosbank practically stopped the 
supervision of banks on Estonian territory in 1989 (Sorg 1998: 170). 
Licensing requirements were relatively lax and minimum capital requirements 
were set at only 5 million rubles (fewer than 40 thousand U.S. dollars in 1992 figures). 
Hyperinflation further reduced the real value of the obligatory initial bank capital. As 
a result, big state owned enterprises, enriched by speculations in a weakly regulated 
environment, were able with little money to create their own banks (the so-called 
“pocket banks”) or grab the branches of all-Union banks and use them to pump 
resources to finance their activities. The initiative also came from a former communist 
nomenklatura with close political links with the managers of incumbent banks. In 
                                                                                                                                            
 
346 Banks tried to increase their cash reserves to be able to speculate. While at the beginning of 1992, 
banks held 176 million rubles in cash, they already held 768 million rubles on the eve of the monetary 
reform (Sorg 1994: 14). 
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many cases, owners, managers and the state were the same or closely related persons, 
making it hard to separate these parties (Sorg 1998: 170–172). Creating their own 
banks allowed enterprises to gain better access to the Soviet Gosbank’s credits, which 
were inexpensive by their low interest rates in a hyperinflationary environment 
(Hansson 1995: 147). These factors led to a proliferation of new private banks. By the 
end of 1992, 25 new banks had been licensed and 43 banks were registered (Fleming 
2001: 90).347 
Incumbent banks with substantial bad loan portfolios and mismatches on their 
balance sheets were able to remain liquid by using their large profits from foreign 
exchange trading or by re-lending cheap central bank credits at high interest rate 
spreads (Hansson 1995: 150). Laar (2002: 184–185) characterized the situation in the 
initial stages of transition in the banking sector as follows: 
 
The former Communist party bosses considered it only fair to compensate the 
loss of their high status by taking up positions in banks, knowing at the same 
time absolutely nothing about banking. Very soon they started trying to go 
about their business in the banking world in the same way as they had in the 
Communist party, by cheating and lying, and taking all the benefits for 
themselves and their friends. But you cannot get very far using those kinds of 
methods in a market economy. The bankers fell back on their earlier 
experiences and tried to shift the blame for their errors and mistakes onto the 
Estonian state, hoping that the new young government would give in to their 
demands as easily as previous governments. In this situation, even 
indecisiveness would have been a decision, one which would probably 
ultimately have led to the fall of the kroon. 
                                                 
347 Banks were however, very small. For example, 11 banks had fewer than 10 shareholders and two 
banks had only one shareholder (Sorg 2000: 403). 
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The independence of Estonia in 1991 resolved the problem of the co-existence of two 
central banks that were creating confusion about whose laws took precedence. The 
Estonian branch of Gosbank was taken over and integrated into the BOE in 1992 
(Hansson 1995: 147–148). Subsequently, the Law on the BOE, granting it a high 
degree of legal independence, took effect in June 1993.348 Monetary reform unified the 
exchange rate, reduced buy-sell spreads, and thus decreased foreign exchange 
revenues of banks (Hansson 1995: 150).349  
As inflation declined, the repayment of loans diminished, which caused 
liquidity problems in several banks. Banks misjudged the resolve of the BOE 
concerning bailouts. The BOE remained faithful to the policy of the “hard kroon” and 
renounced bailing out the banks to save them. Illiquidity problems, coupled with the 
freezing of assets in two big banks in Moscow, triggered a banking crisis in November 
1992. The BOE announced a moratorium on the three largest banks: TCB, which had 
a mixed ownership (government, co-operative, and private), Union Baltic Bank (Balti 
Uhispank, UBB) and NESB (Pohja-Eesti Aktsiapank), owned by the BOE. During the 
moratorium period, the BOE faced significant pressures for protection from the 
management and shareholders of these banks. The UBB Chairman demanded that the 
BOE devalue the currency by forty percent in order to support his bank.350 The 
principal sources of problems were, however, not the same for all three banks.351 
                                                 
348 In fact, the BOE itself drafted the new banking law. It requested input into the rafting process from 
the Estonian Bankers’ Association, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of 
the Economy, but the BOE made all of the final decisions. The BOE considered the involvement of the 
bankers association as a way to ensure acceptance of the law by the banks, not as a joint legislative 
effort (Buyske 1997: 113-14). 
 
349 In the first half of 1992, 63 percent of bank revenues came from foreign exchange trading. After the 
monetary reform, this share decreased to 39 percent (Sorg cited in Hansson 1995: 150, fn. 20). 
 
350 The Baltic Independent, November 27–December 3, 1992. 
 
351 The Savings Bank, which placed 25 million U.S. dollars in assets in Moscow, was also affected. 
Because it held over 85 percent of household savings at the time, the BOE took over its ownership. The 
BOE swapped some of its own assets for the Saving Bank’s claim on the Moscow Savings Bank to 
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Liquidity problems of TCB stemmed from losses on foreign exchange speculations 
and problems with bad loan portfolios. Prime Minister Laar warned that the ultimate 
solution to the banking crisis would be harsh, stressing that the planned 1993 budget 
did not have enough money for a bailout (Hansson 1995: 151). Therefore, the BOE, 
supported by the Laar government decided to liquidate TCB against IMF advice.352 
The government feared the links with organized crime in Russia of shareholders and 
bank customers (Laar 2002: 188). The BOE took a different approach to the other two 
banks, for their problems were caused mainly by the frozen foreign currency assets in 
Moscow.353 UBB froze all accounts of state-owned enterprises and attempted to force 
the government to deal with the problem of frozen assets. UBB and NESB were 
forcibly merged into a new bank, the North Estonian Bank (NEB) and recapitalized by 
the central bank.354 The BOE approach to the bankers was succinctly summarized by 
“Commercial Banks, Kallas, Kroon: Who is Stronger?”—an article in the Estonian 
newspaper, Rahva Haal (Buyske 1997: 85). 
                                                                                                                                            
minimize disruption of public confidence during the planned monetary reform and to protect population 
savings (Fleming 2001: 91). 
 
352 The IMF was concerned about a systemic banking crisis and suggested instead a merger of all three 
banks into a single unit. This proposal was refused by both the BOE and the government on the basis of 
the argument that this solution would not take into account different causes of bank problems and 
would require more resources from the state budget. TBC’s assets were sold at auction, the depositors 
received about 60 percent of their deposits, and shareholders, responsible for the mismanagement of the 
bank, were not compensated. Author’s interview with Mart Laar, former Prime Minister of Estonia 
(1992−1994 and 1999−2002), July 19, 2007, Tallinn. 
 
353 NESB and UBB placed 40 million U.S. dollars and 36 million U.S. dollars with the 
Vnesheconombank, and were thus badly affected when the Moscow offices of Vnesheconombank froze 
foreign exchange deposits in early 1992 (Fleming 2001: 91). 
 
354 The original BOE proposal envisaging unchanged ownership structure of banks was refused by the 
government, which feared that it would be too favorable to incumbent owners of the bank responsible 
for banking problems (Hansson 1995: 152-153). Thus, the BOE and the government created a 
Vnesheconombank-fund (VEB-fund), which issued certificates backed by the frozen assets held in 
Moscow. The shareholders were given VEB-fund certificates in lieu of their shares, and thus virtually 
nothing. The government also exchanged the valueless VEB-fund bonds from the new bank for 
government bonds. Finally, the government added additional bonds to strengthen the NEB’s balance 
sheet, and in return took 100 percent ownership of the bank (Fleming 2001: 99). 
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After the banking crisis was resolved, the BOE announced a stabilization 
period: it established a licensing review and froze the issuance of new bank licenses 
with the rationale that some banks received their operation licenses from Moscow and 
were established before BOE existed. As a result, eight banks were not renewed for 
the license, ten banks merged into Union Bank of Estonia (UBE), and three banks 
declared a moratorium. By 1994, the number of banks in Estonia decreased from 43 to 
21. The biggest banks included the Social Bank (Eesti Sotsiaalpank), Hansapank, 
UBE, Savings Bank, and NESAB. The BOE used this opportunity to further 
strengthen banking regulations.355  
Nonetheless, this was still not enough because of the insolvency problems of 
the largest bank, the Social Bank, which was the government’s main fiscal agent 
financing the oil and metal trade.356 The root cause of the bank’s problems resulted 
from connected lending to small shell enterprises: the owners were distributing large 
loans among themselves at very low interest rates (Laar 2002: 193, Sorg 1998: 174). 
Although the eventual liquidation of the bank did leave a residual tough message, the 
interim efforts of the BOE to provide liquidity support and to seek other ways of 
saving the bank diluted this message (Fleming 2001: 92). The government used this 
event to adopt a new Credit Institutions Act in December 1994 that further increased 
the BOE’s supervision and enforcement powers. 
Bankers were angry at the decision of monetary authorities to liquidate them. 
They promised that the government would go down in three weeks. But the authorities 
                                                 
355 A condition for renewing banking licenses was to meet a schedule for a gradual rise in minimum 
liquidity capital to 5 million ECU. In 1993, new prudential requirements were established, including 
capital adequacy ratio (8 percent, increased later to 10 percent), liquidity ratio (30 percent), minimum 
equity requirement (15 million Kroons, increased to 35 million Kroons by April 1997), and the 
maximum loan to a client not exceeding 50 percent of the bank’s equity (Sorg 1998: 173-4). 
 
356 In 1993, the Social Bank represented about 20 percent of the country’s total commercial bank assets.  
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were firm and did not want to “waste any cent of state money on saving the banks.”357 
The BOE’s president, Siim Kallas, was also consistently firm in his commitment to 
face interest group pressures to limit the independence of the central bank:358 
Some industrial circles, often connected with the former Soviet nomenklatura, 
have tried to force the Bank of Estonia to issue more kroons without proper 
backing. This could enable them to continue as before the production of 
expensive and low quality goods that have no market. The Bank of Estonia 
will never yield to such pressure. 
 
Nor has the BOE yielded to calls by the Ministry of Justice to overturn the central 
bank law to subordinate it to Estonia's economic policy on the grounds that the 
existing law “turns some functions of executive power over to the BOE” (Staprans 
1994: 9). Although there have been occasional signs of dissent, the Estonian 
Parliament has been supportive of the CB and its implications for monetary policy and 
the BOE’s independence (Buyske 1997: 89).359  
 In sum, with the introduction of the CB, the BOE simultaneously declared its 
unequivocal position that it would not help troubled banks to counter moral hazard 
behavior in which banks counted on government rescues and engaged in consolidation 
and privatization of the banking sector. The BOE refrained from intervention, in spite 
of the fact that the CB allowed well-defined bank rescues as long as its foreign 
reserves remained above base money liabilities, which was the case in the banking 
                                                 
357 Author’s interview with Mart Laar, former Prime Minister of Estonia (1992−1994 and 1999−2002), 
July 19, 2007, Tallinn. 
 
358 "Estonia: Monetary Reform, Hard Style," Interview with Siim Kallas in: The Baltic Review, Vol. 1, 
No. 3, 1993:41. 
 
359 There were some political proposals to unite the state and the central bank budgets that would have 
restricted BOE independence and subordinated it to the government in fall 1993. The likely outcome 
would have been that any surplus in the BOE’s budget would have been available to finance the 
government (Sorg 1994: 10). 
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crisis in 1992−1993 (Hansson 1995: 152). Instead, the Estonian monetary authorities 
choose to close down large incumbent banks, which was a politically bold step for 
showing their resolve to discipline powerful financial interests in order to sustain their 
commitment to the CB.  
The steadfast approach of the BOE and the government in dealing with the 
banks unable to operate on sound principles and laid the groundwork for a competitive 
banking sector. Both domestic and foreign banks had to adjust their behavior early on 
and became supporters of the government’s anti-inflationary crusade and policy of a 
strong kroon. As the Chairman of Hansapank expressed, “On balance, I am in favor of 
the 8:1 [Estonian kroon to Deutsche mark] parity, because currency stability controls 
inflation and encourages time deposits,” even though it hurt the banks by holding back 
the creation of new money.360 
 
Financial Development Phase II: The Second Banking Crisis (1998−1999) 
After being corporatized in 1990 (that is, transformed into joint stock 
companies), most former specialized SOBs were (indirectly) privatized as a result of 
the privatization of their owner enterprises (Barisitz 2002: 87). At the same time, the 
government lifted restrictions on foreign investments in the Estonian banking sector 
(Sorg 1994: 11). While the government allowed foreign strategic investments in the 
banking sector right from the beginning with the intention of privatizing Estonian 
SOBs to well-known foreign banks, there was a lack of interest from foreign 
financiers in the initial stages of the financial reforms. The government in turn, did not 
have financial resources to re-capitalize SOBs to make them more attractive for 
privatization.  
                                                 
360 “New Central Bank Leads the Way.” Euromoney, June 1993: 164. 
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Thus, only a few foreign banks established their operations in Estonia initially. 
There were some early (unsuccessful) foreign bids and a few foreign enterprises 
bought shares in Estonian banks. 361 Nonetheless, the entry of new private banks and 
privatization of parts of former SOBs contributed to a “pluralistic” ownership structure 
already in the initial stages of financial development (Hansson 1995: 157, 161). 
Therefore, although foreign banks were cautious about entering the Estonian banking 
sector in the initial years in spite of liberal policies for foreign direct investment in the 
banking sector, the government’s role in finance declined sharply. In 1996, the EBRD 
reports that the share of assets of SOBs of total banking assets represented only 6.56 
percent. 
In this new institutional environment with strong regulation and competition, 
banks usually did not lobby the BOE directly but tried to find weaknesses in banking 
regulations for profit making opportunities. Although there were some rare occasions 
when banks lobbied for favorable laws like the Deposit Insurance Law, or the 
acquisition of control packets of shares in the enterprises selected for privatization, the 
BOE was able to constrain their ambitions in the end.362 Because enterprise 
privatization progressed fast, among the main supporters and sometimes initiators of 
the banking reforms were newly privatized and private enterprises, whose activities 
were the most severely hindered by the post-Soviet banking system (Sorg 1994: 4).  
                                                 
361 American Bank of the Baltics (Ameerika-Balti Uhispank) with the U.S. owner received a license in 
1992 and INKO Baltic Bank, a subsidiary bank of the Ukrainian bank in 1994. In autumn 1997, the 
German Schleswig-Holstein Landesbank expressed interest in acquiring shares of the Estonian 
Investment Bank (Eesti Investeerimispank) but met the resistance from the management, wishing to 
continue as an investment bank and not to be transformed into a retail bank (Sorg et al. 2004: 266). 
  
362 When the Law on Deposit Insurance was being prepared, the six major banks suggested an 
alternative system, where their contribution tariff would be lower due to their lower risk rate. But this 
proposal contrasted with the BOE’s approach envisaging an equal contribution rate for all banks. 
Although the BOE at the end did not accept the proposal of the largest banks, its draft for this law was 
stuck in the coordination stage for more than two years before it reached the Parliament. Deposit 
Insurance Law finally took effect in October 1998 (Sorg 1998: 176). 
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 In the years following the first banking crisis, Estonian banks started to expand 
their activities into Russia, Ukraine, and other Baltic states, where interest rates and 
profitability were higher, for Western foreign banks were still not interested in 
entering those markets. Hansapank was the most successful in establishing an 
extensive network of subsidiaries in all Baltic countries.363 Estonian banks also started 
to operate in non-banking businesses and established independent investment funds to 
speculate on the domestic securities market because they were too small to operate on 
international financial markets (Sorg and Uiboupin 2002). In contrast to their Czech 
counterparts, Estonian bank investment funds were small players because privatization 
was pursued mostly through direct sales and free bidding, and did not influence bank 
lending policies.364 
The Asian crisis of 1997−1998 and the 1998 Russian crisis represented severe 
tests for the Estonian financial system, its CB and its high degree of openness. The 
burst of a market bubble on the Tallinn Stock Exchange and the pressures on the kroon 
due to contagion from the Asian financial crisis significantly reduced bank profits. 
Several banks started to experience liquidity problems (Sorg and Uibopin 2004: 97). 
Although the 1998 Russian financial crisis did not hit Estonian banks directly because 
they were not heavily invested in Russian debt instruments, they were hurt by the 
general economic slowdown. Therefore, in contrast with the first banking crisis, in 
which the roots of crisis were domestic, the second banking crisis in 1998–1999 was 
of an international nature (Sorg 2000: 406).365  
                                                 
363 In 1996, Hansapank acquired Latvian Bank (Deutsche Lettische Bank), which had defaulted. The 
name of the bank was changed to Hansapank−Latvia. In 2001, Hansapank controlled about a fourth of 
the entire Baltic banking sector in terms of assets (Adahl 2002: 112).  
 
364 Author’s interview with Raul Malmstein, Chairman of the Management Board, Financial 
Supervision Authority, July 17, 2007, Tallinn. 
 
365 On Estonian banking crises, see Berensmann (2002: 233-4). 
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 As before, the BOE reacted to the banking problems with six mergers into 
larger banks, three bank bankruptcies, and continuing bank privatization. Aare Järvan, 
the Head of the Policy Department of the BOE, noted that banks had gotten too 
careless again and that a small crisis suited them well (Sorg and Uiboupin 2004: 101). 
At that time, the BOE had a strong supporter of liberal financial policies at the 
Ministry of Finance, for the former head of the BOE and “father” of the kron Kallas 
took the finance ministry portfolio when Laar returned to the Prime Minister’s seat 
(after losing a vote-of-confidence in 1994). This second wave of bank restructuring 
reduced the number of banks from eleven to six. 
The government also continued to privatize domestic banks to foreign 
investors. The story of the Estonian financial system since the mid-1990s has been one 
of growing involvement of foreign, mainly Scandinavian, banks. Swedish and Finish 
banks took over most Estonian banks. The major Swedish banks, Swedbank and 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (S-E Banken), managed to buy the cheapened shares 
of the two major Estonian banks facing financial difficulties on the stock market 
Hansapank and UBB (59 percent and 32 percent). The Finnish Sampo group acquired 
Optiva Bank (resulting from the merger of the Estonian Investment Bank and 
Forekspank).366  
Thus, while during the first banking crisis, the domestic monetary authorities 
had to resolve bank problems, during the second banking crisis, foreign banks assisted 
in putting the Estonian banking system in order (Sorg and Vensel 2001). By the end of 
the 1990s, the privatization of Estonian SOBs by foreigners was completed. Currently, 
foreign banks control 97 percent of the Estonian banking sector. The state had fully 
dispensed with its majority ownership shares in domestic banks. An open financial 
                                                 
366 Finish banking group Sampo controls 7 percent of the market through ownership of Sampo bank and 
Merita Nordbanken has a branch in Estonia, controlling 6 percent of the market (Sulling 2002: 483). 
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system has been associated with a decrease in nonperforming loans from 3 percent to 
below 2 percent and inflation from nearly 11 percent to 5 percent over the period 
1997−2001 (Adahl 2002). 
The Estonian authorities again used this crisis to reinforce further the 
regulatory and supervisory institutions. The government created a unified (banking, 
insurance and securities market) financial supervision, which was taken over by the 
Estonian Financial Supervision Authority in 2002 following the German model.367 
The takeover of Estonian banks by Swedish and Finnish banking groups was also 
accompanied by substantial capital and liquidity injections and improvements in the 
banks’ supervision and risk management. The foreign ownership of Estonian banks by 
much larger Scandinavian groups has been considered to be an implicit guarantee of 
capital supply and a substitute for a lender of last resort (Adahl 2002: 112).368 
In sum, rapid divestiture of state ownership in the banking as well as in the 
enterprise sector has proved important for developing an open financial system in 
Estonia, based on a formal and arms length relationship between the financial sector 
and the state. The divesture has led to intensified competition, increasingly stronger 
regulation and supervision, improved transparency, and trust building by the banks 
themselves. It quickly decreased profit opportunities from speculative activities, 
                                                 
367 Previously, financial supervision was carried out by three institutions. The Banking Supervision 
Department of the BOE performed the supervision of credit institutions. Supervision of the insurance 
sector was undertaken by the Insurance Supervisory Authority, a financially independent organization 
under jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. The securities market was supervised by the Securities 
Inspectorate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. Author’s interview with Raul Malmstein, 
Chairman of the Management Board, Financial Supervision Authority, July 17, 2007, Tallinn. See, also 
Eesti Pank (2001). 
 
368 On the other hand, supervisory authorities in Estonia and in the Scandinavian countries can be faced 
with a “too small to fail” problem. Since the Estonian banks are very small compared to the parent 
banks, they do not pose any threat to financial stability in the country of the parent banks. Therefore, the 
supervisory authorities in the parent banks’ country have weak national incentive to assume 
responsibility for supervising the systemic risks in Estonia, despite the fact that the parent banks are 
expected to take responsibility for an eventual systemic crisis. This enhances the need of the Estonian 
supervisory authorities to keep track of the financial strength of parent banks (Adahl 2002).  
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disciplined bank behavior and enabled the BOE to strengthen its independence and 
credibility.  
Bulgaria 
The Inconsistent Path to Economic Reforms (1991−1996) 
In contrast to the rather cumulative reform trajectory of Estonia, the financial 
crisis of 1996−1997 divided Bulgaria’s experience with economic transition into two 
contrasting periods, both associated with different exchange rate policies. A pro-
Soviet atmosphere of Bulgarian communism and the absence of strong opposition left 
the population largely unprepared for radical economic reforms.369 The inherently 
vulnerable macroeconomic context was further compounded by political instability 
and the nature of the country’s distributional conflicts. 
The absence of a strong opposition in 1989 led to a political victory of the ex-
communists—the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)—in the first free elections in June 
1990 with Andrei Lukanov as Prime Minister.370 As a concession to the opposition, 
the leader of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), Zhelyu Zhelev, its Chairman and 
Bulgaria’s leading dissident, became the first democratically elected president.371 The 
BSP promised to carry out a protectionist program, but the first Socialist government 
was unable to decide on and implement any coherent set of economic reform policies 
                                                 
369 Author’s interview with Veselin Mintchev, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, 
June 27, 2007, Sofia. 
 
370 The political change in Bulgaria began on November 10, 1989, when the communist leader Todor 
Zivkov was ousted in a palace coup after his eighteen-year rule. The communist party was renamed the 
BSP in January 1990. In June 1990 elections, the BSP gained an absolute majority of 211 of 400 seats 
(Vachudova 2005: 42). 
 
371 The first elected socialist President, Petar Mladenov, had to resign soon after the elections, when it 
was shown that at the height of the December 14, 1989 demonstrations, he had said to an aide: “It’s 
time to send in the tanks.” Author’s interview with Georgy Ganev, Program Director for Economic 
Research, Center for Liberal Studies, June 29, 2007, Sofia. See also Koford (2000). 
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(Koford 2000: 324).372 The second elections in October 1991 brought a small plurality 
in the parliament to the UDF, which formed a minority government supported by the 
ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF).373 The UDF-led 
government of Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov was largely responsible for 
implementating the initial liberalization reforms (table 6.3). It embarked on economic 
reforms in February 1991 when it launched a stabilization program, attached to the 
one-year stand-by-agreement with the IMF, similar to the one adopted in Poland in 
1990 and in Czechoslovakia in 1991 (Dobrinsky 2000: 583).374 The reform program 
envisaged the reduction of the budget deficit, the unification of the exchange rate, and 
the attainment of a current account surplus. 
Price liberalization led to high inflation that reached 474 percent at the end of 
1991 (Berleman, Hristov, and Nenovsky 2002: 18). Notwithstanding, in contrast to 
Poland and Czechoslovakia and in spite of high inflation, Bulgarian authorities 
adopted a managed float regime and a money-based stabilization program. In 
1990−1991, the main proponents of the Estonian CB, Stephen Hanke and a team of 
U.S. economists suggested a CB (with the currency pegged to a basket of goods and 
not to a foreign currency) as the initial exchange rate regime to the Bulgarian 
authorities, as well. This proposal was rejected by the IMF, however, which was 
 
                                                 
372 Lukanov resigned under the influence of mass protests and the interim non-partisan government led 
by Dimitar Popov was nominated by UDF. Popov delayed some economic reforms by focusing 
predominantly on a new constitution (Stone 2002: 211). 
 
373 The UDF that grouped historic social democratic and Christian democratic parties, ecological 
movements, a trade union, religious, and human rights groups, announced its existence on November 
23, 1989. In the second elections, the UDF won 110 seats, the BSP 106, and the MRF 24 (Vachudova 
2005: 40). 
 
374 Bulgaria signed its first stand-by agreement with the IMF in February 1991. It consisted of two 
tranches: the first in the amount of 394 million U.S. dollars and the second in the amount of 131 million 
U.S. dollars (Wyzan 1998: 13). 
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Table 6.3: Governments in Bulgaria, 1990−2002 
Duration of 
Government 




















Zhan Videnov Bulgarian Socialist 
Party 
Majority 
12 February 12, 
1997−May 20, 1997 
Stefan Sofianski Union of Democratic 
Forces 
 
May 21, 1997−July 
23, 2001 




reluctant to support the CB that would not be fully backed by foreign reserves as well 
as by the Bulgarian National Bank (Blgarska Narodna Banka, BNB). BNB Governor 
Todor Vulchev, elected in January 1991, provided the limited foreign exchange 
reserves as the main reason behind the decision to float (table 6.5). High indebtedness 
and debt moratorium were cited as additional factors by the CB opponents.375 
The initial choice of the currency regime was, however, a political issue, not 
simply a matter of insufficient international reserves. A float was a desirable regime 
arrangement for powerful financial interests because they favored inflation instead of 
stable money and prices, and were thus unwilling to support restrictive monetary 
policy.376 A flexible regime allowed the central bank to continue its policy of high 
inflation. A genuine commitment to price stability would have needed to be supported 
                                                 
375 Author’s interview with Lena Roussenova, former Member of the Governing Council of the BNB, 
June 22, 2007, Sofia. See, also Hanke and Schuler (1991). 
 




by a more rigid exchange rate arrangement such as a fixed regime or CB, as former 
Chief Economist of the BNB, Lubomir Christov (1997: 140) underlines. However, in 
contrast with Estonia, a political will to commit to a more rigid exchange rate or to 
price stability was missing in Bulgaria. A flexible regime also allowed the government 
to pursue a policy of depreciated currency to support uncompetitive state-owned 
enterprises as well as to depreciate government and bank debts.377 Prior to the 
1996−1997 crisis, no Bulgarian government tried to implement anti-inflationary 
policies based on a credible fixed exchange regime. Exchange rate and monetary 
policies remained dominated by incumbent government banks and enterprises, which 




Source: Bulgarian National Bank. 
 
Figure 6.1: Quarterly average inflation, June 1992–December 2006  
 
                                                 




In a similar vein, no Bulgarian government was able to develop and implement 
a clear policy of bank and industry privatization, either. Although Prime Minister 
Dimitrov promised that his UDF-led government would be the “government of 
privatization,” the UDF was unwilling to compromise with the MRF and the BSP. 
Instead, it opted for the repeated bailouts of financially problematic state-owned 
enterprises and banks through BNB credits (Stone 2002: 213).  
The privatization process was subject to sharp political controversies. Except 
for some special pieces of legislation passed in 1992, including the Transformation 
and Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises Law, and the establishment of the 
Privatization Agency (subordinated to the Council of Ministers) little, if any, progress 
in privatization was achieved in the early years of transition. Instead, members of the 
former communist nomenklatura conducted an informal “quiet” and “illegal” 
privatization, attempting to divert to their private ownership a part of the state assets 
under their managerial control (Frydman, Rapaczynski, Earle et al. 1993: 24–35).378 
Only 5−7 percent of state enterprise assets were privatized between 1992−1997 
(Miller and Petranov 2000: 227).  
It has been argued that the fundamental disagreements over privatization 
between the BSP and UDF, rather than the obstruction of the socialists, caused 
delayed privatization of banks and industries (Barnes 2007: 80–81). Ironically, the 
BSP and UDF were arguing for mass privatization on opposite ideological positions 
than their counterparts in the Czech Republic. While in the Czech Republic radical 
                                                 
378 “Quiet” privatization relies on legislation, which do not provide for open and public divestiture of 
state property, while “illegal” privatization involves breaching existing legislation. For example, 
according to Article 13 of Decree No. 56 on Economic Activity, which was in force between May and 
August 1990, the management of state-owned enterprises was allowed to sell “fixed assets to physical 
and juridical bodies” without specifically defined auction procedures. These sales resulted in an 
extensive transfer of state property to private enterprises and individuals belonging to the networks of 
communist nomenklatura (Frydman, Rapaczynski, Earle, et al 1993: 34-35). 
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neoliberal reformers of the Klaus right wing party pushed for voucher privatization, in 
Bulgaria, it was the socialists who underlined its egalitarian character. The right-wing 
UDF was concerned that mass privatization would create widely dispersed ownership 
and weak governance of newly privatized enterprises, and thus favored a slower, 
direct sales approach. However, a very limited cash privatization occurred before 
1996. In addition to inter-party conflicts over the proper course of privatization, an 
additional reason for delayed privatization was that one of the key partners of the UDF 
coalition was the trade union Podkrepa, whose leadership strongly opposed 
privatization because it feared that it would lead to termination of subsidized wages 
and liquidation of enterprises (Stone 2002: 230).379 
When the economic situation started to deteriorate rapidly, privatizing and 
liquidating inefficient enterprises became more urgent as a way to solve the problem 
of lack of public confidence in government. Therefore, the BSP government launched 
the first wave of a voucher privatization program in January 1995 to provide the 
population with pieces of property (Table 6.4).380 Although patterned on the Czech 
mass privatization, the design of the Bulgarian program differed in several aspects, 
benefiting from its later implementation when some of the deficiencies of the Czech 
program started to become visible.381  
                                                 
379 The Podkrepa confederation of trade unions, founded in 1990, played a crucial role in bringing down 
the BSP Lukanov government in 1990 and helped to force the resignation of another BSP government 
led by Videnov in 1996-1997, as described below (Sharman 2004: 807). 
 
380 Vouchers were sold to citizens over 18 for a nominal fee of 500 lev (per capita monthly wages at the 
time were about 9,800 lev). Vouchers were transferable to privatization funds that could use them to bid 
in national auctions. Although more than one-fourth of state enterprises participated in the first 
privatization wave, most large enterprises were only partially privatized and the state retained majority 
control (Miller and Petranov 2000: 227-228). 
 
381 The following description of the differences between the Czech and Bulgarian voucher privatization 
is based on Miller and Petranov (2000: 228-234) and Koleva and Vincensini (2002). For a detailed 
examination of Bulgarian privatization, see also Pamouktchiev, Parvulov, and Petranov (1997).  
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First, banks were not privatized in the mass privatization program. While they 
sponsored nineteen investment privatization funds (IPFs), they did not pay much 
attention to the voucher program, for many of them started to experience severe 
liquidity problems (Miller and Petranov 2000: 231). Second, before implementing the 
voucher program, Bulgarian authorities established strict regulatory institutions for 
licensing and monitoring investment privatization funds, including the Securities and 
Stock Exchange Commission to oversee and regulate new stock markets.382 
Funds were not allowed to be invested in one another without special 
permission. Legal restrictions were established that prohibited banks or enterprises 
with more than 50 percent state ownership to found or to become shareholders in 
privatization funds. Because banks were not included in voucher privatization, IPFs 
were not allowed to own the banks. These measures prevented cross-ownership webs 
among banks, enterprises, and the state that arose in Czech lands. Third, although 
foreigners were not permitted to bid directly in the auctions, they acquired control of 
enterprises by buying shares directly from IPF representatives who were present at the 
auctions (Miller 2006: 19).383 
 
 
                                                 
382 As a result, the number of privatization funds in Bulgaria (81) was much smaller than in the Czech 
Republic (over 400), mainly because of stricter registration requirements. 
 
383 In the original mass privatization program, a second wave similar to the first one was envisaged but 
the 1996−1997 financial crisis stopped the process. The post-crisis UDF government resisted mass 
privatization. The second wave finally began in July 1998 but on a much smaller scale than the first. 
The majority of privatization funds established during the first wave were converted to investment 
holding companies (76 out of 81) and their shares are traded on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange. 
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No. of citizens eligible (ml.) 6.5 7.6 7.6 
No. of participating citizens (ml.) 3.0 5.9 6.2 
Participating/eligible ratio (%) 47.0 77.6 81.6 
Number of voucher books 
transferred to private funds (ml) 
2.4 4.3 3.9 
Number of voucher books 
transferred/total number ratio (%) 
80.5 72.8 62.9 
Number of investment privatization 
funds 
81 265 350 













Cross-ownership between banks and 
funds 
Discouraged by 





Source: Miller and Petranov (2000: 229), Koleva and Vincensini (2002: 85). 
 
The delay of privatization created a power vacuum and allowed rent seeking 
by enterprise managers and state officials. The Bulgarian authorities did not impose 
hard budget constraints on the activities of state-owned enterprises, which 
accumulated payment arrears and continued to subsist on generous government 
subsidies and credits from the central bank (Dobrinsky 2000: 588). 
 
Financial Development Prior to 1996: the “Credit Millionaires” 
During most of the communist period, all banking functions were the 
responsibility of the BNB, a monobank created by a nationalization process in 1947 in 
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which all existing commercial banks were merged.384 The BNB was under direct 
control of the Council of Ministers. Besides the BNB, there were only two other banks 
during the communist period: the State Savings Bank (Durzhavna Spestovna Kasa, 
DSK), the only bank allowed to hold the accounts of individuals, and the Bulgarian 
Foreign Trade Bank (now Bulbank), which was in charge of all foreign exchange 
operations for the country. Late in the socialist period (mid-1980s), the government 
introduced changes in the financial sector that created rent-seeking opportunities for a 
group of politically connected entrepreneurs and party officials who quickly infiltrated 
the newly developed banking system (Stanchev 2001: 3).385 In 1987, specialized, 
sector-specific banks were created, each restricted to lending to a particular sector (the 
chemical industry and transportation, for example), including Biohim, Elektronika, 
Transportna Banka, Zemedelska i Kooperativna Banka, Transportan Technika (later 
Balkanbank), Stroibank, and Stopanska Banka (Miller and Petranov 2001: 11). These 
banks were owned by sectoral ministries, the largest enterprises in their sectors, and 
the BNB, which initially owned a controlling share in each bank (Barnes 2007: 77). 
Following the political changes of 1989, the banking system was transformed 
into a two-tier system of the central bank and commercial banks. Sectoral banks were 
transformed into classical commercial banks. Simultaneously, the existing 59 branches 
of the BNB were transformed into autonomous banks. As a result, in early 1991, the 
banking system was comprised of the BNB, DSK, and 69 commercial banks organized 
                                                 
384 The BNB was established in 1897. The first governor of the BNB was an official at the Ministry of 
Finance in Russia. Initially the BNB was not allowed to issue the currency. The BNB was not able to 
adhere strictly to the gold standard due to the lack of sufficient gold reserves as well as the episodes of 
inflationary financing of the first and second world wars. The Banking Law of 1947 introduced state 
monopoly over banking activities. For the history of the BNB, see Avramov (1999). 
385 In 1981, Bulgarian government established Mineralbank to provide credits to newly created small 
and medium enterprises. Many of those enterprises were part of a web established by the government to 
trade with the West: they were selling raw materials and energy bought at subsidized CMEA prices on 
the international market. The profits from price differentials were used to buy goods that Western 
governments had embargoed against the communist bloc (Stanchev 2001). These enterprises were also 
heavily borrowing from foreign private banks, and thus contributed to the rising government foreign 
debt in the 1980s (Barnes 2007: 76-77). 
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as joint stock companies (Caporale et al. 2002: 224). However, the initial reforms of 
the banking sector took place in the absence of laws and regulations because the Law 
on Banks and Credit Activity that established a regulatory framework for bank 
activities was adopted only in 1992. 
At the beginning of 1992, the Bank Consolidation Company, administered by 
the BNB and the Ministry of Finance, was established with the mission to consolidate, 
restructure, and privatize undercapitalized SOBs. Three bank consolidation waves 
were conducted between 1992 and 1995, reducing the number of SOBs from about 
seventy to around ten by the mid-1990s (Barnes 2007: 82). The largest SOBs created 
during this process were the United Bulgarian Bank (UBB), Expressbank, and 
Hebrosbank.386 After completing the consolidation process, there were 35 banks in 
Bulgaria; however, the banking sector remained dominated by SOBs (Berlemann, 
Hristov, and Nenovsky 2002: 22).  
Not a single government bank was privatized during the 1991−1995 period 
(Miller and Petranov 2001: 13). SOBs did not act like traditional banks but rather as 
government offices used to distribute political loans to loss-making state-owned 
enterprises.387 Ministers and their deputies were on the boards of SOBs, so they were 
able to push for their preferred policies through SOBs.388 Because SOBs served as 
“cash cows,” both the government and state-owned enterprises were against bank 
                                                 
386 In the first wave in 1992, Doverie Commercial Bank, Stoibank, and twenty smaller banks merged to 
create UBB. The second wave of consolidation took place in 1993, during which twelve SOBs were 
united in Ekspressbank and eight banks merged into Hebrosbank (Barnes 2007: 82). In 1995, Biochim 
Commercial Bank took over Sofiabank. 
 
387 Author’s interview with Roumen Avramov, former Member of the Managing Board of the BNB 
(1997−2002) and Economic Advisor to the President of the Republic of Bulgaria (1990−1991), June 24, 
2007, Sofia. 
 
388 Author’s interview with Emil Harsev, former Deputy Governor of the BNB, July 2, 2007, Sofia. 
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privatization.389 As Kalin Hristov recalls, “The Bulgarian governments on the left and 
right held the view that the banks were the jewels of the economy. They did not want 
to sell banks for nickels… But banks have proven to be rather fake jewels.”390 
Officially, financial reform measures were intended to spur competition and 
decentralization but instead they led to illegal and hidden privatization of banks 
(unregulated and illegal transfer of capital from state to private hands), particularly 
during Berov’s UDF administration (1992−1994) (Peev 2002).391 Although no 
legislative procedure existed for selling off the shares of banks, some banks increased 
their capital by issuing new shares and selling them immediately to private individuals 
who were closely related to the insiders’ networks. Meanwhile, the BNB and DSK 
provided the financial resources for these capital expansions (Dobrinsky 1994: 334). 
Many private banks were created by individuals who wanted to use bank funds to 
finance their personal business activities. In many instances, the financial resources 
needed to establish such private banks were borrowed from SOBs. While large loans 
to bank managers and owners were restricted by law, the regulation was not enforced 
(Miller and Petranov 2001: 15). The owners of newly created private banks like Credit 
Bank, Kristalbank, First Private Bank, and Mollov Bank used the regulatory vacuum 
to “decapitalize” SOBs and transfer capital to their banks (Peev 2002: 24).392 Anyone 
                                                 
389 Author’s interview with Lubomir Christov, former Chief Economist and Member of the Managing 
Board of the BNB (1991−1994), June 29, 2007, Sofia. 
 
390 Author’s interview with Kalin Hristov, Advisor to the Governor of the BNB, June 21 and 27, 2007, 
Sofia. 
 
391 Lyuben Berov, Economic Advisor to President Zhelev was nominated to lead another nonpartisan 
government after the collapse of the Dimitrov’s administration, for neither UDF nor BSP was able to 
form a government. The government led by Dimitrov did not have a cohesive focus and was not able to 
make any important decision without the support of all three parliamentary blocks that supported him. 
A scandal involving arms exports to Yugoslavia led to a vote of confidence in October 1992, which 
Dimitrov’s cabinet did not pass. 
 
392 The infamous businessman Valentin Mollow used money from the government owned DSK to 
create his own First Private Bank, and then took a loan from this new bank to establish another private 
bank, Mollow Commercial Bank (Barness 2007: 78-82). 
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with political connections could establish a bank. By the end of 1992, there were 56 
banks in Bulgaria, many with low capitalization levels. At first sight, the expansion of 
the number of private banks resembled improved competition. In reality, a liberal 
licensing regime, low capital requirements, and weak regulation led to the 
proliferation of new private banks with political connections.393 Both SOBs and new 
private banks were dependent on personal relations with the BNB and the 
government.394 
 In addition to banks, powerful financial-industrial conglomerates, such as 
Multigrup, Orion, Olimp, Tron, and Euronergy, emerged. In 1993, the most influential 
economic groups created Group-13 with explicit political objectives to influence the 
economic policy of the government to obtain regulatory protection from foreign 
competition, allowing them to establish a monopolistic position in energy, transport, 
military industry, and chemicals (Peev 2002: 116). The most powerful member of 
Group-13 was Multigroup, which in 1994 had over 3,500 employees in at least fifty 
enterprises including a bank, insurance company, the country’s most active stock 
exchange, and a sugar plant (Barnes 2007: 78).395 These financial-industrial groups 
benefited from extensive political connections and banking sector liberalization in 
order to take over banks, flout supervision laws, and siphon the assets from the most 
profitable state enterprises into private hands, mainly during the Berov administration 
                                                                                                                                            
 
393 The capital requirement for licensing a commercial bank was 500 thousand U.S. dollars and there 
were no regulatory prerequisites concerning the origins of the funds (Vincelette 2001). 
 
394 Author’s interview with Lubomir Christov, former Chief Economist and Member of the Managing 
Board of the BNB (1991−1994), June 29, 2007, Sofia.  
 
395 Also, author’s interview with Ivan Mihalev, Financial Journalist, Capital Weekly, June 25, 2007, 
Sofia. For a detailed empirical analysis of Multigroup, see Ganev (2001). Multigroup’s leader, former 
wrestler Ilja Pavlov became the richest man in Bulgaria. 
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(Koford 2000: 326, Stone 2002: 214).396 The groups engaged in a so-called “economy 
of transfer.”397 Consequently, most productive enterprise assets passed into private 
hands, and the state was left with the debt-ridden, failing ones. Moreover, the 
government often continued to subsidize these rent-seeking private enterprises. 
Incumbent banks, both SOBs and private, were able to exploit loopholes in the 
law for profit making opportunities. Although the BNB had issued prudential 
regulations in a number of areas including bank licensing, bank liquidity, and capital 
adequacy, it failed to enforce these regulations strictly (Christov 1997: 133). Banks 
were lobbying BNB and the government for national protection from foreign 
competition, arguing that they needed time to become viable in order to survive harsh 
international competition.398 The Bulgarian authorities were responsive to the banks’ 
demands, so they prohibited foreign banks from entering the market right from the 
outset of the financial reforms. This restriction policy on foreign bank entry was 
pursued until 1995.399  
In this weak institutional environment, political insiders, the so-called “credit 
millionaires,” including government banks and enterprises, crony private banks and 
                                                 
396 The patron of Multigroup, Andrei Lukanov served in the foreign trade establishment during the 
Zhivkov era, and then became Prime Minister in the early 1990s. Later, the group developed ties with 
the Berov government, which was nicknamed the “Multigroup government.” Group Olimp also 
benefited from its ties to UDF, while ORION developed political ties with the Videnov socialist 
government (Barnes 2007). 
 
397 Author’s interview with Petar Ignatiev, UBB Economist, formerly in the Banking Supervision 
Department of the BNB, June 25, 2007, Sofia; author’s interview with Ivan Mihalev, Financial 
Journalist, Capital Weekly, June 25, 2007, Sofia. 
 
398 Author’s interview with Martin Zaimov, former Deputy Governor of the BNB and Chairman of the 
Currency Board (1997−2000), June 28, 2007, Sofia. 
 
399 In 1994, five years after the start of banking reform, only two branches of foreign banks started 
operations in Bulgaria, Greek Xios and Dutch ING Bank. In 1995, two additional foreign banks, BNP-
Dresdner Bank and Ionian Bank opened branches in Bulgaria. After the government rescinded its ban 
on branches of foreign banks, several Bulgarian and Russian institutions created the Bulgarian-Russian 
Investment Bank (with 50−50 Bulgarian and Russian ownership) that later changed its name to Bulbank 
(Koford and Tschoegl 2003: 18). 
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enterprises, financial-industrial groups, and individuals belonging to the communist-
capitalist web, benefited from extended political connections with political parties and 
the government to quickly enrich themselves on the account of the population (Peev 
2002: 17).400  
Newly emerging private banks, replicating the behavior of SOBs, were not 
supporters of monetary and financial stability. Instead, they acted like the Ponzi 
schemes.401 Both types of incumbent banks were inflationary forces in the Bulgarian 
economy. They profited from the inflationary environment by paying negative interest 
rates on deposits and earning positive interest rates on credits.402 Given high inflation, 
real deposit rates were highly negative throughout 1991−1993 and deposits were rising 
rapidly, resulting in an outflow of real income from depositors to banks (Dobrinsky 
1994: 50).  
In contrast with the Czech Republic, the government and the managers of 
incumbent banks followed an “explicit” contract based on direct political instructions. 
In one instance, in spring 1995, the Minister of Finance said that state-owned 
enterprises should not bother with paying debt to banks but instead they should 
concentrate on the production.403 Incumbent banks took active part in this process by 
providing loans to enterprises, which did not have intention to repay their debt, 
making these loans implicit subsidies. Banks also engaged in reckless lending to their 
cronies. As a result, the level of bad loans soared: “[u]ntil 1996, commercial credit 
                                                 
400 A “credit millionaire” is an individual or an enterprise that has made money by failing to service 
bank loans (Vincelette 2001: 26). 
 
401 Author’s interview with Kalin Hristov, Advisor to the Governor of the BNB, June 21 and 27, 2007, 
Sofia. 
 
402 Author’s interview with Nikolay Nenovsky, Member of the Governing Council of the BNB, June 26, 
2007, Sofia. 
 
403 Author’s interview with Georgy Ganev, Program Director for Economic Research, Center for 
Liberal Studies, June 29, 2007, Sofia. 
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was expanded to the nonfinancial sector in Bulgaria to a degree that was 
unprecedented relative to any other European transition economy” (OECD 1999: 32). 
More than 74 percent of total bank loans were nonperforming by 1995 (Miller and 
Petranov 2001: 13). While high inflation was wiping out some of the banks’ bad loans, 
many of these loans were denominated in foreign currency, and thus the inflation 
actually increased the debt burden of enterprises (Caporale 2002: 231). 
The banks, overburdened with bad loans, were repeatedly refinanced by the 
BNB on a completely subjective and discretionary basis. The unconditional support 
for banks by monetary authorities encouraged them to take on even greater risks.404 
The most striking example of bailing out problematic banks was a special program 
that replaced bad loans for enterprises with government bonds. In December 1993, 
after heated political debates throughout the year, the Berov government introduced 
so-called ZUNK bonds, 25-year government debt instruments, which replaced debt 
contracted before 1991 that had not been serviced for 180 days (Wyzan 1998: 8).405 
These government securities were designed as quasi convertible: banks could have 
exchanged them for stakes in to-be privatized state-owned enterprises at face value via 
“debt for equity” swaps and use them as collateral for central bank financing 
(Dobrinsky 1994: 54 and 2000: 590). In 1996, under the so-called “Bulbank scheme,” 
the Ministry of Finance paid Bulbank (a legal successor of the Bulgarian Foreign 
Trade Bank) 200 million U.S. dollars for ZUNK bonds with a face value of 400 
                                                 
404 The first attempt to solve the bad-loans problem was in 1987 when the government decided to 
reschedule, until 1990, overdue investment credits of industrial enterprises accumulated since 1986. The 
same approach was applied to agricultural producers, but their credits were rescheduled until the end of 
1992 (Caporale 2002: 232). 
 
405 Various other forms of bank refinancing involving domestic and foreign currency were used 
including discount refinancing with private securities as collateral, Lombard refinancing with 
government securities as collateral, and unsecured refinancing (deposit facilities and later arrears) 
(Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003: 10). 
 257 
million U.S. dollars. These bonds were then distributed as capital contributions to the 
banks (Jotev 1998: 3). 
Not only the central bank but also DSK, the bank with the biggest household 
deposit base, directed by both BNB and the Ministry of Finance, was also active in 
refinancing other banks on the interbank market. The DSK Bank was also one of the 
principal buyers of government securities, so it was actually functioning like the 
central bank (Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003: 10). The series of unconditional 
bailouts of state-owned enterprises and banks during the period 1991−1996 created a 
vicious circle. While the problem with bad loans persisted because new bad credits 
continued to emerge, increasing amounts of public money were required to be 
wastefully distributed in the system (Dobrinsky 2000: 588).  
 
The Bulgarian National Bank: Lender of First Resort  
At the center of the Bulgarian clientelistic system of finance was the BNB and 
Vulchev, its governor. While the 1991 Law on the BNB granted the central bank 
substantial de jure independence, in practice it was subordinate to the government’s 
political guidance and captured by financial and industrial interests.406 The 
government was systematically trying to influence the BNB’s interest rate policy, 
requesting BNB to adjust credit ceilings upwards to individual banks and to provide 
credits to specific sectors (Christov 1997: 147).  
                                                 
406 The BNB scored higher on the Cukierman, Webb, and Nyapti (1992) index of legal independence 
than some industrial countries, like Belgium in 1980-1989. However, its actual independence was 
below the median (Christov 1997: 140). Ganev joked that the appropriate measure of de facto central 
bank independence in Bulgaria should be the number of calls from politicians to the BNB that get 
answered. Author’s interview with Georgy Ganev, Program Director for Economic research, Center for 
Liberal Strategies, June 29, 2007, Sofia. Others claimed that the BNB was granted only “a conditional 
independence” from the government. Author’s interview with Boris Petrov, Head of Analysis Division 
Treasury of the BNB, June 28, 2007, Sofia. 
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An even more constraining effect on central bank independence was the Law 
of Budget, superseding the Law on the BNB in the hierarchy of laws that required the 
central bank to print money for unsecured credit to finance up to 50 percent of the 
approved budget deficit for the current year (Nenovsky and Rizopoulos 2003: 920, 
Christov 1997: 143). The government also regularly rolled over limited advances, 
which had to be paid off before the end of the fiscal year. So, while in 1992, 94 
percent of the budget deficit was monetized, the direct BNB lending covered already 
121 percent of central government borrowing in 1994 (Christov 1997: 143–4). The 
Ministry of Finance regularly took budget financing from the BNB via different 
channels including direct loans, sales of government securities to the central bank, and 
sales of government securities to commercial banks.407 This high level of monetization 
reflected lack of fiscal discipline and redistribution of state resources through the 
banks (Ganev et al. 2001: 26). 
The people in charge of the BNB’s banking supervision department were 
closely connected to the management circles of major state enterprises and banks 
(Wyzan 1998: 31), and the outcome of this capture of the central bank was lax 
banking supervision and discretionary refinancing to commercial banks. The BNB 
acted as the “lender of first resort” rather than a lender of last resort (Berlemann, 
Hristov, and Nenovsky 2002: 24). When the government faced resistance to its 
demands to finance political banks, it simply changed BNB’s management. A 
prominent example of this approach was when Emil Harsev, the Deputy Governor in 
charge of banking sector regulations and lending to banks was removed by a vote of 
Parliament in July 1993. This act clearly violated the provision of the central bank law 
                                                 
407 Due to its role in refinancing banks, some called the BNB the “Ministry of Banking.” Interestingly, 
the BNB was not subordinate to the Ministry of Finance but directly to the Prime Minister. Author’s 
interview with Petar Ignatiev, UBB Economist, formerly in the Banking Supervision Department of the 
BNB, June 25, 2007, Sofia. 
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regulating office terms for its governor and deputy governors. There were also a 
number of internal conflicts between Vulchev, the BNB Governor, who enjoyed close 
political links with the government, and the rest of the Governing Board over bank 
reform delays and central bank financing of the government and domestic private 
banks (Christov 1997: 146).  
At times the BNB tried to resist government attempts to infringe on its 
independence. For example, when the Ministry of Finance stopped paying interest on 
government debt to the BNB in mid-1992, the central bank reacted by imposing a 
temporary halt on extending advances and transfers of funds to the Ministry of 
Finance. This action provoked an intense conflict between these two institutions. 
Nonetheless, the dispute was eventually settled to the detriment of central bank 
independence. In other instances of conflict, though, the BNB prevailed. In order to 
limit the ad hoc requirements of the Parliament and the government to lend to 
individual banks, the BNB started to require government guarantees for these loans, 
which have proven to be a quite successful strategy (Christov 1997).  
The main goal of the central bank, legislatively defined in the 1991 Law on the 
BNB (Article 2) was “to take actions to maintain the internal and external stability of 
the national monetary unit.” While monetary austerity was the essence of the declared 
stabilization policy, the de facto monetary policy of the central bank was rather 
accommodating, and thus compromised economic stabilization (Dobrinsky 2000: 
586). As Christov (1997: 40) claims, “Price and exchange rate stability [were] among 
the bank’s objectives, but not first priority… Concerns over liquidity problems of 
some large banks, however, have too often taken precedence in monetary policy 
decisions.”  
Expansive political lending led to a rapidly growing money supply. The entire 
pre-1997 environment was pro-inflationary. The Bulgarian authorities did not allow 
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foreign investors into the banking sector, which could have disciplined inflationary 
behavior of the government and its cronies. In contrast with the Estonian central bank, 
the BNB did not have the power to liquidate banks when they became insolvent. It 
was difficult for the BNB to force bank closures because the banks appealed the 
decisions in courts (Caporale et al. 2002: 228). Gradually, the BNB was losing control 
over the reserve and money supply sources.  
In exchange rate policy, the BNB initially tried to maintain a policy of nominal 
exchange rate stability by pursuing a high interest rate monetary policy. But it was 
habitually attempting to pursue two mutually exclusive goals. The central bank often 
acted as a “firefighter.”408 On the one hand it tried to maintain stability for domestic 
currency but on the other, it provided bailouts to banks with liquidity problems, which 
put pressure on the exchange rate because the refinancing of banks added to the 
demand for foreign exchange. As a result, the BNB’s interventions in international 
financial markets were inconsistent: at times it intervened in an often futile attempt to 
prevent the lev’s decline, but at other times it intervened in the opposite direction, 
presumably to build up foreign reserves (Dobrinsky 2000: 596). 
The foreign exchange market was characterized by strong fluctuations. While 
Bulgaria adopted a full float initially, in 1992−1993 the BNB pursued a managed float 
and kept it until 1994. In 1995−1996, the regime approached a full float again due to a 
substantial loss of foreign exchange reserves. The government forced the BNB to 
prevent the appreciation of the exchange rate and to keep it at the 18−28 lev per one 
U.S. dollar level to facilitate the development of state-owned enterprises.409 Roumen 
                                                 
408 Author’s interview with Lubomir Christov, former Chief Economist and Member of the Managing 
Board of the BNB (1991−1994), June 29, 2007, Sofia. 
 




Gechev, the Minister of Economic Development, often complained that the exchange 
rate depreciated slowly.410 In 1993, the BNB reduced the basic interest rate twice, 
responding to government pressure that anticipated a high budget deficit at the end of 
the year and that wanted to inflate it away. The interest rate reductions triggered a 
flight from the lev and the nominal exchange depreciated by about 50 percent against 
the U.S. dollar in March 1994.411 The resulting exchange rate helped boost exports and 
contributed to a positive trade balance value of 121 billion U.S. dollars for the first 
time in fifteen years (Minassian 1998: 332–334). Still, this depreciation was gradually 
absorbed by rising inflation, which by the end of 1994 exceeded 120 percent 
(Balyozov 1999: 8).  
The BNB (and some of its senior managers) coalesced with the government, 
state-owned enterprises, and banks in speculative operations related to exchange rate 
movements. According to Hristina Vucheva, former Minister of Economy and Finance 
(quoted in Nenovsky and Rizopoulos 2003: 935, fn. 44), in 1994 “every weekend 
there was an attack on the cash market, an agreement was reached among several 
banks and the exchange rate was changed in the direction of lev devaluation to ensure 
safe profits for the players. Then the BNB intervened, buying expensive dollars and so 
on and so forth till the next hit.”  
In fact, it is argued that the 1994 sharp lev depreciation was pushed by 
powerful financial and industrial lobbies like Multigroup.412 When the government 
provided banks with liquidity, it usually invested these funds in foreign currencies to 
                                                 
410 Author’s interview with George Chobanov, Vice-Dean and Professor of Economics, Faculty of 
Economics and Business, St. Kliment Ohridski University, June 27, 2007, Sofia. 
 
411 The lev fell from 32.71 of the U.S. dollar at the end of 1993 to 55.59 at the end of May 1994, with 
the sharpest declines in January and March 1994 (Wyzan 1998: 21). 
 
412 Author’s interview with Georgy Ganev, Program Director for Economic Research, Center for 
Liberal Studies, June 29, 2007, Sofia. 
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profit from currency speculations.413 Banks generated large profits from large 
exchange rate fluctuations and currency depreciation. Banks also took excessive risks 
in maintaining large credit exposures in foreign currencies that were not subject to any 
regulation (Dobrinsky 2000: 585). Georgy Ganev aptly describes the rent-seeking 
behavior of incumbent banks during the pre-1996 period414: 
 
Banks were opportunistic, risk-taking, and speculating at the expense of tax 
payers. They were issuing bad debts to themselves and engaged in currency 
speculations, taking long positions and converting domestic assets into foreign 
currency…floating also enabled the banks to earn rents from exchange rate 
manipulations… There was a huge moral hazard problem in the banking 
sector. 
 
The 1996−1997 Banking and Currency Crisis 
The popularity of Berov’s government decreased in March 1994 when the lev 
crashed. The BSP won a solid majority in the elections of December 1994 and a new 
generation of socialist politicians, with Zhan Videnov as Prime Minister, came into 
power (Koford 2000: 327). The political influence and rent-seeking of banks worsened 
further under the Videnov government. The policy of soft budget constraints gave rise 
to reckless credit policies and the snowballing of a new wave of bad loans. As a result, 
at the end of June 1994, 35 out of 44 Bulgarian banks began to experience financial 
difficulties (Vutcheva quoted in Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003: 12). Depositors, 
fearing that their foreign deposits would be confiscated by the government in order to 
meet its interest payments on the external debt due in July 1996, started to withdraw 
                                                 
413 Author’s interview with Kalin Hristov, Advisor to Governor of the BNB, June 21 and 27, 2007, 
Sofia. 
 
414 Author’s interview with Georgy Ganev, Program Director for Economic Research, Center for 
Liberal Studies, June 29, 2007, Sofia. 
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their deposits en masse.415 The first wave of the crisis came from the banking system 
when in May 1996, BNB put five commercial banks, three of which were private, 
under conservatorship (Table 6.5).416 The deposits from the bankrupt banks were 
transferred to the healthy banks.  
The general panic among the depositors was further reinforced by the lack of 
agreement between the Socialist government and the IMF at that time.417 In order to 
stop the panic among the population, two strategies were implemented in parallel. 
First, the Bank Deposit Guarantee Act was passed in the Parliament, guaranteeing the 
repayment of individual deposits in full and fifty percent of enterprise deposits. 
Second, after a long period of debt monetization, the BNB started to pursue a 
restrictive policy towards banks by increasing minimum reserve requirements, raising 
interest rates, and intervening on foreign exchange markets to prevent the lev 
devaluation. The BNB raised the base interest rate up to 300 percent in September 
1996 (from 108 percent in May 1996), but then it eased monetary policy during the 
following two hyperinflationary quarters to reduce domestic public debt (to 240 
percent in October and then to 180 percent) (Ganev et al. 2001: 30, Berlemann, 
                                                 
415 The confidence of the public in the banking sector was a key factor in the relative stability of the 
financial system until 1995. Due to the absence of investment options, most of the savings of the 
population was channeled to banks, providing the basis for the financing budget deficit and activities of 
banks (Dobrinsky 2000: 590). 
 
416 Conservatorship is a legal procedure allowing the BNB to suspend the operation of a bank close to 
insolvency. In that case, the BNB appoints a conservator who (temporarily) manages the bank 
(Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003: 13, fn. 17). In May 1996, the BNB put the following banks under 
conservatorship: Private Agricultural and Investment Bank, Mineralbank, First Private Bank, and 
Agrobusinessbank. 
 
417 The previous stand-by arrangement, covering a 12-month period, was approved in April 1994. 
Nonetheless, owing to slippages of the Bulgarian authorities in monetary policy and delays in structural 
reforms, it expired at the end of March 1995. 
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Hristov, Nenovsky 2002: 29). The policy of increasing interest rates, recommended by 
the IMF, however, further intensified the crisis.418  
Table 6.5: The Chronology of the Financial Crisis in Bulgaria, 1996−1997 
 
 Dates Major Events 
1995 4th 
quarter 
Early warning signs: 
Foreign currency reserves begin to fall (after rising in 1994) 
First bank runs occur. 
BNB refinances banks as lender of last resort. 
1996 1st 
quarter 
Foreign currency reserves fall sharply. 
 2nd 
quarter 
Foreign currency reserves reach such a low level than BNB no 
longer intervenes in the foreign currency markets. 
Basic interest rate rises in several steps from 34% to 108% (annual 
rate). 
Lev depreciates by 100%. 
BNB lending to banks and the government accelerates. 
 3rd 
quarter 
In September the following program is implemented: 
Conservators appointed for 9 banks (brining the total to 15 or 
about 1/3 of banks). 
Basic interest rate is raised to 25% per month. 
More support given to the viable banks. 
 4th 
quarter 
Basic interest rate lowered to 15% per month to help banks. 
November: IMF recommends the establishment of a currency 
board. 
December: There are street demonstrations in Sofia and the 
government resigns.  
1997 1st 
quarter 
Early February: Political crisis is finally resolved and an interim 
government is appointed and dates for new elections are 
announced.  
Negotiations between the IMF and the new interim government 
begin almost immediately. 
 2nd 
quarter 
April: Agreement is reached with IMF on new standby package. 




July 1: Currency Board established. 
 
Source: Beck, Miller and Saad (2003: 7). 
                                                 
418 Former BNB Deputy Governor Harsev harshly criticized the IMF policy of high interest rates. For 
him, interest rate increases did not work because economic actors anticipated inflation. This produced 
inflation expectations because enterprises calculated higher inflation in the prices of their products. 
Author’s interview with Emil Harsev, former Deputy Governor of the BNB, July 2, 2007, Sofia. 
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High interest rates caused bankruptcy of another nine banks and a sharp 
increase of government internal debt.419 The BNB reacted by changing the minimum 
reserve requirements in the opposite direction: it lowered them from 9.5 percent to 8.5 
percent but then raised them again to 11 percent in December 1996. Altogether, 
fourteen banks (out of 46) were closed in 1996 and these represented 24 percent of the 
banking system’s assets.420 The rent-seeking policies manifested themselves in the fact 
that ninety percent of uncollateralized refinancing was concentrated in bankrupt banks. 
The banking crisis was accompanied by increasing currency substitution: the share of 
foreign exchange in broad money went up from 27 percent in 1995 to 50 percent in 
1996 (Ulgenerk and Zlaoui 2000: 7). 
In parallel with the BNB’s restrictive policy regarding banks, the government 
and the parliament, fearing the moratorium on internal debt, forced the central bank to 
provide extensive monetary financing of the unsustainable budget deficit, the outcome 
of financial rescues of crony banks and enterprises.421 In a special letter to the 
Government and the Parliament, the BNB Managing Board expressed its disagreement 
with this credit line, pointing to its inflationary effects.422 Nonetheless, at the end of 
1996, the BNB ceded and granted to the Ministry of Finance a loan in the amount of 
115 billion lev that represented a full 7 percent of GDP (Berlemann and Nenovsky 
                                                 
419 These included: Commercial and Savings Bank, Balkanbank, Economic Bank, Businessbank, 
Elitebank, CB Slaviani, CB Mollow, Dobrich CB, and Yambol CB. 
 
420 The cost of the Bulgarian banking crisis represented 75 percent of GDP (Tang, Zoli, Klytchnikova 
2000). For a detailed examination of the Bulgarian banking crisis, see Ignatiev (2005). 
 
421 In September 1996, in the face of a severe crisis of confidence in government, no economic agent 
was willing to buy government bonds. Minister of Finance Dimitar Kostov invited primary dealers of 
banks and “begged” them to buy government securities. This approach was a clear sign that the 
government was bankrupt. Because banks did not show any interest in buying government securities, 
the BNB had to participate in the primary market. Author’s interview with Lena Roussenova, former 
Member of the Governing Council of the BNB, June 22, 2007, Sofia. 
 
422 Author’s interview with Lena Rousenova, former Member of the Governing Council of the BNB, 
June 22, 2007, Sofia. 
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20002: 14). Thus, the BNB was pursuing a dangerous policy mix of high interest rates 
towards the banks combined with expansionary financing of the budget. The 
government completely abolished BNB independence by amending the central bank 
law that allowed the Parliament to terminate the term of its governor and deputy 
governors by a 60 percent majority vote without providing specific reasons. 
Subsequently, the government changed the BNB management and appointed the 
Prime Minister’s advisors as chairmen of supervisory SOB boards to ensure financial 
support for its industrial policy (Christov 1997: 149). As Vice Governor of the BNB, 
Tsvetan Manchev recalls, “It was much easier to change the Governor of the central 
bank than to change the government economic policies.”423  
 
Table 6.6: Governors of the Bulgarian National Bank, 1989–2004 
Governor Tenure Background 
Ivan Dragnevski December 20, 
1989−January 9, 1991 
Banker (Chairman of the 
Bulgarian Foreign Trade 
Bank) 
Todor Valchev January 9, 
1991−January 24, 1996 
 
Lyubomir Filipov January 24, 1996−June 
11, 1997 
Central Banker (Member of 
the BNB Board) 
Svetoslav 
Gavriiski 
June 11, 1997−October 
9, 2003 
Ministry of Finance Official 
Ivan Iskrov October 9 2003 Banker (Deputy Chairman 
of DSK Bank and Executive 
Director Rosseximbank) 
and Member of the 
Parliament 
 
Source: Bulgarian National Bank. 
 
                                                 




While the first impulse came from the banking system,424 the banking crisis led 
to a currency crisis that exemplified third generation moral hazard crises (see chapter 
2) (Krugman 1998, Chang and Velasco 1998).425 The BNB initially tried to defend the 
value of the lev, which came under strong pressure in 1996. Nevertheless, the BNB 
interventions resulted in a dramatic decrease in its foreign currency reserves. In 1996, 
the lev depreciated by 590 percent and the exchange rate collapsed in February 1997 
when the lev depreciated by almost 250 percent. The devaluation was accompanied by 
a 45 day-period period of hyperinflation: the monthly inflation was 44 percent in 
January 1997 and 243 percent in February 1997 and the annual inflation for 1997 was 
578 percent (Figure 1). This hyperinflation reduced the government’s internal debt and 
cleaned up the balance sheets of banks,426 leading some Bulgarian commentators to 
believe that incumbent banks could have provoked hyperinflation.427 
                                                 
424 Others argued that the main impetus behind the 1996−1997 financial crisis and subsequent economic 
collapse lay in psychological reasons related to the “grain crisis” in spring 1996. The socialist 
government re-established price controls on grain, allowing economic elites with political connections 
to the government to buy grain at regulated low prices in Bulgarian lev and subsequently sell it at world 
prices, and thus make huge profits. This led to severe shortages of grain in March 1996, provoking a 
panic among the population because of the lack of the essential commodity, bread. It also meant the 
beginning of the “bread crisis,” leading to a complete loss of political confidence in the government. 
Once popular support eroded, the government was not able to exercise its power. The 1996−1997 crisis 
was a combination of bread, banking, currency, political and economic crisis, leading to complete social 
chaos. Author’s interview with Georgy Ganev, Program Director for Economic Research, Center for 
Liberal Studies, June 29, 2007, Sofia. 
 
425 In contrast to the 1997−98 Asian financial crises, the Bulgarian crisis was a closed economy crisis. 
Capital outflows were very small (about 240 million U.S. dollars) because there were no substantial 
capital inflows (Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003: 17). For excellent examinations of the Bulgarian 
financial crisis of 1996−1997, see Berlemann and Nenovsky (2003), Balyozov (1999), Dobrinsky 
(2000), Berleman, Hristov, Nenovsky (2002), Roussenova (2002). 
 
426 The hyperinflation reduced the government debt from unsustainable levels in 1996, when interest 
payments represented 18 percent of GDP, to 2.5 percent in 1998 (Avramov 1999: 10-11). 
 
427 Author’s interview with Roumen Avramov, former Member of the Managing Board of the BNB 




The government engaged in the negotiations with the IMF in May 1996. While 
the IMF tried to discourage Estonia from instituting a CB, Michael Deppler, Director 
of the First European Department of the IMF, urged the Bulgarian authorities to adopt 
a CB in the second half of 1996, when Bulgaria was extended a fourth stand-by 
agreement.428 The IMF representatives considered the currency to be the only potent 
tool to deal with the financial crisis because it promised a framework to discipline 
both monetary and fiscal policies.429 Notwithstanding, the IMF warned that a CB 
needed to be supported by a vigorous commitment and implementation of a bank 
privatization program. The IMF insisted that the Bulgarian government privatize 
banks and liquidate those with weak balance sheets. This strategy would allow the 
government to cut off the rent-seeking banks and enterprises from state and BNB 
financing.430 The IMF publicly announced that it would not provide further financing 
unless the Bulgarian authorities adopted a CB.431  
                                                 
428 In fact, the IMF first launched the idea of a CB already in 1994 in discussions with the 
representatives of the BNB. However, the timing was not right due to the upcoming change in the 
political regime because it was clear that the BSP would win the elections. Thus, these discussions were 
only exploratory at that time. Author’s interview with Roumen Avramov, former Member of the 
Managing Board of the BNB (1997−2002) and Economic Advisor to the President of the Republic of 
Bulgaria (1990−1991), June 24, 2007, Sofia. 
 
429 According to Roussenova, who became a Member of the BNB Governing Board in the middle of the 
financial crisis and participated in the meetings of Bulgarian authorities with the IMF, the IMF 
representatives first suggested a money-based stabilization program, which was inappropriate and set 
unrealistic monetary targets. For her, the IMF designed this program to intensify the crisis to pave the 
way for the CB. The BNB Governing Council at the end approved the IMF designed program and the 
IMF extended the first tranche of the loan; however, the second tranche was never extended. A new 
round of negotiations of a stand-by arrangement was held in Sofia in May 1996. In July 1996, the 
Bulgarian government requested from the IMF a 20-month stand-by arrangement in the amount of 400 
million SDR (86 percent of quota). Author’s interview with Lena Roussenova, former Member of the 
Governing Council of the BNB, June 22, 2007, Sofia. 
 
430 See EBS/96/116, IMF, A Paper on Bulgaria’s Request for a Stand-by Arrangement, July 5, 1996; 
and EBS/97/53, A Paper on the Request of the Government of Bulgaria for a Stand-By-Arrangement 
and Request for Purchase under the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility, April 3, 1997. 
 
431 Author’s interview with Lena Roussenova, former Member of the Governing Council of the BNB, 
June 22, 2007, Sofia. Although IMF Managing Director Stanley Fisher was critical of a fixed regime, 
the successful experience of Estonia gradually convinced the IMF representatives that a fixed regime is 
an efficient stabilization tool (Stone 2002: 224).  
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The financial crisis was accompanied by a deep political crisis and 40 days of 
popular demonstrations, which culminated on January 10, 1997 when the Parliament 
was attacked.432 The opposition in the Parliament introduced the initiative called 
“Declaration of National Salvation” that promised to dismiss the BNB board, launch 
negotiations with the IMF, introduce a CB, dissolve the parliament and hold early 
elections (Stone 2002).433  
Initially, Bulgarian politicians on all sides of the political spectrum resisted the 
introduction of the CB, mostly on the sovereignty grounds.434 A political stalemate 
between the government and the opposition delayed the implementation of a currency-
board-based program (Pautola and Backé 1998: 89). Similarly, the BNB Governing 
Council wrote a letter to the prime minister expressing its opposition to a CB.435 But 
the IMF insisted on achieving national consent before adopting a CB (Simeonova 
2007: 119). Nonetheless, when the crisis escalated further, the Socialist government 
decided to give up sovereignty and to adopt a CB, for it became an unavoidable option 
to end the economic crisis. In the final states, the crisis brought down the Videnov 
government and destroyed the BSP’s electoral base. A new President, Petur Stoyanov, 
took office and appointed a caretaker government with Sofia’s Mayor Stefan 
                                                                                                                                            
 
432 The idea of mass protests started to develop already in the summer of 1996 as the initiative of the 
major trade unions: Podkrepa and the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria 
(Simeonova 2007: 123). 
 
433 The Bulgarian CB, including the strategy of banking privatization and fiscal reforms, was designed 
by the IMF. Charles Enoch, Deputy Director of the IMF Monetary and Financial Systems Department 
designed most parts of the CB Law, as well as the law on banking supervision. Author’s interview with 
Tsvetan Manchev, Deputy Governor of the BNB, June 26 and July 2, 2007, Sofia. 
 
434 Author’s interview with Martin Zaimov, former Deputy Governor of the BNB and Chairman of the 
Currency Board (1997−2000), June 28, 2007, Sofia. 
 
435 Author’s interview with Roumen Avramov, former Member of the Managing Board of the BNB 




Sofiyanski (UDF) as a caretaker Prime Minister. In the declaration of February 2007, a 
comprehensive reform package with the CB at its heart was embraced by all major 
political parties.436 
 
The Currency Board and Banking Reforms After 1997 
New parliamentary elections were held in April 1997, when the UDF won an 
overwhelming victory.437 The new UDF government of Ivan Kostov, an economist 
who had served as minister of finance in the short-lived UDF government,  officially 
adopted a CB, modeled on the Estonian example, on July 1, 1997.438 However, the 
BNB had already started to function as de facto CB in March 1997. The lev was fixed 
at the exchange rate 1,000 lev per 1 Deutsche mark.439 The CB brought the country’s 
inflation rapidly under control: inflation fell from 2,040 percent per annum in the first 
quarter of 1997 to 1 percent per annum in 1998 (Lewis 2002: 141).440 
In addition, the new UDF-led government introduced several institutional 
changes in central banking accompanied by important changes in the banking system. 
In June 1997, the Parliament passed a new Law on the BNB making it independent 
from the Council of Ministers and other state bodies and altering its structure so that it 
                                                 
436 As in Estonia, many Bulgarian politicians now claim credit for the CB. At some point, all political 
strings competed to introduce a CB (Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003: 17, fn. 25). 
 
437 The UDF won 52 percent of the popular vote and 57 percent of the seats. The Socialists and their 
partners, the Ecoglasnost movement, captured 22 percent of the vote and 24 percent of the seats.  
 
438 Steven Hanke, who was involved in the establishment of the CB in Estonia, became Advisor to 
Bulgarian President (Nenovsky and Rizopoulos 2003: 936). 
 
439 After the lev denomination and the introduction of the euro, the exchange rate was fixed at 1 
Euro=1.95583 lev. 
 




was transformed into a CB.441 Most importantly, the law restricts the possibility of 
monetizing government fiscal debt. Also, the Parliament passed a new banking law 
which incorporated a tightening of banking regulation.442 With the establishment of 
the CB, banking supervision became an integral part of the new exchange rate 
strategy, and a separate BNB department was charged with licensing and supervising 
banks. As a result of a new currency regime, the behavior of the BNB changed almost 
immediately. When two banks suffered liquidity difficulties after 1997, the BNB (as 
its Estonian counterpart) did not bail them out and instead let these banks fail.443 The 
BNB took this approach in spite of the fact that the Bulgarian “second generation” CB 
system allowed it to provide a limited lender of last resort facility to stabilize the 
banking system (Hristov and Nenovsky 2002).444 
In sum, establishing the CB was driven primarily by the need to end practices 
that were impeding banking reforms (Wyzan 1998). Bank privatization became a 
cornerstone for the confidence of the newly established exchange rate regime and 
necessary to sustain it.445 The UDF government adopted an approach to bank 
privatization and supervision similar to the Hungarian strategy from the early years of 
                                                 
441 As in the case of Estonia, the Law on BNB established the Issue Department to run the CB and the 
Banking Department to act as a lender of last resort in case of systemic risk for the stability of the 
banking system (Nenovsky, Hristov, and Mihaylov 2002: 26). 
 
442 The minimum level for the capital adequacy ratio was set at 12 percent. In 1998, a Deposit Insurance 
Fund financed by commercial banks was established. For a detailed analysis of the post-1997 legal 
framework for bank supervision, see Ignatiev and Simeonov (1999). 
 
443 At the beginning of 1999, the Credit Bank was declared to be insolvent and in 2000, the Bulgarian 
Universal Bank went bankrupt. 
 
444 There are some restrictions on the BNB lender of last resort functions, however. The BNB can use 
excess reserves and grant credits only to solvent banks experiencing an acute need for liquidity that 
cannot be provided from other sources. These loans can only be extended against collateral of liquid 
assets and the loan repayment term should not exceed 3 months (Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003: 20). 
 




transition. Bank privatization started in 1997 with the sale of UBB to the EBRD (35 
percent), US Oppenheimer and Company (29.63 percent), and Bulbank (35 percent). 
Similarly, PostBank was sold to the American Life Insurance Company and 
Consolidated Eurofinance Holding (78.23 percent). SOB privatization ended with 
privatizing DSK in 2003 quite exclusively to foreign investors from Austria, Italy, 
Greece, and Turkey. 446 In 2004, the share of foreign bank assets represented nearly 82 
percent of total banking assets, so Bulgaria imported the lender of last resort function 
from abroad because the CB forbade the BNB from playing this role.447 Bank 
privatization combined with restrictions on central bank lending weakened rent-
seeking networks of banks, industries, the BNB, and the government.448 Bank lending 
to the public sector significantly decreased, signaling that moral hazard behavior was 
severely restricted under the CB. 
 
Comparative Assessment and Conclusion 
Chapter 6 has examined evidence from two important exchange rate strategies 
and financial liberalization programs in EE—those of Estonia and Bulgaria—that 
support the main arguments of this study. Both countries embarked on economic 
reforms with financial system dominated SOBs and new private banks that were often 
created as captive funding mechanisms by enterprises or individuals, allowing them to 
                                                 
446 Simultaneously with bank privatization, the UDF government also conducted cash sales of state-
owned enterprises to foreigners and used the revenues to restore the depleted level of exchange rate 
reserves in 1997. It also implemented management-employee buyout schemes that spurred corruption 
scandals and brought down several members of Kostov’s government, including Deputy Prime Minister 
Aleksander Bozhkov (nicknamed Mr. Ten Percent) (Miller and Petranov 2000: 230, Barnes 2007: 90-
91). 
 
447 The only remaining SOB is Encouragement Bank created specifically to support small enterprises.  
 
448 There was an internal scandal concerning the privatization of Bulbank. The government initially 
promised bank managers 2−3 percent of bank shares to obtain their support for privatization but then it 
sold all shares to the Italian bank, Unicredito. Author’s interview with Georgy Ganev, Program Director 
for Economic Research, Center for Liberal Studies, June 29, 2007, Sofia. 
 273 
tap bank resources of bank. These insider banks tried to achieve short-term profits by 
taking excessive risks, often in the form of high-risk lending to crony enterprises, or 
by assuming large open foreign exchange positions. High inflation and 
macroeconomic instability magnified the power and rents of incumbent financiers and 
industrialists. A fixed exchange rate regime, associated with extreme discipline on 
monetary and financial regulatory policies, was thus not welcome by these incumbent 
interest groups. In examining these two cases, it is apparent that government 
commitment to financial liberalization appears to be a necessary condition for 
dissipating rents and dismantling distributional coalitions. Notwithstanding, the 
Estonian and Bulgarian governments had a different capacity to resist the pressures of 
incumbent financial and industrial interests, protect their central banks from political 
interference, and commit to a sustainable fixed exchange rate regime and to bank 
reform programs that brought in new foreign owners. 
Estonia established a CB against IMF advice and in spite of insufficient 
foreign exchange reserves to back it off. The government’s commitment to a hard peg 
and financial liberalization precluded the newly (re)established central bank to credit 
incumbent banks, which benefited from high inflation and exchange rate speculations 
prior to the 1992 monetary reform. The CB also imposed a fiscal discipline because 
the government could not borrow from the central bank. From the outset of the 
transition, Estonian authorities imposed hard budget constraints on banks and strict 
fiscal rules. They signaled to banks that they should not count on bail outs because 
these would undermine the sustainability of a fixed regime, the credibility of which 
was a cornerstone of government reform policies. The BOE had a monopoly in 
currency affairs and was able to apply an arms-length relationship with banks and 
enterprises. The liquidation and privatization of government banks and enterprises 
coupled with liberal foreign investment and trade regimes created an environment that 
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favored outsiders. A currency board was also a way to attract foreign investors 
interested in stable currency and low inflation. 
In contrast, the Bulgarian governments were not able to commit to a 
sustainable stabilization program based on a fixed exchange rate, impose monetary 
and fiscal discipline on economic players, and commit to bank privatization until the 
1996−1997 crisis. Most banks were still government owned at the time of crisis. 
Government involvement burdened SOB portfolios that were granting loans to 
enterprises on behalf of the government and their losses were subsequently 
nationalized. In a generalized atmosphere of soft budget constraints, inflationary credit 
policies, and weak banking regulation, new private banks replicated the behavior of 
SOBs. In contrast to the BOE, the BNB was captured by the government and 
incumbent interest groups gave them effective access to the instruments of monetary 
policy. The BNB had a problematic three-fold mission. In addition to protecting both 
the exchange rate and the banks, the BNB was obliged to finance a large part of the 
budget deficit. The moral hazard behavior induced by explicit governmental 
guarantees that the government would bail out incumbent banks and industries facing 
financial problems resulted in the financial crisis in 1996−1997. Only the crisis 
prompted the government to commit to a CB accompanied by a strict system of bank 
regulation and supervision and a new law on central banks that granted the BNB 
independence from the government. Finally, following the Estonian example, Bulgaria 
also opened its domestic financial market to foreign banks. 
In spite of similar economic problems associated with the collapse of 
communism, two factors increased difficulty for exchange rate and financial policies 
in Bulgaria in comparison with Estonia. First, Bulgaria started the transition with a 
large debt burden reflecting the large share of loans denominated in foreign currencies, 
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which retained their value even in conditions of high inflation.449 These were loans 
from foreign banks to the Bulgarian government, which were then recorded internally 
as foreign currency loans from the BNB to state enterprises (Caporale et al 2002: 231). 
In March 1990, Bulgaria announced a unilateral moratorium on its foreign debt 
service. Therefore, the only access of the government to foreign financing was on an 
official level from international institutions.450 The country was excluded from 
international capital markets and was unable to borrow abroad until July 1994, when 
the foreign debt was restructured in a Brady deal and Bulgaria received some support 
from financial institutions. In contrast, because Russia removed debts from ex-Soviet 
republics, Estonia started the transition with a low debt burden (10 percent) (Hansson 
1995: 160). Second, socialist banks in both countries extended loans to state-owned 
enterprises in the pre-transition period, but while hyperinflation wiped out these loans 
in Estonia, most bad loans in Bulgaria were denominated in foreign currency, and thus 
were not swept by the initial high inflation and currency devaluation. 
The two cases studies discussed in this chapter illustrate other important 
theoretical arguments. First, the cases show that political instability has less to do with 
explaining a commitment to a sustainable fixed regime. Both countries have had 
numerous changes of governments, Prime Ministers, and parliaments but they 
conducted different financial and exchange rate policies. In Estonia, the CB and 
financial reforms enjoyed the support of an anticommunist majority in the parliament 
despite many government transitions (Frye 2002: 317).451 Admittedly, in polarized 
                                                 
449 According to the BNB, the external debt of the Bulgarian government was 12.4 billion U.S. dollars 
in 1992. 
 
450 Since September 1990, when Bulgaria became a member of the IMF, it signed 13 short-term 
agreements with the Fund and received 2.2 billion SDRs (Manchev 2007). 
 
451 Laar (2007: 4) claims that that launching a radical reform program would have not been possible 
without a stable majority in the parliament. Interestingly, the Pro Patria government had a majority of 
only one vote. 
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Bulgaria, the fractious parliament and inability to form a majority government until 
1995 have influenced the country’s incoherent reforms, including the government’s 
unwillingness to commit to a painful stabilization program based on fixed regime, and 
delayed privatization (Stone 2002, Frye 2002: 316–317).  
 Second, a theoretical view based on the weight of government partisanship 
tested in chapter 4 is also a poor predictor of exchange rate policies in these two 
countries. While there has been considerable continuity in both cases in terms of the 
communist pedigree of the political elite in the first years of the transition, different 
from Bulgaria, the strong successor to the Communist Party did not survive in the 
political space of post-communist Estonia.452 Moreover, a strong left party in Estonian 
political life has not developed, either. In spite of quite frequent changes in 
governments, Estonian politics has been dominated by centrist or center-right parties 
and conservative-liberal politicians, particularly during the initial phase of 
independence. Even political parties belonging to the left of the Estonian political 
spectrum have pro-market oriented economic policies.453 The distinction between left 
and right wing policies concerns values rather than economic policies.454 Bulgaria 
developed reasonable strong political parties on the left and right, which proposed 
                                                 
452 The Communist Party’s successor, the Estonian Left, only made a brief appearance in parliament 
following the 1999 elections in a joint candidates’ list together with the United People’s Party of 
Estonia. The Center Party led by Savisar provides a leftist party image, appealing to the losers of the 
transition but the party’s intentions are rather populist. Author’s interview with Evald Mikkel, 
Department of Political Science, University of Tartu, July 20, 2007, Tallinn. 
 
453 The first Prime Minister Tiit Vahi, whose Coalition Party, in alliance with the Agrarian Rural 
People’s Union won again in 1995 admitted that while he favored a German style “social market 
economy, he supported right-wing policies.” See “Estonia: Success punished.” The Economist, March 
11, 1995: 51. A position in the communist regime’s power structures did not determine the ideological 
preferences of the Estonian elite, either. For example, Arnord Ruutel, former Estonian President, was 
the last President of the Supreme Soviet since 1983, but later became the chairman of the nationalist-
conservative Estonian People’s Rural party (Steen and Ruus 2002: 232-234). 
 
454 Author’s interview with Karsten Staehr, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Tallin 
University of Technology and Research Supervisor at the BOE, July 16, 2007, Tallinn. 
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very different economic reforms (Fish and Brooks 2000: 63). Yet, the Bulgarian case 
shows that it is difficult to sustain the view that before the 1996−97 crisis, the left 
Party, the BSP, promoted ideas about redistribution, while the right party, the UDF, 
was willing to adopt a sustainable fixed exchange rate and coherent reform policies, 
for the business constituencies of the right wing parties were expected to favor 
exchange rate stability and low inflation. The economic reform choices of the 
Bulgarian governments dominated by left or right did not correspond to political value 
systems (Stanchev 2001). Regardless of their political orientation, the governments in 
Bulgaria were not able to commit to a currency peg; they kept control of the banking 
industry and used it for its own short-term objectives of supporting the budget and 
loss-making state enterprises.  
Third, instead of political ideology, a different occupation experience and the 
level of national identity formation may have influenced the decisiveness with which 
the Estonian government exited the ruble zone and adopted radical reform policies. In 
one view, the perception of Russia as an “external threat” as well as the large 
Russophone population acted as a homogenizer of the Estonian elite on the necessity 
of conducting radical reforms and cutting ties with Soviet interest groups (Frane, 
Tomšič, and Kristan 2008: 49–51). To this end, the Estonian government was 
politically motivated to resist the influx of “dirty” Russian capital into the Estonian 
financial system.455 As Prime Minister Laar (2002: 165) argued, “National pride, 
which saw the orientation towards the West almost as a national mission”  played an 
important role in the success of reforms.  
                                                 
455 Author’s interview with Mart Laar, former Prime Minister of Estonia (1992−1994 and 1999−2002), 
July 19, 2007, Tallinn. One manager of American Bank of the Baltics expressed his view on the 
licensing policy of the BNB in 1992 in the following way: “If a big Western bank like NatWest were to 
apply, they wouldn’t say no. But they would turn down one of the small, newfangled Russian banks” 
(Euromoney, June 1993: 164).  
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In light of national identity perspective, Estonians politically linked the exit 
from the Russian sphere of influence and introduction of the independent currency to 
their “shared understanding of the purposes of their statehood,” one of them being a 
“return to Europe” (Abdelal 2001: 47). Nonetheless, it is puzzling why, in spite of the 
fact that the Estonian public opinion has consistently been one of the most Euroskeptic 
countries, the government has tied its newly established national currency to the 
Deutsche mark, while Bulgaria, being among the countries for which the EU has the 
most positive image, adopted a fixed regime only when dealing with the severe 
financial crisis became unavoidable.456 Despite differences in the initial choices of 
exchange rate regimes observed in Estonia and Bulgaria, their respective governments 
have pursued CBs in the most recent years (table 6.7).  
As Jeffrey Sachs (quoted in Nash 1995) pointed out, “A currency board is a 
straitjacket on a central bank, an extreme discipline on extremely bad behavior.” 
These cases show that a CB cannot itself create credibility unless accompanied by firm 
supporting policies, of which liberalization of the banking sector is particularly 
important. After assessing policy for a sustainable CB, Vahur Kraf, the governor of 
the BOE proudly claimed, “Today I dare to recall ten years and say—it has been worth 
it to adhere to firm principles to have an open banking system” (2002: 18). 
                                                 
456 The public opinion in Estonia has been Eurocentric mainly as a consequence of historical legacies 
(in particular, the negative experience of being in a “union”, the USSR and a glorified view of the 
country’s inter-war independent statehood); special links with the Scandinavian countries with similarly 
strong anti-EU feelings; and some unpopular government policies linked to EU accession. Public 




Table 6.7: The Main Characteristics of the Currency Boards in Bulgaria and 
Estonia  
 








Previous exchange rate 
regime 
Floating Ruble standard 
Access to convertibility at 
the monetary authorities 
General public and banks In principle, general public, 
in practice, only banks 
Coverage of backing 100 percent of monetary base and 
government fiscal reserves 
100 percent of monetary base 
Power to change the 
exchange rate rule and 
backing rule 
Devaluation needs to be done by an 
act of the parliament 
The BOE has the right to 
revalue the exchange rate. 
Devaluation needs to be done 
by an act of Parliament 
Lender of last resort By the BNB, restricted to systemic 
and emergency situations; limited to 
the amount of foreign exchange in 
excess of backing requirement, that 
is, reserves of the Banking 
Department 
By the BOE; restricted to 
systemic and emergency 
situations; limited to the 
amount of foreign exchange 
in excess of backing 
requirement, that is, reserves 
of the Banking Department 
Reserve requirements Yes Yes 
Treasury bills No  No 
Central bank bills No Yes; BOE CD’s were 
initially issued in may 1993 
with a view to increasing 
collateral that banks can use 
in interbank market 
Credit to government by 
the monetary authorities 
Prohibited Prohibited 
Political commitment  Moderate (political unanimity with 
desultory voices for currency board 
abandonment) 
Strong (full political 
unanimity) 
 
Source: Adapted from Nenovsky, Hristov, and Mihaylov (2002: 12–13). 
 
The CB has enjoyed a strong public support and has been perceived as a pillar 
of a successful monetary and exchange rate policy in both countries. While there have 
been occasional complaints and discussions about possible changes of a hard peg that 
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are motivated by high real appreciation of their national currencies, no economic actor 
or a politician did seriously question CB policies.457 CB has been a success story in 
both countries because it has brought currency credibility and stability. Both countries 
foresee joining the EMU without altering the current principles of monetary and 
exchange rate policies. 
 
                                                 
457 Most of my interviewees in both countries argued that in spite of real exchange rate appreciation, 




THE CZECH REPUBLIC: COLLUSION 
Klaus seemed to have remembered Lenin’s dictum about banks being the 
“commanding heights” of the economy; he was reluctant to let these institutions go 




Similar to the cases of Estonia and Bulgaria, the history of exchange rate 
politics in the Czech Republic helps us to evaluate the importance of financial 
institutional structures in our search to explain the choices and sustainability of the 
exchange rate regime. There is one identifiable turning point in the Czech exchange 
rate history: 1997. The Czech Republic, as part of the former Czechoslovakia, started 
the post-communist transformation with a “big bang” stabilization program based on a 
fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor. In May 1997, financial turmoil forced the 
central bank to abandon a fixed regime that had persisted for 62 consecutive months, 
surviving the split of Czechoslovakia and the dissolution of its common currency. The 
central bank let the Czech koruna float and introduced a new monetary policy strategy: 
inflation targeting.  
The case of the Czech Republic demonstrates how a clientelistic financial 
system, dominated by incumbent banks and industries, leads to financial instability 
and forces the government to drop formal promises to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
regime. The financial system in the Czech Republic in the 1990s, which has emerged 
as the outcome of voucher privatization of banks and industries, was characterized by 
“collusion” among domestic banks, industries, and the state. Nonetheless, in contrast 
                                                 
458 Stroehlein (1999: 13). 
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to the clientelistic financial system in Bulgaria, the independence of the Czech central 
bank became a distinguishing feature of Czech economic policy-making.  
The voucher privatization of banks and industries resulted in the indirect 
control of privatized enterprises by banks, through their investment privatization funds 
(IPFs), which were in turn controlled by the government. By establishing IPFs, banks 
became not only creditors but also owners of enterprises. The incumbent banks often 
acted as extended hands of the government and provided credits based more on 
political expediency rather than on prudent credit risk policies. Banks as owners of 
industrial holdings were also motivated to bail these enterprises out when they were in 
financial difficulties. While the Czech government imposed fiscal discipline, it was 
unwilling to impose hard budget constraints on domestic banks. Both the Czech and 
Estonian governments were committed liberalizing governments, undertaking 
sweeping trade and capital account liberalization. However, unlike those in Estonia, 
the Czech financial markets were exposed only to a limited degree of financial 
openness as the Czech government resisted the acquisitive advances of foreign banks. 
The outcome of the Czech financial reforms was expansive politicized lending, weak 
banking regulation and supervision, high volumes of bad loans, repeated bank 
bailouts, and banking sector instability, all of which led to financial turmoil and forced 
changes in the fixed exchange rate regime.  
Unlike the other three countries examined in this study, the Czech Republic 
started the post-communist transition with advantageous historical legacies. The 
Czechoslovak communist governments were fiscally conservative at the outset of 
transition, so the country enjoyed low domestic government indebtedness, small 
external debt, virtually non-existent inflation, and no shortages or parallel markets.459 
                                                 
459 The total government debt did not exceed 1 percent of the GDP and the annual rate of inflation was 
stable at around 1-2 percent per year (with hidden inflation, this rate was 5 percent). Foreign debt was 
low at around 8 billion U.S. dollars. See Soukup, Taci and Matoušek (2004), Drábek (1995), Erbenova 
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Along with the former East Germany, Czechoslovakia had been the most industrially 
advanced country in the Soviet bloc.460 The latter was also the only EE country that 
experienced continuous democratic capitalism during the inter-war period.461  
Thus, a radical stabilization program was less of a necessity in the former state 
of Czechoslovakia, for its macro-economic fundamentals were good. Still, the first 
post-communist governments had each inherited a state with a strong position vis-à-
vis poorly organized social and political groups, and a considerable mandate to pursue 
economic reforms, including a fixed exchange rate regime and mass privatization 
through vouchers. The Czech state was a very strong post-communist state, both as a 
result of its post-1968 totalitarian dictatorship and its quick government consolidation 
after 1989 (Orenstein and Desai 1997: 44). 
On the other hand, some initial conditions complicated the transition in the 
beginning. Much like in Estonia and Bulgaria, Czechoslovak trade was heavily 
concentrated on CMEA countries, reaching nearly 80 percent of trade and 60 percent 
of Czech exports in the late 1980s. Therefore, the collapse of the CMEA market 
produced serious disruptions to trade, capital flows, and domestic production.462 The 
proximity of Czechoslovakia to the German and Austrian markets, however, soon 
provided new markets for exporters after the collapse of CMEA. 
                                                                                                                                            
and Holub (2006). See Korbel (1977) for the modern history of Czechoslovakia from its creation in 
1918. 
 
460 Before World War II, Czechoslovakia was a democracy, with an average GDP per capita 
comparable to that of Austria. In 1938, the GDP per capita in Austria was 400 U.S. dollars, while in 
Czechoslovakia it was 380 U.S. dollars (Dyba and Švejnar 1995: 22). 
 
461 Czechoslovakia had four free elections during the First Republic (1920, 1925, 1929, and 1935) and a 
semi-free election in 1946.  
 
462 Total loss of output due to the collapse of CMEA was estimated to be around 30-50 percent in 
1991−92 (Drábek 1995: 244, Dyba and Švejnar 1995). 
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 In contrast to Poland, the Czechoslovak state appeared to be very much in 
control of the economy in the late 1980s. The economy was dominated by large-scale 
heavy industry and monopolistic trade organizations. Although the Czechoslovak 
communist leadership loosened regulations on joint ventures in 1988, it did not fully 
legalize private enterprises until 1990 (Barnes 2003: 551). As a result, 93 percent of 
the gross national product in 1988 was still being produced in the state sector, while 
private sectors employed only about 1.2 percent of the labor force (Schwartz 2006: 34, 
Kočenda 1999: 6–7).  
 
Klaus and the Origins of Czech Capitalism: Thacherism, Czech Style or National 
Capitalism? 
 After the communist party was brought down by pressure from street 
demonstrations in November 1989, the transitional government, a “Government of 
National Understanding,” composed of reform communists, social democrats from 
1968, and dissident leaders took power in on December 10, 1989 to plan economic 
reforms and prepare for free elections in June 1990.463 Václav Havel, a famous 
dissident playwright and the leader of Civic Forum, the mass organization formed by a 
group of prominent dissidents from Charter 77 in 1989, became president. 
 Following the 1989 “velvet revolution,” there was broad agreement in the 
former Czechoslovakia on the need to build a market economy but a great controversy 
about the economic reform strategy. The discussion was between two ideologically 
conflicting views on the transformation strategy among a group of economists at the 
Institute for Economic Forecasting at the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, who 
were invited to join the Civic Forum to design a program of economic transition. The 
                                                 
463 The collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia began in the wake of student demonstrations on 
November 17, 1989. See Garton Ash (1990). 
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Director of the Institute, Valtr Komárek, a veteran of the 1968 movement, who was 
deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs in the first post-communist 
government, advocated combining the transition to a market economy with structural 
reforms that foresaw the extensive role of the state in the economy. He was against 
immediate price and exchange rate liberalization and advocated gradual economic 
reform, particularly in the area of privatization, envisioning a case-by-case approach 
and a program of employee ownership (Meaney 1997: 108). 464  
 His rival, Václav Klaus, espoused “Friedmanite-von Hayakian” free-market 
vision and Thatcherite policies (Saxonberg 1999: 401). The Klaus concept of reforms 
advocated the radical abolishment of central planning, rapid privatization, and full 
price liberalization. Klaus was against gradual transformation of the economy, or the 
so-called “third way,”465 and against state involvement in the restructuring of the 
economy. His group of liberal economists promoted a “market without any 
adjectives.” The debate was known as a contest between “radicals” and 
“gradualists.”466 
 The Czech Civic Forum, along with its Slovak counterpart, the Public Against 
Violence, decisively won the first free elections in June 1990, which were considered 
to be a referendum against the communist regime (Stroehlein 1999: 3). By September 
                                                 
464 For Komárek’s views on the economic reform, see Komárek et al. (1990) and Komárek (1990). 
 
465 Klaus (2006) criticized Komárek and anti-communist dissidents led by Havel for advocating “a 
neocollectivist vision of society that rejected liberal democracy,” for the lack of trust in the market and 
beliefs in “an enlightened economic center.” See, also the interview with Klaus in Fund (1990). 
 
466 The group of gradualist economists included František Vlasák, the first chairman of the republic-
level Czech government, Ota Šík who became economic advisor to the Czech President, the Pitthart 
group, and others. The group of economists with which Klaus surrounded himself when designing 
economic reform program consisted of Tomáš Ježek, later the first Czech minister of privatization; 
Dušan Tříska, deputy minister of finance; Ivan Kočárnik, later minister of finance, Karel Dyba, later 
minister of the economy, and Vladimír Dlouhý, the chairman of the Central Planning Office. For the 
examination of the debates on the initial transformation strategy between Klaus’ radicals and 




1990, Klaus had defeated the dissidents in the battle over the chairmanship of the 
Civic Forum. Klaus led a liberal minority within the government as the Czechoslovak 
minister of finance during the first Civic Forum government from December 1989 to 
June 1992.467 
 Klaus’s group of economists proposed a liberal economic reform program, 
which won the support of the government. It became the official Scenario of 
Economic Reform (referred to as the “Capitalist Manifesto”) and was ratified by the 
Parliament in September 1990 (Schwartz 2006: 130).468 The reform package was 
based on restrictive reform policies to support the main reform goals, which included 
macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization, and westward reorientation of foreign 
trade. It was intended to represent a radical departure from central planning rather than 
an attempt at marginal improvements. While the Czechoslovak reform program was 
inspired by the earlier Balcerowitz big-bang reforms in Poland, it was less radical, 
partially to maintain public support for the program.469 As Orenstein (2001: 68–72 and 
1998: 4–5) argued, the final economic reform program combined orthodox 
macroeconomic policies and voucher privatization that would place a majority of 
shares in the hands of the people with social democratic welfare and labor protection 
measures to cope with social tensions resulting from radical economic reforms.470 
                                                 
467 The gradualist group was initially supported by a majority of Civic Forum representatives and 
former communists, while the Klaus group was in a weaker political position in the first post-
communist governments in Czechoslovakia (Orenstein 2001: 68-9). 
 
468 In contrast, Komárek was unable to propose a cohesive reform program. He was replaced as a 
deputy prime minister by Václav Valeš, another economist from the 1968 movement, who completed a 
gradualist program entitled a “Strategy of Gradual Transition to a Market Economy in the ČSFR” 
(second variant of radical economic reform). 
 
469 Author’s interview with Milena Horčicová, Director of the Department for Financial Policies, 
Ministry of Finance, June 15, 2006, Prague. 
 
470 According to Orenstein (1998 and 2004), Klaus was forced to agree to certain social-democratic 
elements to gain government support for his neoliberal economic reform program, e.g., legalization of 
collective bargaining as a mechanism for future wage regulation proposed by the Labor Ministry-
inspired Scenario for Social Reform. The result was a “social-liberal” compromise, which was 
 287 
 Economic reforms in Czechoslovakia started in January 1991 and included five 
main pillars: price and foreign trade liberalization; internal convertibility of the 
currency; restrictive fiscal policy and tight monetary policy to maintain high interest 
rates and to restrict the growth of money supply; and massive and rapid privatization, 
mainly through the voucher scheme (Soukup, Taci and Matoušek 2004: 171).471  
 By the time the next elections took place in June 1992, the Civic Forum 
movement had split into several competing factions. Klaus founded the Civic 
Democratic Party (ODS) from the most conservative faction of the Forum. ODS won 
decisively the June 1992 elections and Klaus became the Prime Minister in the Czech 
Republic (table7.1). ODS formed a coalition with another post-Civic Forum party, the 
Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) and with the Christian Democratic bloc (KDU-
CSL), controlling 53 percent (105 out of 200) seats until the 1996 elections. The ODS-
led government enjoyed stable popular support. It had great political freedom because 
the competition in the political system was weak and there were few checks on their 
political power; the powers of the president were restricted, the media were 
inexperienced and the civil society was undermined (Vachudová 2001: 336–7). The 
opposition parties of the fragmented left were weak and ineffective. The Czech 
communist party was thrown from power in 1989 and subsequently remained loyal to 
its communist ideology, and while the historic Social Democratic Party (CSSD) was 
                                                                                                                                            
neoliberal in macroeconomic policies and social democratic in its approach to labor relations and the 
welfare state. However, Schwartz (2006: 141) notes that these social democratic elements in the 
economic reform program resembled the “the preemptive social initiatives of Bismarck in Germany in 
the 1880s rather than the progressive measures of the modern Scandinavian welfare state.” 
 
471 The introduction of internal convertibility of the Czechoslovak koruna at the beginning of 1991 
meant a transition from foreign exchange rationing towards foreign exchange liberalization. The 
currency was declared internally convertible, and all foreign exchange transactions on the current 
account were liberalized (except for the transactions of physical persons who were domestic residents 
and all transactions involving inward foreign investments) and some capital account transactions (the 
inflow of foreign direct and portfolio investments as well as repatriation of profits) (Tošovský 1991, 
Drábek 1995, Erbenova and Holub 2006). 
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re-established in 1990, it gathered political strength only in the second half of the 
1990s.472 Moreover, the governments led by ODS tried to block the entry of other 
groups into the political arena to limit competition (Vachudova 2005: 36). Klaus tried 
to liberate the government from societal groups, such as Parliament, trade unions, or 
local governments. During his tenure, policy making in the government was in the 
hands of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Privatization (McDermott 2004: 
192).473 
 
Table 7.1: Governments in the Czech Republic, 1990–2002 
 
Duration of Government Prime Minister Party Affiliation of Prime Minister 
January 1, 1993¹−July 4, 
1996 
Václav Klaus Civic Democratic Party  
(Občanská Democratická Strana, ODS) 
July 5, 1996−January 
1,1998 
Václav Klaus Civic Democratic Party 
January 2, 1998−July 
16,1998 
Josef Tošovský Civic Democratic Party 
July 17, 1998−July 14, 
2002 
Miloš Zeman Czech Social Democratic Party  
(Česká Strana Sociálne Demokratická, 
CSSD) 
July 15, 2002−July 19, 
2004 
Vladimír Špidla Czech Social Democratic Party 
 
¹Date of division of Czechoslovakia, government in office as Czech state government since 2 
July 1992 
 
Debating the Need for a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 
 The primary objective of the initial stabilization program was to contain 
inflationary pressures generated by the policies of liberalization and to assure the 
                                                 
472 Komárek, who joined CSSD, withdrew from politics after the poor results of social democrats in the 
1992 elections when they received 6.5 percent of the vote. 
 
473 Later, the Ministry of Privatization lost its superior position vis-à-vis other sectoral ministries since it 
had to invite them to participate in the process of decisions on privatization projects (Ježek 2006: 48). 
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stability of the exchange rate (Drábek et al 1994: 238).474 Liberalization of the 
majority of prices in January 1991 resulted in a one-off increase in price level: the 
average annual inflation jumped to 57 percent in 1991 (Holub and Tůma 2006). The 
macroeconomic stabilization was exchange-rate based partly on the IMF-approved 
exchange rate based stabilization package: the exchange rate was fixed in a narrow 
band of plus or minus 1.5 percent against a basket of currencies of five major trading 
partners in December 1990.475 Exchange rate served as a nominal anchor for 
stabilization policies and credibility import. Klaus (1997: 144) admitted that although 
the Czechoslovak reform program was not designed by foreign experts, its 
endorsement by the IMF sent a positive signal to world markets.  
 Initially, Klaus did not favor a fixed exchange rate regime (Klaus 1993: 531): 
“I was horrified at the very beginning with the idea of having fixed exchange rates. I 
remember at the same time that the IMF was shocked when I suggested a flexible 
exchange rate regime.” He had particularly strong reservations against a currency 
board arrangement, which he considered a compensation for the lack of political 
responsibility or the inability of politicians to establish support for a “rational” 
economic policy (Klaus 1993).476 
                                                 
474 “Macroeconomic priority in the process of transformation is the blocking of inflation and this 
priority must to a reasonable extent override all other foundations of macroeconomic aims-economic 
growth, employment, and the balance of payments.” See The Scenario of Economic Reform (1990: 5). 
Klaus (2000: 10) however, later modified his view on rapid disinflation, claiming that he has always 
considered it dangerous and irresponsible to potentially and dramatically slow down economic growth. 
 
475 As of December 18, 1990, the basket comprised the following currencies: U.S. dollar (31.34 
percent), Deutsche mark (45.52 percent), Austrian schilling (12.25 percent), Swiss franc (6.55 percent), 
and pound sterling (4.24 percent). In fact, the official exchange rate of the Czechoslovak currency has 
been tied to a currency basket since the early 1980s (Hrnčíř 1999).  
 
476 Some members of the Klaus group, including Kočárník, have been consistent supporters of a float. 




 The political debate over the initial exchange rate regime centered on two 
alternative views. One view, promoted by the IMF, focused on the crucial importance 
of stable nominal exchange rates, citing the examples of Poland and Latin American 
countries. The proponents of the second view underlined the favorable historical 
legacies of Czechoslovakia in contrast with other peggers, including a history of 
successful macroeconomic reforms and stable currency during the interwar period that 
did not necessitate a fixed regime.477 
 Ultimately, the fear of inflation and economic instability as well as the desire 
to import credibility from the countries with reputable central banks prevailed and a 
fixed regime was adopted, in spite of insufficient foreign exchange reserves.478 The 
government that promised a commitment to stabilizing a sharply fluctuating post-
communist economy arrived at the conclusion that a fixed regime was the only 
possible anchor of the economy and “the only fixed variable in the system,” in which 
other variables underwent changes and fluctuations (Klaus 1994: 174). Nonetheless, 
the government has not made public any binding commitment to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate regime or a particular exchange rate level (Hrnčíř 1999: 309). 
 Yet, the most contentious debate, mainly between the representatives of the 
federal and the Czech governments, concerned the degree and level of fixity in the 
exchange rate. This debate reflected primarily anxiety over the consequences of 
liberalization for domestic exporters and the country’s ability to successfully reorient 
its trade towards the West after the collapse of CMEA (Kutan and Brada 1998, Hrnčíř 
                                                 
477 Author’s interview with Miroslav Hrnčíř, Advisor to the Governor of the CNB, former member of 
the CNB Board, June 7, 2006, Prague. 
 
478 Author’s interview with Vít Bárta, Advisor to the Vice-Governor of the CNB, June 9 and June 13, 
2006, Prague. Initially, following the example of the Bundesbank, the Czechoslovak central bank 
experimented with monetary targeting but unsuccessfully. Author’s interview with Zdeněk Tůma, 
Governor of the CNB, June 15, 2006, Prague. 
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1999). The contours of the internal convertibility regime of the currency were 
contested. There was a strong opposition to sweeping liberalization measures and calls 
for greater protection of the domestic market (Dědek 2000: 20). Klaus favored fast 
liberalization of foreign trade accompanied by an internal convertibility of the 
currency but only after a significant currency devaluation. He formulated the so-called 
“hypothesis of two transformation cushions”—an undervalued exchange rate and low 
real wages—that promised protection to domestic market players. According to this 
hypothesis, the exchange rate should be dramatically devalued before foreign trade 
liberalization and should stay below purchasing power parity to provide a bridge to a 
privatization period (Klaus 1994: 176, Klaus 1997: 67–68).479  
 Therefore, the exchange rate was devalued in four successive rounds of 
devaluation that took place in 1990−1991, altogether by more than 110 percent. It 
finally was pegged at 28 Czechoslovak koruny per U.S. dollar (Holub and Tůma 
2006).480 Devaluations were designed to encourage domestic exports and provide 
protection from fast penetration by imports of the domestic market. Thus, exchange 
rate, rather than tariffs, has been initially used to maintain external competitiveness.481 
The magnitude of devaluations, much below purchasing power parity, gave the 
government considerable time to protect domestic enterprises from foreign 
competition (Drábek 1995: 252–4 and 263). Devaluations made the environment for 
domestic industrial producers “softer.” Domestic SOBs also benefited from this 
                                                 
479 Additional factors were cited to support the case for currency devaluation including low level of 
foreign exchange reserves in the environment of liberalized foreign exchange flows and danger of a 
persistent real exchange rate appreciation as a result of high inflation (Hrnčíř 1999: 317). 
 
480 There was a lack of consensus concerning the initial exchange rate level, as well. Suggestions ranged 
from 16 Czechoslovak koruna per U.S. dollar (near the existing commercial rate) to 35-38 
Czechoslovak koruna per U.S. dollar (close to the illegal parallel and shadow market rates) (Hrnčíř 
1999: 317). 
 
481 Still, in addition to devaluations, the government also imposed a 20 percent import duty for selected 
commodities (Dědek 2000: 20, fn. 8).  
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exchange rate cushion. The large 55 percent devaluation, introduced in October 1990, 
was intended to protect banks that had experienced deteriorating liquidity (Hrnčíř 
1999: 319).  
 Clearly, a fixed regime and low level of currency favored domestic exporters 
who benefited from a highly competitive exchange rate and protection against 
exchange rate risk, as well as domestic banks with vested interests in the profitability 
of their corporate clients.482 These devaluations have proved to be excessive, however. 
They contributed to inflation shock and prevented the government from making a 
fixed exchange rate an effective anchor.483  
 
Voucher Privatization and Foreign Capital 
Alongside stabilization measures, the Scenario of Economic Reform also 
endorsed voucher or mass privatization as the primary privatization method. One of 
the principal motives behind the voucher privatization program was to build national 
capitalism by excluding foreign participation.484 The Czech reformers warned that 
gradual privatization would encourage “spontaneous privatization” favoring the 
previous class of industrial nomenklatura which would sell state assets. This would 
lead to “a clearance sale of national property abroad” that was economically and 
politically unfeasible (Orenstein 1998: 9 and 2001: 77–79, Appel 2004: 55–56). It was 
                                                 
482 Author’s interview with Pavel Mertlík, former Minister of Finance (1999−2001), Chief Economist in 
Raiffeisenbank, June 16, 2006, Prague. 
 
483 Author’s interview with Oldřich Dědek, Professor of Economics at Charles University, former 
Advisor to the Governor of the CNB and to the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Vice-Governor 
of the CNB (1999−2005), June 12 and 10, 2006, Prague; author’s interview with Miroslav Hrnčíř, 
Advisor to the Governor of CNB and former member of the CNB Board, June 7, 2006, Prague. 
 
484 Additionally, the goal of the voucher method was motivated by its speed, the lack of domestic 
capital, and the intention to create the first (but not the last) domestic owners of capital. Author’s 
interview with Oldřich Deděk, Professor of Economics at Charles University, former Advisor to the 
Governor of the CNB and to the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Vice-Governor of the CNB 
(1999−2005), June 12 and 10, 2006, Prague. 
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uncertain if public opinion would tolerate mass transfers of national property to 
foreigners (Ježek 2006: 45). A particular resentment was felt towards Germans: 
Czechs feared the prospect of becoming low-wage subcontractors for German 
enterprises (Horowitz and Petráš 2003: 257). As Klvačová (1991: 1) observed, 
Czechoslovak privatization was characterized by an aversion (manifested above all 
from the side of real and potential entrepreneurs) to the sale of national property to 
foreign capital.” 485 Klaus tried to promote the so-called “Czech way,” or national 
capitalism favoring domestic over foreign capital.486 The only enterprise privatized 
through direct sales to a foreign investor, prior to the implementation of voucher 
privatization, was Volkswagen’s deal with the car manufacturer Škoda Mladá 
Boleslav.  
 The Klaus privatization team included his deputy and his former colleague 
from the Institute of Economic Forecasting Dušan Tříska and Tomáš Ježek (who later 
became the first Minister for Privatization), the three fathers of Czech (mass) voucher 
privatization.487 They drafted a Large Privatization Law, approved by the Federal 
Parliament in February 1991.488 The law promoted widespread, speedy, and free 
                                                 
485 The government’s reluctance to allow the entry of foreign investors has historical origins. In 1920, 
after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire, Czechoslovakia introduced a Nostrification Law that 
required enterprises with assets in Czechoslovakia to incorporate there (Tschoegl 2003: 48). 
 
486 See Myant (2003) for an analysis of the “Czech way” of transformation. 
 
487 In fact, Jan Švejnar, a Czech émigré economist, then teaching at the University of Pittsburgh (and 
currently at the University of Michigan) became credited with introducing a version of mass 
privatization into the Czech reform debate. In February 1990, Švejnar presented a paper proposing rapid 
privatization of property at a meeting of economists on reform strategies in the Kolodeje castle outside 
of Prague. Author’s interview with Karel Kříž, former Advisor to the Chairman of the Executive 
Committee of the National Property Fund, June 5, 2006, Prague; author’s interview with Tomáš Ježek, 
former Minister of Privatization (1990−1992) and President of the National Property Fund 
(1992−1994), June 20, 2006, Prague. 
 
488 Privatization in Czechoslovakia was pursued under three programs: restitution, small-scale 
privatization, and large-scale privatization through vouchers. The first two programs started already in 
1990. Restitution dealt with private property that had been nationalized by the communist regime after 
1948. There have been at least 200 thousand claims for agricultural land and 70 thousand apartment 
buildings to be returned to their former owners. Small-scale privatization, which officially ended by 
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transfer of property rather than direct sales.489 The government proceeded with 
voucher privatization in spite of its disagreement with the World Bank, which initially 
did not support this privatization method (Drábek 1995: 247).490 Trade unions and 
Social Democrats championed management employee buyouts, wherein the enterprise 
would be owned by workers and management.491 
The Ministry of Privatization, responsible for evaluating privatization plans, 
and the National Property Fund (Fond Narodního Majetku, FNM) were established; 
they were charged to administer state property prior to privatization and to implement 
the privatization of this property. The members of the FNM Board were mainly 
bankers because they were considered to be the only credible “suppliers” of financial 
experts at the time (Ježek 2006: 67–68). The process of large-scale privatization 
through vouchers started in spring 1991. The largest enterprises were transformed into 
joint stock companies, the shares of which were distributed within voucher 
privatization.492 All Czech and Slovak citizens over the age of 18 could buy a package 
                                                                                                                                            
1993, concerned small economic units like retail stores, restaurants, and small industrial enterprises sold 
at public auction, while bidding was restricted to resident citizens and was mostly financed by domestic 
banks (Kočenda 1999). 
 
489 The process of public legitimization of voucher privatization was fast: in May 1990, the Government 
of National Understanding approved a schedule to launch voucher privatization; in September 1990, the 
Federal Parliament approved voucher privatization as the main privatization method in the Scenario of 
Economic Reform; and in February 1991, the Federal Assembly passed the Large Privatization Law 
(the Act on the Conditions of Transfer of State Property to Other Persons no. 92/1991 Coll.) (Schwartz 
2006: 129). 
 
490 There were some disagreements among the privatizers over the privatization methods. Deputy 
Finance Minister Tříska‘s formulated the so-called “97+3” proposal, supported by Klaus, suggesting 
that 97 percent of the shares should be included in voucher privatization and only 3 percent of shares 
for restitution of private property to original owners. Instead, Ježek called for the use of mixed 
privatization methods, believing that certain industries would benefit from foreign strategic investments 
(Appel 2004: 53-60, Husák 1997). For some excellent examinations of privatization in the Czech 
Republic, see Ježek (2006), Coffee (1996), Appel (2004), Schwartz (2006), Orenstein (2004). 
 
491 Author’s interview with Milena Horčicová, Director of the Department for Financial Policies, 
Ministry of Finance, June 15, 2008, Prague. 
 
492 The Czechoslovak government selected around six thousand large enterprises for privatization: 
4,400 in the Czech Republic and 1,600 in Slovakia (Švejnar and Singer 1994: 44). Enterprises were 
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of vouchers for a nominal fee.493 The voucher holders could use these vouchers to 
acquire shares in enterprises in a public auction. Voucher privatization excluded 
foreigners and prohibited foreigners from purchasing vouchers from the voucher 
holders.494 The populist distribution of vouchers, promising their holders large profits, 
helped ODS to win the elections in 1992 and 1996.495 
 In the first wave of mass privatization (five rounds) that started in October 
1992 and ended in June 1993, 988 enterprises participated. In the second wave (six 
rounds) that started in November 1993 and ended in December 1994 and took place 
exclusively in the Czech Republic (the Mečiar government cancelled it in Slovakia), 
861 enterprises participated (Coffee 1996: 123). In 1996, the government closed the 
Ministry of Privatization but transferred its responsibilities to the FNM and the 
Ministry of Finance. By the end of 1997, 58 percent of large enterprises had been 
privatized through the voucher system, while only 14 percent were privatized through 
direct sales (EBRD Transition Report 1998: 162). 
 In spite of this impressive scale of enterprises that was privatized through 
vouchers, the government did not privatize the enterprises entirely and kept its 
                                                                                                                                            
divided into four groups: enterprises to be privatized in the first and second waves of large-scale 
privatization; enterprises to be privatized later; and enterprises to be liquidated. 
 
493 In both waves of privatization, each participant could purchase a book of 1,000 voucher points for a 
fee of thousand Czechoslovak koruna (equivalent to 35 U.S. dollars), or about the average weekly wage 
in 1992. A large number of citizens participated in the voucher scheme: 5.95 million (and 2.59 in the 
Slovak republic) in the first wave; and 6.16 million out of a population of 10 million in the Czech 
Republic in the second wave. In the first wave of voucher privatization, 92.8 percent of shares were 
sold. After the mass privatization program was completed, almost 75 percent of productive capacity 
was transferred to the private sector (Kočenda 1999: 24). 
 
494 It was also difficult for a foreign buyer’s project to get approved because it had to be approved by 
the government of the respective republic, while projects proposed by domestic buyers were decided by 
the founding ministry and the Ministry of Privatization (Kočenda 1999: 4). There were 442 sales to 
foreign strategic investors registered outside of voucher privatization, but these were mostly small 
enterprises (Claessens and Djankov 1999: 500).  
 
495 Author’s interview with Petr Dufek, Director of Macroeconomic Research, Czechoslovak 
Commercial Bank, June 16, 2006, Prague.  
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involvement through the FNM in a large number of enterprises and banks. The 
government maintained control over enterprises through the presence of top ministry 
officials in their statutory bodies. It was able to exercise its influence through various 
means, for example, through the number of shares or the portion of the state property 
that was represented by voting rights. The government held “golden shares” in over 20 
percent of enterprises, allowing it to veto any major changes in an enterprise. Finally, 
the government kept majority or controlling stakes in forty “strategic enterprises” 
(banks, mines, energy, insurance) (Kreuzbergova 2006: 168, Palda 1997: 87). The 
government repeatedly tried to prevent bankruptcies of strategic enterprises that 
employed a large number of workers (Appel 2004: 64), so after voucher privatization, 
the state still maintained its influence over a significant part of the Czech economy.496  
It was not only the government that shaped privatization and its outcomes. 
Nomenklatura managers who had access to resources and capital were in a position to 
influence the course of privatization in their favor. The Ministry of Finance reassured 
incumbent industrialists that voucher privatization would not undermine the 
industrialists’ control over enterprises but on the contrary, the dispersed ownership 
structure, which does not translate into active owners, would allow them greater 
independence in managing their enterprises. As a result, while the reformers officially 
claimed that the voucher method was a way to weaken the former industrial 
nomeklatura, it was actually the favored choice for managers of state-owned 
enterprises (McMaster 2001: 27, Appel 2004: 131). For many nomenklatura managers, 
voucher privatization was also a protection from being taken over by foreign owners, 
who would replace them with Western managers (Schwartz 2006: 206).  
                                                 
496 This paragraph relies mostly on the account of Kočenda (1999). In 1998, the state was still involved 
in 369 companies and the relative book value of all enterprises, where it has preserved a share over 50 
percent, reached 41 percent.  
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 Finally, as I show in the subsequent section, the voucher method of divestiture 
of state assets also ensured that large SOBs established themselves as dominant 
players in the transition politics for two reasons. First, the largest SOBs became, 
through their investment funds, the core investors in a large part of Czech industry. 
Thus, the government maintained an ownership position indirectly in large blocks of 
nominally privatized enterprises through bank-owned IPFs. Second, banks represented 
almost the only source of domestic capital given the underdeveloped capital market 
and reluctance about foreign capital (Kreuzbergova 2006: 163–4). 
Banking Socialism (1990−1997) 
 The banking sector in Czechoslovakia during the communist era consisted of a 
state-owned monobank, the State Bank of Czechoslovakia (SBCS). SBCS served as 
both the central bank as well as the institution for channeling commercial credit and 
providing depository and payment services to state-owned enterprises and four 
specialized banks. The first specialized bank was the Czechoslovak State Savings 
Bank, which split into the Czech Savings Bank (Česká Spořitelna, CS) operating in 
the Czech Republic and the Slovak Savings Bank (Slovenská Sporiteľňa) operating in 
the Slovak Republic after Czechoslovakia adopted a federal structure in 1968. These 
two banks provided depository services and extended credit to individuals. The second 
bank, the Investment Bank, later the Investment and Postal Bank (Investiční a 
Poštovní Banka, IPB), was established in 1948 to promote development and 
investments involving foreign enterprises.497 Third, the Czechoslovak Trade Bank 
(Československá Obchodní Banka, CSOB) was a specialized bank established in 1965 
as a foreign trade bank. Finally, the fourth specialized bank was Živnostenská Banka 
(ZB), established in 1868 to focus on small business and to conduct retail foreign 
                                                 




currency operations. All these banks remained under state control at the beginning of 
the transition. The central bank and commercial bank functions of SBCS were later 
divided into the Commercial Bank (Komerční Banka, KB) in the Czech Republic and 
the General Credit Bank (Všeobecná a Úverová Banka,VUB) in the Slovak Republic. 
Reforms of the Czechoslovak banking sector began on January 1, 1990 with the 
establishment of a two-tier banking sector, liberalization of bank entry, and voucher 
privatization of banks and industries.498 
 The first banking legislation was adopted two days before the Velvet 
Revolution and was simply a modified product of the communist regime. The rules for 
establishing a new bank were very liberal. Enterprises were able to create their own 
banks using a bank loan. The minimum basic capital required for establishing a new 
bank was only 50 million Czechoslovak koruna (1.8 million U.S. dollars at the 1990 
exchange rate) (Mejstřík, Dvořáková, and Neprašová 2004: 23). As a result of 
inadequate financial regulation, there were already 23 banks registered in December 
1990 and the number of banks jumped to 57 by mid-1995, peaking at the end of 1991–
1993 (Procházka 1996: 26). Most of these new private banks were small, 
undercapitalized and inefficient. They usually offered the highest interest rates to 
attract deposits and engaged in questionable insider lending (Nollen, Kudrna and 
Pazderník 2005: 368). 
 The first post-communist law on the central bank also reflected a centrally 
planned approach on the part of its authors. As a result, the central bank remained 
entirely subordinated to the government until February 1992 when a new law took 
effect.499 The new law granted the SBCS independence as well as the authority to 
                                                 
498 See Act No. 158/1989 Coll. On Banks and Savings Banks and Act No. 130/1989 Coll. on SBCS, 
passed on November 15, 1989 (coming into force in January 1990). For detailed analyses of the 
evolution of the Czech banking system, see Mervart (1998), Mejstřík (2004). 
 
499 Act No. 22/1992 on SBCS. 
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supervise and license commercial banks. After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on 
January 1, 1993, the Czech National Bank (Česká národní banka, CNB) became the 
successor of SBCS. The new central bank law further strengthened the political 
independence of the CNB (Soukup, Taci, and Matoušek 2004: 172–173).500 The 
institutional powers of the CNB were strong: it was made responsible for setting 
monetary policy (Article 2) as well as for “proclaiming” the exchange rate for the 
Czech currency vis-à-vis foreign currencies (Art 35) (Koch 1997: 7). In addition, the 
main goal of CNB, to ensure the stability of the national currency, was incorporated 
into the 1993 Constitution. 
 Originally, banks were to be excluded from voucher privatization and instead 
were sold via direct sales. But the Czechoslovak (and the Czech) governments finally 
choose not to sell off the “Big Four” SOBs (KB, CS, IPB, and CSOB) to foreign 
investors and instead to include three of them in voucher privatization among the 
strategic enterprises, with the state retaining large shareholdings. The privatization 
program specified that the government was to retain control of at least a 40 percent 
stake in the banks and to limit foreign investments to a maximum of 25 percent, with 
no single foreign investor being allowed to acquire more than a 10 percent stake 
(Kreuzbergova 2006: 167). At the end, only a minority of shares of the big banks was 
put into voucher privatization, and the government retained control as the single 
largest shareholder with stakes ranging from 47 percent to 60 percent. Although the 
state lost its majority in IPB in 1993, it still kept a significant share of 30 percent until 
1998 (table 7.2). While some banks had their own plans for privatization involving 
institutional and foreign strategic investors, they quickly acquiesced on and even 
                                                                                                                                            
 
500 Act No. 6/1993 on CNB stipulated that the Governor and other members of the Bank Board could be 
appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic, only.  
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promoted the idea that they should be included in voucher privatization. Banks may 
have reasoned that after voucher privatization was completed, they would be able to 
increase capitalization by issuing new shares for cash (Mortimer 1995: 103–104).  
 
Table 7.2: Share of State Assets in Large SOBs  
  
Financial Institution State share (as of 
April 26, 1996) 
Investiční a Poštovní Banka 36.30 
Komerční Banka 48.74 
Československá a Obchodní 
Banka 
90.10 
Česká Spořitelna 45.00 
Česká pojišťovna 26.27 
 
Source: Schwartz (2006: 209). 
 Klaus espoused free-market orthodoxy but he diverged from it in designing 
banking reforms. From the outset, Klaus’s economic reform program was conceived 
as a strategy for national development, appealing to an old Czech tradition from the 
19th century when the development of the Czech state (within the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire) was pursued by promoting Czech businesses through Czech banks (Orenstein 
1997: 9).501 The government was reluctant to sell the domestic banks (“family silver”) 
to foreign investors. The government’s plan for big Czech banks was that the banks 
should finance the transition. Banks were practically the only source of enterprise 
                                                 
501 Teichova (quoted in Rao and Hirsch 2003: 260, fn. 3) notes that during the inter-war period, 
“numerous industrial companies clustered around big banks, tied to them either by credits or direct 
investment. In this way, large joint-stock banks threw a net of relationships of various degrees of 
dependency over almost all branches of production in the country.” Nationality-based credit unions 
financed various agricultural development projects, and the Czech grand bourgeoisie developed new 
heavy industries, such as Škoda Works in Plzeň with strong links with the Czech banks, namely ZB, 
which became a powerful national symbol (Teichova 1988 quoted in Orenstein 2001: 77).  
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finance because privatization did not bring new capital to enterprises, capital markets 
were underdeveloped, and foreign investments restricted (Kreuzbergova 2006). 
Because of this crucial role that banks had in the transition, the government envisaged 
keeping them under state control during the transformation of industry in order to play 
an active role in credit policy. Klaus intended to preserve the soft credit system and 
was reluctant to sell majority shares of the Czech banks fearing that new foreign 
owners would conduct conservative, restrictive credit policies vis-à-vis domestic 
enterprises that would lead to high unemployment.502 Snyder and Kormendi (1997), 
who thoroughly studied the KB case, explain that the government’s decision against a 
meaningful privatization of this most important Czech bank was to preserve the 
channels to pursue credit allocation for its politically vested clients.503 In Klaus’ 
words:504 
 
The reason for the delay of big banks’ privatization did not consist of 
ideological fears. It was a purely practical consideration that private banks will 
behave too prudently … and de facto not dip into the real economy …. It is 
possible to be such a parasite … I was always very afraid that while attempting 
to follow their private interests, the loan channels would be blocked …. 
 
 Therefore, although the 1992 banking law allowed foreign banks to establish 
branches in the former Czechoslovakia, foreign investors could not acquire controlling 
stakes in major Czech SOBs. The prevalent strategy for foreign bank entry in the 
                                                 
502 Author’s interview with Tomáš Ježek, former Minister of Privatization (1990−1992) and President 
of the National Property Fund (1992−1994), June 20, 2006, Prague. 
 
503 For a detailed account of the privatization of KB, see also Dlouhý (2004). 
 
504 Klaus quoted in Nollen, Kudrna and Pazderník (2005: 366). Klaus made similar comments during 
his luncheon address at the Cato Institute in March 1992.  
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initial years of transition was to set a branch.505 After the end of 1993 for more than 
two years, the government applied a moratorium on licensing foreign banks to limit 
the exposure of domestic banks to competition (Schwartz 1997). The official 
explanation was that domestic banks needed “breathing space” to consolidate and 
restructure (Konopielko 1999). By the end of 1996, foreign bank assets in the Czech 
banking sector amounted to only 8 percent of total assets. 
 The only Czech bank privatized to a foreign strategic investor in the early 
1990s was a small bank, ZB. In 1992, the German BHF-BANK acquired a 40 percent 
stake in ZB. The new bank owner did not tolerate imprudent lending.506 Klaus strongly 
disapproved of the privatization of ZB: he called it a “horrifying example” and 
criticized the bank for being “too prudent” and unwilling to “dirty its hands with the 
real economy” (Kreuzbergova 2006: 177, fn. 2).  
Investment Privatization Funds, Cross-Ownership, and Moral Hazard 
 Contrary to expectations, voucher privatization resulted in a highly 
concentrated structure of control rights due to the emergence of IPFs controlled by 
financial institutions, particularly by large SOBs and insurance companies, as well as 
by privately-owned emerging financial groups that accumulated their capital during 
the privatization.507 After the first wave of privatization, the top thirteen privatization 
                                                 
505 Among the first foreign banks that established branches were Bank Austria, Creditanstalt, BNP-
Dresdner, and Citibank. 
 
506 The IFC acquired 12 percent and private individuals and Czech investment funds acquired the 
remaining 48 percent. In 1998, Bankgesellschaft Berlin took over BHF-BANK’s stake and increased its 
ownership to 85 percent. Finally, in 2001 Bankgesellschaft Berlin sold its stake to Italy’s Unicredito 
(Tschoegl 2003: 48). 
 
507 Managers of large SOBs perceived IPFs controlled by non-bank institutions as vehicles for outsiders 
to acquire their bank shares. Some financial groups began to raid the shares of enterprises held in IPFs 
of the major Czech banks. The prominent example was the Motoinvest group, a shady nonbank fund, 
which acquired substantial stakes in the IPFs of KB, CSOB, ZB, and Agrobanka. Takeover threats 
seemed to be an important motivation for SOBs to establish their own IPFs. IB was the first bank to 
establish an investment subsidiary in November 1990 before any legal provisions concerning IPFs were 
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funds gained control of 55 percent vouchers, enabling these funds to control 75 
percent of the board seats in Czech enterprises privatized in the first wave (Appel and 
Gould 2000: 1114; Appel 2004: 131) (table 7.3).508 Out of the top IPFs, nine were 
founded and controlled by the major domestic banks and attracted vouchers to control 
nearly 30 percent of the shares of privatized enterprises (Appel 2004: 62). The state, 
represented by FNM, was a dominant investor in bank-led IPFs. Because the 
government owned controlling stakes in banks, it retained a large ownership stake and 
the potential for involvement in Czech industry. Some note that privatization through 
vouchers actually led to “renationalization” by SOBs (Mejstřík, Dvořáková, and 
Neprašová 2004: 33–34).  
 Initially, there was a complete absence of regulation concerning the 
establishment and functioning of IPFs until the adoption of the Law on Investment 
Funds and Companies in April 1992. However, this regulatory framework came late, 
was inadequate, and was not properly enforced.509 As a result, over 450 IPFs and 44 
pension funds were issued a license by the Federal Ministry of Finance. While the law 
prohibited IPFs established by a bank from purchasing the shares of its founder or 
other banks, banks circumvented this regulation by setting up investment companies 
as wholly owned subsidiaries that established IPFs, rather than banks themselves (Rao 
and Hirsch 2003: 261).  
                                                                                                                                            
enacted, and later set up eleven funds. The largest IPF was established by CS (Rao and Hirsch 2003, 
Schwartz 2006). 
 
508 IPFs acquired 71 percent of total vouchers after the first wave of privatization and 63.5 percent in the 
second wave (Mejstřík 1997). In Slovakia after the first wave, the top fifteen Slovak privatization funds 
obtained 40 percent of vouchers (Appel 2004: 131).  
 
509 IPFs were originally established under the Government Decree on Investment Companies and 
Privatization Investment Funds No. 383/1991 of 5 September 1991. The decree defined IPFs as joint 
stock companies (roughly equivalent to a U.S. limited liability corporation) established by a founder to 
collect independent citizens’ vouchers and invest these vouchers in a mass privatization scheme. Unlike 
its Czech counterpart, the Slovak Ministry of Privatization adopted a legal framework strictly regulating 




Table 7.3: Largest IPFs in the First Wave of Mass Privatization 
 
Group       Shares Held 
       (mm)             Total Shares in Funds 
          (%) 
 
SIS, Czech Savings Bank    21.4   12.2 
PIAS (První investiční akciová společnost, IPB)  13.6   7.27 
Harvard Capital Consulting Investment Firm*  15.2   8.56 
VUB        12.0   6.81 
IKS, Komerční banka     11.9   6.78 
KIS, Česká pojišťovna     7.6   4.33 
Investment firm Slovenské Investície*   6.4   3.66 
Slovak Savings Bank and VSZ (steel company)  7.7   4.48 
Investment firm of Creditanstalt Bank*   3.6   2.05 
Slovenská investiční banka    4.6   2.63 
PPF*       4.9   2.80 
Živnostenská banka*     1.09   0.07 
Slovak Insurance Company    4.4   2.48 
Agrobanka*      3.9   2.24 
Top 14 groups      119.1   67.71 
Total Investment Privatization Funds   175.0   100.0 
*Fully private IPFs.  
 
Source: Marcinčin, Mejstřík, Mládek calculations from data of the Czech Fund of National 
Property in JP Morgan Overview of the Czech Banking Sector, December 2003: 69. 
 
 Competition in the banking sector was therefore further restricted by cross 
ownership, for banking investment subsidiaries acquired significant portions of shares 
not only in industrial enterprises but also in other banks. For example, KB and IPB 
together owned 12.7 percent of the shares of CS, and CS and IPB together owned 15.7 
percent of the shares of KB (table 7.4). In addition, some large enterprises also 
controlled IPFs or owned large stakes in other enterprises. The voucher privatization 
thus did not transfer property rights from the state to private hands but created a 
“recombinant property” through IFPs. This state of affairs resulted in the prevalence of 
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cross-ownership networks of banks, industries, and the state and the prominent 
position of banks in these networks (Stark 1996, Stark and Bruszt 1998).510 
 
 
Table 7.4: Cross-ownership in the Czech and Slovak Banking Sectors 
 
Names of financial groups 
of investment co-owners of 
shares 
Percentage of shares of financial institutions privatized through 
vouchers (in %) 
 CS IPB KB CP ZB VUB IRB SP 
Česká spořitelna (CS) − 0.5 4.9 2.0 5.0 − − −
Investiční a poštovní banka 
(IPB) 
8.8 17.0 10.8 4.1 10.4 − 0.4 − 
Komerční banka (KB) 3.9 − 3.4 − − 4.2 − −
Česká pojišťovna (CP) 0.2 3.0 0.7 1.0 4.0 − − −
Živnostenská banka (ZB) − − − − − − − −
Všeobecná úverová banka 
(VUB) 
1.6 3.5 4.3 − 2.5 10.8 4.1 − 
Investičná a Rozvojová 
Banka (IRB) 
0.8 6.9 1.1 − 0.6 18.8 18.8 15.8 
Slovenská poisťovňa (SP) 0.3 0.4 0.1 − 0.3 0.9 − 4.7 
Československá obchodní 
banka 
0.2 1.1 0.3 − 0.6 − − − 
Harvard Capital and 
Consulting 
12.9 − 17.6 5.0 − − − − 
Agrobanka 0.6 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.4 − −
PPF − 0.6 − − 0.3 − − −
SSK 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.1 − 3.0 − −
Total of 13 groups 29.6 35.0 43.9 12.3 24.3 38.1 23.3 20.5 
Total percentage of shares 
privatized through 
vouchers 
37.0 49.6 53.0 15.0 41.1 49.2 50.1 48.0 
 
Source: Mejstřík, Dvořáková, Neprašová (2004: 57). 
 
In sum, the voucher privatization and the financial development policies of the Czech 
government led to so-called banking socialism,511 which is a financial system 
characterized by indirect control through IPFs of privatized enterprises by banks, 
which remained owned by the government (figure 7.1 illustrates a complex web of 
                                                 
510 Some Czech commentators call the outcome of the voucher method “privatization incest.” Author’s 
interview with Petr Dufek, Director of Macroeconomic Research of CSOB, June 16, 2006, Prague. 
 
511 This term was used by most of my interviewees as well as in the secondary literature to characterize 
the development of the financial system in the Czech Republic, which was inherently associated with 
mass privatization. 
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relationships among the government, banks, and enterprises in banking socialism). 
The outcome was a pervasive moral hazard dilemma, which rose from the role of the 
government in the financial sector. Banks became an instrument of governmental 
policy. The government encouraged expansive bank lending to prevent unemployment 
and bankruptcy of insolvent enterprises in return for the promise of direct bailouts to 
banks in case of distress or indirect bailouts through their corporate borrowers, as well 
as regulatory bank protection. This policy helped the ODS-led governments to remain 
highly popular and to neutralize political opposition to reform. 512 The second source 
of a moral hazard stemmed from the dual role of banks as the owners and creditors of 










Source: Adapted from Kreuzbergova (2006: 165). 
 
Figure 7.1: Banking socialism (1990–1997)  
 
                                                 
512 I disagree with McDermott’s (2007) argument who characterized the Czech approach to financial 
reforms in the 1990s as a case of “extreme depoliticization.” On the contrary, this chapter shows that 
the approach of the ODS-led government to banking reform was highly politicized. 
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 After voucher privatization, the Czech financial system remained dominated 
by the “Big Four,” considered to be “the heart of the economy.”513 These banks and 
the Consolidation Bank accounted for 76 percent of banking assets, 83 percent of 
deposits, and 80 percent of loans in 1995. They employed 80 percent of the banking 
workforce. Many of the newly established private domestic banks were also controlled 
by SOBs (Snyder and Kormendi 1997: 110, Desai 1995: 24). 
 The cross-ownership structures provided the government with multiple 
channels to influence the policies of banks (Nollen, Kudrna, and Pazderník 2005: 366, 
Snyder and Kormendi 197: 105). The government exercised its ownership officially 
through the FNM, which placed its representatives on bank boards. FNM represented 
the government at shareholder meetings and exerted direct control over the bank’s 
senior management. FNM could replace the bank’s management, determine its 
dividends, define strategic objectives, and intervene in credit policies. The supervisory 
board of FNM itself was nominated by the Ministry of Finance, which also held board 
memberships in the banks. Furthermore, members of the Czech parliament represented 
the interests of its constituents, mainly state-owned enterprises, which needed loans 
for operational financing as well as for restructuring. The last potential channel of 
influence represented the central bank in its role of regulator. Nonetheless, the CNB 
during the governorship of Josef Tošovský had established itself as a conservative, 





                                                 
513 Author’s interview with Miroslav Hrnčíř, Advisor to the Governor of CNB, former member of the 
CNB Board, June 7, 2006, Prague.  
 




Table 7.5: Governors of the Czech National Bank, 1989−2007 
 
Governor Tenure Background 
Josef Tošovský December 29, 1989 appointed 
SBCS President, SBCS 
Governor from April 21, 1992, 
January 1, 1993 appointed 
Governor of CNB 
Central banker (State Bank of 
Czechoslovakia) 
Pavel Kysilka, Vice-Governor 
delegated the management of 
CNB 
December 17, 1997−June 23, 
1998 when Tošovský holds the 
office of Prime Minister 
Central banker (State Bank of 
Czechoslovakia) 
Zdeněk Tůma December 1, 2000 Financier  
 
 
Source: Czech National Bank 
 
 The Klaus governing party, ODS, had close relationships with IPFs, shady 
businessmen, and big banks (Schwarz 2006).515 The managers of SOBs were members 
of former banking-industrial nomenklatura. They came from the socialist monobank 
and retained their positions until the late 1990s (Palda 1997: 89). For example, 
Richard Salzmann, a former senior executive in SBCS, was appointed in early 1991 as 
Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of KB. He was a prominent member of the 
ODS political party and a member of the Klaus group. The fact that he was also the 
first chairman of the Prague Stock Exchange represented a conflict of interest between 
the regulators and regulated institutions (Schwartz 2006: 245). 
 The Czech government, in its role of principal, and the banks’ senior 
management, as the government’s agents, followed an “implicit contract” based on 
public statements and personnel appointments rather than on direct political 
                                                 
515 According to some commentators, all Czech ministers of finance had direct relationships with 
commercial bankers. Author’s interview with Pavel Štěpánek, Deputy Director of the Czech Banking 
Association, June 20, 2006, Prague. For example, there were regular dinners among Prime Minister 
Klaus, Finance Minister Kočárník, NBS governor Tošovský, and the chairmen of the big four banks. 
Author’s interview with Ivan Kočárník, former Minister of Finance (1992-1997), June 14, 2006, 
Prague. 
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instructions. The contract focused on government objectives that involved subsidizing 
key political constituencies (Snyder and Kormendi 1997). Under the assumption that 
the government would eventually bail them out, banks were granting credits to 
financially distressed enterprises and these enterprises continued to sell products to 
each other on credit to avoid insolvency. 
 Moreover, the government decided to extend “privatization” loans through 
SOBs, in exchange for equity, to domestic entrepreneurs in order to provide them with 
enough financial resources to privatize state-owned enterprises.516 While credit limits 
and high interest rates were used as elements of anti-inflationary policy, credits for 
privatization were exempted from credit ceilings to stimulate industries (Drábek, 
Janáček, and Tůma 1994: 169–170). As the World Bank Report (1999) noted, a 
significant part of the privatization of enterprises was leveraged, thus generating 
enterprises with no capital because shares of an acquired enterprise were usually used 
as collateral for granted loans. As a result, industrial enterprises became overly 
dependent on banks and (short-term) bank credit. The big SOBs were able to influence 
a significant part of the enterprise sector because they were practically the only source 
of financing in the country. Banks were tied to enterprises not only by large 
outstanding loans but credit relationships that often got turned into ownership 
relationships through debt-equity swaps.517 Large SOBs acquired indirectly significant 
share portions of many domestic enterprises. 
                                                 
516 The Scenario of Economic Reforms did not foresee an important role for the banks in privatization, 
however. According to the Scenario, it was “impossible to assure that the domestic banks will extend 
credit to the domestic population for the purchase of property due to the banks’ capital inadequacies” 
(1990: 17, quoted in Schwartz 2006: fn. 22).  
 
517 Alternatively, as Mlčoch (quoted in Kreuzbergerova 2006: 169) explains, when an enterprise capital 
became negative due to strong indebtedness with the bank, the bank controlled the enterprise as if it 
possessed it, resulting in a situation of a de facto ownership. 
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 In their dual role as the owners and creditors of industrial enterprises, banks 
were facing conflicts of interest. Of course, bank as creditors should apply prudent 
credit criteria. However, banks as owners might want to promote the competitiveness 
of enterprises or prevent the closing down of failing enterprises and thus would grant 
credit under lax credit conditions, relax credit repayments, or roll over loans (Nollen, 
Kudrna, and Pazdernik 2005: 370). The banks often provided “co-owner loans” to 
enterprises: if a borrower had difficulty paying back a loan to a co-owner bank, the 
bank provided another loan rather than initiating bankruptcy proceedings. Banks have 
sometimes used their dual role as creditors and owners to extract rents from a healthy 
enterprise to bail out failing projects (Desai and Plocková 1997). The new small 
private banks that emerged in the environment of weak regulation and bank 
supervision provided the so-called “tunneling” loans that represented “gifts” to the 
borrowers who were either the bank’s managers or shareholders themselves. As one 
Czech commentator pointed out, “The government did not privatize the banks but the 
borrowers privatized the money” of the banks (Havel 2004). 
 Imprudent credit practices of domestic banks, whose decisions reflected 
political interests, thus manifested themselves by lending to risky enterprises and 
rolling over troubled loans to politically important clients, instead of exerting pressure 
on these delinquent debtors. Credit and investment activities of banks comprised a 
substantial moral hazard because they were financed from deposits; therefore, neither 
enterprises nor banks risked their own capital (Kreuzbergova 2006: 170). 
 Managers of SOBs extended a large number of “soft” loans in order to meet 
the expectations of government politicians who appointed them in return for 
government regulatory protection, including protection from foreign competition.518 
                                                 




The regulatory approach of Prime Minister Klaus and the Ministry of Finance, which 
concentrated much of the regulatory authority, derived from a belief in the philosophy 
of laissez faire and the conviction that the state should abstain from close regulation of 
markets (Schwartz 2006: 212–213). Banks also lobbied state officials against bank and 
capital market regulation.519 As a result, the Czech regulatory framework in the areas 
of capital regulations, loan insider lending, loan collateralization and classification 
stringency, and effective bankruptcy procedures was either weak or absent (Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 2002).520 Banks often intervened on behalf of their corporate 
clients, particularly in the area of bankruptcy legislation. The government anti-
bankruptcy policy was based on the banks’ liberal credit policies toward the insolvent 
state-owned enterprises in order to prevent unemployment. “Too big to fail” 
considerations united Czech bankers and Czech industrialists on the same side when 
lobbying for regulation, subsidies, or loan forgiveness (Schwartz 2006: 249).  
 In sum, as I will illustrate in the following section, banking socialism 
generated incentives for moral hazard in the financial sector, whose main symptoms 
were soft bank credit, the accumulation of large shares of bad loans, insufficient 
financial regulation, the abuse of insider trading, non-transparent transfers of 
ownership, and various forms of asset stripping in privatized enterprises (so-called 
tunnelling), which gravitated to financial instability and unsustainable policy for a 
currency peg.  
                                                 
519 Author’s interview with Jan Mládek, former Minister of Agriculture (2005-2006), First Deputy 
Minister of Finance (1999-2001), and Deputy Minister of the Federal Ministry of Economy (1991-92), 
June 9, 2006, Prague. The leading role in these lobbying efforts was played by IPB because its 
Chairman Libor Procházka enjoyed a close personal relationship with Klaus. Author’s interview with 
Tomáš Ježek, former Minister of Privatization of the Czech Republic (1990−1992) and President of the 
National Property Fund (1992−1994), June 20, 2006, Prague. 
 
520 Although the government enacted a bankruptcy law in 1991, subsequent measures prevented this law 
from being applied until the middle of 1993 (Koch 1997: 14). 
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The End of the Czech Miracle: Financial Turmoil in 1997  
 A fixed exchange rate and the restrictive monetary policy of the CNB were 
successful in stabilizing inflation at around a ten percent level in 1992. Growth 
resumed after a temporary stagnation in 1993, a central government budget was close 
to being balanced, and unemployment was low. After the “velvet divorce” of the 
Czechoslovakian Federation on January 1, 1993, a monetary union and common 
currency were created to mitigate the economic effects of the split,521 but the 
Czechoslovakian monetary union officially ceased to exist and the new independent 
currencies became valid by February 8, 1993, less than six weeks after the break-up of 
the Czechoslovakian Federation. 
 Macroeconomic and political stability as well as liberalization of capital made 
the Czech currency attractive. After the large initial currency devaluation eroded in 
1993, the real exchange rate of the Czech currency started to appreciate quickly, 
undermining national competitiveness and generating a large current account 
deficit.522 Currency appreciation was primarily driven by higher domestic inflation 
given the stable foreign prices and massive inflows of foreign capital associated with 
the fast and extensive capital account liberalization in 1994–1995. Substantially higher 
interest rates against Germany (by two to three times), the main market for Czech 
exports, and the public commitment of the Czech monetary authorities to maintain the 
                                                 
521 The monetary union was supposed to be retained for at least the first six months. A common 
monetary policy was to be determined by a special Monetary Committee. In addition, the custom union 
and the common labor market were intended to remain in place. However, low credibility and the lack 
of political commitment to the monetary union caused investors to fear the currency devaluation, which 
contributed to a substantial decline of foreign exchange reserves of the CNB to only U.S. dollar 0.5 
billion in January 1993. Thus, the Czech government and the CNB thus decided on January 19, 1993 to 
separate the currency. After the dissolution of the monetary union, in March 1993, the Czech koruna 
was revalued by 2 percent and the Slovak koruna was devalued by 5 percent but they were revalued 
back again later (Firdrmuc, Horváth, and Fidrmuc 1999).  
 
522 There were additional factors contributing to the balance of trade deficits, including a high 
propensity to import, excessive wage growth, and increased competition in EE and Asia (Šmídková et 
al. 1998: 14–15). 
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currency peg encouraged strong inflows of foreign capital, reaching 17 percent of 
GDP in 1995 (Hallerberg and de Souza 2000: 22). Capital inflows encouraged by the 
high interest rate anti-inflationary policy led to a sharp appreciation of the Czech 
koruna’s real exchange rate, appreciating by about 30–40 percent between 1992 and 
1997 (Horváth 1999:285) (figure 7.2). 
 
Source: Czech National Bank. 
 
Figure 7.2: Nominal and real effective exchange rate, 1993–2001 
 
 The Czech Republic achieved a high degree of liberalization on its capital 
account early on. Foreign direct investments were liberalized in the early 1990s, 
although restrictions on foreign investments in the banking sector were maintained. 
The government applied a liberal approach to foreign credits in 1994–1995, as well. In 
general, the inflow of capital was liberalized more than its outflow (Árvai 2005; 9–
10). While one of the often mentioned reasons for the accelerated capital account 
liberalization was the Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD) 

























































liberalization facilitated the banks’ access to funds on international financial markets 
and brought them new profit-making opportunities.523 
 The fast inflow of short-term foreign capital in 1994–1996 was composed 
mainly of portfolio investments and foreign borrowing by the Czech banks and 
enterprises. Domestic banks played a particularly important role in channeling foreign 
debt finance into the economy and were among the largest foreign debtors. The 
foreign borrowing of domestic banks peaked at 6 percent of GDP at the end of 1995 
and represented 40 percent of total foreign debt (Tůma 2006: 4). 
 Because the CNB built a high degree of credibility by successfully maintaining 
the exchange rate pegged within a narrow band, the banks were encouraged to borrow 
on international financial markets in foreign currencies to increase their resources and 
to profit from the lower foreign interest rates, while bearing no exchange rate risk. As 
a result, the banks accumulated a large negative position toward foreigners. 
Nonetheless, their foreign exchange balance sheet position was much lower because 
the banks were lending most of their foreign borrowing to domestic (often un-hedged) 
enterprises as foreign exchange loans.524 Banks were borrowing in foreign currency, 
and they transferred the risk to domestic enterprises. Therefore, the banks transformed 
the foreign exchange risk into a credit risk. Because many of these foreign loans were 
granted to large enterprises in traditional industries, many of these enterprises 
experienced liquidity problems later. Clearly, the source of large financial inflows was 
                                                 
523 The liberalization of foreign exchange transactions was completed by the adoption of a new Foreign 
Exchange Law that came into effect on October 1, 1995, just before the OECD accession, which took 
place in December 1995. Not only did the government exceed the OECD liberalization requirements, 
but the actual pace and extent of capital account of liberalization was also even greater than the official 
version (Holub and Tůma 2006). 
 
524 While the Czech banks accumulated a negative net position toward foreigners of 100 billion Czech 
koruna, their negative foreign exchange balance sheet position was only between 10-40 billion Czech 
koruna. Moreover, they tended to hedge this negative balance sheet position by off-balance sheet 
operations. As a result, their total open foreign exchange position was usually balanced or slightly 
positive in 1997. Therefore, in contrast to the Asian crisis, the Czech banking system did not experience 
a serious problem of currency mismatches (Holub and Tůma 2006: 16). 
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not the government or the monetary authorities but the domestic banks (Holub and 
Tůma 2006, Erbenova and Holub 2006, Begg 1998).  
 In the atmosphere of weak financial regulation, it was not only the big SOBs 
providing credit to state-owned enterprises without exerting oversight over 
management but also many small private banks practicing insider lending and 
providing doubtful loans to small enterprises (Horowitz and Petráš 2003). The soft 
credit policy of banks and disregard for the principles of prudential banking led to 
accumulating large inter-enterprise debt and nonperforming loans in both SOBs and 
small private domestic banks.525 The Czech banks had double the bad loans of their 
Polish counterparts. Many of these loans were secured by newly privatized property. 
The lending portfolios that big SOBs inherited were heavily concentrated among a few 
enterprises or industrial sectors, so foreclosing on the biggest borrowers threatened the 
banks themselves. 
 The CNB, which has been the supervisory authority of the banking system 
since 1991, was not able to perform its responsibilities effectively in the beginning. Its 
Supervision Department was severely understaffed (with only eight employees in 
1991) and lacked clear authority over the large SOBs; furthermore, the regulation of 
banks was primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance (McDermott 2007: 
233). The task of the CNB was further hampered by sharing government authority in 
the area of financial markets with the Ministry of Finance and other agencies 
(Neumann and Egan 1999: 184). The Ministry of Finance blocked CNB efforts to 
                                                 
525 Inter-enterprise debt increased by 250 percent in 1991 and by 100 percent in 1992 (Rao and Hirsch 
2003: 263). The exception was CSOB, which did not accumulate a large number of bad loans (8 percent 
share on classified loans) and did not receive any government aid after 1993. CSOB had several owners 
that mutually controlled each other: besides the Ministry of Finance, FNM and CNB, the EBRD and 
IFC co-owned the bank. As a result, the CSOB management was less responsive to government 
pressures for enterprise financing and was often criticized for failing to support the country’s economic 
growth. Author’s interview with Pavel Mertlík, former Minister of Finance (1999−2001) and Chief 
Economist of Raiffeisenbank, June 16, 2006, Prague. 
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impose a more stringent classification on non-performing loans on banks (Pazdernik 
quoted in McDermott 2007: 236). However, in 1996, the CNB managed to implement 
new regulations that increased disclosure of financial results, making it more difficult 
to roll over old loans and requiring a new, downward valuation of collateral (Nollen, 
Kudrna, and Pazdernik 2005: 371). 
 Still, the existence of large numbers of bad loans compelled the CNB to 
maintain high interest rate spreads between lending and borrowing rates to boost bank 
profits and thus their ability to build up their reserves. The limited bank competition, 
the small number of private competitors, and the market position of the major SOBs, 
allowed banks to pay out low interest rates on deposits and charge high interest rates 
for their loans to state-owned enterprises, and thus benefit from high interest rate 
spreads (around a 6 percent range) (Desai 1995). The creation of these “artificial” 
bank profits led to the emergence of small under-capitalized banks that continued to 
make risky loans (Brada and Kutan 1999: 6–7).  
 Since 1991, the government intervened on a massive scale to alleviate both 
inter-corporate and bank-held non-performing debts. It tried to solve the bad loan 
problem by placing the communist era trade loans with lower interest rates and longer 
durations in a new state-owned “hospital”−the Consolidation Bank (Konsolidační 
banka) (later the Consolidation Agency)−founded in February 1991.526 Moreover, the 
government provided a one-time recapitalization of banks in 1991–1992 (McDermott 
2007: 229). This way, the debt burden was shifted from the banks back to the 
taxpayers.  
                                                 
526 The Consolidation Bank was proposed by Salzman, the Chairman of KB, who originally suggested 
only to transfer bad loans from the previous regime, the so-called TOZ; these were unsecured special 
purpose loans that originated during the pre-1989 era. However, banks started to transfer not only old 
but also new bad loans. Author’s interview with Tomáš Ježek, Minister of Privatization of the Czech 
Republic (1990−1992) and President of the National Property Fund (1992−1994), June 20, 2006, 
Prague. 
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 When the CNB Banking Supervision department observed, in 1993, the first 
signs that there were problems in small banks, it stopped granting new banking 
licenses and implemented two assistance programs for small banks, the Consolidation 
Program I (1991–1994) and Consolidation Program II (1995–1996), to clean up the 
balance sheets of banks and to prevent the overall destabilization of the banking 
system. During the period 1993–1996, several small and medium-sized banks 
collapsed, their licenses were revoked, and they were subsequently taken over by 
another bank.527 A special case was Agrobanka, the sixth largest bank and the biggest 
private bank, which has been controlled by Motoinvest, an aggressive brokerage firm. 
To prevent the collapse of Agrobanka, the CNB ordered the Big Four banks to extend 
a large credit line to the bank, and later sold part of the bank to a foreign strategic 
investor (General Electric Capital Corporation), while CNB took over the part of the 
bank with negative value, increased the bank’s capital, and provided bridge loans.  
 In October 1996, the government followed with the Stabilization Program, 
which involved acquiring bad quality receivables from the small domestic banks at 
their nominal value by Česká finanční (an agency established by the Consolidation 
Bank) up to a maximum of 100 percent of their capital (Mejstřík, Dvořáková and 
Neprašová 2004, Mervart 1998).528 All of these programs were costly and had limited 
success: 22 percent of all banks loans were uncollectible and bad loans still accounted 
for 35 percent of all bank loans in 1996 (Newman and Egan 1999: 182). 
                                                 
527 The first banks that collapsed were Kreditní a Prumyslová Banka, AB Banka, Banka Bohemia, and 
Česká banka. The Activities of COOP Banka, Velkomoravská banka, Ekoagrobanka, and Realitbanka 
were terminated through bankruptcy or liquidation. The CNB revoked the banking licenses of První 
Slezská Banka and Kreditní banka Plzeň. In addition, the Ministry of Finance had withdrawn licenses 
from 18 investment funds and fined 62 funds and enterprises. 
 
528 In fact, only six banks expressed an interest in joining this program because they were obliged to 
comply with the CNB prudential regulations. At the end only Expandia banka, purchased by the Czech 
Insurance Company, remained in the program (Mejstřík, Dvořáková and Neprašová 2004: 48-50). 
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 The excessive foreign debt and reckless lending of incumbent banks not only 
exacerbated credit risk but also led to inflationary pressures. CNB reacted by imposing 
monetary restrictions and engaging in massive sterilization to prevent excessive real 
exchange appreciation associated with the risk of currency devaluation. These 
measures were not efficient because they were accompanied by a non-cooperative 
fiscal government policy, which became more expansionary over time. Therefore, the 
CNB decided to widen the exchange rate band to plus or minus 7.5 percent on 
February 27, 1996. While much debate and calls for a more flexible regime had 
already started in 1994, the extent of the band widening and the timing of the 
announcement prior to parliamentary elections in May 1996, introduced the intended 
insecurity for the investors and led to one-off outflow of short-term speculative 
capital.529 The depreciation of the koruna was beneficiary for the Czech exporters who 
tried to capitalize on the currency by selling of foreign exchange (Jílek and Jílková 
1998: 72–73). The CNB simultaneously tightened monetary policy by raising interest 
rates and intervening vigorously to avoid currency devaluation.530  
 Nonetheless, the attempts of the CNB to sterilize capital inflows were not very 
successful mostly because of the co-called “sterilization game” played by banks 
(Christensen 2004). The high-yielding sterilization bonds issued by the CNB and a 
credible fixed exchange rate system allowed the banks to borrow cheaply abroad and 
to invest in domestic bonds. Banks increased their foreign liabilities by 35 percent in 
the first half of 1995 and by 37 percent in the second half of 1995. Given large interest 
differentials and relatively free capital movements, sterilization policies attracted 
                                                 
529 Author’s interview with Miroslav Hrnčíř, Advisor to the Governor of the CNB, former member of 
the CNB Board, June 7, 2006, Prague. 
 
530 CNB imposed limits on the banks’ short-term positions toward foreigners, raised interest rates by 
one percent, and the minimum reserve requirements (a tax on banks) by 3 percent.  
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additional short-term capital from abroad. The banks made a significant profit from 
these short-term capital speculations, and they were directly impeding the CNB from 
playing a guardian role for the national currency.531  
 Banks had two principal motives for foreign borrowing: speculative motives to 
exploit profitable investment opportunities as well as an interest in supplying credit to 
their clients, enterprises they controlled or in which they held shares (Christensen 
2004). The large Czech banks made loans in their efforts to consolidate those Czech 
enterprises that could compete with the dominant European players in the traditional 
tradable sectors such as heavy engineering, transport equipment, and chemicals 
(Horowitz 2001: 226, Koleva and Vincensini 2002).The appreciating domestic 
currency was hurting Czech exports, and made them uncompetitive on world markets. 
 Towards the end of 1996 and in spring 1997, in the atmosphere of slow 
economic growth, rising current accounts and fiscal deficits, tensions inside the ruling 
coalition, but primarily between the government and the central bank, began to 
intensify. The personal tensions between Prime Minister Klaus and Tošovský, the 
governor of CNB, were already apparent in the initial years of transition. Tošovský 
was committed to building the credibility of the CNB, a goal that was incompatible 
with Klaus’s vision of the central bank supporting the objectives of economic reform 
through the Czech banks.532 Klaus, himself a former banker with 16 years experience 
with the same bank was a supporter of the banking sector and connected lending and 
was not willing to sacrifice the interests of banks. In return, bankers enabled his party 
to win re-election in May 1992 (Rutland 2001: 251). 
                                                 
531 This paragraph came from Christensten (2004). 
 
532 Author’s interview with Ivan Kočárník, former Minister of Finance (1992−1997), June 14, 2006, 
Prague. 
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 The conflicts between the central bank and the government became especially 
intense as the CNB moved to a restrictive stance in 1996 via increasing minimum 
reserve requirements imposed on banks. Klaus (2000: 13–14) blamed the CNB’s anti-
inflationary monetary policy of high interest rates and minimum reserve requirements 
for slow growth and banking problems, and he blamed the CNB indirectly for 
financial turmoil: 
Our commercial banks, relatively weak and ill-equipped with capital, being … 
at the edge of their possibilities, were hit by these monetary restrictions to a 
greater extent than our central bank expected or realized afterwards. I would 
like to argue that right then we embarked on the financial crisis.533 
 
Klaus also blamed the CNB for prematurely opening capital accounts and for its 
unwillingness to move to a more flexible currency regime voluntarily before the 
currency attack.534 Nonetheless, many observed that Klaus considered the long-
sustained “hard” koruna policy as a source of national pride and a symbol of the 
successful transformation policies of the ODS-led government.535 Inspired by the 
Austrian example, the government was overly optimistic about the resilience of the 
Czech banking system and the sustainability of the peg. The Austrian model, however, 
                                                 
533 Similarly, in his response to a fax from Stanley Fisher, acting managing director of the IMF at that 
time, Klaus characterized the anti-inflationary measures of the CNB in the following way: “The central 
bank made a totally irrational maneuver that can be characterized as overkill, if I can use a nice term” 
(Dyba 2000: 37). 
 
534 “This premature opening of the financial account, which I was personally quite afraid of, was, 
besides the prestige considerations, motivated above all by the CNB’s efforts to reduce the sterilization 
costs associated with the speculative capital inflows, but this effect was surely not achieved. On 
contrary, the doors were opened for speculative capital flows in both directions” (Klaus 2000: 12). 
 
535 Author’s interview with Oldřich Dědek, Professor of Economics at Charles University, former 
Advisor to the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, former Vice-Governor of the CNB (1999-2005), 
June 12 and 10, 2006, Prague; author’s interview with Ivan Kočárník, former Minister of Finance 
(1992−1997), June 14, 2006, Prague. 
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has proved to be inappropriate, for its financial system was more developed than the 
Czech one.536  
 It is clear that the incumbent banks negatively affected the ability of the 
government and the CNB to sustain a currency peg through channelling short-term 
capital flows into the economy, speculating with central bank’s sterilization bonds as 
well as by engaging in inflationary politicized lending to connected parties that 
resulted in massive appreciation of the currency, enterprise insolvencies, and financial 
instability. Banks were pushing for monetary ease and expressed concerns about the 
adverse impact of the restrictive monetary policy of the CNB on the financial situation 
of their debtors, and their ability to repay existing debt (Geršl 2006). Due to their 
growing problems with bad loans, banks may have also had interest in maintaining the 
currency peg.537 Still, the representatives of financial institutions, who were potential 
players against the koruna and could profit from its devaluation, predicted the fall of 
the Czech currency and recommended its devaluation from the beginning of 1997 
(Šmídková et al.1998, Horváth 1999). The rent-seeking behaviour of banks was one of 
the most important triggers of a speculative run on the currency. 
Political instability caused uncertainty on the international markets and a fall in 
confidence in the Czech government. The worsened economic situation prompted the 
Klaus government to issue two small packages of economic reform measures aiming 
at reducing budgetary spending, ameliorating the regulation of the banking sector, and 
                                                 
536 Author’s interview with Miroslav Hrnčíř, Advisor to the Governor of the CNB and former Member 
of the CNB Board, June 7, 2006.  
 
537 Author’s interview with Pavel Mertlík, former Minister of Finance (1999−2001) and Chief 
Economist of Raiffeisenbank, June 16, 2006, Prague. 
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introducing import restrictions in April 1997.538 But the government package to 
tighten fiscal policy and allow correction for the fiscal-monetary mismatch came late. 
The first speculative attack on the fixed exchange rate of the Czech koruna 
came soon after on May 15, 1997.  At the beginning of the crisis, the CNB tried to 
resist the speculative attack and defend the currency peg by massive interventions, 
several interest rate hikes, and administrative measures (domestic commercial banks 
were not allowed to make loans to foreigners in domestic currency) to prevent the 
koruna from depreciating.539 The CNB administered a credit squeeze in defense of 
exchange rate parity in spite of the fact that the move posed a risk for domestic banks, 
representing a channel that impinged on macroeconomic policy. These measures 
proved to be insufficient given bad economic fundamentals and the growing 
inevitability that Klaus’s government was going to collapse.  
                                                 
538 The rising trade and current account deficits led to a shift in trade policy towards greater 
protectionism of domestic exporters in the second half of the 1990s. In 1995, the government 
established the Czech Export Bank to provide export financing to Czech enterprises. The Export 
Guarantee and Insurance Corporation became more active. In spring 1997, the government introduced 
an import deposit applying to 30 percent of all imports, followed by an anti-dumping law adopted in 
June 1997, and preferential treatment of domestic suppliers in public procurement (Erbenová and Holub 
2006: 12). 
 
539 Interest rates were drastically increased: the 3-month PRIBOR interest rates got to 35 percent, and 
the Lombard rate rose from 14 to 50 percent. Repo rates rose to 75 percent and central bank marginal 
overnight lending rate increased to almost 200 percent on May 22, 1997 (Kutan and Brada 1998: 8, 
Horváth 1999: 288). 
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The situation sharply escalated when the population, losing faith in the koruna, 
started massively converting large amounts of koruna into foreign currency, causing a 
further sharp decline in the CNB’s foreign exchange reserves (Šmídková et al. 
1998).540 On May 27, 1997, in spite of the risk of provoking banking crisis, the CNB 
and the government had already decided to devalue the currency by 10 percent, to 
abandon a currency peg, and to adopt a managed float with the Deutsche mark as the 
reference currency.541 The central bank lost 2 billion U.S. dollars of foreign exchange 
reserves during the entire episode, which lasted less than two weeks (table 7.6).542 
 
Inflation Targeting and Financial Liberalization 
 
On December 22, 1997, the CNB announced a new inflation targeting 
monetary policy, combined with a flexible regime (table 7.7).543 The CNB Board 
decided independently to switch to inflation targeting and only then informed the 
collapsing Klaus government, publicly announcing this policy change at the end of 
December 1997.544 Klaus criticized inflation targeting as inappropriate for a 
                                                 
540 Some Czech commentators argue that the timing of the financial turbulence in the Czech Republic 
was influenced by the contagion from the foreign exchange crisis in Asia since the speculative attack on 
the Thai baht had taken place only a few days earlier. However, as Begg (1998: 687-688) argues, the 
Czech koruna was not the “innocent victim of speculative frenzy.” 
 
541 Some argue that the CNB was able to keep the currency inside the official band and defend the peg 
but chose to abandon it (Horváth 1999: 288). 
 
542 For excellent accounts of the 1997 financial turbulences in the Czech Republic, see Dědek (2000), 
Šmídková et al. (1998), Begg (1998), and Horváth (1999).  
 
543 The Czech Republic was the pioneer of direct inflation targeting in the EE region, following the 
examples of Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (and to some extent Spain) that implemented 
this monetary strategy after the 1992−1993 crisis of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Author’s interview 
with Miroslav Hrnčíř, Advisor to the Governor of the CNB and former member of the Board of CNB, 
June 7, 2006.  
 
544 Author’s interview with Milena Horčicová, Director of the Department for Financial Policies, 
Ministry of Finance, June 15, 2006, Prague.  
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Table 7.6: Chronology of the Czech Currency Turmoil in 1997 
 
Dates Events 








Prime Minister Klaus criticizes the monetary policy of the CNB as 
restrictive. 
 




Government approves a stabilization package, which strengthens the 
























Koruna at its low, 3.88% in the devaluation band. Financial Times 
publishes a negative survey for the Czech republic. Opinion poll shows 
Prime Minister Klaus’ ruling party popularity at all-time low. 
 
Koruna fell sharply within the band to 5.25% below its central parity. CNB 
engages in unsterilized intervention, reflected in reserve losses and high 
interest rates. 
 
CNB raises the repo rate from 12.4% to 12.9% and the Lombard rate from 
14% to 50% with restrictions on access to the Lombard window.  
 
KB (the largest Czech commercial bank) increases its prime lending rate to 
24.7%. Other banks follow. CNB limits access to the Lombard window. 
Overnight inter-bank rates rise to almost 100%. 
 
Koruna comes under renewed pressure, depreciates to 6.2% below parity 
and then recovers to 3–4% below parity. Overnight interest rates reach 
almost 200%. Public confidence weakens and residents start to exchange 
koruna into foreign currencies. 
 
The CNB Governor in a joint press conference with Prime Minister 
announces that the ±7.5% target band will be replaced by managed float 
and that koruna will be stabilized vis-à-vis DEM but without officially 
binding limits. 
 












transitioning country and warned that low inflation targets would lead to economically 
costly disinflation policy (Klaus 2000: 20).545 The banking sector did not have time to 
react to the choice of this new monetary policy framework.546 CNB’s main motivation 
to adopt this inflation strategy, as its main proponents, Šmídková and Hrnčíř (2003: 
13) argue, was to increase the independence of CNB further:  
A change to inflation targeting has an effect analogous to increasing the 
independence of central bank since it moves the central bank to the centre of 
economic discussions. In this sense, formal independence of central bank is 
fully realized. Specifically, the CNB announced inflation targets according to 
its own assessment… 
 
Table 7.7: Evolution of Inflation Targeting 
 
Direct Inflation Targeting 
(DIT) adoption date 
January 1998 
Type of DIT  Initial: strict; Present: flexible 
Intermediate target level Initial year: 5.5–6.5% (December 1998); 
Present: 3.0% ±1% band 
 
Actual realization Initial year: 1.7% net, 6.8% CPI; Present: 4% 
Corresponding exchange rate 
regime 






Source: Adapted from Orlowski (2008: 445–446) 
 
                                                 
545 The speed of disinflation caused a conflict between the government and the CNB, given the negative 
growth of GDP between 1997 and 1999 and low inflation in 1999, accompanied by discussions about 
limiting CNB independence in 1999 and 2000 (Geršl 2006: 18). 
 
546 There was some initial opposition to inflation targeting from within the CNB, particularly from its 
monetary policy section. Critics were however, unable to present convincing arguments. Author’s 
interview with Vít Bárta, Advisor to the Vice-Governor of CNB, June 9 and 13, 2006, Prague. 
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The Klaus government was forced from power in late 1997 by the financial 
turmoil and a campaign finance scandal. As Vachudova (2001: 343) noted: “It 
emerged that money had flowed into the ODS and also the ODA party coffers in 
exchange for favors related to privatization and banking.” The ODS-led government 
was dissolved by the president who appointed a new caretaker government in January 
1998 on professional merits rather than political affiliation. Led by the former central 
bank governor Tošovský, this new government introduced financial sector reforms 
including the opening of the Czech banking sector to foreign banks and a stricter 
regulation of investment funds and banks. For example, the new law on banks adopted 
in 1998 prohibited banks from acquiring shares in industrial enterprises.547  
After the early Parliamentary elections of June 1998, a minority Social-
Democratic government led by Prime Minister Miloš Zeman assumed the 
responsibility for a large number of bad loans, and then sold the sanitized financial 
institutions to foreign strategic investors.548 Originally, the Zeman government wanted 
the banks to resolve their problems themselves. Its finance minister, Pavel Mertlík, 
however, pushed through privatizing big Czech banks to international investors and 
fought demands to pump government money into failing industrial conglomerates 
(Andrews 2001).549 When a recession ensued and the banks experienced solvency 
problems, the government decided to privatize them. The Social Democratic 
government not only privatized the largest banks but also regulated financial markets 
                                                 
547 See Resolution No. 732 of November 19, 1997. 
 
548 The Social-Democratic government of 1998−2002 was a single party minority government. While 
the Social Democrats occupied all of the ministerial posts, they only controlled 74 of 200 seats in the 
parliament. CSSD signed what came to be known as the “opposition agreement” with the ODS, the 
second largest party in the parliament. The agreement declared that ODS would allow CSSD to govern 
alone as a minority government (Roberts 2003). 
 
549 Mertlík resigned in 2001 because he ran into increased opposition with some members of the 
coalition government led by Miloš Zeman, particulary Miroslav Grégr who has pushed for big new 
government spending to shore up Czech industry.  
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and actively promoted foreign investment through tax advantages and subsidies. The 
government sold a 65 percent stake in CSOB to Belgium KBC Bank in the spring of 
1999 and a 52 percent stake in CS to Austrian Erste Bank in the summer of 2000. 
Finally, in the summer of 2001, the government privatized KB to Societé Génerale. 
The share of foreign bank assets represented over 90 percent by 2001.550 
The privatization of IPB, the third largest Czech bank, might appear to be 
inconsistent with the argument made in this study because its foreign ownership was 
not enough to discipline the bank’s behavior. The Czech government approved the 
plan to privatize IPB by selling the state’s 46 percent share to Nomura Europe, a 
foreign investor, in March 1998. The Social-Democratic government did not assume 
bad loans prior to sale, nor did it provide any guarantees to the buyer. After the sale, 
the bank’s asset quality deteriorated further. The bank provided misleading 
information about its true financial situation to the CNB banking supervisors, and 
concealed it by recording assets at overstated values, removing bad debts from its 
books, and selling bad assets to related parties. In June 2000, there was a run on the 
bank, which led to forced administration by the CNB. In the meantime, Nomura had 
sold some of IPB’s stronger industrial assets and realized high profits.551 Faced with 
the alternative of closing the bank, the government quickly sold IPB to CSOB, owned 
by the Belgian bank KBC. The costs of IPB losses were high and the sale entailed 
cleaning the bank’s balance sheet and getting the state’s guarantees on deposits and on 
                                                 
550 For the chronology of the post-1997 privatization of the major Czech SOBs, see Havel (2004). 
551 IPB sold its beer holdings, including the world-renowned Pilsner Urquell. Nomura bought them, 
pooled the stake with its own Czech beer assets, and then sold them to South African Breweries PLC 
and realized as much as 300 million U.S. dollars profit (Karnitschnig, with Lesenarova 2000). 
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the quality of assets for a certain period after the sale.552 The forced takeover of IPB 
has been one of the costliest and the most controversial bank failures in EE.553 
Although foreign investment did not prevent the rent-seeking of the IPB 
management and the failure of the bank, this study’s analytical framework can still be 
useful for understanding this case. First and foremost, in contrast with the hypothesis 
made in this study, Nomura did not consider the IPB acquisition as that of a strategic 
investor but rather as a portfolio investor. Nomura bought the Czech bank for its 
equity shareholdings and not for its banking business. The IPB shares were held by 
Saluka Investments, a Dutch-based special purpose vehicle. Therefore, Nomura did 
not engage in bank restructuring, and it resisted the pressures of the CNB and the 
government to recapitalize the bank when the crisis began to loom. Second, while this 
study examines the interests and behavior of conventional commercial banks, Nomura 
is an investment bank; for instance, it is barred by law from banking in Japan. It 
lacked the expertise to transform IPB’s commercial banking activities. Finally, 
Nomura, a minority holder of the IPB, did not have control over the bank’s lending 
decisions, which the incumbent management kept firmly in its hands, so Nomura did 
not exercise real control of the bank management and did not properly supervise their 
local representatives. Voucher privatization led to an increase in incumbent bank 
management’s influence, which was further strengthened in 1993–1994 when the state 
failed to participate in purchases from a new share issue (Čulík 2000). The bank 
managers won control from the state by using subsidiaries and investment funds to 
                                                 
552 For a history of IPB’s privatization, see Kudrna et al. (2002), Wagner and Iakova (2001), Kočenda 
(1999). This author also actively participated in the post-privatization debates concerning IPB during 
her assignment at the DG Competition, European Commission, Brussels in 2004. 
 
553 Nomura Securities of Japan pursued a legal dispute and the international arbitration tribunal ruling 
that the Czech government failed to accord Nomura fair and equitable treatment. For its part, Nomura 




buy IPB shares. By the mid-1990s, IPB became the country’s dominant financial 
group with the most opaque ownership structure in the Czech Republic. The bank was 
heavily connected politically with the Klaus ODS and was one of its leading 
sponsors.554  
Conclusion 
The history of exchange rate politics in the Czech Republic demonstrates how 
a small distributional coalition formed by the financial elite colluded with the 
government and various enterprises. This coalition became the main beneficiary of the 
monetary, regulatory, and exchange rate policies by taking over divested assets and 
bringing a country to financial instability. The reform measures introduced by 
Czechoslovakia in 1991 were a slightly moderate form of shock therapy compared 
with the Polish ones. In spite of the declarations of the Klaus government about the 
state’s radical withdrawal from the economy, there was inconsistency between the 
government’s liberal rhetoric and its continuous interference with the economy. The 
reform approach of the ODS-led governments aimed at promoting a domestic class of 
entrepreneurs through the voucher method of divestiture of state assets in banks and 
industries and political pressures on SOBs to lend to financially distressed enterprises. 
One of the most important outcomes was a reproduction of the financial hegemony of 
banks in the economy, which with bank-sponsored IPFs became new sources of 
power. The Czech voucher privatization plan effectively prevented the entry of foreign 
strategic investors and foreign ownership in the Czech banking systems, so the 
voucher method did not cut the links between the state and incumbent financial and 
industrial interests.  
                                                 
554 The closeness of the links illustrates the fact that Klaus’s chief adviser was on IPB’s supervisory 
board (Anderson 2006). 
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 It was argued that the voucher scheme had been inspired by an Anglo-Saxon 
model of “popular capitalism,” but instead it resulted in a system of cross-holding and 
bank-industry ties that was closer to a German model of capitalism. In contrast to the 
German banks, however, the Czech banks did not shape the enterprises’ investment 
decisions or force their restructuring. Nor did it build long-term relationships with the 
enterprise they controlled through IPFs (Neumann and Egan 1999). 
 The government involvement in the banks generated incentives for moral 
hazard in the financial sector. The government refrained from imposing strict banking 
regulation and provided guarantees for bad loans in return for the banks’ support of 
industries and employment, thus guaranteeing popular support. The government 
induced additional moral hazards by credibly committing to the currency peg and to 
using foreign exchange reserves to bail out banks with liquidity problems. These 
actions encouraged banks to discount the risk of default and to repeat imprudent 
lending practices and short-term capital speculations that eventually resulted in the 
1997 financial turmoil.  
 The successive Klaus center-right governments were committed to certain 
ideologies and policies, often conflicting with that of the central bank, which made it 
difficult for them to correct mistakes. Incumbent banks and industries, which were the 
beneficiaries of successive right-wing governments before the crisis, tried to preserve 
their advantages and prevent opening the domestic banking sector to foreign buyouts 
because of a fear of competition that would reduce their positional rents. Maintaining 
ODS dominance in Czech politics thus came to depend on the support of incumbent 
financiers. Only the economic crisis helped to break the ODS monopoly and allowed 
re-evaluating the role of the banks. 
 The Czech case also demonstrates that central bank independence is not a 
sufficient condition for a sustainable currency regime if a domestic financial system 
 331 
retains its clientelistic features. The CNB has been an internationally praised central 
bank with a high degree of independence from the government in monetary policy. 
Although the Klaus government repeatedly criticized the policies of CNB policies, it 
did not seek to formally limit central bank independence. Because the CNB has been 
independent, it has focused on disinflation rather than targeting domestic monetary 
policy toward exchange rate. The monetary authority of the CNB, however, did not 
match the quality of its regulatory oversight, particularly in the initial stages of reform. 
 The competing arguments based on the role of OCA factors, macroeconomic 
fundamentals, sectoral interests, and international factors are not supported by Czech 
exchange rate history. First, there is a little evidence that OCA arguments played a 
role in the exchange rate regime choices.555 Second, no general deterioration of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals, traditionally associated with currency crises, was 
present during the Czech crisis as it was in Bulgaria. Inflation was relatively low, the 
central bank accumulated sufficient foreign reserves because of large capital inflows, 
and while its fiscal stance deteriorated, it was not excessive. Moreover, favorable 
historical legacies of macroeconomic and currency stability during the interwar and 
communist periods did not necessitate the adoption of a fixed exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor at the outset of the transition. These legacies appear to be inadequate 
in explaining banking instability, financial turmoil, and the collapse of the currency 
peg in 1997. Third, the sectoral argument that large tradable manufacturers have 
incentives to lobby for competitive, depreciated exchange rates is not compelling, 
either. Large Czech enterprises in heavy industries were in a weak position and lacked 
well developed means of organizing and lobbying the government. But the top 
management positions at the big SOBs were held by the appointees from the Klaus 
ODS and other center-right governmental parties, so it was more advantageous for 
                                                 
555 Author’s interview with Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the CNB, June 15, 2006, Prague.  
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enterprises to lobby bank managers that had close links with the ODS-led 
governments (Horowitz and Petráš 2003: 255–256).556  
 Finally, the role of the IMF in Czechoslovakia and its successor state, the 
Czech Republic, in the design of the stabilization program and the exchange rate 
policy has been limited, for the government introduced many program elements before 
signing the standby agreements. In addition, the Czech government decided against the 
last drawings of the standby arrangements and started to repay its debt earlier than 
contractually agreed (Drábek 1995).557 In general, Klaus was notoriously known for 
his negative attitude toward foreign advisers and international institutions,558 claiming 
that they were of no use because of the uniqueness of the reform process in individual 
countries.559 The Klaus ODS also regularly criticized the EU for imposing excessive 
infringements on national sovereignty; instead Klaus promoted nationalist policies and 
anti-foreign investment sentiment (Roberts 2003: 1994, Petrovic and Solingen 2005.
                                                 
556 Exporters, facing appreciated national currency, started to pressure the CNB for easing the monetary 
conditions (the combination of interest rates and the exchange rate) more recently. But the CNB did not 
succumb to these pressures (Geršl 2006). Some industrial sectors emerged over time as well-organized 
and powerful players in the distributional struggles of transition, including the steel industry represented 
by the Iron and Steel Federation and the Automotive Industry Association of car manufacturers 
(Orenstein and Desai 1997). 
 
557 The IMF concluded two stand-by agreements with the Czechoslovak government and one with the 
Czech government. The first stand-by of December 18, 1990 represented a 14-month arrangement in 
the amount of SDR 620 million including SDR 148 million with a contingency loan for oil purchases 
and the so-called Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility in the amount of SDR 439 million 
to compensate for the rising costs of oil imports. The second agreement of March 2, 1992 was SDR 236 
million. The third standby of March 1, 1993 amounted to SDR 177 million, but the Czech government 
decided not to draw the two tranches of this loan (Drábek 1995: 236). 
 
558 Klaus accused international financial institutions of concentrating on “catalyzing loans for big 
multinationals,” which tend to invest in the Czech Republic (Klaus 1997: 144).  
 
559 Klaus has focused his recent criticism on the U.S. economist Joseph Stiglitz, claiming that “...the 
advice given by Joseph Stiglitz—that we should have made our transformation as gradual as the 




The final case is the history of exchange rate policy in Poland. This case aids 
our exploration of the extent to which the ownership structure and institutional 
features of a financial system correspond to choices and sustainability of an exchange 
rate regime. Moreover, the financial system itself is a function of the method of 
divestiture of state assets and openness to foreign investments in the banking sector. 
The history of Polish exchange rate policymaking is punctuated by four turning points 
in 1990, 1991, 1995, and 2000. The presence of strong organized opposition gave 
assurance that the Polish reform team had unchallenged control right at the outset of 
the post-communist transition. These conditions enabled the team in 1990 to 
implement the big bang reform program, based primarily on a fixed exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor. The two subsequent realignments in 1991 and 1995 were associated 
with the adoption of less rigid fixed regimes. The Polish central bank abandoned a 
hard peg after the first sixteen months of the transition and pursued various soft pegs 
until 2000, at which point it adopted a combination of inflation targeting and regime 
flexibility.  
There is no question that the preference for the involvement of foreign 
investors in bank and enterprise privatization and restructuring was driven by the first 
Polish post-communist government’s intention to use outsiders, excluding the 
possibility that incumbent business and financial interests might become powerful 
lobbies for influencing economic policies. Poland took a positive stance toward 
foreign competition in the financial sector from the outset of the transition but then 
backtracked temporarily before again opening the banking sector to foreign buyouts. 
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Privatization was carried out gradually and consistently, on a case-by-case basis, by 
actively involved foreign investors.  
Banking reform resulted in a successful open financial system, based on a 
“consensus” among the government, the central bank, financiers and industrialists in 
monetary, regulatory, and exchange rate policies. The Polish case demonstrates how 
this type of financial system enabled the government to sustain a fixed exchange rate 
regime and adjust it to the competitive needs of domestic industries while avoiding 
financial crisis. It is remarkable that the Polish economy also managed to resist a 
currency attack in the wake of the 1998 financial crisis in Russia, which was Poland’s 
third largest trading partner.560 Having the smallest decline in output among post-
communist countries and being the first to return to economic growth, Poland became 
a symbol of transitional success. 
 In contrast to the Czech Republic, a radical stabilization program was required 
in Poland at the beginning of the transition, for the country’s socialist legacies 
presented serious economic problems. The unsuccessful attempts of the communist 
government in Poland between 1982 and 1988 to liberalize and reform the economic 
system resulted in deep macroeconomic imbalances coupled with economic 
stagnation. The communists increased enterprise autonomy, which allowed for strong 
wage growth. Furthermore, pursuing a loose credit policy further softened the already 
flexible budget constraints. Finally, the monetary authorities pursued an 
accommodating monetary policy involving automatic (interest-free) financing of the 
budget deficit by the central bank. All of these policies led to inflationary pressures, so 
by mid-1989, the last communist government lost control over the economy.  
                                                 
560 Polish exports were down 74 percent in 1998 (Huterski, Nicholls, and Wisniewski 2004: 198). 
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As a result, in 1989, Poland was plagued by hyperinflation (which stood at 
3,000 percent in the last five months of 1989), shortages, a large budget deficit, and 
unserviceable external debt (Gomulka 1995: 323).561 The Polish communist leadership 
used external loans and credits obtained during the 1970s to finance consumption and 
to support the military efforts of the Soviet bloc; furthermore, the government stopped 
servicing its foreign debt in 1981 (Kochanowicz, Kozarzewski, and Woodward 2005: 
38, Polanski 1994: 3–4, Kaminski 2001: 314).562 On the positive side, the communist 
governments’ steps toward liberalization resulted in a private sector, whose output was 
already nearly 19 percent at the beginning of the transition (Schwartz 2006: 34).  
This chapter is structured much like the chapters on Estonia, Bulgaria, and the 
Czech Republic. It starts with an analysis of the initial reform framework that 
surrounded the fixed exchange rate regime. The section that follows establishes the 
elements of the finance-based theory by examining macroeconomic stabilization, 
privatization, and banking reforms and their influence on bank behavior. Finally, as 
the story of government policy unfolds, the chapter shows how a policy of financial 
openness enabled the government and a cooperative central bank to conduct a 
consensual exchange rate policy that promoted national competitiveness.  
 
The Balcerowicz Plan 
The collapse of the communist regime in Poland was “pacted”: it started in the 
early months of 1989 with Roundtable Negotiations on power sharing between the 
Solidarity opposition movement and the communist leaders. The presence of an 
organized opposition to communism at the moment of regime change that was strong 
                                                 
561 The gross foreign debt vis-à-vis Western countries reached nearly 41 billion U.S. dollars in 1989, 
representing 58 percent of GDP. 
 
562 For a detailed examination of the origins of high inflation in Poland in the period from 1980 through 
1989, see Polanski (1991). 
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enough to take power had a profound institutional effect: the leaders of the pre-1989 
opposition were in a position to frame the emerging political debate. Communists 
were aware that a Polish population that demanded change would only accept much 
needed economic reforms promoted by a Solidarity-endorsed government (Vachudova 
2005). The landslide victory of Solidarity in partially free elections in June 1989 
marked the start of economic and political reforms in Poland.563  
The accommodative communist regime in Poland allowed strong and well-
organized economic interests to form, such as farmers’ associations and political 
Solidarity factions (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Poland inherited an industrial structure 
characterized by heavy, geographically concentrated state-owned industries and 
underdeveloped consumer industries and services representing strong and 
concentrated lobbies. Many of these state-owned industrial enterprises were large. 
They had many employees and a monopolistic position on the domestic market, so 
they benefited from great bargaining power. A negotiated exit mode from communism 
also provided an opportunity for these potential rent-seekers to entrench themselves. 
Contrary to expectations, though, these societal and economic interests have not been 
able to “politicize” the state (Grzymala-Busse 2002). The bargaining power of the 
communist (political and economic) elite disappeared by the end of 1989 and the 
opposition leaders were able to frame the reform debate.  
The first Solidarity-led government that emerged in September 1989 inherited 
a command of an economy hovering on the verge of hyperinflation. Prime Minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki and his team of technocrats led by the finance minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz launched a radical anti-inflationary strategy known as a “shock therapy” 
                                                 
563 Solidarity candidates won 35 percent of the seats in the lower legislative chamber that they had been 
allowed to contest and all but one of the 100 seats in the upper house. They also won the political 
support of the previously subservient auxiliary parties that were part of the political establishment 
during the communist period (Lewis 1998: 27-28). 
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program of economic transformation, published in “The Government’s Memorandum 
on Economic Policy,” on January 1, 1990.564 The reform program was an expression 
of the government’s willingness to cut its ties with the past. As shown in chapter 7, 
strong parallels to the program were also visible in the Czechoslovak program and in 
several other post-communist states.  
Balcerowicz (1995), the architect of this initial radical reform program (also 
known as the “Balcerowicz Plan”) maintained that the initial transition period, to 
which he has referred to as the “period of extraordinary politics,” provided a window 
of opportunity for policymakers to push for decisive reforms because “major 
discontinuities, i.e. liberalization from external dependence and political liberalization 
produce a special state of mass psychology and a corresponding state of political 
system,” resulting in an unusually high level of acceptance of radical reform measures. 
At the time that the Polish economic reforms were introduced, the communist status 
quo has been destroyed and no established interests were in place to endanger it, 
which dictated the rapid pace of preparations to launch the Balcerowicz plan. This 
stabilization plan prepared by Balcerowicz’ economic team quickly gained political 
support of the government and the Parliament.565 There was no public discussion 
                                                 
564 When Mazowiecki became Prime Minister, he was searching for a “Polish Erhard,” which refers to 
Ludwig Erhard, the author of West Germany’s “economic miracle.” Balcerowicz was found to fill this 
role. In fact, the choice of Balcerowicz as the finance minister in the Solidarity government was a 
surprise because he was an outsider, unknown in the main political circles. It was Waldemar Kuczynski, 
the chief advisor of Mazowiecki, who “invented” Balcerowicz and launched his extraordinary political 
career. Author’s interview with Waldemar Kuczynski, former Chief Economic Advisor of Mazowiecki, 
Minister of Privatization and Chief Economic Advisor of Jerzy Buzek (1997−2001), July 17, 2006, 
Warsaw; author’s interview with Andrzej Topinski, former Vice-Governor of NBP (1989−1992), 
President of the Polish Bank Association, July 14, 2006, Warsaw. Also see Kuczynski (1992: 45-62). 
 
565 The “Balcerowicz Team” consisted of Marek Dabrowski, later Deputy Minister of Finance; Stefan 
Kawalec, chief Advisor, responsible for financial institutions; Grzegorz Wojtowicz, first Deputy 
President of the central bank; and Janush Sawicki, responsible for foreign debt negotiations. All were 
graduates of the Faculty of Foreign Trade of the Central School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw. 
The group also included foreign advisers (Jeffrey Sachs, David Lipton), foreign advisers of Polish 
origin, the so-called Polonia academics (Stanislaw Gomulka, Jacek Rostowski, and Stanislaw Welisz) 
as well as Polish ones (Andrzej Bratkowski, Karol Lutkowski, Adam Lipowski) (Hunter and Ryan 
2008). 
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concerning the initial economic reforms,566 and this allowed the government to operate 
under conditions of minimal political friction, albeit for only a few months (Kaminski 
2001: 323).567 
The main elements of the Balcerowicz liberalization and stabilization program 
included a restrictive monetary policy; the removal of virtually all price controls (price 
liberalization had already begun under the communist regime); tight fiscal discipline 
and elimination of the budget deficit; the introduction of currency convertibility; a 
restrictive tax-based income policy accompanied by regulations promoting market 
structures in the banking sector, as well as property transformation. The Polish 
reformers believed from the outset that ownership changes are indispensable for the 
market mechanism to work properly. The radical liberalization of business activities 
started as early as 1988. Banking reforms, including far reaching liberalization of 
financial institutions, were instituted in 1988–1989 (Polanski 2002: 107).  
Nonetheless, after only a year, political backlash against strict reforms 
occurred and the Mazowiecki government was replaced by another right-of-center 
Solidarity government led by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (January−December 1991), one 
that promised to promote a “controlled liberalism” version of the transition. The 
subsequent government led by Jan Olszewski (December 1991−May 1992) also came 
to power by opposing shock therapy and favoring a reflationary agenda, low interest 
                                                 
566 Author’s interview with Jerzy Hausner, former Minister of Labor (2001−2003), Minister of State 
Treasury (2004) and Minister of Economy (2003−2005), July 6, 2006, Warsaw. Consensus within the 
government was facilitated by the fact that Balcerowicz was Deputy Prime Minister and he was thus 
able to nominate the entire economic policy team; its members were his close associates, except for the 
President of the central bank, Wladislaw Baka, who was appointed by Jaruzelski, the last communist 
president (Stone 2002: 93, fn. 8). 
 
567 The presidential election in 1990 completed the fragmentation process of the Solidarity elite between 
the dissident intelligentsia led by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and those who supported Lech 
Walesa’s traditional worker power base. Walesa, who won the presidential election in 1990, paid little 
attention to the parliament or the constitution in his efforts to build a strong presidency (Michta 1997, 
Kaminski 2001). However, in spite of his pre-election rhetoric, President Walesa supported the policies 
of Mazowiecki’s government (Stone 2002: 95). 
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rates, and increased government aid to farmers and industries. However, both 
Bielecki’s and Olszewski’s governments failed to devise a transformation program 
that would differ markedly from the Balcerowicz plan. The next Solidarity cabinet of 
Hanna Suchocka (1992–1993) was also strongly committed to the continuation of a 
radical reform program (King and Sznajder 2006: 771, Slay 1993, Stone 2002) (table 
8.1). 
 
Fighting Hyperinflation and the Exchange Rate Anchor 
One of the principal goals of the Polish reform program was to combat 
hyperinflation. As Balcerowicz put it: “Inflation was like a spreading inferno, which 
had to be quenched, or at least contained, in order to make it possible to change the 
economic system” (Balcerowicz quoted in Stone 2002: 91). Fear and doubt about 
ending hyperinflation, introducing currency convertibility and being able to pursue a 
market determined exchange in the absence of functioning foreign exchange markets 
brought a political consensus within the government about the need to peg the Polish 
zloty.568 
While a quick political consensus concerning the choice of the initial exchange 
rate regime emerged, the political debate over where to peg the Polish currency was 
more complex and contentious. In January 1990, the exchange rate was fixed at 9,500 




                                                 
568 Author’s interview with Marek Dabrowski, former First Deputy Minister of Finance (1989−1990), 
Member of Parliament (1991−1993), and Member of the Monetary Policy Council of the NBP 
(1998−2004), July 3, 2006, Warsaw.  
569 For the history of the Polish zloty, see Wojtowicz (2005). 
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alternative proposals, ranging from 5,000 to 28,000 zloty per U.S. dollar to promote 
exports.570 The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, influenced by the export 
lobby, suggested deeper devaluation and pegging the zloty at a 14,000 level per U.S. 
dollar.571 Others, however, warned that excessive devaluation would create additional 
inflationary pressures. At the end, the view prevailed on the introductory devaluation 
of the currency that considered exchange rate as a tool to stimulate exports and restrict 
imports, and thus the accumulation of foreign reserves.572 On the other hand, the 
deliberate undervaluation of exchange rate was also intended to help the government 
to adhere to its commitment to a fixed regime (Wellisz 1997: 159).  
Unlike Estonia or the Czech Republic, the Polish zloty was initially pegged to 
the U.S. dollar rather than the Deutsche mark because of the high level of dollarization 
that existed under the communist regime. Dollar accounts from Polish households 
were substantial, even bigger than the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves. They 
were subsequently spent by the government to service its foreign debt.573 Because of 
the country’s large foreign debt and in order to design its reform program seriously, 
the Polish government had to abide by the opinions of the IMF, the World Bank, and 
                                                 
570 Some even recalled the 1948 German reform, suggesting the possibility of eliminating inflation by 
exchanging money at rates that would depend on different forms of investment (Kowalski and 
Stawarska 1999: 356). 
 
571 Author’s interview with Marek Dabrowski, former First Deputy Minister of Finance (1989−1990), 
Member of Parliament (1991−1993), and Member of the Monetary Policy Council of the NBP 
(1998−2004), July 3, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
572 One of the strong proponents of this view was Gomulka, a government advisor who considered a 
fixed exchange rate to be a tool to restore the country’s external balance rather than a tool to fight 
inflation. Instead, monetary, fiscal, and income policies were intended to play the role of anti-
inflationary tools (Gomulka 1995). Author’s interview with Stanislaw Gomulka, former Advisor to 
Balcerowicz and Reader in Economics at the London School of Economics, July 13, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
573 Author’s interview with Stanislaw Gomulka, former Advisor to Balcerowicz and Reader in 
Economics at the London School of Economics, July 13, 2006, Warsaw. 
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foreign advisors.574 The government needed to obtain the support of the international 
financial community for the rescheduling and reduction of its foreign debt. It also 
needed to gain international credibility for its reforms and to secure new credits 
(Gomulka 1995: 320, Kaminski 2001: 312–5). Although the Polish stabilization 
program resembled a typical IMF package in its logic and basic assumptions, the 
Polish reformers maintained that it was locally owned, conceived, and designed by the 
Balcerowicz team and only later approved by the IMF. In fact, the Polish reform 
program was more ambitious than the reform steps suggested by the IMF. But “Poland 
has always been considered to be ‘the best student in class,’ … and in the end one of 
the few examples of success of the IMF” (Belka quoted in King and Sznajder 2006: 
768). The Polish reformers used the constraints imposed by international financial 
institutions politically as an important argument to the domestic electorate to promote 
a radical reform program (Stone 2002: 92). 
While there were some policy controversies in several important issue-areas 
between the two negotiating parties, they were usually resolved by international 
institutions that accepted the Polish view (Gomulka 1995). In the exchange rate policy 
area, the IMF strongly insisted during the December 1989 negotiations that, in order to 
break the inflationary expectations of the population, the exchange rate should be 
fixed for a period of 12 months, and the Polish government should make a public 
commitment to defend the exchange rate. The Polish side (represented by Balcerowicz 
and Gomulka) maintained that a mere public announcement by the government carries 
                                                 
574 One of the key foreign advisors was Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, who advised the Solidarity 
group from the summer 1989. He has successfully convinced the Solidarity parliamentarians of the 
necessity to rapidly combat hyperinflation and advocated for a reduction of Polish debt on the 
international scene. In its October issue, the New York Times even referred to the Polish reform plan as 
“the Sachs Plan” (Kochanowicz, Kozarzewski, and Woodward 2005: 39-41, Kuczynski 1992). Also, 
author’s interview with Grzegorz Kolodko, former Minister of Finance (1994−1997 and 2002−2003), 
July 2 and 5, 2006, Warsaw. For Sach’s view on the Polish transition, see Sachs (1993). 
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little weight and the sustainability of the exchange rate will depend on the actual 
monetary, fiscal, and income policies. The Polish negotiators finally accepted that the 
fixed exchange rate should be maintained for at least three months as a policy 
objective, but no public announcement had been made about the duration of the 
arrangement.575  
Adopting a limited-horizon of commitment to the fixed exchange rate policy 
was motivated by the need to “anchor” the national currency but at the same time by 
the desire to preserve room for re-adjustment in case the initial regime proves to be 
inappropriate (Wellisz 1997: 158). Because the level of international reserves was 
insufficient at the time the currency peg was introduced, in 1989, the Bank for 
International Settlements in Basel granted a loan of 215 million U.S. dollars as a 
reserve supplement. In addition, the G-24 governments created a 1 billion U.S. dollar 
Zloty Stabilization Fund to underpin confidence in the fixed exchange rate of the 
zloty.  
The Solidarity reform measures that contained a policy of a fixed exchange 
rate regime brought a sharp reduction in inflation, from 1,096 percent prior to their 
implementation to 249 percent in 1990; 60 percent in 1991; 44 percent in 1992; and 38 
percent in 1993 (Gomulka 1995: 323). Although the output dropped by 7.6 percent for 
1991, it has been the most moderate and short lived drop compared with most other 
post-communist countries (Kochanowicz, Kozarzewski and Woodward 2005: 45). In 
fact, Poland was the first post-communist country that had already exceeded its pre-
transition level by 1995. 
The reform program also contained massive cuts in fiscal subsidies (enterprise 
and product subsidies declined in 1990 from 52 to 25 percent) and increased 
                                                 
575 Author’s interview with Stanislaw Gomulka, former Advisor to Balcerowicz and Reader in 
Economics at the London School of Economics, July 13, 2006, Warsaw. 
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competition from private enterprises and imports. Right from the beginning, the Polish 
authorities focused on creating a favorable environment for foreign direct investment. 
They eliminated most licensing requirements and allowed free repatriation of profit 
and invested capital, in addition to the ownership transformation. In contrast to the 
Czech reformers, one of the most important goals of the Polish reformers was to 
impose hard budget constraints on enterprises and the relations between enterprises 
and banks. The Balcerowicz plan assumed that the “hard” financing of enterprises and 
market competition would transform their mode of functioning somewhat like private 
enterprises even prior to privatization (Baltowski and Mickiewicz 2000: 426). 
 
A Multi-Track Approach to Ownership Transformation 
As argued above, the first Polish post-communist governments made 
developing the private sector a cornerstone of their economic reform policies.  
Privatization involving foreign investors was a crucial part of this process. A variety 
of privatization methods were proposed and discussed in 1989−1990.576 The 
privatization process was contentious due to a historical deal between Solidarity and 
the communist governments that empowered enterprise insiders in the 1980s, both 
trade unions and managers, to reduce political tensions at the enterprise level.577 
Balcerowicz and his team of economists opposed transfer to workers and favored 
case-by-case privatization through direct sales, tenders, or auctions to outsiders to 
                                                 
576 In its first economic program, the Mazowiecki government favored the classical concept of 
privatization− public offerings−based on the British model, combined with the rapid development of a 
new private sector. However, the British model was eventually rejected given the large number of 
enterprises to be privatized and the lengthy process of selecting enterprises to be made profitable prior 
to privatization.  
 
577 Enterprise self-management was the principal element of the Solidarity platform. During the 1981 
reforms of the enterprise sector, employee self-management became part of a new set of decentralized 
measures to form state-owned enterprises that were intended to be made “self-dependent, self-managed, 
and self-financed” (known as Three S’s). The legislation adopted in September 1981 made elected 
employee councils the principal strategic decision-making body in many Polish enterprises. 
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prevent insider worker groups and management from taking over the enterprises.578 
The authors of the Polish privatization plan were thus under strong pressure from the 
self-management movement, which had a strong voice in privatization and had called 
for greater employee share ownership.579 In the end, the Mazowiecki government 
decided on a compromise solution, a “multi-track” approach to privatization that was 
reflected in the July 1990 State Enterprises Privatization Act (Article 37). This 
compromise resulted in direct sales to strategic investors and via the stock market, 
employee-management buyouts or leases, and mass privatization.580 
In order to speed up privatization, plans were prepared for a mass privatization 
program that used vouchers. The mass privatization scheme was first elaborated on 
and promoted by two liberal economists from the Gdansk Institute of Market 
Economics, Janusz Lewandowski and Jan Szomburg (1990) (the latter became the 
Minister of Ownership Transformation).581 The law prepared in mid-1991 was 
approved by the Parliament in April 1993 (known as the National Investment Funds 
Law) but the legislative approval did not allow the process to start immediately. 
Rapid, large-scale mass voucher privatization was delayed in Poland because of 
                                                 
578 Krzysztof Lis, the first director of the Agency of Ownership Transformation, proposed the 
transformation of enterprises into joint stock companies without employee councils, limiting worker 
share ownership to a maximum of 20 percent. Author’s interview with Stanislaw Gomulka, former 
Advisor to Balcerowicz and Reader in Economics at the London School of Economics, July 13, 2006, 
Warsaw. 
 
579 Author’s interview with Michal Federowicz, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy 
of Sciences, July 4, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
580 For analyses of the Polish privatization process, see Orenstein (2004), Appel (2004), Simoneti 
(1993), Jarosz (2000). 
 
581 Lewandowski suggested establishing five to twenty National Property Boards (the equivalent of a 
holding company) among which 60 percent of the shares of the 400 largest enterprises in “good 
condition” would be distributed. The Treasury would retain 30 percent of the shares of these enterprises 
and the remaining 10 percent would go to employees free of charge. The Boards were intended to act as 
supervisory bodies that would bring in foreign expertise and ensure that enterprise restructuring would 
take place. However, the plan was heavily criticized. Its critics pointed to the danger of creating “super-
ministries” or industry-wide holding companies that would resemble WOGs, i.e., large economic units 
introduced in Poland in the early 1980s that would control both enterprise and the market (Hashi 2000).  
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political pressure by trade unions and the victory of the left-wing government in 1993. 
The Polish people voted the Polish Solidarity reformers out of power after a wave of 
protests. By the September 1993 elections, the Solidarity camp had disintegrated to 
several factions, and the former communist party (the Democratic Left Alliance, SLD) 
formed a government coalition with the ex-communist satellite Polish Peasant Party 
(PSL). Until the 1997 elections, the SLD controlled 66 percent of the seats. The new 
left government finally implemented, in two waves, a delayed mass privatization 
program in July 1995 and December 1995 (two waves). But even then, Polish mass 
privatization was limited, affecting only 512 mostly medium-sized enterprises that 
represented only 5 percent of GDP. Shares of these participating enterprises were 
distributed according to a common scheme among fifteen National Investment Funds 
(NIFs) (60 percent), the Treasury (25 percent), and employees (15 percent) for each 
enterprise.582 The primary objective for the NIFs (closed-ended investment funds) was 
to restructure the enterprises and sell them to either strategic owners or on the stock 
exchange (Grosfeld and Hashi 2004).583 
The Polish mass privatization scheme sharply contrasted to the Czech program 
in several respects. First, while the Polish program applied a uniform distribution 
scheme of enterprise shares, in the Czech program, the outcome of the bidding process 
was nontransparent. Any number of funds and outside parties could become the new 
owners of privatized enterprises. Thus, while the Czech and Slovak investment funds 
developed spontaneously by public or private entities, the Polish NIFs were 
established by the state.  
                                                 
582 The Polish citizens were entitled to buy privatization vouchers (certificates) between November 
1995 and November 1996 for a token price of 20 zloty. The citizens did not become direct enterprise 
shareholders but certificates entitled them to one share in NIFs, thus they become indirect private 
enterprise shareholders. Of the people who were qualified, 96 percent (26 million) bought the 
certificates. 
 
583 See Hashi (2000) for a detailed examination of the operations of the NIFs.  
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Second, the Polish NIF management was entrusted to a special consortium of 
domestic and foreign financial institutions selected through an international tender 
offer, in order to bring in fund management know-how and ensure that Polish 
institutions learned from their foreign partners. In contrast to the Czech government’s 
approach to privatization that favored domestic over foreign capital, the involvement 
of foreign financiers in Polish privatization was welcome. However, it should be noted 
that the Polish Parliament originally rejected mass privatization in 1993. This rejection 
took place mainly because right-wing members of the government coalition believed 
that having foreign banks managing NIFs would lead to excessive foreign influence in 
the Polish economy, and that was unacceptable to most of the population (Orenstein 
2004: 121).  
Finally, the Polish privatization law prevented cross-ownership of banks and 
industries because Polish banks participating in the consortia were not included in the 
voucher scheme or they were already privatized and limits on NIFs borrowing were 
imposed (Grosfeld and Hashi 2004: 13, Baltowski and Mickiewicz 2000: 437–8). Not 
only did the government hold the view that banks should not be enterprise owners, but 
the banking elite themselves were not interested in acquiring shares in privatized 
enterprises or maintaining close relations with them. In contrast to the Czech or 
German banks, Polish banks were not willing to support domestic industries.584 
Therefore, the success of Polish privatization was mainly due to strict regulation of 
bank lending and independent asset management by a small group of vetted 
enterprises (Horowitz and Petráš 2003: 247, fn. 35).  
In sum, Polish enterprise privatization demonstrated a variety of paths and 
procedures, distinguishing it from the voucher privatization in the Czech Republic, 
                                                 
584 Author’s interview with Michal Federowicz, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy 
of Sciences, July 4, 2006, Warsaw; author’s interview with Piotr Kozarzewski, Senior Expert, Center 
for Social and Economic Research, July 5, 2006, Warsaw. 
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which was more uniform in nature. At the end, under competitive pressures, Polish 
state-owned enterprises were most typically restructured and privatized for foreign 
strategic investors. Fully foreign-owned enterprises accounted for 40 percent of 
foreign direct investment in 1993, and 50 percent in 1998 (King and Sznajder 2006: 
778). As I discuss in the subsequent section, enterprise privatization coupled with far 
reaching liberalization of the financial sector and privatization with foreign 
participation reduced the political power of incumbent industrialists and financiers. 
 
Financial Development: Decentralization and Foreign Participation 
Two pieces of legislation, the Act on the National Bank of Poland and the 
Banking Act, modeled on German legislation, laid the foundation for the 
establishment of a two-tier banking structure in Poland in 1989.585 The new legislation 
allowed the transformation of nine regional agencies of the central bank—the National 
Bank of Poland (Narodowy Bank Polski, NBP)—into independent SOBs, while the 
NBP assumed the role of a classical central bank. Still, in reality, it was not until 1994 
that the NBP put an end to its commercial activities. Thus, nine SOBs were created 
from the voivodship and former country bank branches of the NBP including: 
Wielkopolski Bank Kredytowy (WBK) in Poznan, Bank Slaski (BSK) in Katowice, 
Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy (BPH) in Krakow, Bank Gdanski (BG) in Gdansk, 
Pomorski Bank Kredytowy (PBKS) in Szczecin, Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy 
(BDK) in Lublin, Bank Zachodni (BZ) in Wroclaw, Powszechny Bank Gospodarczy 
(PBG) in Lódz, and Powszechny Bank Kredytowy (PBK) in Warsaw.  
Prior to the collapse of communism, the Banking Act of 1982 had already 
allowed the establishment of new banks. In addition to nine regional SOBs, four 
                                                 
585 Before 1989, the Polish banking system underwent various partial reforms but these were not 
successful in radically changing communist banking. 
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specialized SOBs operated in Poland at the outset of transition: Bank Handlowy w 
Warsawie S.A. (BH), the foreign trade merchant bank; Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. 
(Pekao), a savings bank handling foreign currency transactions involving individuals; 
Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej S.A. (BGZ), a national umbrella bank for local 
cooperative banks involved in the financing of agriculture and food processing; 
Powszechna Kasa Osczednosci-Bank Panstwowy (PKO BP), a savings bank 
specializing in zloty household deposit-taking and in financing housing 
construction.586 In 1990, the government also liberalized the “third” tier of the banking 
system, the cooperative banking sector. Cooperative banks were allowed to leave the 
BGZ, which was the main supervisory body for these banks.587 
The 1989 law on banks further permitted the establishment of new banks 
organized as joint-stock companies with the participation of both Polish and foreign 
banks, and it legalized the operations of foreign banks in Poland. Believing that 
foreign investors bring foreign competition that would help reform the Polish banks, 
the government also encouraged greenfield investments in the financial sector (Epstein 
2008). The government provided incentives for foreign banks (and foreign enterprises) 
to enter the Polish market by exempting them from paying corporate tax for three 
years and allowing them to repatriate their profits. Nonetheless, if a foreign bank 
                                                 
586 In addition to these banks, six other banks complete the list of the largest 19 banks in Poland. Bank 
Rozwoju Eksportu S.A. (BRE) was established in 1986 as an export development bank by the NBP, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and two banks specialized in foreign 
transactions, BH and Pekao. Polski Bank Rozwoju (PBR) was established in 1990 as a development 
bank to aid in restructuring and privatizing state-owned enterprises. Pierwszy Komercyjny Bank (PKB) 
was founded in 1991 to specialize in factoring. Polski Bank Inwestycyjny (PBI) was established in 1993 
to take over nonqualified assets from the NBP’s portfolio and foreign exchange account liabilities 
matched by dollar-denominated bonds issued by the Ministry of Finance. Both PKB and PBI are wholly 
owned by the NBP. The above description of the initial structure of the Polish banking sector relied 
upon Bonin and Leven (2001) and Abarbanell and Bonin (1997).  
 
587 Following mergers and bankruptcies, the numbers of cooperative banks have fallen from 1653 in 
1993 to 902 in 1999. 
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wanted to obtain a license, it was required that at least one member of the bank’s 
managing board had a Polish citizenship. Initially, the dominant investment strategy of 
foreign banks was to establish a new bank or to participate in founding a bank with 
Polish partners.588  
At the beginning, the NBP conducted a very liberal bank licensing policy, 
issuing 42 licenses in 1990 alone (Polanski 1997: 66). As a result, many “crony” 
private banks were established by state-owned enterprises or local governments. These 
newly established banks were generous in extending credits.589 Similarly, although 
subsidies from the state budget were discontinued, SOBs continued their liberal 
lending policy to a privileged group of customers, mainly to large state-owned 
enterprises. In particular, BGZ, an ally of the Peasant Party, granted extensively 
politicized credits to agricultural producers.590  
The monetary authorities attempted to contain these expansive credit policies 
and reduce the capacity of incumbent banks to create money by raising interest rates 
and requiring reserves of 30 percent on deposits. But the enterprises were borrowing, 
in spite of high interest rates, to maintain liquidity. Rapid growth in credit accelerated 
growth in the money supply. In spite of very high level of nominal interest rates (103 
percent in 1990, 53 percent in 1991, and 39 percent in 1992), the NBP’s policy did not 
seem to be restrictive enough. The inflation rate was declining only slowly. Real 
interest rates remained negative and interest spread high (Polanski 1997). The 
                                                 
588 The first foreign banks entering the Polish market included the American Bank in Poland in 1989, 
the Dutch ING in 1990, Citibank (merging with BH in 2001), the Austrian bank Creditanstalt (merging 
with PBK in 2001), and Raiffeisenbank in 1991. 
589 Author’s interview with Wlodzimierz Grudzinski, President of the Bank for Socio-Economic 
Initiatives and Member of Management Board of the Association of Polish Banks, July 16, 2006, 
Warsaw. Also, Polanski (1997: 65). 
 
590 Author’s interview with Stefan Kawalec, former General Director in the Ministry of Finance and 
Chief Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz (1989-1991), Deputy Minister of Finance 
(1991−1994), July 16, 2006, Warsaw. 
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OECD’s estimates of interest rate spreads for the banking sector were 7 and 9 
percentage points in 1992 and 1993 (Montes-Negret and Papi 1996: 20).  
The Polish banks initially favored the inflationary environment of the early 
years of transition, for this environment guaranteed the banks profits from high 
interest rate differentials. They were not keen supporters of anti-inflationary policies 
but they had limited channels to influence the decisions of monetary authorities.591 
High interest rate spreads also encouraged banks to speculate on Treasury bills and the 
NBP’s sterilization bonds.592 When the zloty was pegged to the U.S. dollar in 1990, 
the Polish banks made large profits by purchasing dollars for their current business 
transactions at a fixed rate in spite of significant appreciation in the real effective 
exchange rate. These profits increased the capital base of the banks at the time when 
bad loans had not yet become a serious problem (Bonin 1993: 109). The reckless 
borrowing from banks resulted in corporate sector payment problems, including inter-
enterprise arrears and overdue enterprise debts, and subsequently in bad credit 
portfolios of banks. Then, the chief economists of domestic banks would start publicly 
expressing their preferences for a flexible exchange rate regime.593 
Although the banks enjoyed high profits in 1990, the share of bad loans in 
bank portfolios had risen dramatically by 1991. In mid-1991, bad loans represented 17 
percent of total credits granted by Polish banks but had a weighted average of 42 
                                                 
591 Author’s interview with Andrzej Topinski, former Vice-President of the NBP (1989−1992), 
President of the Association of Polish Banks, July 14, 2006; author’s interview with Andrzej 
Bratkowski, former Advisor to Balcerowicz, Deputy President of the NBP, and Chief Economist of 
Bank Pekao SA, July 17, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
592 Author’s interview with Stefan Kawalec, former former General Director in the Ministry of Finance 
and Chief Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowitz (1989−1991), Deputy Minister of Finance 
(1991−1994), July 16, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
593 Author’s interview with Marek Dabrowski, former First Deputy Minister of Finance (1989−1990), 
Member of Parliament (1991−1993), and Member of the Monetary Policy Council of the NBP 
(1998−2004), July 3, 2006, Warsaw. 
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percent of the credit portfolios of the nine SOBs (Gomulka 1993). For the most part, 
many of these bad loans were the outcome of the political allocation of credit during 
the communist period as well as the communist legacy of bank-enterprise links that 
led to a continued flow of credit to enterprises that enabled them to repay old debts. 
Anti-inflationary monetary policy and suppression of subsidies, in addition to the 
collapse of CMEA, aggravated the situation of many exporters and contributed to a 
high number of bad loans on bank balance sheets (Polanski 1997: 74). As a result, the 
Polish banking system experienced a mini crisis around 1991 that culminated in 1993. 
The crisis resulted in the liquidation of six banks, while ten cooperative banks were 
declared bankrupt (Polanski 1994: 34). 
The Polish government reacted by changing the emphasis in its approach to the 
banking system from establishing new banks to privatizing SOBs. The World Bank 
had already recommended privatizing banks in 1989 because it feared destabilizing 
expansive bank credit policies. Nevertheless, at that time, the Polish government 
preferred to restructure banks prior to their privatization, even though it was 
committed to SOB privatization from the outset of the transition.594 The program for 
the privatization of the banking sector was adopted by the Economic Committee of the 
Council of Ministers in 1991. According to the original timetable, nine SOBs carved 
out of the NBP were supposed to be privatized by the end of 1996, so these banks 
were transformed into joint-stock companies.There was a political will to privatize the 
banking sector quickly and consistently with a privileged position reserved for foreign 
investors.595 The Polish reformers were convinced that due to a lack of sufficient 
                                                 
594 Author’s interview with Stanislaw Gomulka, former Adviser to Balcerowicz and Reader in 
Economics at the London School of Economics, July 13, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
595 Author’s interview with Katarzyna Zajdel-Kurowska, Chief Economist and Head of Treasury 
Research, Citibank Handlowy, July 14, 2006, Warsaw. 
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national capital, the privatization of SOBs could not take place without involving 
foreign investors. In fact, the objective of the Polish program for bank privatization 
was to find a foreign strategic investor for each SOB (Szymkiewicz 2001: 66). The 
motive of the Polish reformers was to strengthen the prospects of domestic banks with 
the active involvement of a foreign strategic investor so that bank privatization would 
provide budget revenues to finance reforms in other areas (Mortimer 1995: 96). 
To encourage bank privatization, Western donor countries (of which the 
United States was the largest contributor) allowed the use of 600 million U.S. dollars 
from the Bank Privatization Fund to recapitalize banks. This fund, established in 1992, 
was originally created to support the fixed exchange rate (the Zloty Stabilization 
Fund) (Mortimer 1995: 96). The funds were not used to support the zloty, so donors 
decided to make them available to support bank privatization. However, the donors 
allowed for disbursements to finance the recapitalization of a commercial bank only 
after it was privatized (Abarbanell and Bonin 1997: 32).  
To this end, the original blueprint of the bank privatization strategy focused on 
finding a strategic investor for a privatized bank which would possess no more than 30 
percent of total shares but would actively participate in bank management; the 
Ministry of Finance would retain about 30 percent of the shares with voting rights 
limited to strategic decisions; and the remaining shares would be offered to employees 
and individual investors in a public offering (Szymkiewicz 2001).596 Bank 
privatization combined initial public offerings and placement with foreign investors 
via direct sales. 
                                                 
596 The government’s intention was to attract capital from various countries and to prevent the 
domination of German capital. Author’s interview with Dariusz Filar, Member of the Monetary Policy 
Council of the NBP, July 11, 2006, Warsaw. 
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The government has chosen two banks to spearhead the privatization program. 
These banks are considered to be among the best Polish banks in terms of both quality 
of their portfolios and management (top-level managers were previously the NBP 
managers). The privatization of WBK, the first of the nine regional SOBs, started in 
June 1991. Although the government searched for a foreign strategic investor, due to 
the initial lack of interest, it subsequently decided to sell 29 percent of its shares to the 
EBRD to provide a counterbalance to the state’s influence in bank governance, rather 
than delay privatization (Bonin 1993: 111–112). In 1993, the Dutch ING acquired 26 
percent of shares in BSK (at present ING owns 88 percent of the shares). By the end 
of 1995, an additional three of nine SOBs were privatized: BSK in 1993, BPH and BG 
in 1995 (Bonin and Leven 1996).  
As the result of the financial liberalization and privatization in 1993, 58 out of 
the 87 operating commercial banks were controlled by private owners. Initially, the 
number of foreign owned banks in the Polish banking system was relatively small. In 
1994, out of 81 banks, only 11 (14 percent) were controlled by foreigners. In spite of 
the liberal policy of foreign bank entry and various incentives provided by the Polish 
government to foreign investors, “foreign banks were initially reluctant to get involved 
in privatization of Polish banks because of the country’s difficult situation with debt 
reduction,” recalls Stefan Kawalec, Chief Adviser to Balcerowicz in charge of 
financial reforms.597 Although an agreement with the Paris club creditors had already 
been signed in 1991, reducing debt by 50 percent, the agreement with the London 
Club reducing outstanding debt by 45 percent was not reached until 1994 (Polanski 
2002, Angreasano 1996). This agreement constituted the starting point for the 
                                                 
597 Author’s interview with Stefan Kawalec, former General Director in the Ministry of Finance and 
Chief Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz (1989−1991), Deputy Minister of Finance 
(1991−1994), July 16, 2006, Warsaw. 
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expansion of foreign bank in the Polish financial system. Since 1994, the role of 
foreign capital in the Polish banking sector increased significantly. 
At the same time, the number of licenses for new banks fell from 16 in 1991 to 
five in 1992 and to only one each in 1993 and 1994 (Polanski 1997: 66). From 1992 to 
1996, only 20 new licenses were granted, mainly to foreign banks (Szymkiewicz 
2001: 56). But this temporary freeze on granting new licenses also affected greenfield 
operations of foreign banks. Instead, the NBP encouraged foreign banks to take over 
small ailing Polish banks, a policy that was successful only in one case (Interbank was 
taken over by ABN AMRO) or to participate as strategic foreign investors in the 
privatization of SOBs (Konopielko 1999: 479–482). The principal objective of the 
NBP was to strengthen the domestic banking system through the restructuring and 
revitalization of domestic banks with the assistance of foreign capital. Seven of the 
“nine” regional SOBs participated in “Twinning Agreements” with foreign partners in 
the framework of the IMF and World Bank programs. However, these programs were 
only moderately successful because only one bank, Allied Irish Bank, invested in its 
“twin,” WBP (still, at present, Allied Irish owns 60 percent of WBK’s shares) (Epstein 
2001). Even though foreign banks preferred greenfield investments early on, later they 
ended up taking over the Polish banks (brownfield investments) (Szymkiewitz 2001: 
64). By 1996, foreign financial institutions controlled 30 percent of total banking 
sector capital (Konopielko 1999: 479).  
Contemporaneous with the privatization program, a bank-led, enterprise-
restructuring plan was designed. The focal point in bank privatization and managing 
problematic bad loans (collected before 1992) was the 1993 Law on Financial 
Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks. Poland adopted a bank-led “decentralized” 
approach to restructuring. According to the plan, no special government institution has 
been created and banks themselves were expected to solve the problem of non-
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performing loans. Instead, the World Bank recommended a standard procedure for 
cleaning up bad loan portfolios (applied previously in Spain and some Latin American 
countries), which envisaged the transfer of bad loans from banks to so-called “bank 
hospitals,” responsible for restructuring. Nonetheless, the Polish Ministry of Finance 
was skeptical about the efficient functioning of a centralized government-run 
restructuring agency and its ability to resist political pressures.598 The centralized 
approach to bad loan problems, which was implemented by the Czech government, 
has proven to be unsuccessful in changing the rent-seeking behavior of Czech banks 
and enterprises, as chapter 7 demonstrates.  
In a decentralized Polish approach, banks and enterprises were encouraged to 
reach a conciliatory agreement, which could have taken one of the following forms: 
rescheduling claims, debt/equity swaps and loan write-offs, bankruptcy, liquidation, or 
sale of claims. The government clearly announced that it would not play an active role 
during the conciliation proceedings. The “lead” bank in a bank conciliation procedure 
was responsible for monitoring the agreement and was held accountable for the losses 
of other creditors if the agreement was not completed on time or if the bank did not 
terminate the agreement when it was breached. The lead bank thus took responsibility 
for resolving the debt of its major clients in return for one-time recapitalization with 
interest bearing government bonds (“restructuring bonds”) with a 15-year maturity to 
create adequate provisions against bad debts. Thus, the restructuring program included 
a one-time recapitalization of seven of the nine main commercial banks, which held 
about 60 percent of outstanding enterprise debt, sufficient to deal with classified debts 
originating prior to 1992. The program also imposed a formal ban on granting new 
loans to enterprises with doubtful or non-collectible loans and a one year deadline for 
                                                 
598 Author’s interview with Stefan Kawalec, former General Director in the Ministry of Finance and 
Chief Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz (1989−1991), Deputy Minister of Finance 
(1991−1994), July 16, 2006, Warsaw. 
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completing the restructuring program. This ban made banks reluctant to reschedule the 
payment of old loans because they were skeptical that their debtors could meet such a 
tight repayment schedule. More importantly, a bank-led enterprise-restructuring plan, 
unique among transition countries, linked bank privatization and recapitalization 
directly to bad-debt workouts. Technical assistance was provided by consortia 
composed of Polish and foreign consulting firms (McDermott 2006 and 2007: 230, 
Kawalec and Kluza 2003).  
The restructuring program and the commitment of the government to privatize 
the SOBs involved in the program, successfully contained moral hazard and changed 
the behavior of domestic banks. In the words of Andrzej Bratkowski: 
Moral hazard was contained because the government made it clear that after 
the first stage of recapitalization, nobody could expect a bailout. Polish banks 
were in a weak position to lobby because they were aware that they could not 
expect further money from the government. Therefore, they preferred to 
cooperate with foreign banks.599 
 
Banks learned how to deal with financial risks, and bad loan problems have not 
reemerged in the banks covered by the restructuring (Van Wijnbergen 1997).600 As a 
result, during the period between recapitalization and privatization, “the banks 
retained capital adequacy and were profitable. They did not need further infusions of 
capital by the government and ultimately were sold to strategic investors with high 
premiums to their book values” (Kawalec and Kluza 2003: 7). Thus, in contrast with 
                                                 
599 Author’s interview with Andrzej Bratkowski, former Advisor to Balcerowicz, Deputy President of 
the NBP, and Chief Economist of Bank Pekao SA, July 17, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
600 There were some instances in which banks continued to behave badly, however. Bonin and Leven 
(2001) examined the performance of BDK and found that the bank continued to provide soft lending to 
keep four old-military industrial enterprises afloat and even increased its credit exposure to these 
enterprises during the bank-led bad resolution program.  
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Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, where the governments engaged in multiple bank 
recapitalizations, the recapitalization of SOBs in Poland has been carried out only 
once. Since the Polish government made it clear at the beginning of the transition that 
it would not be “paternalistic,” bank managers realized that if they wanted to survive, 
they had better not engage in imprudent credit policies and excessive risk taking.601 At 
the same time, bad loans decreased, amounting to 11 percent in 1998 (Szymkiewicz 
2001: 57, Polanski 2002: 112).  
 The SLD-led government that came to power in 1993 made some attempts to 
change the privatization strategy that had been practiced previously. In 1994, the SLD-
affiliated Minister of Finance Kolodko wanted to put off bank privatization, and 
instead commercialize a number of SOBs and consolidate them into two groups 
(around Bank Handlowy and Pekao SA) for two reasons: to maximize the state’s 
revenues from privatization and to facilitate acquisitions by domestic buyers to 
maintain the state’s role in bank management and credit allocation. He believed that 
rapid bank privatization would unfairly favor foreign investors given the 
underdeveloped Polish financial market. By postponing privatization, he intended to 
maintain the government’s role in credit allocation and to eventually create a Polish-
owned international competitive banking conglomerate. These goals were included in 
the Bank Consolidation Plan that the Ministry of Finance under Kolodko’s direction 
announced in 1995. According to the plan, Polish banks were considered to be too 
small to survive the invasion of foreign banks after the liberalization of entry, which 
was required by the EU Association Agreement (Epstein 2001 and 2008).602 In 
                                                 
601 Author’s interview with Zbigniew Polanski, Advisor to President of the NBP Leszek Balcerowicz 
and Professor of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, July 11, 2006, Warsaw.  
 
602 By 1996, two bank groups had been created under the Consolidation Act: Pekao SA merged with 
three regional banks, PBG, BDK and PBKS; and PBR merged with PBK. At the same time, two 
private-led banking groups emerged: the first led by BIG with its purchase of a core stake in the 
privatization of BG and the second led by Kredyt Bank, which had acquired PBI (Konopielko 1997).  
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general, the banking sector in Poland was perceived to have close links with left wing 
parties because at the beginning of the transition, the members of the anti-communist 
opposition movement were mainly dissident intellectuals, and the only people with 
business experience were ex-communist managers in state-owned enterprises and 
banks.603 Members of PSL, the SLD coalition partner, were strongly against 
privatization and foreign participation in the ownership of the agricultural bank BSK. 
 Nonetheless, in 1996, under the pressures from the IMF and other international 
institutions, the plan for bank consolidation and strengthening of domestic ownership 
was dropped and a fast-track privatization through direct sales with foreign capital 
resumed (Epstein 2008).604 In the same year, the Cimoszewicz government launched a 
new ambitious privatization plan to privatize ten banks between 1997 and 2000. 
Cimoszewicz’s plan was, however, only partially implemented due to the 
government’s defeat in the elections of October 1997. After that point, the new 
government accelerated the sale of SOBs principally to foreign banks. By the end of 
the 1990s, 70 commercial banks (out of 77) were in private hands, while 39, over half, 
of the commercial banks were owned by foreigners (Polanski 2002: 109). The most 
important was the privatization of Pekao SA, the second largest Polish bank (with 20 
percent of the Polish banking system assets) to Unicredito Italiano and Allianz AG, 
which had acquired a 52 percent stake. In 2001, the asset share of foreign banks in the 
Polish banking sector represented 69 percent. 
                                                 
603 Author’s interview with Andrzej Bratkowski, former Advisor to Balcerowicz, Deputy President of 
the NBP, and Chief Economist of Bank Pekao SA, July 17, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
604 Social democrats often criticized the rapid privatization of banks in the second half of 1990s, arguing 
that it went too far and that the banks did not support domestic industries. Author’s interview with Jerzy 
Hauser, former Minister of Labor, Minister of State Treasury (2004), Minister of Economy 
(2003−2005), July 6, 2006, Warsaw. 
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 As foreign owned banks started to dominate the Polish financial system, most 
of these banks intensified competition. Simultaneously, the Polish authorities 
strengthened the regulatory and supervisory framework in the banking sector. The 
NBP, from the beginning, obliged banks to measure credit risk and to cover it by 
specific provisions. In some areas, similar to the loan classification criteria, Polish 
regulations were even more restrictive than those in the EU countries (Polanski 2006). 
Although banks tried to lobby for weaker regulation, through lower mandatory 
reserves for example, they were not able to exert influence on government regulatory 
policies. Unlike the Czech regulatory authorities, the Polish government was able to 
limit bank speculation on international financial markets because tight prudential 
regulations and limits to the foreign exchange positions of commercial banks had 
already been introduced in 1993, before capital flows were liberalized. Banks were 
thus compelled to behave in a risk-adverse manner.605 Although banks favoured 
liberalization of capital early on, the Polish authorities adopted a gradual and cautious 
liberalization schedule.606 While inflows of foreign direct investments had already 
been liberalized in 1991, short term restrictions on capital were not removed until 
2002. Poland’s obligations related to the OECD accession in 1996 did not substantially 
accelerate liberalization, either.607 In fact, Polish regulations of capital movements fell 
short of OECD requirements (Árvai 2005: 11–12).  
                                                 
605 Author’s interview with Piotr Spzunar, Deputy Director, Macroeconomic and Structural Analyses 
Department of the NBP, July 3, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
606 Author’s interview with Katarzyna Zajdel-Kurowska, Chief Economist and Head of Treasury 
Research, Citibank Handlowy, July 14, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
607 Poland’s application for the OECD membership required fulfilling obligations resulting from the 
OECD Codes of Liberalization. Consequently, a new Foreign Exchange Law adopted in January 1995 
codified liberalization of non-resident portfolio investment in equity and the liberalization of foreign 
investment in domestic treasury securities, which took place from 1992 through 1994, and allowed the 
selling of Polish securities on international markets. However, many capital controls remained in place 
and Poland was obliged to remove the remaining capital restrictions by the end of 1999.  
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 Polish SOBs gradually began to change their behavior in the face of the 
approaching “corporatization” and privatization (Polanski 1994: 38). Surprisingly, the 
banking sector itself had become active in introducing foreign capital from the outset 
of the transition. Bankers understood that it was better to adapt to competition from 
Western banks than to build on the former post-communist networks.608 The other 
reason why banks were motivated to get privatized was because of what was offered 
to their own employees and managers under the government privatization scheme.609  
 In summary, the Polish governments conducted a gradual bank privatization 
(case-by-case approach) that privileged sales to foreign strategic investors as multiple 
objectives were tried including attracting foreign investors but also raising budget 
revenues from the sale of the banks, promoting enterprise restructuring, and protecting 
the stock market as well as promoting a domestic presence in the financial sector 
(Abarbanell and Bonin 1997: 32).610 Privatization of banks generated substantial 
revenues to the state budget (Polanski 2002). Another major goal of the Polish 
government in conducting bank privatization and restructuring that combined 
“delegation,” “deliberation,” and collective evaluation was to reduce asymmetric 
information on the side of the government and banks. This approach led to limiting 
favoritism to domestic enterprises by banks and the government (McDermott 2004). 
As a result, the Polish approach to financial development generated substantial 
revenues to the state budget and resulted in an open financial system. This system had 
strong banking regulations and supervision that prevented a systemic banking and 
                                                 
608 Author’s interview with Michael Federowicz, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish 
Academy of Sciences, July 4, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
609 Author’s interview with Stefan Kawalec, former General Director in the Ministry of Finance and 
Chief Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz (1989−1991), Deputy Minister of Finance 
(1991−1994), July 16, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
610 Abarbanell and Bonin (1997) criticized these objectives as being mutually inconsistent. 
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financial crisis and enabled the government to conduct a sustainable exchange rate 
policy. 
The Consensual Exchange Rate Policy  
 With the central bank at the center, the financial system that emerged in Poland 
allowed a consensus among banks, industries, and the state in monetary, regulatory, 
and exchange rate policies. The NBP was thus an indispensable part of this 
institutional framework. Throughout the 1990s, the Polish monetary authorities 
pursued an “eclectic” exchange rate policy, focusing both on exchange rate and 
interest rates, a “competitiveness-conscious” strategy. In its quest to reduce inflation, 
Poland has not tolerated a highly valued Polish zloty irrespective of considering the 
competitiveness of domestic industries.  
While ties between banks and enterprises were market based, the NBP did not 
enjoy the same degree of independence from the government as its Czech and 
Estonian counterparts. During most of the 1990s, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Foreign Relations bureaucrats as well as the Parliament dominated the NBP not only 
in exchange rate policy but also in domestic monetary policy. Although the 1989 law 
on the central bank stipulated that the governor of the NBP would be nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish Parliament), the 
requirement remained unchanged that the annual monetary program of the central 
bank required direct parliamentary approval. Therefore, the Parliament had preserved 
a significant role in the conduct of monetary policy and in overseeing the NBP’s 
activities (Kochanowicz, Kozarzewski, and Woodward 2005: 49). In general, the co-
objective of the central bank was to cooperate with the government in pursuing the 
objectives of national economic policy. 
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Similarly, the decisions on exchange rate policy and financial liberalization 
were much more involved than in the Czech Republic and Estonia because several 
parties participated in the decision-making process. The Polish legislation stipulated 
that the principles for establishing the exchange rate were to be determined by the 
Council of Ministers upon a proposal from the President of the NBP in consultation 
with the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Foreign Relations. Therefore, the 
final decision in exchange rate policy area rested with the Council of Ministers (Koch 
1997: 7). The ambiguity of the law on the NBP lent itself to the right of the 
government to veto the decisions in the exchange rate policy area.611 The decision-
making in this area was further complicated by the need to find a compromise among 
the conflicting views of these three institutions: while the central bank focused on anti-
inflationary objectives, the Ministry of Foreign Relations favored a weak currency to 
facilitate exports; and the Ministry of Finance was caught in between the two. For 
example, Kolodko, the SLD Minister of Finance saw support for an exchange rate as 
an anchor but also one that could promote growth.612 Similarly, in the area of capital 
account liberalization, the Foreign Exchange Law stipulated the co-decision making 
shared by the NBP and the Ministry of Finance.613 
As argued previously, during the 1990s, the Polish government pursued an 
approach to exchange rate policy in which the real exchange rate should be stable and 
set at a competitive level. Even though it was not stated in official documents, it 
                                                 
611 Author’s interview with Marek Dabrowski, former First Deputy Minister of Finance (1989−1990), 
Member of Parliament (1991−1993), and Member of the Monetary Policy Council of the NBP 
(1998−2004), July 3, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
612 Author’s interview with Grzegorz Kolodko, former Minister of Finance (1994−1997 and 
2002−2003), July 2 and 5, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
613 Author’s interview with Piotr Szpunar, Deputy Director, Macroeconomic and Structural Analyses 
Department of the NBP, July 3, 2006, Warsaw.  
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seemed there was an assumption right from the beginning that a form or crawl might 
follow the rigid peg when the real exchange rate appreciated substantially (Gomulka 
1995: 336). The Polish exchange rate policy throughout the 1990s aimed to achieve a 
compromise between disinflation objectives and competitiveness of domestic 
industries on international markets.614 Once the accelerating inflation was brought 
under control and due to various domestic pressures, the Polish government gave low 
priority to further reductions in inflation and tried to sustain the competitiveness of 
domestic exporters (Burdekin, Nelson and Willett 1999). 
A currency peg adopted as a part of the economic stabilization program at the 
beginning of the transition reduced the inflation rate very quickly from four digit 
numbers but relatively high inflation persisted (only in 1998, for the first time, was 
there a yearly consumer price index of one digit). The single currency peg to the U.S. 
dollar exposed it to changes in the international value of the dollar at the time when 
Polish trade with European countries increased. The government thus devalued the 
zloty in May 1991 after sixteen months and pegged it to a basket of five currencies.615 
Inflation differentials combined with a fixed exchange rate led to a quick appreciation 
of the zloty, which in turn led to a sharp increase in imported consumption goods and 
put strong pressure on the competitiveness of domestic exporters. The government 
reacted by introducing a compromise solution: a pre-announced crawling peg to a 
currency basket in October 1991. The crawling peg allowed for very limited exchange 
rate flexibility, so the exchange rate continued to be a nominal anchor for disinflation 
policy. Nevertheless, the rate of crawl was to ensure a competitive exchange rate at the 
                                                 
614 Author’s interview with Jerzy Pruski, First Deputy Governor of the NBP, July 12, 2006, Warsaw.  
 
615 In May 1991 the zloty was devalued by 14 percent against the U.S. dollar and became pegged to a 
basket of five currencies reflecting their relative importance in Polish trade (45% U.S. dollar, 35% 
Deutsche mark, 10% British pound, 5% French franc, and 5% Swiss franc). 
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same time.616 Against the background of continuous problems of controlling inflation 
and accelerating capital flows, the NBP introduced a crawling band, in May 1995 and 
the zloty was allowed to fluctuate in a band of plus or minus 7 percent. This strategy 
was intended to give the central bank more room for monetary policy maneuvers 












Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 8.1: From hard peg to free float, 1990−2005 
 The soft peg policy that was pursued after abandoning a rigid peg in 1991 
opened the NBP to conflicting pressures for devaluation from speculators and 
exporters (Kowalski and Stawarska 1999: 356). Although the export industries were 
profitable immediately after the entry devaluation before the 1990 fixing of the zloty, 
                                                 
616 Monthly devaluations were set at 1.8 percent (23 percent annually) to 1 percent (12 percent 
annually) at the beginning of 1996. Decisions on devaluations were taken on the basis of the balance of 
payments and the foreign exchange levels, to preserve the competitiveness of domestic exporters (Koch 
1997: 12).  
 




























































they started to express their discontent when the exchange rate began to appreciate and 
the trade balance became negative. Two industries were particularly affected by the 
currency appreciation: the shipyard industry whose entire production was designated 
for exports and the coal industry, which was struggling with endless unsuccessful 
restructuring programs even though it was less dependent on exports.618  
The different Polish governments limited their export promotion policy to managing 
the exchange rate (Campbell 2002: 506). They tended to avoid a pro-active industrial 
policy in the interventionist sense. Syryjczyk, the minister of industry and trade in the 
first post-communist Mazowiecki government, declared that “the best industrial policy 
is no industrial policy.”619 Some attempts to formulate industrial policy existed during 
the Suchocka administration, such as the establishment of the Agency for 
Restructuring.620 Kolodko, a finance minister from the SLD/PSL coalition 
government, pushed more aggressively for a pro-industrial policy that would increase 
competitiveness on the part of Polish industry in his new “Strategy for Poland” (King 
and Sznajder 2006: 774). But because SLD was supported by new industrialists and 
bankers who emerged from the nomenklatura privatizations under the last communist 
government, it essentially continued with the business friendly policies of the first 
post-communist governments (Stone 2002: 111). The Polish governments 
implemented short-term industry support programs under the temporary pressures of 
                                                 
618 Author’s interview with Stefan Kawalec, former General Director in the Ministry of Finance and the 
Chief Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz (1989−1991), Deputy Minister of Finance 
(1991−1994), July 16, 2006, Warsaw. In general, in spite of the nominal appreciation of the exchange 
rate, Polish exports performed quite well (Polanski 2004: 15). 
 
619 Author’s interview with Jerzy Hausner, former Minister of Labor (2001−2003), Minister of State 
Treasury (2004) and Minister of Economy (2003−2005), July 6, 2006, Warsaw. 
 
620 Author’s interview with Stanislaw Gomulka, former Advisor to Balcerowicz and Reader in 
Economics at the London School of Economics, July 13, 2006, Warsaw. 
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interest groups from coal mining, the defense industry, the steel industry, and textiles 
but they have not elaborated a long-term industrial policy strategy.621  
Some good examples that illustrate the reluctance of the Polish governments to 
pursue an active industrial policy are the cases involving textiles and steel producers, 
which were the key industrial sectors crucial to industrialization under the communist 
regime. Because of their insulation from world markets during communism, they 
became uncompetitive internationally. These industries were politically important in 
terms of geographic concentration and employment. Therefore, they had a strong 
potential to pressure the government for help. In particular, when Poland signed the 
Association Treaty with the EU in 1993, the government came under pressure from 
these two “sensitive” sectors that were facing harsh competition with EU products. 
Under pressure from the steel sector, the government temporarily imposed import 
tariffs, but in general, the Polish government refrained from employing sector-
selective trade protection policies (Campbell 2000).622  
 The monetary policy pursued by the central bank was also only mildly 
restrictive. The NBP initially resorted to discretionary methods in monetary policy and 
played an important role in inflationary financing of budget deficits. The first NBP 
Presidents—Hana Gronkiewicz-Waltz and Grzegorz Wojtowicz—were too weak 
politically and too reluctant to apply drastic monetary measures (table 8.2).623 In spite 
of the initial plan to abolish selective credit policies, the NBP continued to provide 
                                                 
621 Author’s interview with Michal Federowicz, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy 
of Sciences, July 4, 2006, Warsaw. For example, the industrial policy program for 1996−1997 
“International Competitiveness of Polish Industry” made industries responsible for their own 
competitiveness. 
 
622 Poland’s agricultural sector was hit even harder because it was competing with the heavily 
subsidized agricultural products of the EU member countries. Still, it did not receive government 
support. Concentrated industrial exporters were more influential than dispersed agricultural producers.  
 
623 Author’s interview with Andrzej Bratkowski, former Advisor to Balcerowicz, Deputy President of 
the NBP, and Chief Economist of Bank Pekao SA, July 17, 2006, Warsaw. 
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privileged conditions for some sectors of the economy, which included investments in 
government infrastructure (Polanski 1994: 38, fn. 39). Already in the second half of 
1990, the NBP lowered refinancing and rediscount credit rates, triggered by the initial 
fall in inflation and pressure from industrial interests. But this step has proved to be 
premature and has again led to higher inflation (Kowalski and Stawarska 1999: 362). 
The government repeatedly pushed the NBP to lower interest rates that would reduce 




Table 8.2: Governors of the National Bank of Poland, 1989−2007 
 
Governor Tenure  Background 
Grzegorz Wójtowicz 1991−1992 Central Banker 
Hana Gronkiewicz-
Waltz 
1992−2000 Professor of Law 
Leszek Balcerowicz 2000−2006 Politician (Prime Minister and Minister 
of Finance) 
Slawomir Skrzypek 2007− Banker (Chairman of PKO BP) 
 
 The NBP also financed the government deficit, which meant monetary 
accommodation of fiscal policy that fueled inflation. Initially, in the legal framework 
of the stabilization program, it was postulated that the NBP was not allowed to finance 
more than 2 percent of state budget expenditures per year and that all loans to the 
government should bear interest. Nonetheless, since 1992, the NBP started to acquire 
short-term Treasury bills issued by the government and it became the main finance 
provider for the state budget deficit (Polanski 1994: 17). While soft-budget constraints 
and the expansive credit policy of banks led to inflationary pressures in the Czech 
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Republic, the monetization of the fiscal deficit by the NBP acted as the “motor of 
inflation” in Poland (Wellisz 1997). The NBP financed 100 percent of the government 
deficit in 1989, 80 percent in 1991, 52 percent in 1992, and 65 percent in 1993. 
In the area of banking reform, the NBP also tended to support the policies of 
the Polish governments. Under the administration of the Democratic Left Alliance and 
Polish Peasant Party, a government unwilling to promote foreign participation in the 
Polish banking system, the NBP cooperatively refused to grant banking licenses 
directly to foreign banks. Instead, foreign banks were able to obtain a license and 
access the Polish financial market by bailing out problematic banks (Polanski 1997: 
68). Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, who was then president of the NBP, supported bank 
consolidation promoted by the SLD-led Ministry of Finance instead of privatization to 
foreign investors (Epstein 2001). A significant change came in 1998 when Poland 
joined the OECD and signed an association agreement with the EU. The OECD 
explicitly called for limiting the power of the NBP to restrict sales of Polish banks to 
foreign strategic investors (Williamson 1999). 
At the same time, the government made several attempts to limit NBP 
independence further, which caused numerous conflicts. One of the most high profile 
conflicts was fought between the SLD-PSL-led government and the NBP when 
Kolodko, Minister of Finance, criticized the central bank for its overly restrictive anti-
inflation “crusade” and called for an interest rate reduction. In addition, the SLD-PS 
coalition requested legislation to create a separate institution for banking supervision 
and an NBP Council that would be responsible for monetary policy decisions rather 
than just having monetary power concentrated in the hands of one person, the NBP 
President. 624 According to this legislative proposal, the government and the Sejm 
                                                 
624 Author’s interview with Grzegorz Kolodko, former Minister of Finance (1994−1997 and 
2002−2003), July 2 and 5, 2006, Warsaw. 
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would appoint three members each, while the Polish Union of Banks would appoint 
two. The president of NBP would also serve on the Council but he would be appointed 
by the prime minister instead of the president, making this appointment subject to 
greater political participation. In addition, the law would have allowed the central 
bank to lend the government up to 5 percent of the state budget. The Freedom Union, 
chaired by Balcerowicz, opposed this bill and submitted an alternative proposal on 
institutional reform at the NBP, which was ultimately passed under international 
pressures in 1997 (Epstein 2006).625 
 Ironically, the new NBP Act into the 1997 Polish Constitution strengthened, 
rather than weakened, the institutional independence of the central bank. It established 
a new NBP decision-making body, a 10-person Monetary Policy Council (Rada 
Polityki Pieniężnej, RPP) in 1998 (modeled on the Banque de France) in order to 
depolitize monetary policy making and to grant greater independence from the 
government to the central bank (Polanski 1998: 22). The members of the RPP have 
six-year terms, like the NBP president. While the Constitution defines the mission of 
the NBP in such broad terms as “responsibility for the value of Polish currency,” it has 
also given the central bank “the exclusive right (…) to formulate and implement 
monetary policy (Article 227, paragraph 1). Significantly, the new law for the central 
bank has also eliminated the possibility of direct lending by the NBP to the 
government and has thus reduced the inflationary effects of fiscal policy.  
A further strengthening of NBP independence was the outcome of its own 
initiative.626  First, the two Polish economists, Jacek Rostowski and Andrzej 
                                                 
625 Another object of contention between the NBP and the Ministry of Finance concerned the ownership 
by the NBP of three banks under recovery (Prosper Bank, Pierwszy Komercyjny Bank and Budbank) 
and the Polish Investment Bank until 1996 (Huterski, Nicholls and Wisniewski 2004: 206). 
 
626 The following discussion is based on author’s interview with Marek Dabrowski, former First Deputy 
Minister of Finance (1989−1990), Member of Parliament (1991−1993), and Member of the Monetary 
Policy Council of the NBP (1998−2004), July 3, 2006, Warsaw.  
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Bratkowski (who became the NBP Deputy President) (2002), popularized the idea of 
unilateral euroization prior to the official entry of Poland into the euro zone. The main 
reasoning behind this policy option was that soft pegs pursued to promote national 
competitiveness represented an “inflationary perpetum mobile,” reducing the NBP’s 
control over money supply and inflation throughout the 1990s.627 In contrast, 
unilateral euroization, which can conceptually be treated as an anti-inflationary 
strategy akin to a hard peg, would have a dampening effect on inflation and could play 
a disciplinary role for fiscal prudence. However, this idea did not find support among 
the domestic political elite and was strongly opposed by the European Commission. 
Subsequently, a member of the new RPP, Boguslaw Grabowski, brought up 
the idea of inflation targeting as an alternative monetary policy in summer 1998.628 
The NBP announced the inflation targeting strategy in September 1998 and released 
the document “Medium-term Strategy of Monetary Policy (1999−2003)”, which 
outlines the details of new policies and sets the inflation target at a level below 4 
percent by the end of 2003 (table 8.3). The NBP also allowed the Polish zloty to move 
within a wide plus or minus 15 percent band. However, a crawling peg, which was 
still maintained, made the objective of monetary policy ambiguous, since price 
stability could still conflict with external competitiveness. The NBP stopped 
intervening on the foreign exchange market since July 1998. Nonetheless, because 
inflation targeting was in the hands of the NBP and the exchange rate remained co-
determined by the central bank and the Council of Ministers, the adoption of float that 
                                                 
627 Author’s interview with Marek Dabrowski, former First Deputy Minister of Finance (1989−1990), 
Member of Parliament (1991−1993), and Member of the Monetary Policy Council of the NBP 
(1998−2004), July 3, 2006, Warsaw.  
 
628 Author’s interview with Boguslaw Grabowski, Member of the Monetary Policy Council of the NBP 
(1998-2004), July 17, 2006, Warsaw. 
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would accompany a new monetary strategy of inflation targeting was delayed.629 
Finally, the decision was taken to replace the crawling system with a pure float of the 
Polish zloty in April 2000.  
 
Table 8.3:Evolution of Inflation Targeting 
 
Direct Inflation Targeting 
(DIT) adoption date 
January 1999 
Type of DIT  Initial: Strict; Present: Strict 
Intermediate target level Initial year: 6.6%−7.8% (Dec 1999); Present: 2.5%, 
±1% band 
Actual realization Initial year: 9.8% (Dec 1999); Present: 2.2% 
Corresponding exchange rate 
regime 
Initial: Crawling band; Present: Pure float, as of 
April 2000 
Target announcements RPP of NBP 
 
Source: Adapted from Orlowski (2008: 445–446). 
 
The move towards inflation targeting combined with a full float left much less 
room for a government maneuver. The only person who voted against a full float was 
NBP governor Gronkiewicz-Waltz, who expressed concerns about inflation 
stabilization under a floating regime.630 According to the 1997 central bank law, 
exchange rate policy is still determined by the Council of Ministers and the RPP 
approves the rules setting the exchange rate for the zloty along with implementing 
policy. However, because exchange rate policy is not a policy parameter in the new 
monetary framework, the central bank strengthened its independence further. The 
institutional strengthening of the NBP’s independence enhanced the credibility of the 
                                                 
629 Author’s interview with Jerzy Pruski, First Deputy Governor of the NBP, July 12, 2006, Warsaw. 
630 Some members of the RPP, however, wanted to continue to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market. Author’s interview with Krzysztof Rybinski, Deputy President of the NBP, July 5, 2006, 
Warsaw. 
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new monetary strategy compared with the previous one, which encouraged the 
government to fuel inflation (Lyziak, Mackiewicz, and Stanislawska 2007: 71).  
Another major legislative change decreased the scope for central bank action, 
however. The new legislation entrusted banking supervision tasks to the Banking 
Supervision Commission, which is organizationally independent of the NBP. This 
solution can make banking supervision vulnerable to political influence via the 
Commission’s representatives. Thus, it might negatively influence the independence 
of the central bank because it becomes more difficult to coordinate banking 
supervision with monetary policy.  
 Even though they were mostly unsuccessful, there were attempts to limit NBP 
independence after 1997. The Polish government continued to call on the central bank 
to lower interest rates in order to boost domestic exports. The most recent failed effort 
to limit the powers of the NBP was in 2002, when a group of parliamentarians from 
PS and the Labour Union proposed a bill to increase the number of RPPs from 10 to 
16. New members would be elected by the Sejm, the Senate, and the President. 
Conversely, the SLD suggested that the government should set monetary policy, with 
the Monetary Policy Council merely in an advisory role (Kosc 2002).  
Notwithstanding, the inflation target replaced the currency peg as the policy 
disciplinary anchor and provided an effective tool to combat inflation. In both Poland 
and the Czech Republic, inflation targets are announced and adopted by the central 
banks, allowing them to assume sole responsibility for inflation (Krzak and Ettl 1999). 
As a result of the monetary policy conducted between 1998 and 2002, inflation came 
down from 13.3 percent in December 1997 to 0.8 percent in December 2002 (Pruski 




The political economic history of Polish exchange rate policy highlights the 
ways in which Polish policymakers’ preferences for exchange rate stability and 
competitive valuation of the Polish zloty have competed with others’ preferences for 
price stability. During the 1990s, exchange rate policy was an integral part of a 
national strategy of export-stimulated industrial development and economic growth.631 
Nonetheless, Polish policymakers never actively promoted competitive devaluations 
of the Polish zloty in nominal terms, and thus did not practice “beggar-thy-neighbor” 
tactics.  
 A successful financial reform and privatization with the participation of 
foreign strategic investors weakened the political influence of incumbent banks, as the 
outsider financiers brought with them more competition and stronger bank regulatory 
and supervisory institutions. In contrast to the Czech Republic, where the government 
allowed shares in major SOBs to be included in voucher privatization, in Poland, 
banks were reserved for conventional privatization methods of direct sales. From the 
beginning of the transition, Polish enterprises and banks were facing hard fiscal 
budgeting as well as credit constraints. The government approach to bad enterprise 
loans was to let banks to solve their bad loan problems with their debtors, and to focus 
on simultaneous bank and enterprise restructuring, as well as a gradual redefinition of 
property rights. Against the background of privatizing SOBs and the entrance of 
foreign banks in the Polish financial system, banks were forced early on to compete 
with each other. These initiatives had a positive long term impact on banking behavior 
and helped banks to change their heretofore incestuous relationships with incumbent 
enterprises. Thus, the Polish approach to financial reform created an institutional 
                                                 
631 In contrast to three other cases under close examination in this study, Poland is not a very open 
economy. In 1999, its exports amounted only to 17.6 percent of GDP, while the overall trade was at 
47.5 percent.  
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environment for a consensual policy making via deliberations that occurred not only 
between the government, the central bank, and commercial banks, but also between 
banks and industrial enterprises, their debtors. This institutional framework created 
favorable conditions for the competitively oriented exchange rate policy without big 
turbulences, costly devaluations, and financial crises.  
The Polish central bank, which did not enjoy the same degree of independence 
as its Czech or Estonian counterparts, shared the authority over exchange rate policy 
with the government, and took a cooperative stance in working with the government. 
The Polish authorities used an array of instruments to support competitiveness of 
domestic industries including foreign exchange interventions, capital controls, and 
selective compensation of enterprises. In the late 1990s, the NBP, like its Czech 
counterpart, decided to adopt a new monetary strategy of inflation targeting that 
required a flexible exchange rate regime to obtain more independence from the 
government in pursuing an anti-inflationary monetary policy. Nonetheless, a 
consensual exchange rate policy in Poland aimed at disinflation yet simultaneously 
promoting national competitiveness would not have been possible without an open, 
stable, and well-regulated financial system.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS  
Argument and Evidence 
This study is motivated by the empirical observation of exchange rate regime 
heterogeneity in post-communist EE. It has sought to elucidate the pivotal role of 
financial institutions in the choice and sustainability of exchange rate regimes. In this 
concluding chapter, I start by summarizing the main argument and the evidence I have 
offered in support of the argument. Next, I propose the extension of the model at hand 
by exploring the political reasons and conditions behind the choice of privatizing 
SOBs and opening financial systems to foreign bank entry. Then, I address the 
ramifications of the argument at hand for the development of theory in political 
economy and examine the policy implications of the argument and the findings. I 
close this chapter by proposing future research directions. 
This dissertation has pursued two broad lines of theoretical inquiry. In the 
preceding chapters, I have put forward a theoretical agenda to advance a finance-based 
theory that links financial institutions to exchange rate policies, and I have examined 
the primary hypothesis against a variety of empirical evidence. The principal 
hypothesis of this study is that in countries with financial systems dominated by 
SOBs, accompanied by weak monetary and regulatory institutions, their governments 
will lack the political support, willingness, and credibility to commit to and to sustain 
a fixed exchange rate regime. The likelihood of a country pursuing a fixed exchange 
rate regime will be higher in systems with a greater presence of foreign and private 
banks in national systems of finance. The finance-based theory is best conceived as a 
structural constraint on state behavior. The ownership and institutional structures of 
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financial systems mediate political preferences and power of different types of 
financiers and policy responses of governments to their demands.  
I also argued that the connection between financial interests and exchange rate 
policies are mediated by financial institutional structures of financial governance. 
Understanding the determinants of exchange rate policies required research into the 
financial development in EE states. The second line of investigation, conducted in 
chapter 3 and in the case chapters, has explored the effects of privatization and 
financial openness on development of financial systems in EE states. 
To analyze the plausibility of the finance-based hypothesis, I examined a variety of 
evidence. I began by carrying out econometric analyses of the primary hypothesis 
against quantitative data from 25 countries over the 15-year period between 1990 and 
2004. To test the argument, I used a new measure of financial development 
incorporating the ownership structure as well as institutional features of the banking 
system. I then tested my hypothesis using logistic models on panel data. I also devised 
a new instrument for financial development that captures the mode of state asset 
divestiture, which I then used in applying an instrumental variable approach to address 
the question of endogeneity and causality in my models of exchange rate 
determination. The hypotheses were tested against the predominant explanations for 
exchange rate regime determination, including optimum currency area theory, 
financial dollarization, capital mobility, central bank independence, sectoral interests, 
and political regime. The tests are fairly robust to different measures of financial 
development, model specifications, and estimation methods. Results from these 
econometric analyses demonstrate that the finance-based hypothesis derived from the 
theory contribute to explaining the probability that a country will pursue a de facto 
fixed exchange rate in any given year. 
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Then, I explored the consistency of the general argument in chapter 5 by 
tracing the links between financial liberalization and exchange rate policies and 
exploring changes (voluntary and forced) in all EE states during different stages of 
post-communist transformation. The comparative analysis shows that the differences 
in the ability of governments to commit to and sustain a fixed regime reflect the 
variation in the determination of EE governments to cut ties with financial and 
industrial incumbents and to pursue financial openness and disinflation, to establish 
independent central banks and effective regulatory institutions, and to implement 
budget discipline. Those societies where governments were reluctant to liberate 
themselves from the influence of incumbent rent-seeking financial and industrial 
interests from the pre-communist era were unable to sustain currency pegs. Even when 
they officially announced pegs, they frequently reneged on their commitments to fixed 
regimes and pursued de facto flexible regimes. Chapter 5 explores and illustrates these 
discrepancies between official and actual exchange rate policies in EE states.  
Finally, I examined the specific process and mechanism that link financial institutions 
and exchange rate policies by conducting detailed analyses of four states—Bulgaria, 
Estonia, the Czech Republic and Poland—in chapters 6−8. The cases also provided 
strong support for the principal hypothesis. In the next section, I revisited the country 
histories in light of questions about distributional issues. 
In sum, the combination of several models of inquiry in this study mean that 
they work with one another’s deficiencies and make the research rigorous, testable, 
and generalizable. Statistical analysis can establish the empirical validity of the 
assumptions, but without contextual knowledge, it may miss key causal variables, 
which can result in unreliable conclusions. Qualitative analysis can generate a case for 
causation in a few cases by tracing the causal processes, but it is difficult to establish 
the generality of its conclusions or to falsify hypotheses. 
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Distributional Consequences of Exchange Rate Policies  
While this study puts stress on the impact of financial institutional structures 
on exchange rate policies, to understand the economic policy choices of individual 
countries, it is important to evaluate the distributional consequences of these policies. 
Governments often do not act as benevolent social planners trying to find the best 
exchange rate policy for the society as a whole, but they try to accommodate 
preferences of different societal groups. As the case studies revealed, the choices of 
national exchange rate policy were the outcomes of a political process with important 
domestic distributional consequences.  
The dual role of the exchange rate emphasizes the distributional consequences 
of different exchange rate policies. First, the nominal anchor approach underlines the 
role of the exchange rate in the inflationary process and its relationship with the 
functioning of the financial system, interest rates, and capital flows. The second is the 
real exchange rate approach that underlines the differences between tradable and 
nontradable goods, and the effect of the exchange rate on external competitiveness and 
the balance of payments (Bonilla and Schamis 2001: 66). Under a flexible regime, 
monetary expansion has its effect mostly through a depreciation of the currency that 
stimulates net foreign demand.632 Thus, the choice between fixed and flexible regime 
is a choice between inflation and current account, and therefore a choice between 
benefits to special interest groups against costs to the general public (Stein and Strebb 
1999). This trade-off is particularly relevant in transition states, where inflation has 
been a persistent problem. 
Although this research has been empirical in its focus, analyzing why 
governments choose and sustain a fixed exchange rate regime when they do, I have 
                                                 
632 A currency float supplements the traditional channel used to stimulate domestic demand via 
decreasing real interest rate (Frankel 1995: 38). 
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granted that fixed regimes help the governments to curb inflation, which represented 
the principal problem of transition throughout the 1990s. The politics of inflation with 
its distributional consequences occupied center stage during the post-communist 
transformation. Fixed exchange rates do generate an economic benefit of low inflation 
but not without imposing costs. Whether the benefit of price stability is “worth” the 
cost is an inherently political question (Clark 2003). As Kirshner (2001: 42) argues, 
“Inflation is always and everywhere a political phenomenon. All levels of inflation, 
high and low, are the outcome of political conflicts.” 
 In Bulgaria, inflation served as the major redistributive tool during the pre-
1997 period.633 Debtors with debt in domestic currency favored a flexible regime, for 
they benefited from devaluations that resulted in high inflation. High inflation 
depreciated and reduced the real cost of servicing the debt of the coalition of 
debtors—capturers of the government and the central bank. The debtor group was 
composed of incumbent political elites, the subsidized state-owned enterprises and 
refinanced SOBs, crony private banks and enterprises. The Bulgarian central bank 
served as a “transmission mechanism” of wealth to the debtors: it had repeatedly 
refinanced distressed bank assets and extended massive loans to banks and to the 
government, which produced hyperinflation, one negative consequence. The general 
population, the main creditor, was the net saver and its savings in the form of deposits 
and government securities systematically depreciated. So, the taxpayers were against 
high inflation and flexible regime because they were losing money. During the pre-
crisis period in Bulgaria, from a redistribution perspective, the debtor group dominated 
over the creditor group (Nenovsky and Mihaylova 2007). The politics of redistribution 
then turned into the politics of hyperinflation, in response to which a political coalition 
                                                 
633 Author’s interview with Georgy Ganev, Program Director for Economic Research, Center for 
Liberal Studies, June 29, 2007, Sofia. 
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favoring price and exchange rate stability emerged and implemented a currency board 
in 1997. 
 Unlike Bulgaria, the Estonian government was determined from the outset of 
the transition to prevent the arbitrary redistribution of wealth that accompanied the 
initial inflation. A precondition was an open competitive financial system and an 
independent central bank able to keep incumbent banks and enterprises in check to 
curb inflation. The coalition in favor of low inflation enjoyed broad support. Exchange 
rate stability became associated with price stability in the public mind. The currency 
board (CB) promised that it would quickly bring credibility to monetary policy by 
tying the hands of policymakers to attain two principal objectives: disinflation and 
stable exchange rates. The currency board was also an institutional way to curb the 
BOE’s discretionary power, which has later emerged as a strong regulatory force of 
banks. This institutional arrangement eliminated discretion in the management of the 
exchange rate and limited the use of discretionary monetary policy to accommodate 
distributional conflicts. In the distributional game of economic and financial reforms 
in Estonia, foreign investors and private entrepreneurs were the main winners, 
relatively, while incumbent interests, members of the Party nomenklatura and farmers 
were the losers (Ennuste et al. 2004: 12).  
 In the Czech Republic, a distributional coalition led by SOBs and their 
investment funds, protected by the state, became the main beneficiaries in the 
distributional game. The institutional logic of banking socialism based on the 
collusion among incumbent banks, industries, and the state facilitated the 
redistribution through preferential allocation of credit, subsidies, loan forgiveness, and 
bailouts to incumbent enterprises via SOBs. The resulting debt burden of bad loans 
resulting from expansive credit policies was redistributed from banks back to the state, 
that is, taxpayers. The pattern of currency turmoil in 1997 was the inconsistency 
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between the central bank policy of the fixed exchange rate regime used as a nominal 
anchor to tame inflation and the government fiscal deficit resulting from subsidies and 
government bailouts in conditions of a liberalized capital account.  
 Finally, the Polish case illustrates the tradeoff between inflation and balance of 
payments. Early financial reforms and a fixed regime appeased distributional conflict 
and diminished its intensity. While farmers, government enterprises, and banks 
initially favored a reflationary agenda and a flexible regime, their political influence 
was neutralized through privatization and banking reforms early in the transition. Still, 
the central bank, dependent on the government as well as a joint decision-making of 
exchange rate policy between the central bank and other government ministries 
resulted in a consensus on subordinating domestic price stability to serve 
competitiveness of domestic industries through the policy of politicized soft pegs.634 
In sum, this study illustrates an approach based on a story of redistribution wherein 
those societal and political actors who favor low inflation, currency stability, and 
financial openness stand to win from fixed regimes, while those who favor national 
protection, economic closure, and reckless macroeconomic policies stand to lose.  
There are several lessons that can be drawn from these empirical observations from 
transition states. The first lesson is that an exclusive focus on exchange rate policy 
may miss other locations of political struggle, such as inflationary monetary policies, 
or expansive fiscal or credit policies, which influence exchange rate policies and have 
broad distributional consequences. Thus, research on interest groups in exchange rate 
policy should pay more attention to the ability of interest groups to engage in 
collective action to influence various macroeconomic policies that in turn affect 
exchange rate policies.  
                                                 
634 Exchange rate supplements the traditional channel used to stimulate domestic demand via decreasing 
real interest rates (Frankel 1995: 38). 
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Second, the costs of financial repression in financial systems dominated by 
powerful incumbent financiers are usually borne by depositors who receive low or 
negative interest on their funds and by small enterprises that have limited access to 
credit, for credit is being extended to large government enterprises and rich 
individuals. In contrast, in open financial systems, healthy banks, backed by foreign 
parents, actively support the restructuring of privatized enterprises, grant loans to 
small entrepreneurs and finance mortgages of people to buy homes. 
Third, during the banking financial crises, there had been massive redistributions from 
ordinary taxpayers to the financial sector. The fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs of the 
banking crises during the 1990s (including bank restructuring and deposit 
compensation) ranged from 7 to 42 percent of the output for the Central European 
countries, from 0.1 to 18 percent of output for the CIS countries, and from 2 to 3 
percent of the output for the Baltic countries (Tang et al. 2000). In most CIS countries, 
enterprises, banks, and depositors were left exposed rather than bailed out through 
recapitalization (Sherif et al. 2003: 71). The 2008 global financial crisis has also 
inflicted a sharp contraction in economic fortunes and major cutbacks in employment 
in many transition economies.  
 
Extension of the Argument: Why Do Countries Privatize Banks? 
In this section, I extend the model at hand by going one step back in the causal 
chain to explore two interconnected questions: first, why governments do (or do not) 
privatize SOBs;635 and second, why they open their domestic banking sectors to 
foreign buyouts. 
                                                 
635 For an excellent volume examining the rationale and performance of SOBs as well as policies that 
governments take to privatize them or to manage them, see Caprio et al. (2004). 
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Different economic and political motivations drive policy decisions of 
governments regarding SOBs. Policy makers may apply a cost-benefit calculation and 
privatize SOBs when the costs of state ownership exceed the benefits of the possibility 
to reward favored clients or to provide employment (Caprio et al. 2004: 31).636 
Governments might also choose to privatize because they believe in the effectiveness 
of privatization based on observed experience or imitation of successful privatization 
policies in peer countries (Meseguer 2005). 
The economic calculus must be adjusted, however, to account for political 
support for the privatization of SOBs. As I have illustrated in case studies, the decision 
on whether to liberalize and privatize or not, and what method of privatizing to use, 
can be influenced by interest groups because privatization has important economic 
impacts on these groups. Privatization, in turn, is one of the channels through which 
interest groups can indirectly influence financial development (Ben-David 2003). As 
all four cases under close examination in this study illustrate, in the initial stages of 
transition, incumbent financiers wanted to continue holding assets under controllable 
government bank ownership, instead of allowing a hostile takeover, particularly by 
foreign banks. Incumbent SOBs operating with high costs and low productivity 
wanted to prevent the entry of foreign banks, which were significantly more 
competitive. Incumbent industrialists, their clients, who received privileged access to 
credit, were also strong opponents of financial liberalization. In Russia, incumbent 
banks not only did not support privatization in the banking sector, but also, some even 
lobbied for the strengthening of the state’s links via renationalization and for greater 
                                                 
636 According to the 1998 OECD Report (1998: 14), governments usually favor bank privatization out 
of a conviction that, first, private enterprises are more efficient and competitive in global markets than 
are state-owned enterprises; second, privatization will foster the development of a healthy banking 
system, and capital flows accompanying privatization can spur the development of capital markets; and, 
finally, privatization will improve a country’s fiscal balances given the cost of serial recapitalizations of 
insolvent SOBs. 
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state support of industries—their clients and often shareholders—in the form of tax 
and custom breaks (Tompson 1997: 1172). On the other hand, the approach of Polish 
authorities to financial development based on openness to foreign bank entry resulted 
in a positive attitude of incumbent banks toward privatization by foreign investors in 
order to survive in a tough international competition.  
Trade unions represent another interest group that can influence government 
privatization decisions. Pagano and Volpin (2005) showed that in their effort to avoid 
takeovers, enterprise managers and trade unions join forces in order to restrict investor 
rights and secure their own employment. Incumbent managers want to provide 
employees with long-term contracts to make enterprises unattractive to potential 
buyers. While Podkrepa, the largest trade union in Bulgaria was an important factor 
behind delayed privatization of banks and industries through its strong influence on 
the right-wing UDF coalition, the Czech and Estonian trade unions had little impact on 
different privatization decisions adopted by right-wing governments in these two 
countries. The Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions, the major trade 
union in the former Czechoslovakia, made unsuccessful efforts to augment ownership 
share for employees in privatized enterprises (Appel 2004: 137). Trade unions, seen as 
a remnant of the political past, were weakened by anti-communist feelings in the post-
communist Czech Republic (Appel 2000: 530–532). In Poland, the political process at 
the outset of the transition was dominated by Solidarity and the Polish Confederation 
of Trade Unions, which were strongly aligned to the political parties that adopted 
radical reform programs and promoted privatization (Shields 2004). Although Polish 
trade unions remained the most influential in the region, with the progress of 
privatization and the rise of unemployment, their role has significantly diminished 
over time (Kochanowicz, Kozarzewski, and Woodward 2003). 
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Various political incentives may also influence government decisions to 
protect domestic banking sectors from foreign ownership. In financially repressed 
systems, populism, nationalism, and statism may play a significant role in the 
government approach to the banking sector (Caprio et al. 2001: 4–5). Populist and 
nationalist agendas of the Czech governments prior to the financial turmoil in 1997 
included the objective of impeding the control of the domestic financial system by 
foreigners. The successive Klaus centre-right governments in the Czech Republic as 
well as the Socialist government in Poland that came to power in 1993 wanted to 
create “national champions” and maintain domestic control of large financial 
institutions. Protectionist governments are reluctant to liberalize domestic finance 
because they want to use state interventions in the financial sector and direct credit to 
“priority sectors” such as agriculture, small enterprises, exporters and failing 
enterprises to improve the allocation of funds and to prevent unemployment.637 Sales 
to foreign strategic investors also carry political risks that governments have “sold 
out” (Caprio et al. 2004). 
The spread of privatization (and liberalization) in the financial sector in EE has 
been also attributed to the conditionality attached to IMF, World Bank, or EBRD 
lending for the purpose of recapitalizing and privatizing banks. International pressures, 
however, appear to be a factor in privatization design in some countries but not in 
others. International institutions seemed to have an important influence on the decision 
of the Polish Socialist government to resume the privatization of banks to foreign 
investors in 1996 after it tried to postpone it temporarily. On the other hand, while the 
conditions of the IMF programs in Bulgaria included bank privatization and a 
                                                 
637 Wyplosz (2001) showed how governments in post-war Belgium, France, and Italy supported favored 
industries, regions, and enterprises through interest rates and other controls that fueled inflation, 
repeated devaluations, and the exchange rate crises of 1983, prompting a political reassessment and 
radical changes in the governmental approach to the financial sector. 
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comprehensive system of prudential banking regulations, successive Bulgarian 
governments fell behind those conditions until the country was hit by a systemic 
banking and financial crisis in 1996–1997. The IMF, in its efforts to promote bank 
privatization, has been often considered by borrowing countries to represent the 
interests of foreign creditors (Nenovsky and Rizopoulos 2003: 918). The Czech 
government implemented voucher privatization of banks and industries that led to the 
preservation of state ownership, in spite of disapproval by the World Bank. Similarly, 
despite strong EU pressures to privatize two of the country’s largest SOBs by 
December of 2000, the Slovenian government was reluctant to sell its domestic banks 
to foreigners, and by 2001, it still owned nearly 90 percent of the banking sector 
(Lindstrom 2005).638 In sum, in spite of international pressures, EE governments seem 
to have enjoyed considerable room for maneuvering in bank-privatization policies. 
Besides economic nationalism, there are also economic arguments in favor of 
maintaining domestic control over banks. Domestic banks usually establish a longer-
term relationship with domestic industries, and they tend to provide more consistent 
financing of domestic exporters and importers. Domestic banks are also more 
susceptible to moral suasion of the government to lend to domestic rather than to 
foreign enterprises, which would be rather insensitive to long-term national goals. 
Finally, government reluctance to sell domestic banks to foreigners can be motivated 
by their fear that in the long run, the domestic economy will become merely a “branch 
plant” for big international banks (Porter 1998: 20).639  
                                                 
638 The EU requires from its member and acceding countries the alignment of their financial regulations 
with the Banking Law and Financial Stability Law of 1999. 
 
639 These concerns have been reinforced in some post-colonial countries by a resentment of foreign-
owned banks, which were viewed as representing the economic interests of their shareholders and large 
multinational clients at the expense of domestic enterprises (Andrews 2005). 
 388 
Another lesson from the case studies examined here is that governments have 
shown a greater propensity for privatizing banks after systemic banking and financial 
crises, which also reinforce the view that SOBs have a negative influence on financial 
stability and economic growth. The crises themselves usually have large and visible 
fiscal effects and undermine the credibility of incumbent constituencies. When the 
fiscal costs of banking crises are high, the political cost of maintaining state ownership 
can outweigh the benefits, and governments may be inclined to privatize, particularly 
to a foreign strategic investor, in order to prevent the use of public funds for bailouts 
of SOBs (Andrews 2005: 15). Moreover, countries in crisis are often in greater need of 
international mobile capital as a result of their pre-crisis budgetary and balance-of-
payments imbalances (Haggard and Maxfield 1996). Thus, banking and financial 
crises presented the EE governments with unique opportunities to change policies that 
were hard to implement in normal times.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
From the standpoint of theory, this research has implications for different 
strands of political economy literature, notably the literature on the political economy 
of international finance, the debate on the development of financial systems, and the 
literature on the post-communist transitions. 
This study holds considerable significance for the literature on the political 
economy of international finance. The findings of this study expand our understanding 
of the workings of interest-group politics by illuminating the role of financial interests 
in exchange rate but also in monetary and regulatory policies. The main contribution 
of this study is that it does not treat financiers as a homogeneous societal group but 
argues that their interests and behavior in exchange rate, regulatory, and monetary 
policies are differentiated by the nature of their ownership—government, private 
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domestic, and foreign. I show that in contrast to standard expectations about the 
interests of banks, both commercial and central, in maintaining low inflation and 
stable currency, banks can support inflationary policies, engage in reckless risk-taking 
with other people’s money, and facilitate capital flight in transitional institutional 
environments. Although the primary interest of banks—profit maximization—is fixed, 
bank strategies, behavior and coalitions reflect the nature of their ownership and 
changes in specifics of the institutional environment.  
This research also helps to identify institutional structures of finance, in which 
financiers are the engines of economic growth as well as those systems, in which they 
become vested interests that contribute to unsustainable exchange rate policies, and 
thus impede economic development. As an interest group, banks can also enhance 
democratic politics inasmuch as democracy provides them with a formal means of 
participation in the political system through well-established channels of interest 
group representation and lobbying that would increase the group’s support for 
democratic institutions. However, as illustrated in this study, if banks use their power 
to extract excessive resources from the state to the detriment of the general population 
through their personalistic contacts with the political elite, this type of interest group 
behavior is antithetical to democratic politics and responsible money management. 
Here, my theory also addresses the debate on “state strength.” Here, a strong state is 
one with a bureaucratic apparatus capable of regulating and monitoring banks and 
their business clients. 
In addition, this research contributes to the study of financial liberalization. In 
contrast to most analyses solely examining capital account liberalization, this study 
focuses on the liberalization of the domestic financial sector. While capital account 
liberalization may be the most visible element, its significance cannot be fully 
assessed apart from domestic financial reforms, for two main reasons: first, the 
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financial sector has a broad economic impact, and it can mobilize a wide range of 
political actors and interest groups, and second, banking regulations strongly affect 
international capital movements (Horowitz 2005: 112).640 This study highlights the 
importance of liberalizing domestic finance, which is a precondition for the financial 
integration of transition and emerging-market economies into global financial 
markets.641  
While the benefits of the liberalization of capital movements are still hotly 
debated, there is more agreement on the positive effects of financial sector 
liberalization.642 Bekaert et al. (cited in Detragiache et al. 2006: 4) found that financial 
liberalization, in the sense of opening the stock market to foreign investors, can 
increase economic growth by as much as 1 percent per year. Nonetheless, the 
liberalization of the financial sector can contribute to macroeconomic instability and 
lead to financial crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) showed that 18 out of 26 
financial crises in the past twenty years occurred after financial sector was liberalized 
within the preceding five years. Countries that allow foreign banks to enter their 
financial markets are often affected by the performance of these banks in other 
countries. Losses that European banks made on American mortgage products, for 
instance, may cause tighter credit in some EE states. 
A second theoretical implication addresses the literature on financial 
development, surveyed in chapter 3. While most of this literature considers only the 
                                                 
640 Despite numerous studies on the topic, the benefits of the liberalization of capital movements are 
still strongly debated and a consensus view has not yet emerged (Mishkin 2006, Eichengreen and 
Leblang 2002). 
 
641 By 2007, almost 900 foreign banks had a presence in developing countries. On average, they 
accounted for 40 percent of bank lending, up from 20 percent a decade earlier. See “Charting a different 
course.” When fortune frowned: A special report on the world economy, October 11. 
 
642 For a comprehensive chronology of financial liberalization (liberalization of capital accounts, of the 
domestic financial system, and of domestic stock markets) in developed and emerging economies since 
1973, see Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003). 
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impact of various economic and political factors on financial development or the 
effects of financial development on economic growth, this study sets out to assess 
systematically how different financial institutional structures impact macroeconomic 
policies. Therefore, it speaks to the debates in the new institutionalist literature that 
emphasizes the primacy of institutions in economic policies (Acemoglu, et al. 2001).  
A third theoretical implication speaks to the studies done on the processes of 
building fundamental market institutions in countries experiencing economic and 
political transformations. There is a growing literature that explores the role of various 
factors in producing divergent financial systems in EE that include Soviet-era 
institutional legacies, varying political and economic policy approaches to post-
communist transformation, electoral competition, and exposures to international 
institutions (Neumann and Egan 1999, Johnson 2000, 2005, Epstein 2001, 2006, 
McDermott 2006, Lindstrom 2005, Denizer et al. 2006). Although bank privatization 
has been an essential part of financial reform agendas in transition countries, studies 
exploring the role of bank privatization are scarce, and most of them focus on its 
effects on bank performance and efficiency (Bonin et al. 1998 and 2004). Some 
scholars have explored the impact of the chosen model of enterprise privatization in 
explaining financial system development in the post-communist region (Popov 1999). 
More generally, scholars have investigated the role of initial conditions, political 
institutions, and strategies that arose in the course of transition, in explaining divergent 
outcomes in the post-communist world (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006, de Melo et 
al, 2001, Hellman 1998, Bunce 1999 and 2000, Fish 1998). This is the first study that 
systematically examines the differences between the emerging models of financial 
governance in the post-communist region of EE.643 
                                                 
643 Edited volumes dealing with various aspects of financial reforms focusing on specific country 
experiences burgeon, though. See Blejer and Škreb (1999), Dickinson and Mullineux (2001), Colombo 




I believe that social science should inform public policy debates. Beyond 
scholarly implications, my own reading of the evidence suggests that a broader 
societal impact of this project lies in two broad areas.  
This study should prove helpful in determining a priori a country’s 
vulnerabilities in adopting a fixed regime and identify the cases where this would be a 
sustainable policy choice. A better understanding of financial institutional structures 
that allow sustaining a fixed regime should allow policymakers to make a more 
informed decision about when it is most advisable to adopt and pursue this policy. 
This research can be useful in predicting exchange rate regimes in countries that try to 
combat high inflation and stabilize their economies or for those EE states preparing for 
entry into the EMU. As explained in chapter 1, I do not examine which regime is 
better for an economy, but the empirical evidence provided in this study does support 
the argument that a fixed regime helped to stabilize economies left with high inflation 
after the collapse of Soviet planning and has been a good way of keeping on track for 
eventual membership in the euro zone. But there are those who argue that to deal with 
volatility of foreign capital, greater currency flexibility may be desirable in transition 
and emerging states. When a country is hit by a crisis and outsiders suddenly pull 
money out of a country with a pegged currency, the money supply decreases, and the 
country risks a depression. While a fixed exchange rate regime limits room to 
maneuver, a country with a flexible regime can try to restore competitiveness of 
domestic exporters and growth by devaluing the currency. However, in the context of 
the 2008 financial overhaul, in the EE countries with flexible regimes, the low level of 
global demand has severely limited the supply response to the currency depreciations 
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in the region.644 Therefore, researchers have not demonstrated the case for a fixed or a 
flexible regime and growth. The contention in this study is that politics, through the 
strength of financiers, influence the determination of exchange rate regime. 
 The theory of exchange rate choice and sustainability developed in this study is 
not general to all circumstances and contexts. But no theory can be universal. My 
theory has been generated and tested on the sample of transition economies and it 
should travel well to other emerging markets. It has been argued that the 2008 U.S. 
financial crisis is very similar to the financial crisis in Russia and other transition 
countries, both in what led to the crisis and how to fix it, so we can extract several 
useful lessons from this study for developed countries, as well. 
Much like incumbent banks and the “oligarchs” did in Russia and other EE 
states, financiers played the main role in creating the current financial crisis in the 
United States, taking ever-greater risks with the implicit backing of the government. 
The United States has created a system whereby the Wall Street “oligarchs” have 
monopolized the economy. The great wealth that the financial sector amassed and 
concentrated gave financiers enormous political weight, for the banking and securities 
industry has become one of the top contributors to political campaigns (Johnson 
2009a, Desmond 2009, Summers 2008). 
At first sight, it seems that the current U.S. financial crisis poses a challenge to 
the finance-based theory advanced in this study, for the Anglo-Saxon brand of finance 
is home to the world’s most advanced financial system and vanguard of open finance 
and free-market capitalism dominated by private rather than government banks. But 
the Anglo-Saxon system is capital-based unlike more traditional bank-dominated 
systems in EE states. In fact, the epicenter of the current financial crisis is not 
traditional commercial banks, but bank-like institutions referred to as the “shadow 
                                                 
644 See “Financial Sector Key to European Recovery.” 2009. IMF Survey Magazine, April 24. 
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banking system”—money-market funds, securities dealers, hedge funds, and other 
non-bank financial institutions—that operated outside the regulatory system grew 
rapidly even to surpass conventional banking in importance and made various risky 
cross-border investments. Traditional private domestic banks, which take deposits and 
grant loans, are part of the Federal Reserve system and are highly regulated (Krugman 
2009: 153–165). 
Still, long before they were formally taken, the two private mortgage 
companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, had implicit government guarantees. As 
Calomiris and Wallison noted, one reason the market for subprime mortgages 
exploded after 2004 was that these institutions started buying subprime mortgages 
because of a political order to expand the financing of “affordable housing.”645 
Therefore, the first lesson from the transition economies should be about the dangers 
of government involvement in financial markets, through implicit guarantees of 
“private institutions,” coupled with moral hazard and weak regulation that generate 
bad economic outcomes at the expense of taxpayers. This is also the lesson from the 
Fannie and Freddie failure. As a result of the U.S. government bailout, financial 
system is currently nominally in private hands but is able to tap the state for support. 
Johnson and Kwak (2009) argue that these state backed banks operate for the benefit 
of bankers and their creditors, and the situation is characterized by “public-private co-
dependency.”  
In spite of similarities, the significant difference between the current U.S. and 
transition and emerging market crises in the past is the exchange rate. Post-crisis 
booms are often triggered by large nominal exchange rate depreciations, making 
exports competitive and starting a new cycle of capital flows. The dollar is, however, 
                                                 
645 Calomiris and Wallison quoted in “Taming the beast: How far should finance be re-regulated?” 
2008. When fortune frowned: Special report on the world economy. The Economist, October 11. 
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the world’s reserve currency and significant real depreciation is not very likely 
(Johnson 2009b). 
 A second and related lesson from this study is that in the world of liberalized 
capital flows, a well-regulated domestic financial system is crucial for sustainable 
exchange rates and preventing financial crises. The key policy decisions of the U.S. 
government were to deregulate commissions for stock trading in the 1970s and to 
eliminate the Glass-Steagall restrictions on mixing commercial and investment 
banking in the 1990s, allowing commercial banks to engage in the traditional 
operations of investment banks. The latter, which were driven into riskier activities by 
these policy changes, were entirely outside the regulatory framework (Eichengreen 
2008). As stated above, the U.S. crisis involved for the most part risks taken by the 
institutions of the shadow banking system that were never regulated in the first place 
and not the problems with deregulated institutions taking new risks, as the most recent 
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman (2009: 163) argues. The 1997 financial turmoil in the 
Czech Republic shares some similarities. Believing in free market capitalism and 
deregulation,  the Czech governments were reluctant to regulate investment 
privatization funds and loan insider lending as well as to adopt regulation in the area 
of bankruptcy proceedings, which created financial vulnerabilities that led to the 
banking and financial crisis. 
 The third lesson is that although funding from foreign banks to sustain local 
credit booms are blamed for EE states having been affected by the financial crisis, 
these banks act as a strong stabilizing force and play a vital role in preventing “hard 
landing” of the region. Foreign parent banks are currently facing several challenges 
including their own difficult funding conditions, expected increase of bad loans in EE 
due to worsening economic conditions, deteriorating economic situation in home 
countries of parent banks, and exposure to depreciating currencies in some EE states 
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due to high levels of foreign currency lending (Stokes 2009). Thus, some distressed 
foreign banks have reduced lending and stopped issuing mortgages in foreign 
currency. Foreign banks are also associated with the risk that the financial crisis will 
be spread through the “common lender” channel: through its loan portfolio a bank may 
be exposed to a country that has a financial crisis, triggering large capital outflows 
from other borrowers. For instance, the same Swedish banks that dominate Latvia’s 
banking system also dominate those in Estonia and Lithuania, and thus a Latvian crisis 
can spill over to other two Baltic states through the Swedish parent banks (Stokes 
2009). Nevertheless, just as the Baltic states are dependent on the health and strategy 
of Swedish banks, the banks depend on the performance of their Baltic subsidiaries. 
The Swedish government is aware that the situation in the Baltic states is crucial to the 
stability of the Swedish financial system, so it had been contributing large sums to 
international efforts to help the Baltic countries, not only to Swedish banks 
(Dougherty 2009). Similarly, foreign banks from other countries who dominated the 
region’s banking systems have pledged to continue to support their EE subsidiaries 
(Stokes 2009). 
 The presence of foreign banks is fairly uncontroversial in most EE states. For 
instance, the Russian occupation of the Baltic states for much of the twentieth century 
makes the presence of Scandinavian banks seem rather benign (Dougherty 2009). 
Foreign banks are highly trusted institutions in EE. In some EE countries, as Krastev, 
a Sofia-based analyst argues, people trust foreign banks even more than any public 
institutions. Foreign banks have become the symbolic and financial linchpins not just 
of economies, but of whole countries.646 Still, blaming economic hardship on foreign 
banks that have taken deposits but are unwilling to make loans can be a tempting 
slogan for populist politicians in EE. 
                                                 
646 See “Who’s next?” 2008. The Economist, October 23. 
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 The fourth lesson that can be extracted from this study is that state ownership 
of banks often leads to financial instability. This is true even in advanced financial 
systems and German public banks, or Landesbanken, prove the case. The German 
government had to bail out Landesbanken with taxpayers’ money after their 
managements recklessly gambled away billions on subprime investments. Political 
protection is characteristic for many Landesbanken, owned by state governments or 
local savings banks. These public sector banks speculated far more recklessly than 
private banks in American subprime mortgage securities did. In the end, the federal 
government and private banks had to bail them out to weather the global financial 
turmoil and stop them from collapsing. The bankruptcy of some of these banks would 
trigger an unprecedented loss of confidence in the German financial system (Reuter 
2008). 
One common method of dealing with banking crises is nationalizing private 
banks rather than letting them collapse. Because state ownership of banks is 
disappointing, there are good reasons to be skeptical about the recent wave of 
nationalization of financial institutions in the United States and Western Europe. 
Nationalization of bad banks also carries huge costs of its own. With the global 
financial system crowded with unwanted bank assets, it could take a long time for the 
government to privatize banks. Meanwhile, as the Czech cases illustrates, politicians 
would be tempted to use banks as instruments of industrial policy, supporting 
politically powerful enterprises. Politically motivated lending could result in even 
larger amounts of bad loans in the future and private banks would be disadvantaged.647 
Managing banks should not be the role for governments; politicians should be kept 
away from credit. As this study shows, once the allocation of loans becomes 
politicized, the outcome is financial fragility and high inflation because the central 
                                                 
647 “Economics focus: The spectre of nationalization.” 2009. The Economist, January 24-30: 82. 
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bank loses the ability to manage monetary policy. Corruption and government 
interference can destroy the foundations of even the most advanced financial systems, 
particularly when these problems are combined with weak regulatory institutions 
(Prasad 2009). 
 Fifth, the 2008 banking and financial crisis in Iceland confirms the argument 
made in this study that insider privatization results in a financial system that remains 
dominated by incumbent financiers that create financial vulnerabilities that make the 
financial crisis possible. For decades, the government of Iceland owned the banks, 
which exercised significant power with negative real interest rates and an overvalued 
currency. Iceland’s privatization of its SOBs during 1998−2003 aimed to cut the links 
between banks and the government but it did not fully succeed. The two largest SOBs 
were sold to well-connected individuals with close ties to the two governing parties, 
which maintained their representatives on the banks’ governing boards. No serious 
attempt was made to attract foreign buyers of banks as was done in the Baltic 
countries. Unlike the Baltic countries, there is as yet no foreign competition in 
Icelandic banking. Incumbent banks engaged in unprecedented borrowing and 
lending: they borrowed abroad at low interest to make long-term housing loans home 
at very low interest rates at home and engaged in extensive insider lending without 
adequate collateral. As a result, in September 2008, the three largest banks collapsed 
within a week and the Islandic króna depreciated by 50 percent. The Islandic 
government temporarily nationalized the old private banks based on a Nordic solution 
but has plans to re-privatize these new SOBs that took over deposits of old private 
banks and invite foreign ownership (Gylfason 2009). 
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Finally, this study shows that centralized asset-recovery schemes have a bad 
record.648 In the Czech Republic, banks continued to make bad loans after their bad 
debt burdens were removed and placed in a state-owned “bank hospital” responsible 
for restructuring bad assets. This centralized solution to bad debt has proved to be 
prone to political misuse by a coalition of bankers, enterprises and government 
politicians at the expense of “Main Street.” In contrast, the Polish decentralization 
scheme, in which banks and enterprises were expected to solve the problem of bad 
assets themselves, has proven effective in limiting moral hazard. 
 
Paths for Future Research 
This study lends itself to a number of different avenues for future research. I 
have already speculated on how we can extend the causal chain of exchange rate 
policy determination to explore the political reasons and conditions behind the choice 
of privatizing SOBs and letting foreign banks in. In closing, I raise two additional 
possibilities.  
 First, within the scope of this study, the present hypothesis generated in this 
study may be examined under other institutional contexts by conducting out-of-sample 
tests, while looking at a larger set of emerging market economies in Asia and Latin 
America, to increase the research’s analytical range and empirical scope. Were I to 
find evidence consistent with my theoretical framework, these tests would further 
underscore the empirical robustness of the argument at hand. 
                                                 
648 When a country is trying to reform a financial system plagued with a large portfolio of 
nonperforming loans, the government may close troubled banks and liquidate their property 
(appropriate mostly in the case of smaller banks); or it may relax regulatory restrictions, e.g., capital 
and reserve requirements, to facilitate the banks to solve their problems themselves when the economy 
recovers; or finally, it may fix the portfolio of banks through re-capitalization or providing liquidity to 
banks. In EE, recapitalization of state-owned banks was also often necessary before privatization to 
clean off the banks’ balance sheets. 
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 Second, another research possibility that captures the underlying theme of this 
study is the issue of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) whose growing power in global 
finance has given rise to considerable political controversy. Governments establish 
SWFs, defined as government investment vehicles funded by foreign exchange assets, 
to manage their international investments, in addition to owning banks. SWFs, used by 
governments of developing and emerging countries to acquire strategic stakes in 
developed countries, often in a non-transparent way, are a graphic contemporary 
example of the controversial role of foreign investments.649 The proposed research 
would represent a hard test of my argument on the positive effect of foreign ownership 
on a host country’s macroeconomic policies and financial regulation. In contrast with 
foreign private banks examined in this study, SWFs are mostly state-owned, which 
raises the risk of moral hazard problems because governments may have political 
objectives over profit maximizing objectives. SWFs are predominantly based in the 
Middle East, South Asia, and EE; thus they play an important role in a reversal of 
global capital flows: capital increasingly flows from the periphery to the core 
countries (Lucas 1990). With respect to the management of SWFs, important issues of 
international financial stability and economic cooperation come into play, including 
maintaining the openness of economies and financial systems to cross-border 
investments. The rise of SWFs could provoke a new round of protectionism, in which 
Western governments erect barriers to foreign investment in what they consider to be 
strategic sectors in their economies.650 Finally, foreign investment by SWFs raises 
national security concerns because the purpose of the investment may be to secure 
control of strategically important industries for political rather than for financial gains. 
                                                 
649 Included among the big seven SWFs that have over $100 billion in assets are Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, 
China, and Russia. 
 
650 Dubai Ports World had to abandon their attempt to buy P&O’s U.S. ports after a national security 
debate was prompted in the U.S. Congress. 
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There is still more to be done. We could delve still deeper into welfare 
implications of different exchange rate regimes. We might explore the implications of 
exchange rate policies in EE states for regional and international monetary and 
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Country Bank Year of  
Privatization 




Albania National Commercial Bank 2000  Privatization 06/2000. Value: US$10million.   
Albania INSIG 2003  Proceeds: $11 million   
Albania       
Albania       
Bulgaria United Bulgarian Bank May 1997 Tender 65 % sold to Oppenheimer (US) and the 
EBRD. 
7/2000 12.4 (2000) 
Bulgaria Bulgarian Post Bank 1998 Tender 78 % share sold. 11/1998 5.2 (2000) 
Bulgaria SG Express Bank 1999 Tender 67 % sold in 09/1999. Value: US$39.5 
million. 
11/1999 4.5 (2000) 
Bulgaria Bulbank October 2000 Tender 98 % sold to a consortium of Unicredito 
(Italy) and Allianz (Germany). 
10/2000 25.4 (2000) 




Tender 100 % sold to OTP Bank (Hungary) 5/2003 
 
12.1 (2000) 
Bulgaria Biochim Bank October 2002   10/2002 5.3 (2000) 
Bulgaria Hebros Bank 1999  Privatized December 1999. Value: 
US$23.5million. 
3/2000 3.4 (2000) 
Croatia Dubrovacka Bank 1994  Majority share sold to domestic investor, 
renationalized in 1998 due to distress.  
  
Croatia Dubrovacka Bank 2002  Re-privatized in 2002. State-owned, acquired 
by Dalmatinska. 
 2.9 (2000) 
Croatia Privedna Banka Zagreb (PBZ) 1999  Domestic private. Nationalized in 1996, and 
then privatized.   
12/1999 12.99 (2000) 
Croatia Rijecka Banka 2000  Domestic private. Renationalized in 1996, 
privatized 4/2000. 
4/2000 7.0 (2000) 
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Croatia Splitska Banka 2000  Domestic private. Nationalized 1996. 
Privatized 5/2000. 
5/2000 7.1 (2000) 
Croatia Zagrabacka Banka 1996 IPO Domestic private. IPO June 1996. Shares sold 
12/99. 
3/2002 28.9 (2000) 
Croatia Varazdinska Banka 2000  Domestic private. Acquired by Zagrabacka 
banka 6/00. 
 2.6 (2000) 
Croatia Dalmatinska Banka 2000  Domestic private. 10/2000 2.3 (2000) 
Czech Republic Komerční Banka 1992 IPO Voucher privatization 12/92. 21 % sold 
through IPO in November 1994, subsequent 
exchange offerings of 3 % in 1995 and 1996. 
Government retained majority stake until June 
2001 when government sold 60 % to Societé 
Générale. 
6/2001 18.4 (06/2001) 
Czech Republic Česká Spořitelna 2000  Voucher privatization 12/1992 2/2000 15.7 (06/2001) 
Czech Republic Investiční a Poštovní Banka (IPB) 1992  Voucher privatization 12/92. Sold to Nomura 
Investments, performed poorly and 
subsequently renationalized. Merged with 
CSOB 6/2000. 
3/1998 Part of CSOB 
Czech Republic Československá obchodní banka 
(ČSOB) 
1999  Privatized 9/99. Merged with IPB 6/2000. 9/1999 21.4 (06/2001) 
Czech Republic Konsolidační banka (not a 
commercial bank) 
  State owned bank for bad debts during bank 
restructuring.  
  
Czech Republic GE Capital (Agrobanka) 1998  Private domestic. Nationalized in 1996. 
Privatized in 1998 
1998 2/9 (06/2001) 
Czech Republic Živnostenská Banka 2003  Domestic private.  2/2003 2.0 (06/2001) 
Estonia Optiva Pank 2000  Privatized 07/2000. Value: US$12.7 million.   
Hungary General Banking Trust 1990   1996 3.5 (1999) 
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Hungary Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank 
(MKB) 
1994  Privatized. 7/1994 9.6 (1999) 
Hungary ABN Amro/Magyar Hitel Bank 1996  Privatized 12/1996. Merged with K&H 
7/2001. 
12/1996 5.8 (1999) 
Hungary National Savings and Commercial 
Bank (OTP) 
1997 IPO 30 % sold through IPO October 1997. Further 
41 % divested in October 1997, and 14.1 % 
by subsequent share offering in November 
1999. 
 25.1 
Hungary Kereskedelmi and Hitel Bank 
(K&H) 
1997  Minority share sold 7/1997. Merged with 
ABN Amro 7/2001. 
7/2001 7.7 (1999) 
Hungary Postabank   Private domestic. Nationalized 1998.  4.7 (1999) 
Hungary Budapest Bank (BB) 1995  Privatized 12/1995. 12/1995 4.1 (1999) 
Hungary Central-European International 
Bank (CIB) 
1998  Private domestic. 1998 8.0 (1999) 
Kazakhstan Industry and Construction Bank 1992  Privatized as Kredsoz Bank.   
Kazakhstan Agroprom Bank 1993  Completely privatized by 1996.   
Kazakhstan Turan-Alem Bank 1998     
Latvia Unibank 1995 IPO Government sold 66 % through IPO issued 
for privatization vouchers. Minimal 
government ownership after 1997 secondary 
offering of Global Depository Receipts. 
  
Latvia Savings Bank 1997  Control transferred to private sector, 
government retaining 30 % share, reduced to 
less than 1 % by 2003. 
  
Lithuania Savings Bank 2001 Tender Government shares sold to Hansabank in 
September 2001 
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Stopanska Banka 1999  Majority share sold to Greek National Bank, 
itself also a state-owned bank 12/1999. Value: 
US$ 57.6 million. 
  
Poland Bank Rozwoju Eksportu 1992 IPO  Government sold 47.5 % by IPO in July 1992 
to hold 52.5 %. 
10/2000 4.2 (1999) 
Poland Bank Slaski + ING-Barings (ING) 1993 IPO Government sold 40.9 % by IPO in October 
1993, 25.9 % by private placement in 
February 1994 to ING (Netherlands), to hold 
33.2 %. Later merged with Warsaw branch of 
ING to form ING Bank Slaski – 88 % owned 
by ING. 
7/1996 5.5 
Poland Wielkopolski Bank Kredytowy 
Spolka Akceyjna + Bank Zachodni 
(WBK + BZ) 
1993 IPO WBK privatized 3/1993. Government sold 
55.72 % by IPO, 25.6 % by secondary 
offering in June 1994, 17.2 % by secondary 
offering in January 1996 to hold 5.1 %. 






Poland Bank Inicjatyw Gospodarczch + 
Bank Gdanski (BIG+BG) 
1995 IPO BIG domestic private. 
BG: Government sold 62.7 % by IPO in 
December 1995 to hold 37.3 %. BIG, 
a domestic bank acquired controlling interest 
and merged the bank to form BIG- Bank 
Gdanski 9/1998. 
1/2001 6.3 (1999) 
Poland Bank Przemyslowo 1995 IPO Government sold 50.1 % by IPO in January 
1995 to hold 49.9 %. 37 % sold by tender to 
Bayerische Hypo-und Verinsbank in 1988, 
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Poland Bank Handlowy + Citibank 1997 IPO Government sold 95 % by IPO on June 30, 
1997 to hold 5 %. Citibank acquired in 2000 
88 % through the purchase of shares from 
original core investors (Yurich Insurance, 
Sparebanken Sverige and JP Morgan) as well 
as widely held sheres.  
2/2000 8.0 (1999) 
Poland Bank Kredytowy 1997 IPO Government sold 67 % to hold 33 %. Bank 
Austria acquired control in 2000, merging the 
bank with Bank Austria Creditanstalt Poland. 
  
Poland Bank Zachodni 1999 Tender Government negotiated sale of 80 % to Allied 
International Bank (Ireland). June 1999. 
Value: US$580million. 
  
Poland Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej 
(BGZ) 
  State owned  5.1 (1999) 
Poland Bank Polska Kasa opieki S.A. 
Group (Bank Pekao SA) 
1998 Tender-
IPO 
Privatized 6/1998. Government sold 52 % to 
foreign bank led consortium, 14 % to 
employees. Secondary offerings in 2000 
divested government holding to less than 5 % 
with UniCredito Italiano holding a controlling 
stake (53 %). Value: US$ 1,090 million. 
6/1999 17.5 (1999) 
Poland Powszechny Kaa Oszczednosci-
Bank Panstwowy (PKO BP) 
  State owned.  17.6 (1999) 
Poland  Kredyt Bank 1999  Private bank. 1999 4.3 (1999) 
Poland Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy + 
Powszechny Bank Kredytowy (BPH 
+ PBK) 
  BPH privatized 1/1995. 







Romania Banca Romana Pentru Dezvoltare—
Société Générale  
1998 Tender Government sold 41 % share  15.7 (03/2002) 
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Romania Banc Post 1999 Tender  Government sold 42 % share, 4/1999.  4.1 (03/2002) 
Romania Raiffeseen—Banca Agricola 2001 Tender Government sold 98 % to a consortium 
including Raiffeisen Zentralbank (Austria) 
7/2001 3.5 (03/2002) 
Romania Romania Commercial Bank 2004  Agreement to sell 25 % to EBRD and IFC in 
2003, interim step to full privatization. 
  
       
Slovakia Slovenská Sporiteľňa 2000 Tender Government sold 87 % to Erste Bank 
(Austria) 
  
Slovakia Všeobecná a Úverová banka 2001 Tender Government sold 94.5 % to Banca Intesa 
(Italy) 
  
Ukraine Bank Ukraina 1993−1994  Shares distributed, mainly to employees, 
government continued to influence 
management. 
  
Ukraine Prominvetbank 1993−1994  Shares distributed, mainly to employees, 
government continued to influence 
management. 
  
Ukraine Ukrsotsbank 1993−1994  Shares distributed, mainly to employees, 




*The PeKaO Group in Poland includes three of the original nine commercial banks hived off from the portfolio of the central bank. These are Pomorski Bank Kredytowy 
(PBKS) in Szczecin, Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (BDK) in Lublin, and Powszechny Bank Gospardarczy (PBG) In Lodz. 
 


















Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) de facto classification of exchange rate regimes: 
1) no separate legal tender 
2) pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement 
3) pre-announced horizontal band, bandwidth not exceeding +/–2% 
4) de facto peg 
5) pre-announced drawling peg 
6) pre-announced crawling band, bandwidth not exceeding +/–2% 
7) de facto crawling peg 
8) de facto crawling band, bandwidth not exceeding +/–2% 
9) pre-announced crawling band, bandwidth exceeding +/–2% 
10)  de facto crawling band, bandwidth not exceeding +/–5% 
11)  moving band, bandwidth not exceeding +/–2% 
12)  managed floating 
13)  freely floating 
14)  freely falling 
15)  hyper floating 
 
The IMF de jure classification (up to 1997)  
(1) single currency peg 
(2) SDR peg 
(3) other composite currency peg 
(4) flexibility vis-à-vis a single currency 
(5) flexibility vis-à-vis group of currencies 
(6) exchange rate adjusted according to indicators 
(7) other managed floating 
(8) independently floating 
 
The IMF de jure classification (since 1998)  
(1) no separate legal tender 
(2) currency board arrangement  
(3) other conventional fixed peg 
(4) horizontal band 
(5) crawling peg 
(6) crawling band 
(7) managed floating without pre-announced path for exchange rates 

















VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND DATA SOURCES 
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Fixed (+) 10-point  
scale 
Financial Development index has 3 dimensions, and is the 
simple average of three variables: 1) the reform of 
banking institutions and regulations, adapted to a scale of 
1–10, 2) the share of private banks in total bank assets, 
adapted to 0–10 scale, 3) the share of foreign banks in 
total bank assets. The index is not reported for Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The minimum value of the 
index is 0, meaning there is no change from the previous 
regime. The maximum value is 10, which corresponds to a
full liberalization and institutional transformation of the 
financial sector. Source: Fries (2005), Anita Taci’s data, 
EBRD Transition Reports, various issues. 
 
Alternative measures: 1) Credits issued by deposit money 
banks and other financial intermediaries to the private 
sector divided by GDP. Source: Thorsten Beck, Asli 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, (2000) updated through 
2005. 2) The ratio of commercial bank domestic assets 
divided by commercial bank plus central bank domestic 
assets. Source: Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Ross Levine, (2000) updated through 2005. 3) Directed 
credit (a binary variable): countries in which credits to 
borrowers mandated by the government constitute more 
than 25% of the total credit volume in the economy are 
assigned a value of one; all others are coded zero. Source: 






Ratio foreign liabilities to foreign assets held by banks as 
a proxy for the true currency mismatch since it only 
considers the liabilities held by banks with foreigners 
(i.e. non-residents) and the banks' claims on foreigners, 
irrespective of the currency of denomination. It excludes 
the foreign assets and liabilities held by banks with 
domestic residents. Source: Author’s calculation using 
IMF International Financial Statistics (following Domac 
and Martinez Peria 2000). 
 
Alternative measure: Ratio of (gross) foreign liabilities 
to money stocks as a measure of dollarization. Source: 










Scale Definition and Data Sources 
Central Bank 
Independence 
Fixed (+) 0−1 
continuous 
Central bank independence index/LVAW is 
weighted index of 16 characteristics of the 
Cukierman’s measures of legal central bank 
independence that pertain to the allocation of 
authority over monetary policy, procedures for 
resolution of conflicts between the government 
and central bank, the degree of relative focus on 
price stability, limitations on lending, and the 
procedures for the appointment and dismissal of 
the governor of the central bank. 0=minimum 
minimum level of independence; 1=maximum 
level of independence. Source: Popova (2000) 
and Bodea and Popova (2005). 




Fixed (+) ratio Exports + Imports measured as a share of GDP. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Economic Size Flexible 
(–) 
continuous Log of GDP in dollars over USA GDP. Source: 
World Development Indicators Series.  




Dummy variable for high inflation: 1 if inflation 
> 150 %; 0 otherwise. Source: Author’s 
calculations using World Bank Development 
Indicators; data from 1992 onwards are 
complemented by the 1999 EBRD Transition 
Report Update; the data for 1990 are from de 







Dummy variable: 1 for the years when the 
country accepted the obligations under Article 
VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement; 0 
otherwise. Source: Author’s construction using 
the IMF Annual Reports on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 
various issues. 







The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 
representing the highest and 7 the lowest level 
of democratic progress. I added the two scores 
for political rights and civil liberties to form a 
democracy index. Source: Author’s construction 
using Freedom House, Annual Survey of 













to Services  
Flexible   
(–) 
ratio Ratio of Industry +Agriculture to Services. Value of 
industry comprises the value added in mining, 
manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and 
gas. Services include value added in wholesale and 
retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), 
transport, as well as government, financial, 
professional, and personal services such as 
education, health care, and real estate services. 
Source: Author’s construction using World 
Development Indicators Series. 
European 
Union 
Fixed (+) 0–1  
dichotomous
Dummy variable for the preparation to EU 
accession, taking a value of 1 from the year the 
country signed the EU Association Agreement or the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (Croatia 
and Macedonia). Dates were given for when the 
agreements were signed. The agreements came into 
force at a later date. Source: Author’s construction 








Ambiguous 0–1  
dichotomous
Dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if Left party, 0 
if Right or Center party. Source: Author’s 
construction using Philip Keefer, World Bank 
Database of Political Institutions, July 2005. 
International 
Reserves 
Fixed (+) continuous Gross reserves (end-year), excluding gold in months 
of imports of goods and services. Source: EBRD 
Transition Reports, various issues. 
Latitude Fixed (+) continuous The absolute value of the latitude of the country, 
scaled to take values between 0 and 1. Source: La 





7-point scale A seven category scale, from 1 to 7, with a higher 
score indicating more constraints. Score of 1 
indicates unlimited authority: there are no regular 
limitations on the executive’s actions, score of 3 
indicates slight to moderate limitations, score of 5 
indicates substantial limitations, score of 7 executive 
parity or subordination: Accountability groups have 
effective authority equal to or greater than the 
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COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
Albania Fixed peg: 1990−1991. August 1992: Managed float as part of the IMF 
stabilization program. Major reference currencies: EUR (DEM up to January 
1, 1999) and USD. Monetary policy: informal inflation targeting through 
money growth targeting (since 1998). 
Armenia November 1993: exit from ruble zone. A national currency (dram) was 
introduced on November 22, 1993. December 1993: Independent float after a 
short period with a fixed peg to the USD.  
Azerbaijan Exit from ruble zone: July 1993. New currency (manat) was introduced on 
August 15,1992 and became the sole legal tender on January 1, 1994. March 
1995: the exchange rate was effectively unified, when the government 
abolished the Unified Foreign Exchange Fund and allowed the rate applied for 
surrender requirements to align with the market rate.  
July 9, 1999: the manat devalued by 7% against US dollar, after having 
remained only CIS currency immune to the Russian crisis; managed float 
introduced. 
Belarus Exit from ruble zone: November 1993. A temporary currency (Belarusian 
ruble) introduced on May 25, 1992, and became the sole legal tender on 18 
May 1994. A new national currency (ruble) introduced on August 20, 1994, 
and became the sole legal tender on October 21, 1994. Since 1996, the nominal 
exchange rate has been allowed to depreciate within a pre-established dollar 
band. The official rate has devalued by over 400% between September 1998 
and June 1999. Crawling band was adopted. 
Bulgaria Free float/managed float from February 1991. Currency board from July 1, 
1997. Exchange rate fixed at Lev 1,000 to DEM (EUR from 1999) (90 % 
devaluation over its previous rate). Monetary policy: nominal exchange anchor 
EUR (DEM) (since July 1997), money growth targeting. 
Croatia A new national currency (the Croatian dinar) introduced on December 23, 
1991, and exchange rate peg to DEM. October 1993: devaluation of currency. 
May 30, 1994: Croatian dinar replaced by the kuna. Tightly managed float, 
reference currency, EUR (up to January 1, 1999 DEM). Since October 1993, 
the exchange rate fluctuated in a corridor of ±8 percent around the euro, and 
since 2002, a de facto corridor narrowed down to ±4 percent. Monetary policy: 






COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
Czech 
Republic 
The initial choice of a “nominal anchor” foreign exchange rate regime was 
defined by the stabilization program jointly designed with the IMF in 1990, 
with the peg to USD/DEM combination being set after a cumulative 
devaluation of 95 %. January 1, 1991: currency basket peg regime, basket 
(45.52% DEM, 31.34% USD, 12.35% ATS, 4.24% GBP, 6.55% CHF. 2 
January 1992: change in basket composition: 36.15% Dem, 49.07% USD, 
8.07% ATS, 2.92% FRF, 3.79% CHF. February 1993: split of Czechoslovak 
currency—Czech koruna, no change in basket composition or band width. 3 
May 1993: a peg to a basket (65% DEM, 35% USD) in ± 0.5 band from 
December 1990 until February 1996. The band was broadened to ± 7.5 % on 
18 February 1996. The koruna was devalued on May 15, 1997. May 16, 1997: 
managed float with DEM and later EUR as reference currency was adopted 
(officially targeting domestic inflation rate). Monetary policy intermediate 
target evolved from the domestic credit volume target (1990) to a net 
domestic assets in the banking system target (1991/92) to a M2 (money and 
quasi money) “corridor.”  
Estonia Exit from ruble zone: June 1992. A national currency (Kroon, EKK) 
introduced on June 20, 1992. Currency board regime, established in June 
1992 EKK was pegged to the DEM at 8 EEK/1 DEM; from January 1999 to 
EUR at the market conversion rate: EEK 15.65/EUR. The main function of a 
currency board: the acquisition of hard currency in the interbank forex 
market. It also has some monetary policy tools: central bank bills issued since 
1993 in very small amounts, low reserve requirements and standing deposit 
facilities. No lender or last resorts instruments available. 
FYR 
Macedonia 
April 26, 1992: A new currency (denar) was introduced, initially issued in the 
form of coupons, not backed by either gold or foreign exchange reserves. 
Notes and coins introduced April 1993. April 1992−September 1995: Flexible 
exchange rate with monetary targeting. Since October 1995: Peg to DEM 
(since January 1999 EUR). June 1997: devaluation by 16.2 %. Monetary 
policy: Nominal exchange rate anchor EUR. 
Georgia 1991: Exchange rate unified. An interim and parallel currency, the Georgian 
coupon, was introduced in April 1993, and declared sole legal tender in 
August 1993. Due to very high inflation, domestic transactions were 
conducted in foreign currency or in the form of barter. October 1995: new 
currency (lari) introduced, and managed float adopted, later changed to 
conventional peg. December 1998: exchange rate regime modified from 








COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
Hungary Before 1989: Multiple exchange rates.March 21, 1989: peg against a 
basket according to currency composition of foreign trade. December 9, 
1991: adjustable currency basket peg against a basket 50% ECU, 50% 
USD. Several moderate devaluations and several changes in basket 
composition as well as width of the fluctuation band between 1991 and 
1995. July1, 1992: band with ±0.3%. August 2, 1993: pegging against a 
basket: USD 50%, DEM 50%. May 16, 1994: pegging against the basket 
USD 30%, ECU 70%. June 1, 1994: band with ± 0.5%. December 22, 
1994: band width ±2.25%. March 16, 1995: crawling peg introduced, 
with monthly devaluations. January 1, 1997: basket of USDF 30%, DEM 
70%. January 1, 1999: basket of USD 30% and EUR 70%. January 2000: 
crawling peg to EUR. May 4, 2001: simple peg with ±15% fluctuation 
band. June 4, 2003: one time 2.25% devaluation of central parity. 
Kazakhstan Exit from ruble zone in November 1993. Introduction of national 
currency (tenge) on November 15, 1993, and became the sole legal tender 
on November 18, 1993. As a part of April 1999 devaluation package, a 
50% currency surrender requirement was introduced. Managed float 
adopted. 
Kyrgyz Republic Exit from the ruble zone in May 1993. Exchange rate unified and new 
currency (som) introduced on May 10, 1992, and became the sole legal 
tender on May 15, 1993. July 1998: abolition of all remaining foreign 
exchange controls. Managed float adopted. 
Latvia Exit from ruble zone in August 1992. A temporary currency—Latvia 
ruble or “rublis”–introduced May 7, 1992, and became the sole legal 
tender July 20, 1992. 
A new national currency (lat) introduced on June 25, 1993, and became 
the sole legal tender on August 1, 1993. A currency peg linked to the 
IMF’s fiduciary account unit, the SDR with intervention bands (+/– 1%) 
introduced in October 1993.Currency board was established in 1994; with 
USD as the reserve currency.1997: SDR peg, fluctuation band +/–1%. 
1999: SDR peg, fluctuation band: +/–1%.  
Lithuania Exit from ruble zone on October 1992. The ruble was initially replaced by 
an interim coupon currency from May to October 1992. A new temporary 
currency (talonas) introduced on May 1, 1992, and became the sole legal 
tender on October 1, 1992. The talonas, initially in a float regime, lost 
over 50% of its value between its introduction and April 1993. A new 
national currency (litas) introduced on June 25, 1993, and became the 
sole legal tender on August 1, 1993. The government with the support of 
the IMF decided to press for the constitution of an Estonian-type currency 
board arrangement already in October 1993 against the advice of the 
central bank. The currency board was finally introduced in April 1994 
upon the unchanged administrative structure of the central bank. It is a 
modified currency board arrangement: reserve requirements and short 
term credit facilities, including for LLR operations preserved.  
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COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
Moldova September 1992: exchange rate unified. Exit from ruble zone: in 
November 1993. New currency (Moldovian coupons) established on July 
24, 1993. Became sole legal tender on July 25, 1993. November 1993: a 
new currency, leu, introduced. Managed float changed to independent float 
in 1998. 
Poland Before 1990: multiple exchange rates, adjustable peg to a basket of 
currencies.  
January 1, 1990: after devaluation of zloty by 42%, exchange rate fixed to 
USD, 1 USD=9500 Zloty; linked to the need to fight hyperinflation as a 
part of an exchange rate based stabilization program. May 16, 1991: 
devaluation by 17% and exchange rate fixed to a currency basket (45% 
USD, 35% DEM, 10% GBP, 5% FRF, 5% CHF).  
October 14, 1991: crawling peg to the currency basket; with occasional 
step devaluation was introduced. January 1, 1995: redenomination—1 new 
zloty equal to 10,000 old zlotys. March 6, 1995: band widened ±2%. May 
16, 1995: introduction of crawling band ±7%, crawling rate 1.2%. October 
28, 1998: crawling band was widened to ±12.5%. January 1, 1999: change 
in currency basket: EUR 55%, USD 45%. March 25, 1999: monthly rate of 
crawl reduced to 0.3%, and band widened to ±15%.  
June 7, 1999: National Bank of Poland is not obliged to perform 
transactions with commercial banks during fixing. April 12, 2000: floating 
exchange rate and inflation targeting were adopted. 
Romania Managed float since 1991. Reference baskets: USD; since 2002: 
EUR(60%), USD (40%), since 2004: EUR(75%), USD(25%). Loosely 
managed float (August 2005). Monetary policy: money growth targeting, 
inflation targeting since August 2005. 
Russia From July 1992, the ruble’s exchange rate came be announced as the 
single exchange rate reflecting market forces. Crawling band against the 
USD, replacing the previous “dirty float,” was introduced in July 1995 
designed to limit the ruble’s fluctuation. 
In December 1995, the government adopted a target range of 4,500–5,150 
rubles to USD. December 1996: the fluctuation range at 5,000–5,600 
rubles to USD was adopted. In the beginning of 1998, a policy to fix the 
ruble’s exchange rate at 6.2 rubles to 1 USD. In January 1998, a re-
domination of the currency: 1,000 old rubles has effectively become new 1 











COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
Slovenia Tolar was introduced in 1991. Managed float (DEM and then EUR 
reference currency), closely managed on a gradually depreciating path. 
The Bank of Slovenia targets a domestic money aggregate (M3: money, 
quasi-money and time deposits) and informally shadowing the DEM.  
Slovak 
Republic 
Initial choice of “nominal anchor” foreign exchange rate regime was 
defined by the stabilization program jointly designed with the IMF in 
1990, with the peg to USD/DEM combination set after cumulative 
devaluation of 95 %.  
January 1, 1991: currency basket peg regime, basket (45.52% DEM, 
31.34% USD, 12.35% ATS, 4.24% GBP, 6.55% CHF). January 2, 1992: 
change in basket composition: 36.15% Dem, 49.07% USD, 8.07% ATS, 
2.92% FRF, 3.79% CHF.  
February 8, 1993: Split of Czechoslovak currency—introduction of new 
currency—the Slovak koruna—basket: 36.16% DEM, 49.06% USD, 
8.07% ATS, 2.92% FRF, 3.79% CHF, band ± 1.5%. July 10, 1993: 
devaluation 10%. July 14, 1994: basket changed: 60% DEM, 40% USD. 
January 1, 1996: band ±3%. July 31, 1996: band ±5%.  
January 1, 1997: band ±7%. Confronted with a fall in foreign exchange 
reserves and fears of currency devaluation, the National Bank of Slovakia 
replaced the currency basket peg with managed float on October 2, 1998. 
January 1, 1999: reference currency EUR. 
Tajikistan December 1991: central bank law adopted. Exit from ruble zone in May 
1995. A national currency (Tajik ruble) introduced on May 10, 1995, and 
became the sole legal tender on May 15, 1995. May 1995: exchange rate 
unified. Independent float introduced.  
Turkmenistan Exit from ruble zone on November 1993. July 1993: foreign exchange 
reserves controlled by president. October 1993: central bank law adopted. 
A new currency—manat—introduced on 1 November 1993. April 1998: 
the commercial and official exchange rates were unified. Fixed peg 
adopted. 
Ukraine October 1991: central bank law adopted. Exit from ruble zone November 
1992. The introduction of temporary currency—coupon-karbovanets—on 
November 12, 1992, and became the sole legal tender on November 16, 
1992. The exchange rate of the coupon against the ruble not officially 
established, fluctuated de facto from 3 to 4 rubles per coupon. The 
exchange rate of the coupon against the USD was set at 10:1, whereas the 
black market rate was 100:1. August 1993: multiple exchange rates 
reintroduced: the National Bank of Ukraine official rate, the auction rate, 
the commercial rate of cash purchase-sale and the black market exchange 
rate. 
A new national currency—hryvnia—introduced on September 2, 1996. 
1998: As part of the anti-crisis measures, the currency band was widened 
to 2.4 to 3.5 hryvnia to the USD in September 1998, leading to a 





COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
Uzbekistan Exit from ruble zone on November 1993. A 
temporary currency—sum-coupon—
introduced on November 1, 1993. A new 
national currency—sum—introduced on 
November 15, 1993 and became the sole 
legal tender on 1 January 1994. The multiple 
exchange rates were institutionalized at the 
beginning of 1997 to support activities and 
investments in the government’s priority 
sectors. The black market exchange rates 
were almost twice as high as the formal rates 
in mid-1998. 2000: two administrative 
exchange rates unified. June 2000: access to 
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The peak in inflation was in 1994, when average inflation rate was 1354 
percent. In 2004, the average inflation rate was only 6.53 percent. As the table below 
shows, in terms of inflation performance, countries with pegged exchange rates—
official and actual—experienced lower inflation that those with floats in different 
transition periods as well as the overall transformation period. The only exception 
seems to be the 1996−1999 period, during which countries pegged experienced higher 
inflation, compared to those that adopted floats. This finding seems to support the 
argument that credibility associated with fixed regimes helps governments achieve 
lower inflation. The data also suggest that official intermediate regimes have served as 
effective tools in inflation reduction: the average inflation rate in countries with soft 
pegs was 26 percent (in contrast with 341 percent in countries with floats).651 
 
Inflation Performance (Mean) in EE 
 
































Differences in mean inflation rates are due to the missing data. The mean inflation for 
the missing observations for de facto classification represents in some periods twice 
as much as that for de jure classification. 
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Restrictions, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Eichengreen and Razo-
Garcia (1996), World Bank Development Indicators, and EBRD Transition Reports. 
 
In spite of the variety of approaches to exchange rate policy, most EE countries 
have made substantial progress in reducing inflation by 2004. However, a gap opened 
in the inflation performance across transition economies: while many countries 
                                                 
651 The calculations are based on the de IMF classification of exchange rate regimes. The following 
regimes were coded as intermediate: horizontal band, crawling peg, and crawling band. 
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reached inflation rates below 10 percent, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine have 
all converged on inflation rates above 10 percent (see figure below). These are 
countries in which governments delayed financial reforms and closed financial 
markets to foreign competition, and so were not able to commit to sustainable fixed 
regimes. 
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Pavel Mertlík, former Minister of Finance (1999−2001), Chief Economist in 
Raiffeisenbank, June 16, 2006, Prague. 
Petr Dufek, Director of Macroeconomic Research, Czechoslovak Commercial Bank, 
June 16, 2006, Prague.  
Jan Mládek, former Minister of Agriculture (2005−2006), First Deputy Minister of 
Finance (1999-2001), and Deputy Minister of the Federal Ministry of 
Economy (1991−1992), June 9, 2006, Prague. 
Pavel Štěpánek, Deputy Director of the Czech Banking Association, June 20, 2006, 
Prague. 
Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the CNB, June 15, 2006, Prague. 
POLAND 
Marek Dabrowski, former First Deputy Minister of Finance (1989−1990), Member of 
Parliament (1991−1993), and Member of the Monetary Policy Council of the 
NBP (1998−2004), July 3, 2006, Warsaw.  
Andrzej Bratkowski, former Advisor to Balcerowicz, Deputy President of the NBP, 
and Chief Economist of Bank Pekao SA, July 17, 2006, Warsaw. 
Michal Federowicz, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of 
Sciences, July 4, 2006, Warsaw. 
Dariusz Filar, Member of the Monetary Policy Council of the NBP, July 11, 2006, 
Warsaw. 
Stanislaw Gomulka, former Advisor to Balcerowicz and Reader in Economics at the 
London School of Economics, 13 July 2006, Warsaw. 
Boguslaw Grabowski, Member of the Monetary Policy Council of the NBP 
(1998−2004), July 17, 2006, Warsaw. 
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Wlodzimierz Grudzinski, President of the Bank for Socio-Economic Initiatives and 
Member of Management Board of the Association of Polish Banks, July 16, 
2006, Warsaw.  
Jerzy Hausner, former Minister of Labor (2001−2003), Minister of State Treasury 
(2004) and Minister of Economy (2003−2005), July 6, 2006, Warsaw. 
Stefan Kawalec, former General Director in the Ministry of Finance and Chief 
Advisor to Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz (1989−1991), Deputy Minister 
of Finance (1991−1994), July 16, 2006, Warsaw. 
Grzegorz Kolodko, former Minister of Finance (1994−1997 and 2002−2003), July 2 
and 5, 2006, Warsaw. 
Piotr Kozarzewski, Senior Expert, Center for Social and Economic Research, July 5, 
2006, Warsaw. 
Waldemar Kuczynski, former Chief Economic Advisor of Mazowiecki, Minister of 
Privatization and Chief Economic Advisor of Jerzy Buzek (1997−2001), July 
17, 2006, Warsaw.  
Andrzej Topinski, former Vice-Governor of the NBP (1989−1992), President of the 
Polish Bank Association, July 14, 2006, Warsaw. 
Zbigniew Polanski, Advisor to President of the NBP Leszek Balcerowicz and 
Professor of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, July 11, 2006, 
Warsaw. 
Jerzy Pruski, First Deputy Governor of the NBP, July 12, 2006, Warsaw.  
Krzysztof Rybinski, Deputy President of the NBP, July 5, 2006, Warsaw. 
Piotr Spzunar, Deputy Director, Macroeconomic and Structural Analyses Department 
of the NBP, July 3, 2006, Warsaw. 
Katarzyna Zajdel-Kurowska, Chief Economist and Head of Treasury Research, 
Citibank Handlowy, July 14, 2006, Warsaw. 
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SLOVAKIA 
Elena Kohútiková, Vicegovernor of the NBS (2000−2006), December 6, 2005, 
Bratislava.  
Karol Mrva, Member of the NBS Board, Executive Director Financial Market 
Operations, December 9, 2005, Bratislava. 
Ján Oravec, President of the National Union of Employers (representing enterprises 
with foreign capital in Slovakia), December 15, 2005, Bratislava. 
Juraj Paľa, Director of the Department of the European Union, Slovak Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, December 13, 2005, Bratislava. 
Juraj Renčko, former Advisor to the Minister of Finance of the Slovak Republic, and 
the Head of the Coordination Unit for Bank and Enterprise Restructuring and 
Privatization (1999−2002), December 2005, Bratislava. 
Peter Ševčovic, Member of the Bank Board of the NBS, Bratislava, December 2005. 
Ladislav Vaškovič, CEO of EXIMBANKA, former Chairman of the Board of VUB, 
December 12, 2005, Bratislava.  
Ján Vlčko, Associate Director of the Department of the European Union, Slovak 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, December 13, 2005, Bratislava. 
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